

No Demands

Exhibition reader compiled by niilas helander

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The society of enmity

Achille Mbembe

Perhaps it has always been this way.[1] Perhaps democracies have always constituted communities of kindred folk, societies of separation based on identity and on an exclusion of difference. It could be that they have always had slaves, a set of people who, for whatever reason, are regarded as foreigners, members of a surplus population, undesirables whom one hopes to be rid of, and who, as such, must be left 'completely or partially without rights'.[2] This is possible.

It's equally possible that nowhere on earth has a 'universal democracy of humanity' ever existed; that, with the earth divided into states, it is within such states that one seeks to realize democracy, that is, in the last instance, a politics of the state which, by clearly distinguishing between its own citizens – those who are seen to belong – and the rest, keeps at a firm distance all those who are not seen to belong.[3] At any rate, the contemporary era is undoubtedly characterized by forms of exclusion, hostility, hate movements, and, above all, by the struggle against an enemy. As a result, liberal democracies – already considerably ground down by the forces of capital, technology and militarism – are now being drawn into a colossal process of inversion.[4]

The disturbing object

The term 'movement' necessarily implies the setting into motion of a drive, which, even if impure, is composed of a fundamental energy. This energy is enlisted, whether consciously or not, in the pursuit of a desire, which is ideally a master-desire [*désir-maître*]. This master-desire – at once comprising a field of immanence and a force composed of multiplicities – is invariably directed towards one or several objects. 'Negro' [*Nègre*] and 'Jew' were once favoured names for such objects. Today, Negroes and Jews are known by other names: Islam, the Muslim, the Arab, the foreigner, the immigrant, the refugee, the intruder, to mention only a few.

Desire (master or otherwise) is also that movement through which the subject – enveloped on all sides by a specific phantasy [*fantasme*] (whether of omnipotence, ablation, destruction or persecution, it matters little) – seeks to turn back on itself in the hope of protecting itself from external danger, while other times it reaches outside of itself in order to face the windmills of the imagination that besiege it. Once uprooted from its structure, desire then sets out to capture the disturbing object. But since in reality this object has never existed – does not and will never exist – desire must continually invent it. An invented object, however, is still not a real object. It marks an empty yet bewitching space, a hallucinatory zone, at once enchanted and evil, an empty abode haunted by the object as if by a spell.

The desire for an enemy, the desire for apartheid, for separation and enclosure, the phantasy of extermination, today all haunt the space of this enchanted zone. In a number of cases, a wall is enough to express it.[5] There exist several kinds of wall, but they do not fulfil the same functions.[6] A separation wall is said to resolve a problem of excess numbers, a surplus of presence that some see as the primary reason for conditions of unbearable suffering. Restoring the experience of one's existence, in this sense, requires a rupture with the existence of those whose absence (or complete disappearance) is barely experienced as a loss at all – or so one would like to believe. It also involves recognizing that between them and us there can be nothing that is shared in common. The anxiety of annihilation is thus at the heart of contemporary projects of separation.

Everywhere, the building of concrete walls and fences and other 'security barriers' is in full swing. Alongside the walls, other security structures are appearing: checkpoints, enclosures, watchtowers, trenches, all manner of demarcations that in many cases have no other function than to intensify the zoning off of entire communities, without ever fully succeeding in keeping away those considered a threat. Such is the case in those Palestinian towns that are completely surrounded by areas under Israeli control.[7]

In fact, the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories can be seen to serve as a laboratory for a number of techniques of control, surveillance and separation, which today are being increasingly implemented in other places on the planet. These range from the regular sealing off of entire areas to limitations on the number of Palestinians who can enter Israel and the occupied territories, from the regular imposition of curfews within Palestinian enclaves and controls on movement to the objective imprisonment of entire towns.[8]

Permanent or temporary checkpoints, cement blocks and mounds of earth serving as roadblocks, the control of aerial and marine space, of the import and export of all sorts of products, regular military incursions, home demolitions, the desecration of cemeteries, whole olive groves uprooted, infrastructure turned to rubble and obliterated, high- and medium-altitude bombardments, targeted assassinations, urban counter-insurgency techniques, the profiling of minds and bodies, constant harassment, the ever smaller subdivision of land, cellular and molecular violence, the generalization of forms adopted from the model of a camp – every feasible means is put to work in order to impose a regime of separation whose functioning paradoxically depends on an intimate proximity with those who have been separated.[9]

In many respects such practices recall the reviled model of apartheid, with its Bantustans, vast reservoirs of cheap labour, its white zones, its multiple jurisdictions and wanton violence. However, the metaphor of apartheid does not fully account for the specific character of the Israeli separation project. In the first place, this is because this project rests on quite a unique metaphysical and existential basis. The apocalyptic and catastrophist elements that underwrite it are far more complex, and derive from a longer historical horizon than those elements that used to support South African Calvinism.[10]

Moreover, given its 'hi-tech' character, the effects of the Israeli project on the Palestinian body are much more formidable that the relatively primitive operations undertaken by the apartheid regime in South Africa between 1948 and the early 1980s. This is evidenced by its miniaturization of violence – its cellularization and molecularization – and its various techniques of material and symbolic erasure.[11] It is also evidenced in its procedures and techniques of demolition – of almost everything, whether of infrastructures, homes, roads or landscapes – and its fanatical policy of destruction aimed at transforming the life of Palestinians into a heap of ruins or a pile of garbage destined for cleansing.[12] In South Africa, the mounds of ruins never did reach such a scale.

If all forms of inclusion are necessarily disjunctive, separation can conversely only ever be partial. In South Africa wholesale separation would have undermined the very survival of the oppressor. Short of exterminating the entire native population from the outset, it was impossible for the white minority to undertake a systematic ethnic and racial cleansing on the model of other settler colonies. Mass expulsions and deportations were hardly an option. Once the entwining of different racial segments had become the rule, the dialectic of proximity, distance and control could never reach the paroxysmic levels seen in Palestine.

In the occupied territories, such proximity is attested by Israel's continued control over the management of the population register and its monopoly over the issuing of Palestinian identity cards. This is also the case with nearly all the other aspects of daily life, such as regular transfers, the authorization of various permits, and the control of taxation. Peculiar to this model of separation is not only that it can be tailored to the demands of occupation (or abandonment, if need be).[13] It can also, when required, transform itself into an instrument of strangulation. Occupation is in every respect a form of bare struggle, a kind of combat between bodies in a dark tunnel.

The desire for apartheid and the phantasy of extermination are not new phenomena, however. They have continued to metamorphose over the course of history, particularly within the old settler colonies. Chinese, Mongols, Africans and Arabs – in some cases long before Europeans – were responsible for the conquest of vast territories. They established complex long-distance trade networks across seas and oceans. But it was Europe, perhaps for the first time in modern history, which inaugurated a new epoch of global resettlement.[14] This resettlement of the world, which occurred between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, was double faceted: it was at once a process of social excretion (for the migrants who left Europe to found overseas colonies) and a historic tipping point, which, for the colonized, came at the cost of new forms of enslavement.

Over the course of this long period, the resettlement of the world often took the shape of innumerable atrocities and massacres, unprecedented instances of 'ethnic cleansing', expulsions, transfers, and concentrations of entire populations in camps, and indeed of genocides.[15] The colonial enterprise

was driven by a mixture of sadism and masochism, applied gropingly and in response to largely unexpected events. As such, it was inclined to smash all forces standing in the way of its drives or inhibit their course towards all sorts of perverse pleasures. The limits to what it might have considered 'normal' were constantly broken, and few desires were subject to straightforward repression, let alone embarrassment or disgust. The colonial world's capacity to make do with the destruction of its objects (natives included) was astonishing. If any object came to be lost, the thought was that it could easily be replaced with another.

Further still, the principle of separation lay at the root of the colonial project. Colonialism had to a large extent consisted in a constant effort to separate: on one side, my living body; on the other, all those 'body-things' surrounding it – with my human flesh as the fundamental locus through which all other exterior 'flesh-things' and 'flesh-meats' exist for me. On one side, therefore, is me – the basic nexus and source of orientation in the world – while, on the other, are the others with whom, however, I can never completely fuse – others with whom I may relate, yet never genuinely engage in relations of reciprocity or mutual implication.

In a colonial context, this constant effort to separate (and thus to differentiate) was partly a consequence of an anxiety of annihilation felt by the colonizers themselves. Numerically inferior but endowed with powerful means of destruction, the colonizers lived in perpetual fear of being surrounded on all sides by 'evil objects' threatening their very survival and existence: natives, wild beasts, reptiles, microbes, mosquitoes, illnesses, the climate, nature as such, even witches.

The apartheid system in South Africa and the destruction of Jews in Europe – the latter, though, in an extreme fashion and within a quite different setting – constituted two emblematic manifestations of this phantasy of separation. Apartheid in particular openly challenged the possibility of a single body comprehending more than one individual. It presupposed the existence of originary and distinct (already constituted) subjects, each made of a 'race-flesh' or 'race-blood' able to evolve according to its own rhythm. It was believed that assigning them to specific territorial spaces would be enough to neutralize the otherness of one with respect to the others. These originary, distinct, subjects were called upon to act as if their past had never been a past of 'prostitution', of paradoxical dependencies and all manner of intrigues. Such was the phantasy of purity underpinning their existence.[16] Historical apartheid's failure to secure, once and for all, impenetrable frontiers between different fleshes can therefore be understood as an *a posteriori* demonstration of the limits of the colonial project of separation. This is because, short of total extermination, the Other can never be external to us: it is within us, under the double figure of the alter ego and the altered ego [*l'autre Moi et du Moi autre*], each mortally exposed to the other and to itself.

The colonial project drew a great deal of its substance and surplus energy from its basis in all sorts of instinctual drives, more or less openly acknowledged desires, in the main located below the conscious I of the agents concerned. In order to exercise a durable project on the native people they had subjugated, and from whom they wanted to differentiate themselves at all costs, the colonists had to somehow constitute them into various kinds of *physical objects*. In this sense, the whole game of representations under colonialism consisted in turning the natives into a variety of typical or type-images.

These stereotypes largely corresponded to the debris of their real biographies, their primary status preceding their first encounter with the colonizers. By producing this imagined material, an entirely artificial secondary status of psychic objects came to be fixed onto their primary status as authentic human persons. For natives within their daily lives, the dilemma thus became how to distinguish between the psychic object they had been asked to interiorize – and often forced to accept as their true self – and the human part of themselves that they had once been and that was still theirs despite everything, but which, under colonial conditions, they were now being forced to forget.

Once created, these psychic patterns became constitutive of the colonial self. Their position of exteriority with respect to the colonial self was thus always, at the same time, one of ultimate dependence. The continued psychic functioning of the colonial order rested on investment in these objects. Affective, emotional and psychic life under colonialism orbited around such objects and patterns; without them it would have lost its substance and coherence. It depended for its vitality on permanent contact with them, and indeed showed itself to be particularly vulnerable to being separated from them. In colonial or para-colonial situations, the 'evil object' (the object that has survived from initial destruction) can never be thought of as completely exterior from the self.

Divided from the very start, it is always already at once subject and object. Since it depends on me at the same time as I depend on it, I cannot simply be rid of it through sheer persecution and obstinacy. In the end, I may choose to destroy everything I abhor, but this can never release me from my link to this other entity – even as I destroy it or separate myself from it. This is because *the evil object and I can never be entirely separated.* At the same time, however, *we can never be entirely one and the same*.

The enemy, that other that I am

The desire for an enemy, for apartheid, the phantasy of extermination, such irrepressible forces can be seen as shaping the basic line of fire, indeed the decisive struggle, at the beginning of this century. As the fundamental vectors of contemporary brainwashing, they push democratic regimes everywhere into a kind of vicious stupor, and, inebriated and reeking, to a life of drunks. As both diffuse psychic structures and generic passionate forces, they are responsible for the dominant affective tonality of our times and serve to sharpen many contemporary struggles and mobilizations. These struggles and mobilizations in turn feed on a threatening and anxiogenic vision of the world, privileging a logic of suspicion where everything must be seen as secret or as belonging to a plot or conspiracy.[17] Pushed to their ultimate consequences, they lead almost inexorably towards a wish for destruction, one according to which blood (spilt blood) makes law, in an explicit application of the ancient dictum of retaliation, the eye-for-an-eye or *lex talionis* of the Old Testament.

In this depressive period within the psychic life of nations, the need, or rather the drive, for an enemy is no longer purely a social need. It corresponds to a quasi-anal need for ontology. In the context of the mimetic rivalry exacerbated by the 'war on terror', having an enemy at one's disposal (preferably in a spectacular fashion) has become an obligatory stage in the constitution of the subject and its entry into the symbolic order of our times. Indeed, it seems as if the denial of the enemy were lived, within oneself, in the form of a deep narcissistic wound. To be deprived of an enemy – or to not experience a terrorist attack or any other bloody acts inflicted by those who hate us and our way of life – means being deprived of the kind of relation of hatred that would authorize the free exercise of many otherwise forbidden desires. It means, in other words, to be deprived of that demon without which almost nothing is allowed, even at a time when calls for absolute licence, unbridling, and generalized disinhibition appear to ring out with great urgency. It is equally to hinder that compulsion to scare oneself, one's capacity to demonize, and that kind of pleasure and satisfaction one feels when a presumed enemy is shot down by special forces or when he is captured alive and subjected to endless interrogations, rendered and tortured in one of the many so-called 'black sites' that stain the surface of our planet.[18]

This is an eminently political epoch, since 'the specific political distinction' from which 'the political' as such is defined – as Carl Schmitt argued, at least – is that 'between friend and enemy'.[19] If our world today is an effectuation of Schmitt's, then the concept of enemy is to be understood for its concrete and existential meaning, and not at all as a metaphor or an empty lifeless abstraction. The enemy Schmitt describes is neither a simple competitor, nor an adversary, nor a private rival whom one might hate or feel antipathy for. He is rather the object of a supreme antagonism. In both body and flesh, the enemy is that individual whose physical death is warranted by their existential denial of our own being.

However, to distinguish between friends and enemies is one thing; to identify the enemy with certainty is quite another. Indeed, as a ubiquitous yet obscure figure, today the enemy is even more dangerous by being everywhere: without face, name or place. If they have a face, it is only a *veiled face*, *the simulacrum of a face*. And if they have a name, this might only be a borrowed name, a false name whose primary function is dissimulation. Sometimes masked, other times in the open, such an enemy advances among us, around us, and even within us, ready to emerge in the middle of the day or in the heart of night, every time his apparition threatening the annihilation of our way of life, our very existence.

Yesterday, as today, the political as conceived by Schmitt owes its volcanic charge to the fact that it is closely connected to an existential will to power. As such, it necessarily and by definition opens up the extreme possibility of an infinite deployment of pure means without ends, as embodied in the execution of murder. Underwritten by the law of the sword, it is the 'meaningful antithesis whereby men could be required to sacrifice [their] life' (*to kill themselves for others*), and, under the aegis of the state, that in the name of which such men could be 'authorized to shed blood, and kill other human beings' (*to kill others*) on the basis of their actual or supposed belonging to an enemy camp.[20] From this standpoint, the political can be understood as a particular form of association or

grouping established with a view to a combat, which is at once decisive and profoundly opaque. But it is not merely the business of the state, and hence an exercise in delegated death, since it also concerns not only the possibility of sacrifice – or self-sacrifice, the giving of one's life – but also, and very literally, the possibility of suicide.

This is because, in the end, suicide serves to brutally interrupt all dynamic of subjection and any possibility of recognition. To willingly relinquish one's existence by giving death to oneself is not necessarily to make oneself disappear. Rather, it is to willingly abandon the risk of being touched by the Other and by the world – a gesture of disinvestment that forces the enemy to confront his own emptiness. The person who commits suicide no longer wishes to communicate, neither by word nor violent gesture, except perhaps at the moment when, by putting an end to his own life, he also puts an end to the life of his target. The killer kills himself while killing others or after having killed. Either way, he no longer seeks to participate in the world such as it is. He disposes of himself, and disposes of some of his enemies as he does so. He thus discharges himself of what he once was and of the responsibilities that as a living being were once his to attend.[21]

The person who commits suicide – killing his enemies in an act in which he also kills himself – shows the extent to which, as far as the political is concerned, the true contemporary fracture is the one opposing those who cling onto their bodies, who take their bodies as the basis of life itself, to those for whom the body can only open the way to a happy life when expunged. The martyr-to-be is engaged in a quest for a joyous life, one that he believes rests only in God, and that is born of a will to truth in turn converted to a will to purity. There can be no authentic relationship to God other than through conversion, that act through which one becomes other than oneself, and, in so doing, escapes from the facticity of life – that is, impure life. By committing to martyrdom, one takes a vow to destroy such impure corporeal life. Usually, nothing is left of the fundamentalist's body but debris, scattered among other objects: bloody traces that appear more vivid against other traces, prints, enigmatic fragments such as bullets, guns, phones, sometimes scratches or marks. Today, however, there is rarely a suicide attack without its technical devices, at the intersection between ballistics and electronics – chips to unsolder, memory chips to test. In the strict sense of the term, to bring an end to one's life, to *abolish oneself*, is thus to undertake the dissolution of that seemingly simple entity that is one's body.

The contemporary age can be seen to embody the fundamental character of the political as a hatred of the enemy, the need to neutralize him, and a generalized desire to avoid the sorts of dangers and contagion he is perceived to bring. Convinced they now face a permanent threat, contemporary societies have therefore come to experience their daily lives as a series of 'small traumas' – an attack here, a hostage there, first a shoot-out, then a permanent state of alert, and so on. New technologies have also deepened access to the private lives of individuals. Thus, secret, invasive and sometimes illegal techniques of mass surveillance are able to target people's most intimate thoughts, opinions and movements. Indeed, by heightening and reproducing the affect of fear, liberal democracies have also gone on to manufacture bogeymen designed to scare their citizens – today a young veiled woman, tomorrow a terrorist novice returning from the battlefields of the Middle East, lone wolves and sleeper cells hidden away in the crevices of society, observing us, looking for the right moment to strike.

What about the 'Muslim', the foreigner or the immigrant, those about whom one has continued, beyond all reasonable bounds, to weave images that, little by little, have begun to connect into vicious chains of association? That such images do not match reality matters little. Primary phantasies know neither doubt nor uncertainty. As Freud argued, the mass is only 'excited by immoderate stimuli. Anyone seeking to move it needs no logical calibration in his arguments, but must paint with the most powerful images, exaggerate, and say the same thing over and over again.'[22]

The current epoch is marked by the triumph of mass morality.[23] Contemporary psychic regimes have brought to a maximum level of exacerbation the exaltation of affectivity and, paradoxically, within an age of digital telecommunications, the desire for mythology, a thirst for mysteries. The increasing expansion of algorithmic reason – which, as everyone knows, serves as the crucial basis for the financialization of the economy – goes hand in hand with the emergence of new modes of mytho-religious thinking.[24] Fundamentalism is hence no longer considered as antithetical to rational knowledge. On the contrary, the one serves as support for the other, as the two are put in the service of a form of visceral experience culminating, among other things, in the notion of a 'communion of martyrs'.

Convictions and firm certainties acquired at the end of a long 'spiritual' path, punctuated by revolt and conversion, reveal neither feeble fanaticisms nor barbaric madness or ravings, but rather a type of 'inner experience' only shared by those who come to profess the same faith, obey the same law, the same authorities, and the same commandments. Essentially, they belong to the same community. This community is made up of communicants, the 'damned of the faith' who are condemned to testify, by word and act, and to the bitter end if necessary, to the 'to-the-bitter-end' character of divine truth itself.

Within the mytho-religious logic of our times, the divine (just like the market, capital or the political) is almost always perceived as an immanent and immediate force: vital, visceral and energetic. The paths of faith are believed to lead to states or acts considered scandalous from the standpoint of simple human reason, or to risks, apparently absurd ruptures and bloody stirrings – terror and catastrophe in the name of God. One of the effects of faith and fundamentalism is to arouse a sort of great enthusiasm, the kind of enthusiasm that opens the door to a *great decision*.

Indeed, there are many today who live purely in wait of such an event; and martyrdom is one of the means used by the damned of the faith to bring an end to this waiting. Today, such men of faith and enthusiasm seek to make history through a great decision, namely through the enactment of vertiginous acts of an immediate and sacrificial nature. By means of such acts, the damned of the faith come face to face, and with open eyes, with a dimension of excess and loss. Animated by a will to totality, they seek to become singular subjects by scoping the depths for disjunctive forces, daemons of the sacred. Embracing a form of voluntary loss – that which destroys language as much as the subject of discourse – they allow for the inscription of the divine into the flesh of a world become gift and grace. This is no longer a matter of mere mortification, but of annihilation: a crossing from the self to God. The ultimate aim of these sacrificial acts is to master neither life nor the outside world, but an interior dimension; to produce a new morality and, at the end of a decisive (and if need be bloody, and at any rate definitive) battle, to eventually experience an exulting, ecstatic and sovereign form of affirmation.

The damned of the faith

Mytho-religious thinking is not the exclusive preserve of terrorist groups. In their effort to curb terrorism and complete their transformation into security states, liberal democracies no longer hesitate to turn to grand mythological schemas. In fact, there are hardly any today that do not appeal to bellicose enthusiasm, often with the aim of patching back together their old nationalist fabrics. For every attack that results in casualties a kind of tailor-made mourning is automatically produced. The nation is summoned to shed its tears of rancour in public and show its defiance against the enemy. And with each tear, a shining path is traced. Clothed in the rags of international law, human rights, democracy, or, simply put, 'civilization', militarism no longer needs a disguise.[25] To relight the flame of hatred, old allies are suddenly transformed into 'enemies of humanity as a whole', while might becomes right.

Having only relatively recently counted on dividing humanity into masters and slaves, liberal democracies today still depend for their survival on defining a sphere of common belonging against a sphere of others; in other words, friends and 'allies' on the one hand, and enemies of civilization on the other. Indeed, without enemies they struggle to keep themselves going alone. Whether such enemies really exist matters little. It suffices to create them, find them, unmask them, and bring them out into the open.

Still, this endeavour became increasingly onerous when one began to believe that the fiercest and most intrepid enemies had lodged themselves in the deepest pores of the nation, forming a kind of cyst that would destroy the nation's most fertile promises from within.

The problem, in this sense, is how to separate the nation from that which gnaws at it without harming its very body (i.e. civil war). Searches, raids, various forms of control, house arrests, the recording of charges under emergency laws, increases in exceptional measures, extended powers for police and intelligence services, and, if required, loss of nationality: everything is put to work, and with ever-growing harshness, in order to pin down these evils – yet not onto their true authors, our attackers, but, as if by accident, onto those who merely resemble them. In doing this, what else is one doing but perpetuating the very thing one claims to oppose? By demanding the death of all those who are not unconditionally on our side, do we not risk forever reproducing all that is tragic of a humanity in the grip of hatred and unable to free itself?

Just as in the past, this war against existential enemies is once again framed in metaphysical terms. As a great challenge, it engages the whole of being, its whole truth. These enemies, with whom no agreement is either possible or desirable, thus appear in the form of caricatures, clichés and stereotypes, granting them a figural sort of presence. In turn, this presence only serves to confirm the type of (ontological) menace we perceive as confronting us. In an age marked by a re-enchantment of blood and soil as much as increasing abstraction, the enemy therefore emerges as a spectral figure and a figural presence, while the cultural and biological elements of enmity are combined to constitute a single dimension.

With their imaginations whipped up by hatred, liberal democracies do not hesitate to feed on all sorts of obsessions about the real identity of the enemy. But who is this enemy really? Is it a nation, a religion, a civilization, a culture or an idea?

State of insecurity

Hate movements, groups invested in an economy of hostility, enmity, various forms of struggle against an enemy – all these have contributed, at the turn of the twenty-first century, to a significant increase in the acceptable levels and types of violence that one can (or should) inflict on the weak, on enemies, intruders, or anyone considered as not being one of us. They have also contributed to a widespread instrumentalization of social relations, as well as to profound mutations within contemporary regimes of collective desire and affect. Further, they have served to foster the emergence and consolidation of a state-form often referred to as the surveillance or security state.

From this standpoint, the security state can be seen to feed on a *state of insecurity*, which it participates in fomenting and to which it claims to be the solution. If the security state is a structure, the state of insecurity is instead a kind of passion, or rather an affect, a condition, or a force of desire. In other words, the state of insecurity is the condition upon which the functioning of the security state relies in so far as the latter is ultimately a structure charged with the task of investing, organizing and diverting the constitutive drives of contemporary human life. As for the war, which is supposedly charged with conquering fear, it is neither local, national nor regional. Its extent is global and its privileged domain of action is everyday life itself. Moreover, since the security state presupposes that a 'cessation of hostilities' between ourselves and those who threaten our way of life is impossible – and that the existence of an enemy which endlessly transforms itself is irreducible – it is clear that this war must be permanent. Responding to threats – whether internal, or coming from the outside and then relayed into the domestic sphere – today requires that a set of extra-military operations as well as enormous psychic resources be mobilized. The security state – being explicitly animated by a mythology of freedom, in turn derived from a metaphysics of force – is, in short, less concerned with the allocation of jobs and salaries than with a deeper project of control over human life in general, whether it is a case of its subjects or of those designated as enemies.

This freeing of psychogenetic energy can be seen in an increasing attachment to what was once called illusion. In its classic conception, illusion is opposed to reality. Mistaking effects for causes, illusion empowers the dominance of images and the world of appearances, reflections and simulacra. It draws from a world of fiction that is opposed to a real world founded in the fundamental fabric of things and of life. The *demand of an originary surplus*, which has always been necessary for life, today has not only accelerated – it has become uncontrollable. This imaginary surplus is not perceived as the complement to an existence that would be more 'real' because supposedly consonant with Being and its essence. For many, it is instead experienced as the very motor of the real, the very condition of its plenitude and radiance. The production of this surplus, which was once administered by religions of salvation, is today increasingly delegated to capital and to all kinds of objects and technologies.

The domain of objects and machines, as much as capital itself, is increasingly presented in the guise of an animistic religion. In this context, everything

is put into question up to and including the status of truth. Certainties and convictions are held as genuine truths. There is no need to employ reason. It is enough to simply believe and surrender oneself to belief. As a result, public deliberation, which is one of the essential features of democracy, no longer consists in discussing and seeking collectively, under the eyes of all citizens, the truth and, ultimately, justice. The great opposition no longer being that between truth and falsity, the worst crime becomes doubt. This is because, in the concrete struggle opposing us to our enemies, doubt hinders the total freeing of voluntarist, emotional and vital energies necessary for the use of violence and, when required, the shedding of blood.

The reserves of credulity have similarly increased. Paradoxically, this increase has gone hand in hand with an exponential acceleration of technological development and industrial innovation, the continuing digitalization of facts and things, and the almost universal advance of what might be called *electronic life and its double*, or *robotically adjusted life*.[26] A new and unprecedented phase in the history of humanity has effectively begun, in which it will become increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish human organisms from electronic flows, the life of humans from that of processors. Such a phase is made possible by advances in algorithmic computation, leading to an accumulation of know-how through the storage of enormous data flows, processed at maximum power and speed. This digital-cognitive turn will culminate in a general incorporation of microchips within biological tissues. The coupling of human and machine, which is already under way, has led not only to the emergence of new mythological conceptions of the technical object. It has also, as an immediate consequence, put back into question the very status of the modern subject inherited from the humanist tradition.

The other decisive factor in this freeing process is a lifting of inhibitions – a return of the excluded part, of the structures embracing the repressed element – and a multiplication of enhanced pleasures resulting from this freeing of psychogenetic energies and drives. Such a process also results in an adjournment – if not a wholesale suspension – of the powers of moral reflection. What gratificatory pleasures might be possible today for those whose inhibitions are lifted and whose moral conscience is withdrawn? What might explain the contemporary attraction exerted on the multitude by the idea of absolute and irresponsible power? What of many people's seeming acceptance of the most extreme actions, their receptiveness to the simplest and most confused arguments? And what of the readiness with which many appear to fall into line, and with which world powers can be led towards all sorts of crimes simply by acknowledging the force of this idea?

In order to answer these questions one needs to say something about the fundamental mechanisms of affective life under present conditions.[27] The almost total interconnection between individuals made possible by new technologies has not only given rise to new strategies in the formation of masses. Today, constituting a mass is nearly the same as constituting a horde. In truth, this is no longer an era of masses. It is rather an era of virtual hordes. In so far as the mass survives, however, it is still only 'excited by immoderate stimuli'.[28] As Freud argues, the mass 'respects strength and is only moderately influenced by the good, which it sees simply as a kind of weakness. What it expects in its heroes is brawn, even a tendency to violence. It wants to be dominated and suppressed and to fear its master.'[29]

Almost everywhere, then, the traditional field of antagonisms has collapsed. Within national borders, new forms of association and social struggles have emerged. These are motivated less by class identity than by familial relations and thus by blood. The old friend and enemy distinction is now embodied in the conflict between kin and non-kin, namely between those linked through blood or origin and those considered to belong to a different blood, culture or religion. According to this vision, these are people who, having come from elsewhere, can never be considered our fellow citizens and with whom we can have almost nothing in common.

Though they live among us, they can never be one of us. They must therefore be expelled, put back in their place, or simply led back beyond our borders under the aegis of a new security state that has come to dominate our lives. Domestic pacification, what might be termed a molecular or 'silent civil war', mass incarcerations, the decoupling of nationality from citizenship, extrajudicial executions sanctioned by new legal and criminal powers – all these factors contribute to a blurring of the old distinction between internal and external security against a background of heightened racist affects.

Nanoracism and narcotherapy

At first sight, the case is clear. Our epoch seems to have finally discovered its truth. It only lacked the courage to declare it.[30] Having reconciled itself with

its true side, it can finally allow itself to proceed naked, free of all inhibition, without any of the old masks and obligatory disguises that had once served as its fig leaves. The great repression (which never really happened) is therefore followed by a great release. But at what price, for whom, and for how long?

With nothing left to hide, the start of this century stands as if gazing out onto a wide-open expanse: vast salt marshes extending without a shadow towards the horizon. The barrel has been scraped. All taboos have been broken. Any notion of the secret or the forbidden lies face down, dead on the ground. Everything becomes see-through and called to its final consummation. The vessels are almost full and twilight cannot be delayed. Whether this ending takes place in a shower of bullets or not, we shall find out soon enough.

In the meantime, the tide does not stop rising. Racism – whether in Europe, South Africa, Brazil, the United States, the Caribbean or the rest of the world – will remain with us for the foreseeable future.[31] It will continue to proliferate not only as a part of mass culture, but also (we would do well not to forget it) within polite society, not only in the old settler colonies, but also in other areas of the globe, long deserted by Jews and where neither Negroes [*Nègres*] nor Arabs have ever been seen.

In any case, one had better get used to it: in the past it was games, circuses, plots, conspiracies and gossip that provided the entertainment. As the continent of Europe begins to turn into a sort of boring iceberg (but also elsewhere), one will soon have to entertain oneself through nanoracism, that form of narcotherapy somewhat resembling a little woodland owlet: diminutive, cute, but sporting a powerful beak that is hooked and sharp at the point. These are the bromides of our times, soothing and numbing everything into a kind of flaccid paralysis. Once everything has lost its elasticity, it now appears as if to suddenly contract. Spasms and contractions – that is what we ought to be talking about. Anywhere one finds cramps, spasms, a general shrinking of the spirit – these are the places where nanoracism treads.

Yet, in the end, what is nanoracism if not that narcotic brand of prejudice based on skin colour and expressing itself in seemingly anodyne everyday gestures, often apropos of nothing, apparently unconscious remarks, a little banter, some allusion or insinuation, a slip of the tongue, a joke, an innuendo, but also, it must be added, consciously spiteful remarks, like a malicious intention, a deliberate dig or jab, a profound desire to stigmatize and, in particular, to inflict violence, to wound and humiliate, to degrade those not considered to be one of us?

Of course, even in an era of shameless nanoracism – where everything comes down to 'us versus them', whether expressed in upper or lower case it doesn't matter – no one wants to hear about it anymore. They should stay home, people say. Or if *they* really insist on living next to *us*, in *our* home, it should be with their pants down, rears out in the open. Nanoracism defines an era of demeaning lowest-common-denominator racism, a sort of pocket-knife racism, a spectacle of pigs wallowing in dirt.

Its function is to turn each of us into callous boors. It consists in placing the greatest number of those whom we regard as undesirable in intolerable conditions, to enclose and marginalize them daily, to continually inflict on them an endless series of racist jabs and wounds, to rob them of all their acquired rights, to smoke them out of their hives and dishonour them to the point where they have no choice but to self-deport. And, speaking of racist wounds, it should be remembered that these are cuts and bruises endured by a human subject and thus of a quite specific character: they are painful blows that are difficult to forget because inflicted on the body and its materiality, but also, above all, on intangible elements such as dignity and self-esteem. Indeed, their traces are mostly invisible and their scars difficult to heal.

Speaking also of cuts and bruises, it is now clear that on this iceberg continent of Europe – as well as in America, South Africa, Brazil, the Caribbean, and elsewhere – those who suffer daily racist injuries must today be counted in the hundreds of thousands. They constantly run the risk of letting themselves be touched in the most intense manner by someone – an institution, a voice, a public or private authority – asking them to justify who they are, why they are here, where they come from, where they are going, why they don't go back to where they came from; in other words, a voice or authority which deliberately seeks to cause them a large or small shock, to irritate them, to hurt them, injure them, to get them to lose their cool and self-composure as a pretext to violate them, to slander and debase without restraint that which is most private, most intimate, and vulnerable, in them.

With regard to this sort of constant abuse, it should be added that nanoracism is not the exclusive preserve of narrow-minded 'white people', that subaltern group of individuals tormented with resentment and

rancour, who hate their own condition profoundly but who would nonetheless never commit suicide, whose nightmare is to one day wake up in the garb of a Negro or with the brown skin of an Arab, not far away in some colony, but right here at home in their own country – the worst of all nightmares.

Nanoracism has become the obligatory complement to hydraulic racism – that of micro- and macro-juridical, bureaucratic and institutional apparatuses – the racism of the state machine, one which eagerly shuffles stowaways and illegals around, which continues to confine the rabble within urban peripheries like a mass of jumbled objects, which in fact multiplies the number of undocumented people, fencing off its territories and electrifying its borders, sometimes content with merely observing the shipwrecks at high seas; a state which controls every aspect of transportation, buses, airport terminals, underground trains, streets, *unveiling* Muslim women and handling them as it sees fit, multiplying detention centres and transit camps, investing lavishly in deportation techniques; a state, therefore, which practises discrimination and segregation under the full light of day while swearing to the neutrality and impartiality of the secular Republican order – 'indifferent to difference', as the saying goes – and still talking nonsense about that putrefying miasma of 'the rights of man and the citizen', so-called against all good sense, and despite the fact that for today's state they are hardly the hard-on fodder of yesteryear.

Nanoracism is racism turned culture, a kind of all-pervading breath in its banality and capacity to infiltrate into the very pores and veins of society at a time of generalized brainwashing, automated stupidity and mass stupor. The great visceral fear is that of the Saturnalia, the moment when today's *jinns*, which are very much like those of the past – in other words, Negroes, Arabs, Muslims, and, never far away, Jews too – like the scattered droppings of a Pan-god, take the place of their masters and transform the nation into an immense dump, Muhammad's dump.

Still, the distance that separates the phobia of the dump from the camp has always been very short. Refugee camps, camps for the displaced, migrant camps, camps for foreigners, waiting areas for people pending status, transit zones, administrative detention centres, identification or expulsion centres, border crossings, welcome centres for asylum-seekers, temporary welcome centres, refugee towns, migrant integration towns, ghettos, jungles, hostels, migrant homes, the list goes on, as observed in a recent study by Michel Agier. This endless list serves to capture not only an ever-present (though often largely invisible, not to say all-too-familiar and perhaps banal) reality. The camp has not only become a structural feature of our globalized condition. It has also ceased to scandalize. Or, rather, the camp is not just our present. It is our future, namely our solution for 'keeping away what disturbs, for containing or rejecting all excess, whether it is human, organic matter or industrial waste'.[32] In short, it is a form of government of the world.

Unable to face up to the basic fact that what once belonged to the exception is now the norm (the fact that liberal democracies, like any other regime, are capable of incorporating criminality into their system), we find ourselves plunged head-deep into an endless racket of words and gestures, symbols and language, delivered with increasing brutality like a long series of blows to the head. There are mimetological blows too: secularism and its mirror image, fundamentalism. All this, every blow, delivered with perfect cynicism. For, let's face it, all the surnames have lost their first names, as it were, and there are no more names to name the outrage, no more language to speak the unspeakable. Almost nothing stands up any longer, except in the form of a kind of viscous and rancid snot, draining from the nostrils without even a single sneeze. Everywhere, appeals to good sense, to common sense, appeals to the good old Republic – as we watch it bend over, bearing the weight and grinning while its spine cracks – appeals to our old friend the humanism of cowards, and appeals to a specific type of degenerate 'feminism' for which the term 'equality' translates as duty-to-make-the-veiled-muslim-girl-wear-a-thong-and-shave-the-bearded-man.[33]

Just as in the colonial era, the disparaging interpretation of how blacks and Muslim Arabs treat 'their women' draws on a combination of voyeurism and envy – the envy of the harem. The instrumentalization of questions of gender for racist ends, highlighting the Other's tendency towards modes of masculine domination, is almost always aimed at obscuring the existence of phallocracy at home. The overinvestment of virility as a symbolic and political ingredient belongs not only to the so-called 'new barbarians'. All forms of power, including our democracies, sit on a continuum in which such symbolic investments can be seen to correspond with a gain in speed and force. Power is always in some sense a mode of confrontation with the statue [*la statue*], while investment in femininity and maternity serve to orient sexual pleasure towards a politics of rapture, whether secular

or not. Yet, to be taken even remotely seriously, it is important at some point to show that one has balls. The fact is that as part of our hedonistic culture the father is still conferred the role of first planter, and it's the man who is supposed to sow the first seeds. In a culture haunted by the figure of the incestuous father, driven by a desire to have sex with his own virgin daughter or son, the notion of annexing the woman to one's body as a complement to man's defective statue has become utterly banal. One should therefore forget all these charred mythologies with no muscle, and move on without hesitation. But to what exactly?

Despite all the horrors of the slave trade, colonialism, fascism, Nazism, the Holocaust, and other massacres and genocides, Western nations especially, even with their bowels distended by a whole variety of gases, continue to mobilize racism in the service of all manner of wacky and murderous histories. These are histories that are as new as they are old: those of foreigners, hordes of migrants in whose face our doors must be shut, barbed wire that must be hastily erected lest we be swamped by a tide of savages, histories of borders that must be established as if they had ever gone away, histories of nationals including some from very old colonies still labelled with the epithet of immigrants, intruders that must be banished, enemies that must be eradicated, terrorists who are after us because of our way of life, who must be targeted from high altitude and from a distance by drones, histories of human shields transformed into the collateral damage of our bombardments, histories of blood, slaughter, soil, fatherland, traditions, identity, pseudo-civilizations besieged by barbarian hordes, histories of national security, and all kinds of euphemistic, coarse histories, frightful histories that turn everything as black as soot, endless histories that are continuously recycled in the hope of pulling the wool over the eyes of the most gullible.

In fact, having fomented misery and death far away – far from the gaze of their own citizens – Western nations now dread the return of the law of the sword, that brand of pious vengeance demanded under the old *lex talionis*. In order to protect themselves from these vengeful drives, they employ racism like a hooked blade, the poisoned supplement to a beggar's nationalism now reduced to its last rags, as the true centres of decision-making are denationalized, wealth is offshored, the majority become disenfranchised from real power, debt accumulates, and whole territories are zoned off while entire populations suddenly become superfluous.

But if racism has become so insidious, it is also because it has now become a part of the constitutive drives and economic subjectivity of our times. It has not only become a product to be consumed alongside other goods, objects and commodities. In this epoch of salaciousness, it is also the fundamental basis for the kind of 'society of the spectacle' described by Guy Debord. In many cases it has acquired an almost sumptuary status. It is something that one allows oneself not because it is unusual, but because it provides an answer to the general call to lust and abandon launched by neoliberalism. *Out* with the general strike. *In* with brutality and sex. In an epoch so dominated by a passion for profit, this mixture of lust, brutality and sexuality gives rise to a process in which racism comes to be incorporated into the 'society of the spectacle' and molecularized by the structures of contemporary consumption.

It is practised without one being conscious of it. This explains our amazement when the other draws our attention to it or when the other calls us out on it. It feeds our hunger for entertainment and allows us to escape the surrounding boredom and monotony. We pretend that it is just a matter of harmless acts that do not possess all the meanings some would like to assign to them. We take offence when the police of another country deprive us of our right to laugh, of the right to a humour that is never directed against ourselves (self-derision) or against the powerful (satire), but always against those weaker than ourselves – the right to laugh at the expense of those we wish to stigmatize. A kind of hilarious, utterly moronic, almost dishevelled form of nanoracism that takes pleasure in wallowing in ignorance and that claims a right to stupidity and to the violence it serves to sanction – herein lies the spirit of our times.

We should fear that the switchover has not already happened. That it is not too late. That the dream of a decent society has not been reduced to a mirage. We should fear a violent return to an era in which racism did not yet belong to only the 'shameful parts' of society, which one merely seeks to hide without eradicating. In such a scenario, a hearty and bold brand of racism would become a kind of habit, and the muted rebellion against society would become increasingly open and virulent, at least on the part of the recluse.

The question of belonging still remains unanswered. Who is from here and who is not? Those who should not be here: what are they doing in our home? How do we get rid of them? And, in any case,

what do 'here' and 'there' mean in a world that is both networked and re-balkanizing? If the desire for apartheid is really one of the characteristics of our times, then in reality Europe, for its part, will no longer be as it once was – that is, monochrome. In other words, there will no longer be (if it was ever the case) a unique centre of the world. From now on, the world will be conjugated in the plural. It will experience itself as plural and there is absolutely nothing one can do to reverse this new condition. It is irreversible, irrevocable. One of the consequences of this new condition is the reactivation in many places of the phantasy of annihilation.

This phantasy is present in every context where the social forces tend to conceive of the political as a struggle to the death against unconditional enemies. Such a struggle is then called existential. It is a struggle without the possibility of mutual recognition, and even less of reconciliation. It opposes distinct essences, each possessing a quasi-impenetrable substance, or a substance that can be possessed only by those who – under the law of blood and soil – are said to belong to the same kin. The political history as much as the history of philosophy and metaphysics of the West are in fact permeated by this problematic. As everyone knows, the Jews paid its price at the very heart of Europe. Before that, Negroes [*Nègres*] and indigenous peoples, especially in the New World, were first to embark on this bloody Way of Sorrows.

This conception of the political can be understood as the almost necessary completion of Western metaphysics' time-honoured obsession with the question of Being and its supposed truth, on the one hand, and the ontology of life, on the other. According to this myth, history is seen as the unfolding of the essence of Being. In Heideggerian terminology, 'Being' is opposed to 'beings'. Moreover, the West is the crucial site of Being's disclosure since it alone could have developed this capacity to disclose an experience of repeated inception, the reactivation of existential origins. Everything else is just beings. Only the West could have developed this capacity to disclose an experience of repeated inception since it is the crucial site of Being. That is what makes it universal. As a result, its meanings must be valid unconditionally, beyond all topographical specificity, namely in all places, all times, independently of all language, history, indeed any condition whatsoever. With respect to the history of Being and the politics of Being, however, one could argue that the West has never properly thought its own finitude. It has always posited its own horizon of action as something inevitable and absolute, and this horizon has always been intended as being by definition planetary and universal. Such a conception of the universal does not necessarily correspond to something that would be valid for all humans *as* humans. Neither is it synonymous with a broadening of my own horizons or a care for the conditions of my own finitude. The universal here is the name given to the truth of the victor, or, rather, to the violence of the victor, to his wars, which are always predatory conflicts. These predatory conflicts are also and above all onto-historical conflicts, since it is through them that a history of truth is staked out in its destinal unfolding.

Pushed to its logical conclusion, the phantasy of annihilation or destruction envisions not only the bombing of the planet, but also the disappearance of humans, their outright extinction. This is not an apocalypse as such, if only because the notion of the apocalypse presupposes the survival, somewhere, of a witness whose task it is to recount what they see. It is a form of annihilation conceived not as a catastrophe to be feared, but rather as a sort of act of purification by fire. However, it remains the case that this purification would be the same as an annihilation of present humanity. Such an act of annihilation is supposed to open the way to another beginning, the inception of another history without today's humanity. It is, in this sense, a phantasy of ablation.

In these anxiogenic times, the clues of a return to the question of ontological difference are all there. Under the auspices of the 'war on terror', and through aerial bombardments, extrajudicial executions (preferably with the help of drones), massacres, attacks and other forms of slaughter, which constitute the overall tone of this new era of warfare, the idea of the West as the only province of the world capable of understanding and instituting the universal can be seen to resurface. The division of humanity into native and foreign peoples is far advanced. If the fundamental demand was once that of finding the enemy and bringing him out in the open – as Schmitt and Heidegger believed – today it suffices to create him in order to stand up to him, to confront him with the prospect of total annihilation and destruction. For, indeed, these are enemies with whom no communication is either possible or desirable. No understanding is possible with those who lie beyond the confines of humanity.

Can one truly come to presence in the world, dwell in the world, or traverse it, on the basis of this impossibility of sharing it with others, this impassable distance? Is it enough to shoot down enemies

and expel foreigners to be truly rid of them, to doom them to eternity, to forget them for all time? This attitude demands that such acts of death and banishment succeed in erasing the face (its living substance) that gives the enemy his humanity. The task of disfigurement and erasure is almost a precondition for any execution under the contemporary logic of hatred. Within societies that continue to multiply structures of separation and discrimination, the relation of care towards the other has been replaced with a relation without desire. Explaining and understanding, knowledge and recognition, are no longer necessary requirements. Hospitality and hostility have never been so opposed, a factor that serves to explain the interest in returning to those intellectual figures for whom the misery of men and the suffering of enemies were never mere 'silent remainders of politics'.[34] Instead, they were always combined with a demand for recognition, notably in contexts where the experience of being unrecognized, humiliated, alienated and mistreated was the norm.

Translated by Giovanni Menegalle

Notes

This article first appeared as chapter 2 of Achille Mbembe, *Politiques de l'inimitié*, La Découverte, Paris, 2016.

1. As Freud argued in 1915, history 'is essentially a series of murders of peoples'. Sigmund Freud, 'Our Attitude Towards Death', in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Volume XIV (1914–1916): *On The History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers on Metapsychology, and Other Works*, trans. James Strachey et al., Vintage, London, 2001, pp. 289–300; p. 292. Lacan went further in the 1950s, remarking that 'our civilisation is itself sufficiently one of hatred'. Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953–1954*, trans. John Forrester, Norton, New York, 1991, p. 277.
2. Carl Schmitt, *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*, trans. Ellen Kennedy, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2000, p. 10.
3. Ibid., pp. 10–16.
4. Wendy Brown speaks of 'de-democratisation' in *Les Habits neufs de la politique mondiale*, Les Prairies Ordinaires,Paris, 2007. See also Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Truth of Democracy*, trans. Pascale Anne-Brault and Michael Naas, Fordham University Press, New York, 2010.
5. Wendy Brown, *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*, Zone Books, New York, 2014.
6. Eyal Weizman, 'Walking Through Walls: Soldiers as Architects in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict', *Radical Philosophy* 136, March–April 2006, pp. 8–22.
7. Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation*, Verso, London and New York, 2012.
8. Amira Hass, 'Israel Closure Policy: An Ineffective Strategy of Containment and Repression', *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, vol. 31, no. 3, 2002, pp. 5–20.
9. Cédric Parizot, 'Après le mur : Les représentations israéliennes de la séparation avec les Palestiniens', *Cultures & Conflits* 73, 2009, pp. 53–72.
10. Idith Zertal, *Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010; Jacqueline Rose, *The Question of Zion*, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 2007; Judith Butler, *Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2012.
11. See Saree Makdisi, 'The Architecture of Erasure', *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 36, no. 3, 2010, pp. 519–59. See also Mick Taussig, 'Two Weeks in Palestine: My First Visit', http://criticalinquiry.uchicago.edu.
12. See especially Ariella Azoulay, *Civil Imagination: A Political Ontology of Photography*, Verso, London and New York, 2015, pp. 125–73.
13. Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni and Sari Hanafi, eds, *The Power of Inclusive Exclusion: Anatomy of Israeli Rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories*, Zone Books, New York, 2009; Neve Gordon, *Israel's Occupation*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2008.
14. James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Angloworld*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009.
15. See especially A. Dirk Moses, ed., *Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History*, Berghahn, New York, 2008; Patrick Wolfe, 'Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native', *Journal of Genocide Research*, vol. 8, no. 4, 2006, pp. 387–409.
16. Cornelis W. De Kiewiet, *A History of South Africa: Social and Economic*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1957; Nigel Penn, *The Forgotten Frontier: Colonists and Khoisan on the Cape's Northern Frontier in the 18th Century*, Ohio University Press, Athens, 2006.
17. See Peter L. Geschiere, *Sorcellerie et politique en Afrique: La viande des autres*, Karthala, Paris, 1995.
18. See Mohamedou Ould Slahi, *Les Carnets de Guantanamo*, Michel Lafon, Paris, 2015.
19. Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007, p. 26.
20. Ibid., p. 35.
21. Talal Asad, *On Suicide Bombing*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2007.
22. Sigmund Freud, *Mass Psychology and Other Writings*, trans. J.A. Underwood, Penguin, London, 2004, p. 26.
23. Gustave Le Bon, *Psychologie des foules*, PUF, Paris, 2013 (1895).
24. See Jean Comaroff, 'The Politics of Conviction: Faith on the Neo-liberal Frontier', *Social Analysis*, vol. 53, no. 1, 2009, pp. 17–38.
25. Nicola Perugini and Neve Gordon, *The Human Right to Dominate*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015.
26. On these developments, see Éric Sadin, *L'Humanité augmentée: L'administration numérique du monde*, L'Échappée, Paris, 2013.
27. The following remarks are largely inspired by Frédéric Lordon's *Willing Slaves of Capital: Spinoza and Marx on Desire*, trans. Gabriel Ash, Verso, London and New York, 2014.
28. Freud, *Mass Psychology*, p. 26.
29. Ibid.
30. The following remarks reproduce in part my 'Nanoracisme et puissance du vide', in Nicolas Bancel, Pascal Blanchard and Ahmed Boubeker, eds, *Le Grand Repli*, La Découverte, Paris, 2015, pp. 5–11.
31. See David Theo Goldberg and Susan Giroux, *Sites of Race*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2014; and David Theo Goldberg, *Are We All Postracial Yet?*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2015.
32. Michel Agier, ed., *Un monde de camps*, La Découverte, Paris, 2014, p. 11.
33. Nacira Guénif-Souilamas and Éric Macé, *Les Féministes et le garçon arabe*, Éditions de L'Aube, Paris, 2004; Joan Wallach Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 2009.
34. Michel Foucault, 'Face aux gouvernements, les droits de l'homme', in *Dits et écrits*, vol. 4, Gallimard, Paris, 1994, p. 708.

Rethinking the Apocalypse:

An Indigenous Anti-Futurist Manifesto

...This is a transmission from a future that will not happen. From a people who do not exist...

Rethinking the Apocalypse: An Indigenous Anti-Futurist Manifesto

"The end is near. Or has it come and gone before?"
- An ancestor

Why can we imagine the ending of the world, yet not the ending of colonialism?

We live the future of a past that is not our own.
It is a history of utopian fantasies and apocalyptic idealization.
It is a pathogenic global social order of imagined futures, built upon genocide, enslavement, ecocide, and total ruination.

What conclusions are to be realized in a world constructed of bones and empty metaphors? A world of fetishized endings calculated amidst the collective fiction of virulent specters. From religious tomes to fictionalized scientific entertainment, each imagined timeline constructed so predictably; beginning, middle, and ultimately, The End.
Inevitably in this narrative there's a protagonist fighting an Enemy Other (a generic appropriation of African/Haitian spirituality, a "zombie"?), and spoiler alert: it's not you or me. So many are eagerly ready to be the lone survivors of the "zombie apocalypse." But these are interchangeable metaphors, this zombie/Other, this apocalypse.

These empty metaphors, this linearity, only exist within the language of nightmares, they are at once part of the apocalyptic imagination and impulse.
This way of "living," or "culture," is one of domination that consumes all for it's own benefit. It is an economic and political reordering to fit a reality resting on pillars of competition, ownership, and control in pursuit of profit and permanent exploitation. It professes "freedom" yet its foundation is set on lands stolen while its very structure is built by stolen lives.

It is this very "culture" that must always have an Enemy Other, to lay blame, to lay claim, to affront, enslave and murder.
A subhuman enemy that any and all forms of extreme violence are not only

permitted but expected to be put upon. If it doesn't have an immediate Other, it meticulously constructs one. This Other is not made from fear but its destruction is compelled by it. This Other is constituted from apocalyptic axioms and permanent misery. This Othering, this weitko disease, is perhaps best symptomatized in its simplest stratagem, in that of our silenced remakening:

> *They are dirty, They are unsuited for life, They are unable, They are incapable, They are disposable, They are non-believers, They are unworthy, They are made to benefit us, They hate our freedom, They are undocumented, They are queer, They are black, They are Indigenous, They are less than, They are against us, until finally, They are no more.*

In this constant mantra of violence reframed, it's either You or it's Them. It is the Other who is sacrificed for an immortal and cancerous continuity. It is the Other who is poisoned, who is bombed, who is left quietly beneath the rubble.
This way of unbeing, which has infected all aspects of our lives, which is responsible for the annihilation of entire species, the toxification of oceans, air and earth, the clear-cutting and burning of whole forests, mass incarceration, the technological possibility of world ending warfare, and raising the temperatures on a global scale, this is the deadly politics of capitalism, it's pandemic.

An ending that has come before.

The physical, mental, emotional, and spiritual invasion of our lands, bodies, and minds to settle and to exploit, is colonialism. Ships sailed on poisoned winds and bloodied tides across oceans pushed with a shallow breath and impulse to bondage, millions upon millions of lives were quietly extinguished before they could name their enemy. 1492. 1918. 2020...

Biowarfare blankets, the slaughter of our relative the buffalo, the damming of lifegiving rivers, the scorching of untarnished earth, the forced marches, the treatied imprisonment, coercive education through abuse and violence.

The day to day post-war, post-genocide, trading post-colonial humiliation of our slow mass suicide on the altar of capitalism; work, income, pay rent, drink, fuck, breed, retire, die. It's on the roadside, it's on sale at Indian markets, serving drinks at the casino, restocking Bashas, it's nice Indians behind, you.

These are the gifts of infesting manifest destinies, this is that futured imaginary our captors would have us perpetuate and be a part. The merciless imposition of this dead world was driven by an idealized utopia as Charnel House, it was "for our own good" an act of “civilization.”
Killing the “Indian”; killing our past and with it our future. “Saving the man”; imposing another past and with it another future.

These are the apocalyptic ideals of abusers, racists and hetero-patriarchs. The doctrinal blind faith of those who can only see life through a prism, a fractured kaleidoscope of an endless and total war.

Its an apocalyptic that colonizes our imaginations and destroys our past and future simultaneously. It is a struggle to dominate human meaning and all existence.
This is the futurism of the colonizer, the capitalist. It is at once every future ever stolen by the plunderer, the warmonger and the rapist.

This has always been about existence and non-existence. It is apocalypse, actualized. And with the only certainty being a deathly end, colonialism is a plague.

Our ancestors understood that this way of being could not be reasoned or negotiated with. That it could not be mitigated or redeemed. They understood that the apocalyptic only exists in absolutes.

Our ancestors dreamt against the end of the world.

Many worlds have gone before this one. Our traditional histories are tightly woven with the fabric of the birthing and ending of worlds. Through these cataclysms we have gained many lessons that have shaped who we are and how we are to be with one another. Our ways of being are informed through finding harmony through and from the destruction of worlds. The Elliptic. Birth. Death. Rebirth.

We have an unknowing of histories upon histories of the world that is part of us. It is the language of the cosmos, it speaks in prophecies long carved in the scars where our ancestors dreamed. It is the ghostdance, the seven fires, the birth of the White Buffalo, the seventh generation, it is the five suns, it is written in stone near Oraibi, and beyond. These prophecies are

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
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not just predictive, they have also been diagnostic and instructive.

We are the dreamers dreamt by our ancestors. We have traversed all time between the breaths of our dreams. We exist at once with our ancestors and unbirthed generations. Our future is held in our hands. It is our mutuality and interdependence. It is our relative. It is in the creases of our memories, folded gently by our ancestors. It is our collective Dreamtime, and it is Now. Then. Tomorrow. Yesterday.

The anti-colonial imagination isn't a subjective reaction to colonial futurisms, it is anti-settler future. Our life cycles are not linear, our future exists without time. It is a dream, uncolonized.

This is the Indigenous anti-future.

We are not concerned with how our enemies name their dead world or how they recognize or acknowledge us or these lands. We are not concerned with re-working their ways of managing control or honoring their dead agreements or treaties. They will not be compelled to end the destruction that their world is predicated upon. We do not plead to with them to end global warming, as it is the conclusion of their apocalyptic imperative and their life is built upon the death of Mother Earth.
We bury the right wing and the left wing together in the earth they are so hungry to consume. The conclusion of the ideological war of colonial politics is that Indigenous Peoples always lose, unless we lose ourselves.

Capitalists and colonizers will not lead us out of their dead futures.

Apocalyptic idealization is a self fulfilling prophecy. It is the linear world ending from within. Apocalyptic logic exists within a spiritual, mental, and emotional dead zone that also cannibalizes itself. It is the dead risen to consume the all life.

Our world lives when their world ceases to exist.

As Indigenous anti-futurists, we are the consequence of the history of the colonizer's future. We are the consequence of their war against Mother Earth. We will not allow the specter of the colonizer, the ghosts of the past to haunt the ruins of this world. We are the actualization of our prophecies. This is the re-emergence of the world of cycles.

This is our ceremony.

Between silent skies. The world breathes again and the fever subsides.
The land is quiet. Waiting for us to listen.

When there are less distractions, we go to the place where our ancestors emerged.

And their/our voice.

There is a song older than worlds here, it heals deeper then the colonizer's blade could ever cut.

And there, our voice. We were always healers. This is the first medicine.

Colonialism is a plague, capitalism is pandemic.

These systems are anti-life, they will not be compelled to cure themselves.
We will not allow these corrupted sickened systems to recuperate.
We will spread.

We are the antibodies.

+ + + +
Addendum:
In our past/your future it was the unsystematic non-linear attacks on vulnerable critical infrastructure such as gas utilities, transportation corridors, power supplies, communications systems, and more, that made settler colonialism an impossibility on these lands.
- Our organizing was cellular, it required no formal movements.
- Ceremony was/is our liberation, our liberation was/is ceremony.
- We honored our sacred teachings, our ancestors and coming generations.
- We took credit for nothing. We issued no communiqués. Our actions were our propaganda.
- We celebrated the death of leftist solidarity and it's myopic apocalyptic romanticism.
- We demanded nothing from capitalists/colonizers.

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"we are the consequence of the history of the colonizer's future."

feral feminisms
FERAL THEORY
issue 6 · fall 2016

A Poltergeist Manifesto

Billy-Ray Belcourt

This paper attempts to build an ironic political myth faithful to decolonization that takes queerness as its referent and dreams up worlds that can bear all of us. It speculates about decolonization as a kind of feral-becoming, pointing to futures that give way to life-forms that do not need the human to find their conditions of possibility in the world. The central figure of this myth, this prehistory, is the figure of the poltergeist—the analytic and ontological space of queer indigeneity and the feral monster in the horror story of decolonization.

Introduction: Savage Pasts

> I wasn't created
> to be a lonesome turtle
> crawling around by myself
> (though none of these turtles
> are worth beach-combing)
> - Gregory Scofield, "I Used To Be Sacred (On Turtle Island)" (1996, 63)

This paper attempts to build "an ironic political myth" (Haraway 1991, 149) faithful to decolonization by dreaming up worlds that can bear all of us, worlds that slip-slide into others without disavowing their hybrid alterities. Decolonization is a politics of the future perfect, one that thinks in a vernacular of the what-will-have-happened. It is a teleology of the elsewhere, gestating an attachment to an otherwise that might hold out for more radical genres of living, ones that do not resort to violence to survive the present. Decolonization experiments with more capacious desires that do not dispose of or eliminate some bodies to throw the good life into sharp relief. It conjures an ethos that stalls the governmental work of extracting indigeneity from the political. In the melodrama of decolonization, indigeneity reminds us that this world is both too much and not enough. The world is not for us, but we need it to get to a future that is not constituted through uneven forms of collective suffering (Muñoz 2009, 1). This paper speculates about decolonization as a kind of feral-becoming and it turns to a wild and unruly form of politics that might give way to life-forms trying to make a break for it. In a word: we might have to become feral in order to become something else. At the centre of this myth, this prehistory, is the figure of the poltergeist: a queer and wayward crawler searching for other turtles that might be worth beach-combing (see Haraway 1991, 149; Scofield 1996, 63).

Admittedly, the feral is a precarious space from which to theorize, sullied with an injurability bound up in the work of liberal humanism as such, an enterprise that weaponizes a set of moral barometers to distribute ferality unevenly to differently citizened and raced bodies—ones that are too close for comfort and must be pushed outside arm's reach. Perhaps ferality traverses a semantic line of flight commensurate with that of savagery, barbarism, and lawlessness, concreting into one history of elimination: that is, a history of eliminating recalcitrant indigeneities incompatible within a supposedly hygienic social. The word savage

comes from the Latin salvaticus, an alteration of silvaticus, meaning "wild," literally "of the woods." Of persons, it means "reckless, ungovernable" ("Savage"). In the space-time of settler states, savagery temporarily stands in for those subjectivities tethered to a supposedly waning form of indigeneity, one that came from the woods and, because of this, had to be jettisoned from or assimilated into the national body. Here is Audra Simpson on the history of Indian "lawlessness":

> Its genealogy extends back to the earliest moments of recorded encounter, when Indians appeared to have no law, to be without order, and thus, to be in the colonizer's most generous articulation of differentiation, in need of the trappings of civilization. "Law" may be one instrument of civilization, as a regulating technique of power that develops through the work upon a political body and a territory. (2014, 144)

According to Simpson, the recognition of Indigenous peoples as lawless rendered them governable, motivating the settler state (here, Canada) to curate and thus contain atrophied indigeneities—and, consequently, their sovereignties, lands, and politics—within the borders of federal law (2014, 144-45). Similarly, in *The Transit of Empire* Jodi Byrd traces the epistemological gimmicks through which the concept of "Indianness" came to align with "the savage other" (2011, 27). For her, this alignment provided the "rationale for imperial domination" and continues to stalk philosophy's patterns of thinking (ibid.). Simpson, writing about the Mohawks of Kahnawake, argues that "a fear of lawlessness" continues to haunt the colonial imaginary, thereby diminishing "Indigenous rights to trade and to act as sovereigns in their own territories" (2014, 145). We might take the following lyrics from the popular Disney film *Pocahontas* as an example of the ways indigeneity circulates as a feral signifier in colonial economies of meaning-making:

> [Ratcliffe] What can you expect
> From filthy little heathens?
> Their whole disgusting race is like a curse
> Their skin's a hellish red
> They're only good when dead
> They're vermin, as I said
> And worse
> [English settlers] They're savages! Savages!
> Barely even human. (Gabriel and Goldberg 1995)

Savagery connotes a state of non-ontology: Indigenous peoples are forced to cling to a barely extant humanity and coterminously collapse into a putatively wretched form of animality. Savagery is lethal, and its Indian becomes the prehistoric alibi through which the human is constituted as such. Indigenous peoples have therefore labored to explain away this savagery, reifying whitened rubrics for proper citizenship and crafting a genre of life tangible within the scenes of living through that are constitutive of settler colonialism as such. These scenes, however, are dead set on destroying the remnants of that savagery, converting their casualties into morally compatible subjects deserving of rights and life in a multicultural state that stokes the liberal fantasy of life after racial trauma at the expense of decolonial flourishing itself.

This paper is therefore interested in the subjectivities and forms of sociality that savagery destroys when applied from without, and the political work of appropriating that savagery in the name of decolonization. Ours is a form of indigeneity that hints at a fundamental pollutability that both confirms and threatens forms of ontology tethered to a

taxonomized humanity built in that foundational episode of subjection of which Simpson speaks. I am suggesting that savagery always-already references an otherworld of sorts: there are forms of life abandoned outside modernity's episteme whose expressivities surge with affects anomalous within the topography of settler colonialism. This paper is not a historicist or nostalgic attachment to a pre-savage indigeneity resurrected from a past somehow unscathed by the violence that left us in the thick of things in the first place. Instead, I emphasize the potentiality of ferality as a politics in a world bent on our destruction—a world that eliminates indigeneities too radical to collapse into a collective sensorium, training us to a live in an ordinary that the settler state needs to persist as such, one that only some will survive. This world incentivizes our collusion with a multicultural state instantiated through a myth of belonging that actively disavows difference in the name of that very difference. We are repeatedly hurried into a kind of waning sociality, the content and form of which appear both too familiar and not familiar enough. In short, we are habitually left scavenging for ways to go on without knowing what it is we want.

Let's consider Jack Halberstam's thoughts on "the wild":

> It is a tricky word to use but it is a concept that we cannot live without if we are to combat the conventional modes of rule that have synced social norms to economic practices and have created a world order where every form of disturbance is quickly folded back into quiet, where every ripple is quickly smoothed over, where every instance of eruption has been tamped down and turned into new evidence of the rightness of the status quo. (2013, 126)

Where Halberstam finds disturbance, I find indigeneity-cum-disturbance *par excellence*. Halberstam's "wild" evokes a potentiality laboured in the here and now and "an alternative to how we want to think about being" in and outside an authoritarian state (2013, 126-27). Perhaps the wild risks the decolonial, a geography of life-building that dreams up tomorrows whose referents are the fractured indigeneities struggling to survive a historical present built on our suffering. Ferality is a stepping stone to a future grounded in Indigenous peoples' legal and political orders. This paper does not traffic in teleologies of the anarchic or lawless as they emerge in Western thought; instead, it refuses settler sovereignty and calls for forms of collective Indigenous life that are attuned to queerness's wretched histories and future-making potentialities.

Indigeneity is an ante-ontology of sorts: it is prior to and therefore disruptive of ontology. Indigeneity makes manifest residues or pockets of times, worlds, and subjectivities that warp both common sense and philosophy into falsities that fall short of completely explaining what is going on. Indigenous life is truncated in the biopolitical category of Savage in order to make our attachments to ourselves assimilable inside settler colonialism's national sensorium. Settler colonialism purges excessive forms of indigeneity that trouble its rubrics for sensing out the human and the nonhuman. In other words, settler colonialism works up modes of being-in-the-world that narrate themselves as the only options we have. What would it mean, then, to persist in the space of savagery, exhausting the present and holding out for futures that are not obsessed with the proper boundary between human and nonhuman life? This paper now turns to the present, asking: what happens when indigeneity collides with queerness inside the reserve, and how might a feral theory make sense of that collision?

Deadly Presents

"I went through a really hard time… I was beaten; more than once. I was choked" (Klassen 2014). These were the words of Tyler-Alan Jacobs, a two-spirit man from the Squamish Nation, capturing at once the terror of queer life on the reserve and the hardening of time into a thing that slows down bodies and pushes them outside its securitized geographies. Jacobs had grown up with his attackers, attackers who were energized by the pronouncement of queerness—how it insisted on being noticed, how it insisted on being. When the dust settled, "his right eye [had] dislodged and the side of his faced [had] caved in" (ibid.). Settler colonialism is fundamentally affective: it takes hold of the body, makes it perspire, and wears it out. It converts flesh into pliable automations and people into grim reapers who must choose which lives are worth keeping in the world. It can turn a person into a murderer in a matter of seconds; it is an epistemic rupturing of our attachments to life, to each other, and to ourselves. It is as if settler colonialism were simultaneously a rescue and military operation, a holy war of sorts tasked with exorcising the spectre of queer indigeneity and its putative infectivity.

I rehearse this case because it allows me to risk qualifying the reserve as a geography saturated with heteronormativity's socialities. This is a strategic interdiction that destroys supposedly degenerative queer affect worlds, untangling some bodies and not others from the future. I don't have the statistics to substantiate these claims, but there is an archive of heartbreak and loss that is easy to come by if you ask the right people. Indeed, what would such statistics tell us that we don't already know? What would the biopolitical work of data collection do to a knowledge-making project that thinks outside the big worlds of Statistics and Demography and, instead, inside the smaller, more precarious worlds created in the wake of gossip? I worry about ethnographic projects that seek to account for things and theory in the material in order to map the coordinates of an aberration to anchor it and its voyeurs in the theatres of the academy. The desire to attach to a body is too easily energized by a biological reading of gender that repudiates the very subjects it seeks so desperately to know and to study. What about the body? I have been asked this question, again and again. A feral theory is something of a call to arms: abolish this sort of ethnography and turn to those emergent methodologies that might better make sense of the affects and life-forms that are just now coming into focus and have been destroyed or made invisible in the name of research itself.

Queer indigeneity, to borrow Fred Moten's description of blackness, might "come most clearly into relief, by way of its negation" (2014). Perhaps decolonization needs to be a sort of séance: an attempt to communicate with the dead, a collective rising-up from the reserve's necropolis, a feral becoming-undead. Boyd and Thrush's *Phantom Past, Indigenous Presence* thinks indigeneity and its shaky histories vis-à-vis the language of haunting, where haunting is an endurant facet of "the experience of colonialism" (Bodinger de Uriarte 2012, 303). But, for me, ghostliness is differentially distributed: some more than others will be wrenched into the domain of the dead and forced to will their own ontologies into the now. Perhaps the universalist notion that haunting is a metonym for indigeneity repudiates the very life-forms that it claims to include: those who are differently queered and gendered, and, because of this, haunt waywardly and in ways that cannot be easily predicted (Ahmed 2015). This paper thus takes an imaginative turn and proceeds with something of an incantation to summon the figure of the queer Indigenous poltergeist—the feral monster in the horror story of decolonization. Queer Indigenous poltergeists do not linger inaudibly in the background; we are beside ourselves with anger, we make loud noises and throw objects around because we are demanding retribution for homicide, unloved love, and cold shoulders. We do not reconcile; we

escape the reserve, pillage and mangle the settler-colonial episteme. Our arrival is both uneventful and apocalyptic, a point of departure and an entry point for an ontology that corresponds with a future that has yet to come. Sometimes all we have is the promise of the future. For the queer Indigenous poltergeist, resurrection is its own form of decolonial love.

The poltergeist is an ontological anomaly: a fusion of human, object, and ghost, a "creature of social reality" and a "creature of fiction" (Haraway 1991, 149). From the German *poltern* meaning "[to] make noise, [to] rattle" and *Geist* or "ghost," it literally means "noisy ghost," speaking into existence an anti-subjectivity that emerges in the aftermath of death or murder ("Poltergeist"). It is the subject of Tobe Hooper's 1982 film *Poltergeist*, which tells a story of "a haunting based on revenge" (Tuck and Ree 2013, 652). The film's haunting is a wronging premised on an initial wrong: the eponymous poltergeist materializes when a mansion is constructed on a cemetery—a disturbing of spirits, if you will. José Esteban Muñoz argues that "The double ontology of ghosts and ghostliness, the manner in which ghosts exist inside and out and traverse categorical distinctions, seems especially useful for... queer criticism" (2009, 46). In this paper, the poltergeist names the form which indigeneity takes when it brings queer matter into its folds. In other words, this essay evokes haunting as a metaphor to hint at the ways in which queerness was murderously absorbed into the past and prematurely expected to stay there as an effect of colonialism's drive to eliminate all traces of sexualities and genders that wandered astray. The poltergeist conceptualizes the work of queer indigeneity in the present insofar as it does not presuppose the mysterious intentions of the ghost—an otherworldly force that is bad, good, and undetectable all at once. Instead, the poltergeist is melancholic in its grief, but also pissed off. It refuses to remain in the spiritual, a space cheapened in relation to the staunch materiality of the real, and one that, though housing our conditions of possibility, cannot contain all of us. We protest forms of cruel nostalgia that tether ghosts to a discarded past within which queer Indigenous life once flourished because we know that we will never get it back and that most of us likely never experienced it in the first place. We long for that kind of love, but we know it is hard to come by. I turn to the poltergeist because I don't have anywhere else to go. Help me, I could say. But I won't.

Queer indigeneity, then, is neither here nor there, neither dead nor alive but, to use Judith Butler's language, interminably spectral (2006, 33). We are ghosts that haunt the reserve in the event of resurrection. According to Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, a reserve is a "tract of land, the legal title to which is held by the Crown, set apart for the use and benefit of an Indian band" ("Terminology"). The "reserve system" is part of the dispossessory ethos through which the settler state reifies land as the sign of sovereignty itself, and thus effects the political death of indigeneity, decomposing it into nothingness, into contaminated dirt. Reserves are the products of imaginations gone wild; they are ruins that bear "the physical imprint of the supernatural" on arid land, on decaying trailers arranged like weathered tombstones (Tuck and Ree 2013, 653). They are borderlands that connote simultaneous possession and dispossession: they represent the collision between settler sovereignty (insofar as the Crown holds the legal title to the land) and indigeneity (pointing to a genre of life that is distinctly Indigenous). Reserves were—some might say they still are—zones of death that regulated and regulate the movements of Indigenous bodies, quarantining their putatively contaminated flesh outside modern life in order to preserve settler-colonial futurities. It is as if the reserve were a site of complete atrophy, where indigeneity is supposed to waste away or degenerate, where queerness has already bled out. Look at the blood on your hands!

The queer Indigenous poltergeist, however, foregrounds what I call a "reserve consciousness" —an awareness of the deathliness of the reserve. A reserve consciousness might

be a kind of critical phenomenology that, to use Lisa Guenther's description of this sort of insurgent knowledge project, pulls up "traces of what is not quite or no longer there—that which has been rubbed out or consigned to invisibility" (2015): here, the so-called on-reserve Indian. It might be about becoming a frictive surface; by rubbing up against things and resisting motion between objects, we might become unstuck. Queer Indigenous poltergeists are what Sara Ahmed calls "blockage points": where communication stops because we cannot get through (2011, 68). That is, queer indigeneity connotes an ethical impasse, a dead end that presents us with two options: exorcism or resurrection. If settler colonialism is topological, if it persists despite elastic deformations such as stretching and twisting, wear and tear, we might have to make friction to survive. I turn to the reserve because it is a geography of affect, one in which the heaviness of atmospheres crushes some bodies to death and in which some must bear the weight of settler colonialism more than others. The violence done to us has wrenched us outside the physical world and into the supernatural. Some of us are spirits—open wounds that refuse to heal because our blood might be the one thing that cannot be stolen. Does resistance always feel like resistance, or does it sometimes feel like bleeding out (Berlant 2011)?

Feral Socialities

I must leave the beaten path and go where we are not. Queerness, according to Muñoz, is not yet here; it is an ideality that "we may never touch," that propels us onward (2009, 1). Likewise, Halberstam suggests that the presentness of queerness signals a kind of emerging ontology. He argues that failure "is something that queers do and have always done exceptionally well in contrast to the grim scenarios of success" that structure "a heteronormative, capitalist society" (2011, 2-3). For Muñoz, queer failure is about "doing something that is missing in straight time's always already flawed temporal mapping practice" (2009, 174). We know, however, that this isn't the entire story. Whereas Muñoz's queer past morphs into the here and now of homonormativity's carceral tempos, indigeneity's queernesses are saturated with the trauma of colonialism's becoming-structure. Queer death doubles as the settler state's condition of possibility. Pre-contact queer indigeneities had been absorbed into colonialism's death grip; however, this making-dead was also a making-undead in the enduring of ghosts (Derrida 1994, 310). If haunting, according to Tuck and Ree, "lies precisely in its refusal to stop," then the queer Indigenous poltergeist fails to have died by way of time travel (2013, 642).

Queer indigeneity might be a kind of "feral sociality": we are in a wild state after escaping colonial captivity and domestication. When the state evicts you, you might have to become feral to endure. To be feral is to linger in the back alleys of the settler state. It is a refusal of settler statecraft, a strategic failing to approximate the metrics of colonial citizenship, a giving up on the ethical future that reconciliation supposedly promises. As an aside, I suspect that the settler state's reconciliatory ethos is always-already a domesticating project: it contains Indigenous suffering within the spectacularized theatre of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, building a post-Residential School temporality in which Indigenous peoples have been repaired through monetary reparations and storytelling. In the melodrama of reconciliation, the settler state wins its centuries-long war against Indian lawlessness by healing Indigenous peoples of the trauma that blocked them from becoming properly emotive citizens. Queer indigeneity, however, escapes discursive and affective concealment and therefore the category of the human itself, disturbing the binary clash between the living and nonliving by way of its un-humanity, a kind of "dead living" whereby flesh is animated through death.

Perhaps we must become feral to imagine other space-times, to imagine other kinds of queerness. If settler colonialism incentivizes our collusion with the humanist enterprise of multiculturalism (and it does), what would it mean to refuse humanity and actualize other subject formations? In other words, how do the un-living live?

Here, I want to propose the concept of "Indian time" to theorize the temporality and liminality of queer indigeneity as it festers in the slippage between near-death and the refusal to die. Indian time colloquially describes the regularity with which Indigenous peoples arrive late or are behind schedule. I appropriate this idiom to argue that the presentness of queer indigeneity is prefigured by an escape from and bringing forward of the past as well as a taking residence in the future. To be queer and Indigenous might mean to live outside time, to fall out of that form of affective life. Indian time thus nullifies the normative temporality of settler colonialism in which death is the *telos* of the human and being-in-death is an ontological fallacy. It connotes the conversion of queer indigeneity into non-living matter, into ephemera lurking in the shadows of the present, waiting, watching, and conspiring. Where Jasbir Puar argues that all things under the rubric of queer are always-already calculated into the state's biopolitical mathematic, queer indigeneity cannot be held captive because it cannot be seen—we are still emerging in the social while simultaneously altering its substance (2012). If decolonization is, according to Tuck and K. Wayne Yang's reading of Frantz Fanon, an "unclean break from a colonial condition," perhaps the queer Indigenous poltergeist is feral enough to will a decolonial world into a future that hails rather than expels its ghosts (2012, 20). The queer Indigenous poltergeist might have nothing else to lose.

Two-Spirit and the Politics of Tradition

There is an ontological distinction between two-spirit and queer indigeneity: queer indigeneity is incommensurable with and therefore disruptive of two-spirit. In other words, queer indigeneity escapes ontological capture and troubles the very idea of indigeneity itself. Queer indigeneity is indigeneity's necessary aberration, one that is irreducibly non-social. Queer indigeneity is so otherworldly it becomes an epistemic blockage to History, contorting semiotically into the stuff of horror films. It connotes a before and an elsewhere so capacious that it strangulates the settler state's prospects of unabated continuity. There are thus argumentative limits to thinking about indigeneity through the language of queerness—that is, the axiom that settler colonialism queers indigeneity for elimination obfuscates the onto-existential particularities of queer indigeneity (Morgensen 2011, xii). I suspect that two-spiritness cannot disturb the sexual politics of settler colonialism insofar as it is rendered normative and semantically stable in the passing on of tradition.

The term "two-spirit," according to Richard LaFortune, was introduced at the "third annual spiritual gathering of gay and lesbian Native people that took place near Winnipeg in 1990" to name "the presence of both a feminine and a masculine spirit in one person" and to "challenge the use of the word *berdache*" by anthropologists (Driskill 2010, 72). While others would and have pushed for a definition of two-spirit that aligns more neatly with recent imaginings of queerness, I take issue with an identity category that contradictorily tries to explain the contemporary and its bodies by looking to the past. I have borne witness to academic papers and kitchen-table conversations that tether two-spirit to the sacred and to a biological reading of gender that marks life outside the binary as inherently colonial—too modern or queer to be conceptualized inside indigeneity's corporeal and identitarian folds.

Where Qwo-Li Driskill, for example, argues that there is a particular complexity to two-spiritness such that it can name ways of being in a body that are fluid and ambiguous, it is my contention that two-spirit unloads the affective weight of queer indigeneity (2010, 72). The knowability of two-spirit is contingent upon both the putative givenness of "masculine" and "feminine" as cisnormative qualifiers and their discursive proximity to tradition, as if there were an amorphous timelessness to two-spiritness that could be transplanted from the past onto Indigenous bodies in the present—a forgetting of the terror of queer life, how it passes below the aegis of gender and, in this, generates death-worlds social theory struggles to see, study, and repair. In other words, biology fails to name the bodies and identities making claim to the future. Two-spiritness connotes a kind of ethical injunction: to approximate indigeneity, you must approximate tradition in this way and not that, or else. This is fundamentally punitive: if you do not do it correctly, you could die or be killed. Two-spiritness might be stuck in the past; it might turn a haunting into a memorial. Queer indigeneity does things that two-spiritness cannot: it is a floating signifier without referent and without any agreed upon meaning; it refuses to attach to any one history, biology, or geography. Queer indigeneity is categorically messy; it leaks outside itself, congealing into things otherwise unthinkable, refusing the promise of anthropic fullness, as Fred Moten might say, and remaining feral.

Sara Ahmed suggests that some bodies come up against walls that do not move when their fleshiness thingifies institutions *as* walls (2012, 26). The feeling of queer indigeneity is the feeling of coming up against something solid and tangible—an institution that prevents queer Indigenous bodies from moving—or what I call the "politics of tradition." Tradition is "the transmission of customs or beliefs from generation to generation, or the fact of being passed on in this way" ("Tradition"). It is a sort of affective glue that sticks some objects together, sticks us to bodies and to ideas we often do not know—conversion points that make something or someone traditional through proximity or performance. Here, a politics of tradition refers to the ways tradition produces and deproduces some corporeal forms, how some bodies pass below and beyond the aegis of the senses and, in this, sidestep theory's ocular reach and thus disturb the traditional itself. According to Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Indigenous "cultural and linguistic revitalization movements have tapped into a set of cultural resources" precisely because they were rendered unpassable (2012, 115). Leanne Simpson, however, argues that the passing on of tradition has coterminously reified heteropatriarchy and "disconnected some of our most vital people from the land and our knowledge systems" (2014). In the same vein, Glen Coulthard recommends that "we remain cognizant of the pitfalls associated with retreating into an uncritical essentialism in our practices of cultural revitalization" (2014, 156). Two-spiritness might be the domestication or traditionalization of queer indigeneity, a slowing down of its semiotic velocity, and a distancing from the kinds of subjectivities that the traditional cannot containerize. For two-spiritness to be rendered passable, it must first be thingified by casting out supposedly and rightfully angry apparitions (A. Smith 2014, 4). However, decolonization "is not an exorcism of ghosts" (Tuck and Ree 2013, 648). If decolonization is to sustain queer life, then we might need to make recourse to different epistemological starting points. We might have to be superstitious.

Tradition, therefore, effects a kind of governability that does away with the otherwise radical potentiality of queerness when indigeneity becomes its fleshy form. Jeff Corntassel argues that Indigenous peoples should be striving for "forms of 'ungovernability'" that de-occupy "settler institutions and values from Indigenous homelands" (2006, 35). I want to take this provocation further: queer indigeneity works up a kind of ungovernability that always already circumvents the human's impasse. Elsewhere I have argued that "settler colonialism is

an epistemic rupturing of everything, a steady bombardment whose intensity is felt unevenly across differently subjected Indigenous bodies" (Belcourt 2015). The traditional is always-already disavowing disparate assemblages of ideas and subjectivities that do not make sense inside its epistemological confines. Tradition is pre-emptive; it is measured against certain impossibilities. Queerness germinates in the rifts between the possible and the impossible. When rendered together (if at all), queerness (as the anti-subjectivity) and indigeneity (as the ante-ontology) appear nonsensical. Let's world vis-à-vis nonsensical and patchwork forms of thinking!

Conclusion: Killing Colonial Joy

Perhaps we need to make ferality an object of feeling, "as something we invest in, as a way of relating to the world, a way of making sense of how we relate to the world" (Ahmed 2010). Haunting speaks us into existence, as Sara Ahmed might say. Like the feminist killjoy, becoming a queer Indigenous poltergeist "can be an alienation from happiness," a being "out of line with an affective community" because you do not "experience happiness from the right things" (ibid.). Being feral implies a kind of impropriety, a failure to observe standards and to sublimate anger into happiness. Settler colonialism foregrounds certain mythologies of happiness that are insidiously energized by Indigenous suffering. Indeed, Ahmed suggests that happiness scripts "could be thought of as straightening devices, ways of aligning bodies with what is already lined up" (2010, 91). The queer Indigenous poltergeist refuses to be straightened out and finds its conditions of possibility in the crooked and bent. We know the happy stories that the settler state tells about itself—stories about multiculturalism, about reconciliation, about nationalism, about gay-friendliness. Settler colonialism might be about preserving happiness—the "happily-ever-after" that its statecraft narrates by flattening the historical and material impasse that indigeneity signifies.

If the "good life," according to Lauren Berlant, "is for so many a bad life that wears [them] out," then perhaps being worn out captures the emotional prehistory of decolonization (2011, 27). Unlike the cruel optimist about whom Berlant speaks, the queer Indigenous poltergeist is not dramatically tethered to the "good life" (ibid.). Instead, the very fact of its haunting suggests that the bad life is for some a geography from which to hone forms of political revolt. Perhaps being unhappy is its own form of decolonial activism. Settler colonialism, then, might be about making knees jerk, about sudden and putatively involuntary reflexes that launch the body into action and make happiness automatic, unconscious, second nature. To this end, the queer Indigenous poltergeist is its own kind of killjoy—a killjoy that refuses to let go of the past, that kills the happiness of settlers by making things awkward, that points out moments of colonial violence, that points out our murders. If, according to Tuck and Ree, decolonization means "attending to ghosts, and arresting widespread denial of the violence done to them," this essay is a call to arms: we must kill joy (Tuck and Ree 2013, 247; see also Ahmed 2010). If we end with the understanding that queerness is simultaneously present and absent on the reserve, and that we must abolish settler colonialism's happiness regime, how can we let the queer Indigenous poltergeist take us elsewhere?

What would happen if we went wild, if we refused domestication and instead chose lawlessness? When our backs are against the wall, we do not have many options from which to choose. Tradition does biopolitical work: it operates at the level of anatomy, not only reifying gender's collapse into biology but also training our bodies into thinking that we have finally

found something that feels like something. I'm not buying it, and I think that queer indigeneity is the point of departure decolonization has been waiting for. It's your move.

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Getting Rid of the Distinction between the Aesthetic and the Political

Ariella Azoulay

Abstract
The point of departure of Berger and Mohr's *Another Way of Telling* (1982) is what they call the discovery that 'photographs did not work as we had been taught'. Since their book was written, the same feeling of 'discovery' has been expressed in other writings on photography. Often, these 'discoveries' have been linked with the way 'ordinary' people have been using photography. This paper addresses this recurrence and asks what are the discursive conditions under which this understanding of photography has been perceived as a 'discovery' whenever it has surfaced in the last 30 years. The paper analyzes the conceptual grid within the hegemonic discourse on photography that has contributed enormously to the marginalization of this new understanding of photography – the common opposition between the 'aesthetic' and the 'political', and accordingly between two seemingly contradictory judgments: 'this is too political'; 'this is too aesthetic'. These judgments, applied frequently to photographs taken in zones of 'regime-made disaster', usually differ and sometimes completely prevent the possible encounter with the photographed people who, through the photograph, are co-present with the spectators in the event of viewing the photograph.

Key words
aesthetic ■ Benjamin ■ judgment of taste ■ Palestine ■ photography ■ political ■ visual culture

INDOOR SCENE at a Palestinian house in a refugee camp near Ramallah, 2002 (Figure 1). Palestinian refugee camps, as can be read in this photograph, are sites of 'regime-made disaster'.[1] The photograph was taken by a soldier who was present at the time and had a camera in

■ *Theory, Culture & Society* 2010 (SAGE, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, and Singapore), Vol. 27(7-8): 239–262
DOI: 10.1177/0263276410384750

Figure 1 Refugee camp near Ramallah, 2002
Source: Photographed by a soldier member of Breaking the Silence

his possession. This photograph, like many others taken by Israeli soldiers, found its way into private family albums and was circulated through various family and social networks. One day someone who had access to this image – maybe the photographer or one of the photographed persons – recognized in the given photograph a crime committed, a deed that never should have been done, a violation, a disaster, a horror – something that had been previously ignored and suddenly appeared in a different light. The gaze – in order to detect what was now newly formulated as a disaster or a crime, and in order to enable the viewer to grasp his/her own complicity with that crime – had to be freed of certain viewing patterns, whether artistic or national, to which it was previously committed.

The point of departure of John Berger's and Jean Mohr's groundbreaking book, *Another Way of Telling*, is what they call the discovery that 'photographs did not work as we had been taught' (1982: 84). In one of the chapters, Mohr presents five of his photographs to ten people and asks them to describe them. The answers, printed below the photos, are presented as possible answers to the photographer's question expressed in the chapter's title: 'What did I see?' The photographer gave up the position of the knowing subject with regard to his own photos. This position has not been occupied by another knowing subject, such as a critic or a curator, but has rather been offered to 'ordinary people' who were chosen randomly. In most cases, what they saw in the photo was not what the photographer saw or was about to include in the final frame. The possibility of seeing this gap and exploring it further is the new way of seeing, the new way of

telling what one sees in a photograph, that Berger and Mohr present in their book.

Since their book was written in 1982, the same feeling of 'discovery' has been expressed in other writings on photography, and in different contexts.[2] Often, these 'discoveries' have been linked in one way or another with the way 'ordinary' people (i.e. people who are not considered experts in photography) have been using photography. These people supposedly possess a certain kind of knowledge regarding the photographed image which helps us to understand that 'photographs do not work as we had been taught'. The same can be said regarding, for example, the work of the Israeli artist, Michal Heiman, who conducts 'tests' on museum spectators, who are invited to describe what they see in the photographs presented to them as if they were patients in a clinic (Heiman, 1998). Similar situations may be found earlier in Wendy Ewald's photographic projects, carried out with various communities as an effort to reclaim citizenship through the use of photography (Ewald, 2000); or in that of Susan Meiselas's archives for Kurdistan, created in collaboration with the persons photographed or their relatives, all part of a community that lacked its photographic memory until this archive was created (Meiselas, 2008).

The question I want to raise regarding the recurrence of this new way of seeing is not why this or that writer, photographer or artist ignores the previous 'discovery' regarding the nature of photography, but what are the discursive conditions under which this understanding of photography has been perceived as a discovery whenever it has surfaced in the last 30 years. However, this article does not propose a comprehensive or direct answer to this question; rather, it describes and analyzes a certain conceptual grid that has contributed enormously to the marginalization of this understanding of photography – this 'new way of viewing' which paradoxically is so common among 'ordinary people' using photography – within the hegemonic discourse on photography. This hegemonic discourse was developed under the aegis of art discourse. This conceptual grid is the common opposition between the 'aesthetic' and the 'political', and accordingly between two seemingly contradictory judgments: 'this is too political'; 'this is too aesthetic'. These judgments, applied frequently to photographs taken in zones of regime-made disaster, usually defer – and sometimes completely prevent – the possible encounter with the photographed people who through the photograph are co-present with the spectators in the event of viewing the photograph.

The 'new way of viewing' is characterized by the effort to link the photographs to the situation in which they were taken. A similar effort is associated with my attempt here to get rid of the opposition between the 'too aesthetic' and the 'too political'. Linking the photograph to the situation and act of taking the photograph doesn't mean ignoring what John Berger describes as an abyss 'between the moment recorded and the present moment of looking at the photograph' (Berger and Mohr, 1982: 87); on the

contrary, it means not giving up on the urgency of restoring and re-establishing as many links as possible between the photograph and the situation in which it was taken. The aim of this effort is to enable us as spectators to re-position ourselves in relation to the disaster we are watching and to let us be engaged with its happening, its victims – our fellow citizens, its lingering effects on its victims and on its perpetrators, as well as on its accomplices – we the spectators.

In order to do so, one should explore not only what is seen in the photograph and what the photographer intended to frame within it. The following quotation by the photographer (of the photo taken inside a Palestinian home in the refugee camp in Ramallah, Figure 1) who became a spectator of his own photographs, is an example of an old 'new way of viewing' that bypasses the ready-made grid of the two contradictory judgments ('this is too political'/'this is too aesthetic') that tend to dominate the way we view photographs from zone of disasters:

> It was during the World Cup and we were carrying out searches in a certain village. We had to enter one of the houses. Now you got a really cool platoon commander who's a fan of the Argentinian team too, and he too wants to watch the game. So you tell him, 'Listen, bro', you know . . . this house or that house, it's all the same but this one's got a television set, man.' So we went into the house with the TV set, and just took a family out of its home so we could watch the Argentina-Nigeria game. (from Testimonies, Breaking the Silence website)[3]

Through a civil gaze, the souvenir-photo from the time of one's military service in Ramallah became a document of a crime, of an event to be denounced, to be shared in public. With the help of information such as this testimony of one of the participants in the photographic event, this photo becomes a document of a regime-made disaster, a document of the exposure of Palestinian houses to the intrusion of Israeli soldiers. This is a regime-made disaster as Palestinians' dwellings have been continuously exposed to violence since the establishment of the Israeli regime in 1948, which expelled them from the state and transformed them into refugees, and then, in 1967, transformed them into occupied people, governed by a regime under which they are non-citizens.

The relation between the 'aesthetic' and the 'political' continues to frame the discussion of art in general, and of photography – in which I have a special interest – in particular. The two categories, 'political' and 'aesthetic', prevail in contemporary discussion of photographs perceived as art. Each of them serves as a predicate in prevalent judgments of taste whose general form is: 'this photograph is (not enough/too) political' or, alternately, 'this photograph is (not enough/too) aesthetic'.

Walter Benjamin contributed greatly to the institutionalizing and disseminating of this dichotomy. His frequently cited formulation concludes his essay on the work of art: 'Its [Humankind's] self-alienation has reached

the point where it can experience its own annihilation as a supreme aesthetic *pleasure. Such is the aestheticizing of politics, as practiced by fascism. Communism replied by politicizing art.*'[4] This formulation has yielded numerous books and essays, motivated scholars to invest years in the attempt to fathom it, and inspired the work of artists and curators. It has sharply formulated two directions of the artistic act and placed them as two poles of a contradiction, mutually exclusive, upon which contemporary judgments of taste are based.

In the first part of this text, I shall dwell on the gain and loss of the use of this opposition in the discourse of art and photography. In the latter part, I shall propose a renewed conceptualization of the political as a new framework to deal with images.

The images that evoke such judgments of taste are usually recognized as pointedly social or political; often the people photographed are men or women in distress. The 'aesthetic' and 'political' categories that serve to classify images actually sort these same actors who classify the images and make judgments of taste. These actors are sorted according to their positive or negative attitude towards those categories, generally used as contrasts. When a speaker in favor of political art tags as 'aesthetic' a work whose content is political, she judges it for being overly aesthetic. In like manner, there are always those who will prefer aesthetic art and find detriment in the overly political. Therefore, this judgment of taste determines whether the image under discussion is 'aesthetic' or 'political', and points out its success or failure as either one of the two – when it is condemned as aesthetic it is because the image has not succeeded in being political, and vice versa – and also expresses the affinity of the speaker toward one of these opposing poles.

Here are a few recent examples. All of them either implicitly or explicitly refer to Benjamin:

> The aestheticization of politics is what we would call branding, or design, which presents politics as a seductive spectacle. It's the same idea as Guy Debord's 'society as spectacle'. Politics becomes a way to seduce people, which can actually lead to fascism and war. On the other hand, the politicization of art is a way to get free of that and to act purely politically – beyond aesthetics, beyond art, beyond seduction, beyond spectacle. (Grosz, 2008)

> The process of making exhibitions politically strives to address an audience that differs from the traditional audience of an art-exhibition in terms of social origin and class composition. It mobilizes the spectator to find himself as a political subject. But it realizes quite differently from the direct experience of participation in political action. (Vilensky, 2007)

> Armenia's governing authorities strive to aestheticize the domination of violence by recruiting show business or soap operas, actors or artists to their campaigns. Karen Ohanyan resists those tendencies by politicizing art. (Jaloyan, 2009)

> Is there political art today in Serbia? Or can we even speak about specific crises of recent art production and local curatorial practices in relation to the political, and their inability to provide adequate articulations of, responses to, and engagements in what constitutes effective political interventions today? Is it possible to say that while in the 1990s artistic practices effectively functioned as a political front, today there is no such a thing as critical-political art? (Vilenica, 2008)[5]

> We are looking, in fact, at an aesthetic – too aesthetic – exhibition of works that speak colonialism in its most painful and extreme sense. They are not uninteresting, quite the contrary – they are even fascinating. As works per se they are well done and up to par. The question, however, remains whether they evoke even a single twinge of regret, account-taking, a fleeting sense of identification, or does the aestheticism which infests them all underscore the alienation that distances those living in affluence from those exploited human resources. (Baruch Blich)[6]

The simple contradiction proposed by Benjamin has proven to be mesmerizing. It has attributed to art an omnipotent role in the struggle against fascism in particular, and against oppressive political power in general. He presented the politicization of the aesthetic as a task designated for the opponents of fascism. In this formulation, Benjamin actually set in opposition not two realms but rather two acts – aestheticization and politicization – to each of which is attributed the power to turn its object into that from which it wished to distinguish itself. The relation between them has been presented as mutually exclusive: either the aesthetic becomes political, or the political becomes aesthetic. In time, this formulation by Benjamin has become extricated from his intricate thinking – which does not easily yield to dichotomy and the revolutionary horizon it implies – and has taken on a life of its own. Many have taken this formulation as a moral edict, a political call, almost a defined mission that the individual is called upon to undertake in order to block fascism.[7] Many readings of this essay by Benjamin and the common use of the political imperative ensconced in this paragraph have turned the term 'politicization' into the mission of a rare few. The artist, the interpreter, the critic, the curator – all have been tested by the political judgment of taste, ruling whether they have successfully brought about the desired politicization.

The reorganization of the public sphere in the late 18th century, and the dissemination of works of art (and images in general) in various places, created new forms of being-with-others in public and affected existing ones. Used in this historical context, the term 'politicization' of art designates those new patterns of human gathering in the new spaces of art and power such as the Louvre in Paris or Somerset House in London. None of these patterns alone generates politicization, but together, the consequences of their gazes, words and deeds reorganize the shared space, or, as in the later formulation of Jacques Rancière (2006), take part in 'the distribution of the sensible'.[8] Opening the Louvre to the general public, to view the art

salons exhibited there since 1740, created new conditions for the relations between audience, art and ruling power. The gathering of human masses viewing and being inspired by works of art, all within a space that was previously reserved for the ruling power – the royal palace – exposed the regime (later named the '*ancien régime*') to the public gaze no less than it exposed the works themselves.[9]

The politicization of art in other European countries in the late 18th century can be described in a similar way. Holger Hoock, in his research of the Royal Academy of that time, describes the growing interest of the Crown and the government in art, alongside the flourishing discussion of art by a growing public. The encounter of this public with art and power, and to no less an extent with itself as a public, honed its political and aesthetic capacities and skills (Hoock, 2005).

The inverted symmetry produced by Benjamin's formulation is largely misleading and makes us forget that the issue is not a perfect inverted symmetry – the aestheticization is of the political, while the politicization at hand is of art, not of the aesthetic (Buck-Morss, 1992). The unfelt and ungrounded shift in Benjamin's paragraph, from the 'aesthetic' to 'art', is very common in what I propose to name 'the political judgment of taste' that judges whether a work of art is political or not. This smooth transition, rendering an almost invisible 'jump', is due to the fact that at the heart of the 'political judgment of taste' is the opposition between the 'political' and its other, and the transformation of the political into an activity that can be performed by an individual. The artistic (or the aesthetic – for those who favor this opposition, it is all the same) and the political are produced as mutually exclusive opposites and represent two directions in the practice of art.

Since it was formulated up until the end of the recent century, this opposition appeared pertinent and seemed to leave no room for action – within the public sphere – outside the two positions it characterized. Any work of art, or any writing about it, were regarded as an engagement in a struggle that obliged one to position oneself on one of these two distinct sides, thereby confirming the power of the opposition and its function; while the 'aesthetic' position was criticized from various points of view[10] – often seeking to 'politicize' what was constructed as 'aesthetic' – the relation between the terms of this opposition as such was not an object of investigation until recently.[11] If one chose not to accept the horrors of the modern world, and if one supposed that art is more than the practice of producing pictures on a wall, the choice was obvious: one should resist the aestheticization of the political that is identified with fascism and choose the politicization of art identified with Marxism.

Over two decades ago I found myself on the left shore of the formula, the one striving for a constant politicization of art. However, with time I began to ask questions about the naturalness of this 'either–or' choice. The chiastic inversion that Benjamin made with aestheticization and politicization began to seem paralyzing. It limits one's field of vision to art's strictly professional gaze, and disrupts the movement of the wandering or

swept gaze, when the latter dares to dwell too long upon elements in an image that are not relevant to the artistic intention that the image is supposed to incorporate, in other words, to its aestheticization or politicization. Thus, too often I heard too many people – myself included – sentencing an image and pronouncing it an utter aestheticization of the political – or, even more currently, the 'aestheticization of the suffering of others' – while the image at hand, I want to suggest, could easily serve as a rich source of knowledge about the world and people appearing in it, who by their presence address not only the spectator's professional gaze.

Re-reading such judgments of taste made by various scholars and curators, especially when referring to harsh images, photographs of disaster or distress areas, I began to be bothered by them and perceive them as symptoms of a discourse. This became even more troubling since it was clear that turning the seen into an object of political study goes hand in hand with the professed political tendencies and moral sensitivities of some of these experts: seeing above and beyond the photographed persons – that is, ignoring them – would contradict their explicit position. Some secret pact seemed to be made by people who unknowingly participated in an act of silencing, distancing or concealment, for judgments of taste uttered by experts in the visual domain determine what is not to be seen or what is not worthy of one's gaze.

The intellectual skills and capacities of those experts are finally reflected in a kind of assessment that evaluates the images and establishes whether a certain image is political, and another – aesthetic. Thus, after the Kantian judgment of taste of the 18th century whose essence was the statement: 'This is beautiful', and after the Duchampian judgment of taste formulated in the early 20th century, whose essence was 'This is art' (de Duve, 1998), towards the end of the 20th century, a problematic formation evolved, of a non-reflexive judgment of taste whose essence is: 'This is *too* aesthetic', or alternately, 'This is *too* political.'

This 'too' attribute is a structural expression of the problematic nature of the contemporary judgment of taste (which I shall elaborate later). For the time being, let me just note that, unlike the two former judgments of taste, the latter judgment does not exist as a correspondence of the general category and the individual instance, and is rather based upon a tentative evaluation of superfluity – 'too' – that distorts the correspondence. What I call the 'political judgment of taste' preserves the Kantian pretension to universal judgment – the judgment of taste expresses the presupposition or pretension that each and every individual facing the work of art would, or should, judge it precisely as I do. And, indeed, the experts who make these judgments of taste are remarkable not only in their abilities to hunt down too-aesthetic or too-political images even when laypeople would not detect them as such at first glance; but also because the experts hurry to announce publicly that these images are not worth looking at, and even to encourage others to adopt their judgment and ignore them, exile them from their field of vision (Barthes, 2000).

In discussion of this kind, there is no room for the photographed persons to address their spectators. The expert spectator who exercises her professional gaze in order to make a 'political judgment of taste' pretends to know better than those photographed that the way they appeared in the photograph is not the right one. Here, for example, are two highly stylized photographs taken by Micha Kirshner in 1988, in an attempt to make the victims of oppression during the First Intifada present in Israeli public space (Figures 2 and 3).

Kirschner's style and his aesthetic choices are very apparent in the photographs. Most prominent is his choice to stage the photographed persons and their physical and emotional injuries in the studio ambience, which he improvised on site, while in the streets the Israeli army continues to suppress the Palestinian uprising, and a free camera could have documented the actual harm done in real time. Staging the photographed



Figure 2 Daoud Atiya, 1988
Source: Photo by Micha Kirshner

persons also included extreme body posing so that they displayed their injury to the camera and enabled it to be framed by an item of clothing, a gesture or lighting. The claim that the photographer aestheticizes the suffering of the Palestinians was not long in coming. Those who make this claim pose as spokespersons for the photographed persons, but actually overlook one of the main features these have left in the photograph – their explicit willingness to be photographed in this way, namely their partnership in the act of photography under the unbearable oppression of those years. Such stylized studio photographs require time, mutual understanding of photographer and photographed, cooperation, concentration, participation, attentiveness, consideration, choice, the will to be exposed, daring, decisiveness, consultation and negotiation capacity. These are apparent in every one of the photographs, making them a fascinating document of cooperation between an Israeli photographer of Jewish descent and Palestinians under occupation. Together they seem to expose to the spectators' view the deeds perpetrated by the Israeli regime.

However, all of these things – expressing the being-together of humans, their political existence – are not visible when the photograph becomes the object of a 'political judgment of taste' and the gaze viewing the photograph seeks its object in the act of the individual photographer. But these particular photographs, like photographs in general, are not the possession of the photographer alone. The photographed persons took part in the act of photography, just as they did in the telling of what happened to them which accompanied the display of the photographs. From the texts accompanying the photographs, the spectators could learn that 20-year-old Daoud Attiya was chased down the street in Issawiya village by an army jeep and, when overtaken, he was held trapped between the jeep and the fence for two and a half hours without getting any medical assistance. His body, twisted as a result of the injury, is now presented to us (Figure 2). That Ayisha al Qurd (and her son, Yassir, whom she delivered in jail) was in 'administrative detention' (detention by the state without trial, usually for 'security reasons), during which her house was demolished as a punishment for belonging to a 'hostile organization', an incarceration from which she was finally released without being charged in court (Figure 3).

When a judgment of taste establishes that a certain image is aesthetic even though it could have or should have been political, it pronounces the image, in fact, to be exactly what it rules it to be – an aesthetic object. It does so because it contracts the various dimensions of the image's existence into a single one – its existence as a work of art exclusively in the aesthetic plane.

Three presuppositions are implied by these judgments of taste:

1. that there are images that do not exist in the aesthetic plane;
2. that the photograph is the product of a photographer alone;
3. that the aesthetic or the political are attributes of images.

Figure 3 Ayisha al Qurd and her son Yassir, 1988
Source: Photo by Micha Kirshner

The *first presupposition* actually identifies the category 'aesthetic' with over-stylization whose presence is so powerful that it overshadows the photographed subject. Indicating over-stylization and identifying it with the category called 'aesthetic' produce the absurd illusion that there are images or objects that do not exist in the aesthetic plane and are devoid of stylistic components. Even when one speaks of 'anti-style' or 'bad taste', certain stylistic components are an inseparable part of objects or images made by a human being, even if not as a function of a reasoned, conscious or intended choice. Within a discussion or debate about the images, various speakers can characterize differently stylistic components that have been attributed to the images, or even try to negate the existence of such components. But the existence of an image in the aesthetic plane is not a matter of choice and it cannot be obliterated. The visual or stylistic components of the image exist in the aesthetic plane and may be sorted into various groups,

or be attributed various tastes, schools, trends, periods and places. But, again, they cannot be done away with altogether, just as one cannot do away with them in objects and images that are not considered art. Therefore, the mere existence of an image in the aesthetic plane is not a matter of choice. One may propose various judgments of taste that relate to the aesthetic dimension of an object or image, but one cannot rule out or add this dimension, or assume that the image or object might exist outside it; the aesthetic is given by way of the object's being given to the senses.

The *second presupposition* identifies the photograph with the photographer's stylistic choices that might be reflected in the framing of the persons photographed, in the composition, the lighting, color or focus (in both senses). This identification subjugates what is seen in the photograph to the photographer's intention, vision, planning and talent, and relates to the photograph as though it were nothing but their concrete realization. When the category 'aesthetic' is, thus, cast pejoratively at the photographed image, the photographer's choice of a certain stylistic model is not presented as a choice of a single model out of a broad range of visual models, but rather as determining either the aesthetic or the political. Presenting one chosen option of several, all of which belong to a single plane – the aesthetic – as a decision between the aesthetic or political planes, testifies to the nature and limits of the category 'political' as it is posed in opposition to 'aesthetic'. Within this opposition, the political is actually a style or a kind of visual dialect 'used' by the artist. But this dialect is a convention referring to a certain style as a lack of style, or as a sub-style, and therefore as non-aesthetic and political, in other words politically valid.

The *third presupposition* attributes the quality of being aesthetic or political to the image itself; it is the other facet of the previous presupposition according to which the image's being aesthetic or political is a result of the photographer's decision to design it as one or the other. Therefore, as soon as the image is out of the photographer's hands, those who wish to make a judgment of taste about it relate to it as though it is out in the world carrying traits that have been molded into it once and for all. They assume their ability to expertly distinguish these traits even as others remain blind to their existence. The spectator or critic accepts a priori her role in exposing the image's existing traits and her authority to judge the photographer as the only person responsible for those traits. The spectator thus denies her own contribution in creating the image as 'aesthetic' or 'political', and her own power to reduce or extend conditions that would facilitate linking the image to other statements. The judgment of taste assumes the aesthetic and the political as traits of the image and the result of the artist's intention, although the aesthetic is a necessary dimension of any image and the political is not a trait but the relations between a plurality of persons, on which I shall elaborate later.

These three presuppositions are exercised in the judgment of taste that establishes that any image whose overt contents are political or social is '(too) aesthetic'. This judgment of taste displaces the speaker's unease

about the photographed persons in distress. It thus becomes an unease about the special attention that the photographer paid to the look of their images while facing them. The rare beauty radiating from their portraits or the perfect lighting or composition in which their distress is shown becomes an excuse on the part of the expert spectator to exclude them from the field of vision. But focusing upon the stylistic measures taken by the photographer and advancing them into the foreground might force to the background the political space where the photographer and the photographed are already present. The speaker who judges that 'this image is (too) aesthetic' ignores his own non-political gesture in relation to the photographed persons – shifting his gaze from them and excluding them not only from the field of vision but also from a civil/political community in which they are struggling for their place through the photograph and the space of appearance it opens for them.[12] In order to make a judgment of taste, the speaker facing the photograph – or work of art in general – must isolate it from its surroundings and suspend the political space that other people threaten to produce – or might have produced – by their mere presence around the photograph. In this way, the judgment of taste is directed towards the mode of existence of the work of art as a special kind of object – an artistic object subjected to judgment, and everything else is distanced and perceived as irrelevant. Paradoxically, in order to say 'it is too aesthetic' one needs to already be 'within art' and forgo one's reference to the world that the image is supposed to articulate.

In order to discover why critics or researchers who – within the Benjaminian dichotomy – strive to politicize the aesthetic actually achieve the contrary, I shall re-formulate my opposition to the three presuppositions implied by the judgment of taste 'it is too aesthetic'.

1. Contrary to the presupposition that the aesthetic is a possible trait of images, and that there are images that do not have an aesthetic dimension, I say that no images can exist outside the aesthetic plane.
2. Contrary to the presupposition that photography can only be discussed through its product and a photograph can only be seen as the creation of the photographer, I say that photography is the act of many and a photograph is a sampling or a trace of a space of human relations whose existence cannot be reduced to a mere status of raw material or just objects of an artistic image.
3. Contrary to the presupposition that the 'political' is a trait of a certain image and absent from another, I say that the political is but a space of human relations exposed to each other in public, and that photography is one of the realizations of this space.

These three arguments will serve as my basis for a renewed conceptualization of the status of a photograph and for presenting the discussion of the aesthetic and the political not as opposites but as two distinct planes: the plane in which man-made objects appear alongside other objects, and the plane in which their actions appear.

First claim – in certain periods of time, certain artistic conventions rule that a certain aesthetic formation is worthy or unworthy of representing certain political content.

If, however, one accepts the claim that the political is not a trait of an image or an object, nor of its creator, but a relation among people in public, the image of the object cannot be perceived as political in itself. Ruling that a certain image is 'aesthetic' or 'political' expresses a convention of representation that reduces the aesthetic existence of an image to what everyday jargon calls its 'aesthetics' or its 'look'. However, recognition and priority attributed to a certain aesthetic formation and denied to another cannot change the fact that any image, even one whose contents are political par excellence, always exists in the aesthetic plane as well. The aesthetic existence of an image must be understood as its action upon the senses. This action upon the senses, or the impression of the senses, has no purpose beyond itself, as opposed to the action of a practical instrument or a tool or product (such as the seductive garment: 'wear me', or the key that says 'click me'). The identifying or orienting gaze enables us to acknowledge the product as such, and the professional gaze – including that of the art lover – is activated in the aesthetic plane where the object acts apart from the action of people in political space.

Second claim – the photographer makes a significant series of choices during the photographic event and regarding the look of the final product – the photograph – beginning with the actual decision to point the camera at a certain event or person and up to decisions as to color or camera-angle that will determine the tone of the frame.

But even when such decisions are extremely detailed and precise, the photograph – certainly one in which people are shown – is not the finished realization of the image foreseen in the photographer's mind. A camera was used and people were there. Their encounter for the photographic session is usually managed in keeping with photographers' decorum, but it is not totally dominated by such rules. At any moment the space between them and, later, the space between them and those who will stand viewing *their* picture, might become political space where people gaze at each other, speak and act away from disciplinary or governmental constraints.

A photograph showing persons who were photographed cannot be regarded merely as an object produced by a single individual. Those photographed, who continuously see and are seen, bear constant and permanent witness to the fact that, regardless of its concrete circumstances, a photograph is never merely a product of material in the hands of an individual creator. A photograph is the space of appearance in which an encounter has been recorded between human beings, an encounter neither concluded nor determined at the moment it was being photographed. This encounter might continue to exist or be renewed through additional human beings who were not necessarily present at the time it was photographed. The renewal of this encounter is a constant capacity of spectators who acknowledge the photographed persons and see themselves as their actual or

potential addressees or partners. Historically, indeed, the photographer assumed the artist's position and monopolized the power of the individuals with whom he was gathered for the photography session, making the photograph 'his own'. But this did not seal the space of relations between the photographer and the photographed; the photographer only fixed an instant of this encounter in the image. Beyond the image's aesthetic existence, the photograph preserves traces of other people's gaze and action, and thus becomes a kind of singular point in which these are stored and might be linked one to the next and moved anew at any point in time, in unforeseen directions.

Third claim – as I have said above, the political is not a trait and cannot be attributed even to images whose contents address explicit political issues. The political, even in its minimal sense, is not compatible with a trait of an image or of a person because, as previously stated, it only exists where people are assembled, and it disappears when they disperse. When one considers the presence of the photographed persons, it becomes clear that the photograph was created and is shown in conditions of plurality. Even when the photograph does not show people, the area in which it was taken is always an environment created by human beings to be dwelt in. The photograph by itself is not political but the space among people, where it takes place, can potentially become political.

This formulation of the political as the realization of the potential of human relations, which I have borrowed from Arendt, has helped me break loose from the opposition of the 'aesthetic' and the 'political' whereby the political becomes a trait (see her discussion of the political in Arendt, 2005: 93–200). However, upon close examination of Arendt's formulation, I realized that it, too, is held in the grip of the opposition of the political and its other. Space becomes political, claims Arendt, when the being-together of people in it has no purpose beyond itself and when the meaning of political – not its end – is freedom. This identification of the political with freedom was the basis for Arendt's judgment of most forms of humans being-together. Her judgment – 'this is not political' – also referred to different formations of being together which were conducted like political relations and called themselves political relations. As far as she was concerned, these were distortions or a degeneration of the political. A famous instance of such negation was Arendt's relation to the space of action and speech that had been constituted since the French Revolution and which she called 'social', trying to stabilize its distinction from the 'political'. Many, writing about Arendt, have perceived this opposition as problematic, and nearly all of them have preferred to abandon it and borrow mainly the spirit of her definition of the political – as I did for a long time.

But adopting the spirit of things alone did not make Arendt's formulation any less rooted in the practice of the judgment of taste. To overcome the exclusive opposition underlying this political judgment of taste, I shall present the form that Arendt called political as one of several formations of the political. I shall claim that this specific formation which she identified

with action and with freedom does not suffice to describe the complexity of the political and its various formations and practices.

I shall first make brief mention of several main characteristics by which Arendt describes political action.

The course of action is unpredictable, and thus too its consequences; action has an agent, not an author; it is distinct from simple productive action; the subject is revealed in action, the subject speaks the action; the action is not totally enslaved for the good of a cause because it is entangled in a web of relations between humans who have contradicting wills and intentions; the revelation of the subject in action entails risk since it is not clear who exactly will be revealed; the action exists in plurality; the action needs public space and aspires to the fame that it involves; the action exists only when it presupposes a 'human togetherness'; the action always exists between at least two persons, in the space between them and among the many, and revolves around things in the objective world; this between-two is not tangible or stable since it does not leave traces like practical objects/utilities; the action generates a new beginning.

I shall claim that these characteristics, which Arendt identified only with political action in the sense of freedom, are evident as well in other acts and interventions by people in the two other realms – labor and work – that Arendt distinguishes. Thus for example the changing price of rice or the demolition of a neighborhood – which in Arendt's taxonomy are not political action – might signify a new beginning and their outcome cannot be predicted. The characteristics shared by action in the Arendtian sense and other interventions that are not defined by her as political stem from the fact that any act or action which human beings carry out in a space inhabited by others cannot be managed and planned to their very end, since such interventions encounter, evolve, develop, are stopped, come into friction and confrontation with the interventions of others. If this presupposition is accepted, then this description by Arendt does not suffice:

> Political space is present potentially whenever people assemble together and it can – at any given moment – be realized. (2005)

With slight alteration this description may be re-written so as to express this common denominator of different kinds of political existence:

> Political space is present whenever people assemble together and it can – at any given moment – realize its inherent potential for freedom.

This formulation enables one to detach the sweeping identification of the political and freedom and to delineate 'the political' that is identified with freedom within only one of three of the domains of the political that I wish to characterize in relation to the *vita activa*: labor and work. This categorization extracts the political from the opposition in which it is held both in political judgments of taste and in its Arendtian conceptualization.

This categorization also undermines the identification of labor and work with private space, and recognizes that, in the modern world, these might be private matters but part of a political life among people. *Vita activa* in general, then, appears as political life, the realm in which people exist side by side with each other and their various actions directly or indirectly impact the lives of others. This life is usually distinct from *vita contemplativa*, which the classic distinction attributes to the realm of the contemplating gaze – reflection, wonder, amazement and aimless contemplation of a landscape or a figure.

Abstract thought has been perceived ever since the ancient Greeks through the metaphorization of this gaze: theory, speculation, study, things that people imagine or conceive in their mind's eye, etc. Unlike Arendt, who leaves the gaze in the realm of *vita contemplativa*, I claim that the gaze is an indivisible part of *vita activa*, of instrumental activity, of the effort to attain goals and objectives, to become more efficient and sophisticated.[13]

The first formation and realm of *vita activa* that Arendt defined as labor is activity that is meant to provide basic existence, to enable survival and reproduce life. The gaze is part of it. Humans look around them in order to identify themselves in their environment, manage their own movement, and identify the things, animals and people they encounter, fathom their intentions and the risks and chances involved in meeting them. They exercise that gaze that corresponds to the first realm of the *vita activa* – labor – that I term 'the identifying or orienting gaze'. It is based on a mechanism of identifying the seen, a vital condition for existence itself. It corresponds to what, in speech, will also be part of that same basic practice of orientation and survival, such as using signals of orientation, naming things, exchanging practical information and sharing experience with others.

The second realm which Arendt defined as work is the activity that produces objects which do not fulfill immediate needs and are not annihilated with immediate consumption; these are primarily tools, instruments, and part of tools that can serve to create other products, and eventually participate in the creation of a whole world, arrange people's life on earth and enable them to turn this space into their dwelling place. Among these products Arendt includes the work of art, thus limiting it to her objectal dimension and delineating it as a closed and stable object of a judgment of taste. Within this formation I propose to place the professional gaze that accompanies a certain type of action and guides it. This is a directed gaze that characterizes professionals (a physician, an artist, a photographer, a policewoman, an architect, a seamstress or educator) and it enables one to arrange that which is seen and control it through accumulated, ongoing and evolving knowledge. The professional gaze is not vital to existence itself but rather to the regulation of activity of a certain kind, to the analysis of situations and events, to eye–hand coordination and the like, in situations where action is free of having to fulfill immediate needs and is harnessed

to loftier goals. Professional speech – the one that specializes in reporting, documenting, analyzing, validating or judging – characterizes this formation. The discourse of art is a part of it and proposes a framework and tools for professional discourse to discuss images, including photographed ones.

The third realm is what Arendt defined as action, which is distinguished from work since it produces no end-product and does not act upon a previous plan but is the individual's daring to generate something new in act or speech, or in the act of speech, and generate it publicly, among people, exposed to their gaze, without any governing or disciplinarian limitation. Among all the characteristics that Arendt attributes to this realm, I shall claim that only its essential openness, not subjected to an external authority or governing power, distinguishes it from the two other realms. I shall call this the civil realm. The gaze exercised in its framework is distinct from the purposeful gaze, but also from the mode of contemplation typical of the *vita contemplativa*. It does not demand separate time and space for its existence, but can be realized at any given moment and is not opposed to the two other forms nor does it obliterate them. It is aided by them and is nurtured by them but suspends the constraints imposed on them. Its object is not ennobled or sanctified, beautiful or awesome, nor is it completed and sealed, and can be present in anything and produced by anyone. Photography enabled this gaze to deviate from the interest strictly in pictures, objects and extraordinary events, and turned human existence in all its aspects – behavior patterns, items, situations, customs, gestures or places that had not previously seemed worthy of study – into objects of the gaze.

This is a new way to relate to the visual that has developed along with photography and takes place among people in public spaces, where the spectator's gaze is never limited only to what is to be seen or what he or she was asked to view. Her gaze is always in conflict with others' gaze, who are there not only as the object of her gaze but as participants in the formation of what can be seen. Photographs produced from such encounters can never be possessed by one of the participants in the event of photography, namely photographers, photographed persons or spectators. This is the civil feature of photography – no one can dominate and possess it completely and become its sovereign without a violent action that denies political space its validity (the civil gaze being merely one of its dimensions).

Each one of the three realms of *vita activa* – with their three dimensions of action, speech and gaze – can be characterized by behavior patterns, rules and their own norms that distinguish them from each other. The first, the orienting, is exercised constantly by each and every individual; the two other forms of gaze, speech and action need, as I said, the information it produces. The second form is exercised more selectively in realms of knowledge, interest, training, profession, craft or art. It is accompanied by specific authority and constitutes it, such as the artist's or the physician's authority. It exists between the professional subject and her professional

environment and specific objects within it, and does not require the sharing of objects of knowledge, action or gaze but rather accounting for their results, subject to the disciplinary or institutional rules within which it acts. And the third form of speech, action and gaze, not subject to disciplinary or governing rules, is a form that exists in plurality. First and foremost because the object of the gaze, for example, is not demarcated a priori, and everyone may arrange it differently and turn any gaze and gazer into an object. The action principle of such a civil gaze presupposes non-subjugation to external authority. The intervention of such authority directly damages not only the gaze of several individuals but also the open principle of this space itself, that must remain shared, un-possessable, not enslaved to a specific group, regime or realm.

Finally, I wish to show how this description of *vita activa* proposes a different framework for discussing images in general and photographs in particular, in a way that does not regard them as images with predicates such as 'aesthetic' or 'political' but rather as images whose existence is made up of several formations of *vita activa*. The description I propose enables one to present various human actions not under common oppositions that establish that a certain action is political and another aesthetic, but rather as complex actions that exist simultaneously in several dimensions and which cannot be reduced to either one or the other. The work of art – a product of work – is distinguished from other things that have an aesthetic existence in its effect upon the senses. It has no purpose and, in contemporary discourse, it is perceived as an opportunity for another type of encounter with situations with which the image resonates in various forms. The discourse of art tends to attribute what is created in such an encounter to the creative artist as the exclusive author of the work, or to the work of art as an acting agent. Thus for example, instead of saying that a certain work of art presents an image of a wounded woman, one tends to say that 'the work of art deconstructs the image of woman as an ideal, impeccable body', or that 'the work of art problematizes the representation of the medical body and says so and so . . .' This deviation from the effect of the work of art upon the senses expresses an attempt to break open the professional realm of art.

Under the opposition between the aesthetic and the political, this deviation continues to take place within the rules of discourse of art and actually metaphorizes the gaze, speech and action since the work of art does not act in a political space alone and of its own accord, and especially does not undertake actions such as argumentation or persuasion. One consequence is the deception entailed in the description of the work of art – emerging every once in a while – as something that can change the world – or has lost its power to change it, a *deus ex machina*:

> The success of Lange's photographs in eliciting aid confirmed a feeling that prevailed during the New Deal: those who saw the afflicted would be moved to assist them . . . when the Depression itself remained largely

> invisible for several years and a large daily dose of photographs was still a relatively new regimen, the eye and the mind, and perhaps the heart, were more receptive. (Goldberg, 1991: 139)

A description such as this one by Vicki Goldberg makes one forget that others are the ones acting, seeing and speaking through the work of art, by its mediation and under its auspices.

A spectator can look, speak and act by force of rules and limitations that the discourse of art imposes upon her possibilities of speech, gaze and action, and go on to regard the work of art merely as a point of departure of the gaze, speech and action – and their purpose. But she can also transcend the professional discourse in which she exercises her professional knowledge, enjoy her authority and exercise it, and look at the image not as the origin and purpose in itself (the professional art discourse) but first of all as a carrier of traces of actions, gazes and speech of others with whom she gets together. Then, however, she is already transcending the professional discourse and participating in a joint civil space whose rules are different and in which she is not entitled to any priority or authority.

Traces of those who have taken part in the production of a photograph are present in a weakened form in a work of art. In photographs, even those that have been integrated in the professional discourse of art, these traces cannot be erased without violent disciplinary or governmental action. The photographed persons share a political space of relations with the photographer as well as with spectators. Even if the photographed persons are ignored by the spectator, and even if she relates what she sees only to the photographer and perceives herself as standing alone facing a single creator, their presence as participants can't be erased.

A political judgment of taste establishes that the photographer aestheticized the suffering of photographed Palestinian Ayisha Al Qurd (Figure 3), and assumes that her suffering is the object of the photograph, shaped by the photographer. The political judgment of taste which supposedly aims to choose between the aesthetic and the political fuses them, in fact, as a single whole in the way it relates to the image, and thus does not actually make room for a practical gaze of the third type I described – the civil view.

The ontological state of the photograph – a result of presencing a previous getting-together and in itself the occasion for a new getting-together – invites a deviation from professional discourse, either political or artistic, in which the experts observe, speak and intervene. Such transcendence cannot tend toward 'the political', as the spectator and the photographed persons are already within the political. Going beyond the limits of the professional discourse, then, might lead towards the civil – the space in which the existence of others is not pre-determined, and their participation, like that of the spectator who transcends the political judgment of taste, is prerequisite.

The civil domain does not stand in opposition to the domain of work and creation, and moving towards it does not necessarily mean giving up or destroying other domains. Keeping these three domains – labor, work and the civil – distinct from each other is sometimes the last obstacle to a total instrumentalization of the political space which includes all three of them, and its subjugation to the professional political gaze of the ruling power.

An aesthetic reading of a photograph, of the way it is offered to the gaze, is not opposed to other readings. It is one of several possible readings, enabling us to see what they cannot, and might sometimes provide a more solid basis for the other readings. Without the investigative gaze at the garment worn by the photographed Ayisha al Qurd and at the specific lighting that illuminates it so as not to flatten it in spite of its blackness, there could not have emerged a civil view that recognizes traces of Al Kurd's part in the perfect pieta setting for her portrait. Thus, too, the photograph of Daoud Atiya and the other photos in the series were not achieved in a snapshot gesture, but rather created after photographer and photographed negotiated the proper manner at a given time to shape their portraits in a flawed public space where the injury to Palestinian bodies was not – and still is not – the object of public interest. In order for the civil view to take place, each and every individual must permanently renew the situation necessary for its existence – the open and unrestricted participation of others. Civil intentionality towards the photographed persons simply does not suffice. One is called upon to identify and acknowledge the injury to the conditions of their partaking in shared space. An identifying gaze will look for the name of the photographed, her place of residence, the details of her story which have made her a photographed person, thus partaking in the act of photography – a mother of five children who, along with her spouse, the army has dispossessed of their lives by turning them into administrative detainees, demolishing their home in Khan Yunes refugee camp, where their parents were exiled 40 years earlier, and releasing them several months later without prosecuting them.

Unlike the theoretical view, the practical view in its three forms does not have as its object some Being that transcends the visible. A practical view wishes to dwell upon the visible and use it. It will articulate the seen, helped by outside pictorial information that necessarily exceeds that which a given discourse has framed for its gaze. A civil view cannot exist within the paradigm of viewing the 'suffering of others', as if the spectators' citizenship is immune from the suffering that befalls others – in this case the Palestinian non-citizens – and which is observable from the outside.

A civil view will insist on gazing not only at the photographed person but at all those who took part in the act of photography, from the regime that demolished Ayisha al Qurd's house, exposing her to photography, the soldier who carried out the arrest and demolition, the photographer who arrived at the scene, the assistant, the interpreter whose services were needed to accomplish the negotiation between the photographer and the

photographed, and a friend of the family. Together they render the picture of a regime under which the disaster that befell Ayisha al Qurd does not appear as such. The civil spectator will know such a disaster to be a regime disaster.

Translated by Tal Haran

Notes

1. For more on regime-made disaster see Azoulay (forthcoming).

2. Dwelling on their discovery doesn't mean that it had no precedents. I choose to start with their book and not, for example, with Walter Benjamin's concept of the 'optical unconscious' because of their explicit claim about discovery.

3. See Breaking the Silence website: http://www.shovrimshtika.org/index.e.asp

4. In its various versions, this essay was written vis-a-vis the horrors in Europe during the latter half of the 1930s. Quoted from the last version, written in 1939 (Benjamin, 2003: 270).

5. These questions were raised by Vilenica at the first RUK (Workers in Culture) conference in Belgrade organized as a response to the violent closing of the exhibition 'Exceptions: Young Scene from Priština (Kosovo)', whose opening was violently interrupted by right-wing organizations (see: http://radniciukulturi.net/files/7februar.Glasilo%20Radnika%20u%20kulturi.pdf).

6. From a critique of an exhibition at Museum on the Seam (http://bezalel.secured.co.il/zope/home/he/1173510036/1176900614).

7. Here is the source of the commonly asked question 'Is there political art?' in the discussion of art in different parts of the world since the latter half of the 20th century. The question has various formulations and is usually accompanied by the answer that states that there is – or is not – political art at a given time in a given place.

8. In his recent book Rancière (2009) criticizes the widespread trend in the art world to claim that a certain artistic activity is political.

9. On the migration of political terminology into art discourse, see Haskell (1974: 218).

10. For a critique of the 'aesthetic' position from a Marxist point of view, see for example Jameson (1982), Eagleton (1990), or from a feminist point of view see Schott (1993), or specifically within the discourse of photography see Rosler (2006).

11. I recognize the same effort to deconstruct this opposition and get rid of its power in two different recent books: Groys (2008) and Rancière (2009).

12. For a more detailed critique of this position see (Azoulay, 2008, chs 3–4).

13. For more on Arendt and the gaze see Azoulay (2010).

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Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society
Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40

Decolonization is not a metaphor

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Abstract
Our goal in this article is to remind readers what is unsettling about decolonization. Decolonization brings about the repatriation of Indigenous land and life; it is not a metaphor for other things we want to do to improve our societies and schools. The easy adoption of decolonizing discourse by educational advocacy and scholarship, evidenced by the increasing number of calls to "decolonize our schools," or use "decolonizing methods," or, "decolonize student thinking", turns decolonization into a metaphor. As important as their goals may be, social justice, critical methodologies, or approaches that decenter settler perspectives have objectives that may be incommensurable with decolonization. Because settler colonialism is built upon an entangled triad structure of settler-native-slave, the decolonial desires of white, non-white, immigrant, postcolonial, and oppressed people, can similarly be entangled in resettlement, reoccupation, and reinhabitation that actually further settler colonialism. The metaphorization of decolonization makes possible a set of evasions, or "settler moves to innocence", that problematically attempt to reconcile settler guilt and complicity, and rescue settler futurity. In this article, we analyze multiple settler moves towards innocence in order to forward "an ethic of incommensurability" that recognizes what is distinct and what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization in relation to human and civil rights based social justice projects. We also point to unsettling themes within transnational/Third World decolonizations, abolition, and critical space-place pedagogies, which challenge the coalescence of social justice endeavors, making room for more meaningful potential alliances.

Keywords: *decolonization, settler colonialism, settler moves to innocence, incommensurability, Indigenous land, decolonizing education*

> Decolonization, which sets out to change the order of the world, is, obviously, a program of complete disorder. But it cannot come as a result of magical practices, nor of a natural shock, nor of a friendly understanding. Decolonization, as we know, is a historical process: that is to say it cannot be understood, it cannot become intelligible nor clear to itself except in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give it historical form and content.
>
> *-Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 1963, p. 36*

> Let us admit it, the settler knows perfectly well that no phraseology can be a substitute for reality.
>
> *-Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 1963, p. 45*

Introduction

For the past several years we have been working, in our writing and teaching, to bring attention to how settler colonialism has shaped schooling and educational research in the United States and other settler colonial nation-states. These are two distinct but overlapping tasks, the first concerned with how the invisibilized dynamics of settler colonialism mark the organization, governance, curricula, and assessment of compulsory learning, the other concerned with how settler perspectives and worldviews get to count as knowledge and research and how these perspectives - repackaged as data and findings - are activated in order to rationalize and maintain unfair social structures. We are doing this work alongside many others who - somewhat relentlessly, in writings, meetings, courses, and activism - don't allow the real and symbolic violences of settler colonialism to be overlooked.

Alongside this work, we have been thinking about what decolonization means, what it wants and requires. One trend we have noticed, with growing apprehension, is the ease with which the language of decolonization has been superficially adopted into education and other social sciences, supplanting prior ways of talking about social justice, critical methodologies, or approaches which decenter settler perspectives. Decolonization, which we assert is a distinct project from other civil and human rights-based social justice projects, is far too often subsumed into the directives of these projects, with no regard for how decolonization wants something different than those forms of justice. Settler scholars swap out prior civil and human rights based terms, seemingly to signal both an awareness of the significance of Indigenous and decolonizing theorizations of schooling and educational research, and to include Indigenous peoples on the list of considerations - as an additional special (ethnic) group or class. At a conference on educational research, it is not uncommon to hear speakers refer, almost casually, to the need to "decolonize our schools," or use "decolonizing methods," or "decolonize student thinking." Yet, we have observed a startling number of these discussions make no mention of Indigenous

peoples, our/their[1] struggles for the recognition of our/their sovereignty, or the contributions of Indigenous intellectuals and activists to theories and frameworks of decolonization. Further, there is often little recognition given to the immediate context of settler colonialism on the North American lands where many of these conferences take place.

Of course, dressing up in the language of decolonization is not as offensive as "Navajo print" underwear sold at a clothing chain store (Gaynor, 2012) and other appropriations of Indigenous cultures and materials that occur so frequently. Yet, this kind of inclusion is a form of enclosure, dangerous in how it domesticates decolonization. It is also a foreclosure, limiting in how it recapitulates dominant theories of social change. On the occasion of the inaugural issue of *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, & Society*, we want to be sure to clarify that decolonization is not a metaphor. When metaphor invades decolonization, it kills the very possibility of decolonization; it recenters whiteness, it resettles theory, it extends innocence to the settler, it entertains a settler future. Decolonize (a verb) and decolonization (a noun) cannot easily be grafted onto pre-existing discourses/frameworks, even if they are critical, even if they are anti-racist, even if they are justice frameworks. The easy absorption, adoption, and transposing of decolonization is yet another form of settler appropriation. When we write about decolonization, we are not offering it as a metaphor; it is not an approximation of other experiences of oppression. Decolonization is not a swappable term for other things we want to do to improve our societies and schools. Decolonization doesn't have a synonym.

Our goal in this essay is to remind readers what is unsettling about decolonization - what is unsettling and what should be unsettling. Clearly, we are advocates for the analysis of settler colonialism within education and education research and we position the work of Indigenous thinkers as central in unlocking the confounding aspects of public schooling. We, at least in part, want others to join us in these efforts, so that settler colonial structuring and Indigenous critiques of that structuring are no longer rendered invisible. Yet, this joining cannot be too easy, too open, too settled. Solidarity is an uneasy, reserved, and unsettled matter that neither reconciles present grievances nor forecloses future conflict. There are parts of the decolonization project that are not easily absorbed by human rights or civil rights based approaches to educational equity. In this essay, we think about what decolonization wants.

There is a long and bumbled history of non-Indigenous peoples making moves to alleviate the impacts of colonization. The too-easy adoption of decolonizing discourse (making decolonization a metaphor) is just one part of that history and it taps into pre-existing tropes that get in the way of more meaningful potential alliances. We think of the enactment of these tropes as a series of *moves to innocence* (Malwhinney, 1998), which problematically attempt to reconcile settler guilt and complicity, and rescue settler futurity. Here, to explain why decolonization is and requires more than a metaphor, we discuss some of these moves to innocence:

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[1] As an Indigenous scholar and a settler/trespasser/scholar writing together, we have used forward slashes to reflect our discrepant positionings in our pronouns throughout this essay.

i. Settler nativism
ii. Fantasizing adoption
iii. Colonial equivocation
iv. Conscientization
v. At risk-ing / Asterisk-ing Indigenous peoples
vi. Re-occupation and urban homesteading

Such moves ultimately represent settler fantasies of easier paths to reconciliation. Actually, we argue, attending to what is irreconcilable within settler colonial relations and what is incommensurable between decolonizing projects and other social justice projects will help to reduce the frustration of attempts at solidarity; but the attention won't get anyone off the hook from the hard, unsettling work of decolonization. Thus, we also include a discussion of interruptions that unsettle innocence and recognize incommensurability.

The set of settler colonial relations

Generally speaking, postcolonial theories and theories of coloniality attend to two forms of colonialism[2]. *External colonialism* (also called exogenous or exploitation colonization) denotes the expropriation of fragments of Indigenous worlds, animals, plants and human beings, extracting them in order to transport them to - and build the wealth, the privilege, or feed the appetites of - the colonizers, who get marked as the first world. This includes so-thought 'historic' examples such as opium, spices, tea, sugar, and tobacco, the extraction of which continues to fuel colonial efforts. This form of colonialism also includes the feeding of contemporary appetites for diamonds, fish, water, oil, humans turned workers, genetic material, cadmium and other essential minerals for high tech devices. External colonialism often requires a subset of activities properly called military colonialism - the creation of war fronts/frontiers against enemies to be conquered, and the enlistment of foreign land, resources, and people into military operations. In external colonialism, all things Native become recast as 'natural resources' - bodies and earth for war, bodies and earth for chattel.

The other form of colonialism that is attended to by postcolonial theories and theories of coloniality is *internal colonialism*, the biopolitical and geopolitical management of people, land, flora and fauna within the "domestic" borders of the imperial nation. This involves the use of

[2] Colonialism is not just a symptom of capitalism. Socialist and communist empires have also been settler empires (e.g. Chinese colonialism in Tibet). "In other words," writes Sandy Grande, "both Marxists and capitalists view land and natural resources as commodities to be exploited, in the first instance, by capitalists for personal gain, and in the second by Marxists for the good of all" (2004, p.27). Capitalism and the state are technologies of colonialism, developed over time to further colonial projects. Racism is an invention of colonialism (Silva, 2007). The current colonial era goes back to 1492, when colonial imaginary goes global.

particularized modes of control - prisons, ghettos, minoritizing, schooling, policing - to ensure the ascendancy of a nation and its white[3] elite. These modes of control, imprisonment, and involuntary transport of the human beings across borders - ghettos, their policing, their economic divestiture, and their dislocatability - are at work to authorize the metropole and conscribe her periphery. Strategies of internal colonialism, such as segregation, divestment, surveillance, and criminalization, are both structural and interpersonal.

Our intention in this descriptive exercise is not be exhaustive, or even inarguable; instead, we wish to emphasize that (a) decolonization will take a different shape in each of these contexts - though they can overlap[4] - and that (b) neither external nor internal colonialism adequately describe the form of colonialism which operates in the United States or other nation-states in which the colonizer comes to stay. *Settler colonialism* operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony. For example, in the United States, many Indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed from their homelands onto reservations, indentured, and abducted into state custody, signaling the form of colonization as simultaneously internal (via boarding schools and other biopolitical modes of control) and external (via uranium mining on Indigenous land in the US Southwest and oil extraction on Indigenous land in Alaska) with a frontier (the US military still nicknames all enemy territory "Indian Country"). The horizons of the settler colonial nation-state are total and require a mode of total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments.

Settler colonialism is different from other forms of colonialism in that settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain. Thus, relying solely on postcolonial literatures or theories of coloniality that ignore settler colonialism will not help to envision the shape that decolonization must take in settler colonial contexts. Within settler colonialism, the most important concern is land/water/air/subterranean earth (land, for shorthand, in this article.) Land is what is most valuable, contested, required. This is both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted each day of occupation. This is why Patrick Wolfe (1999) emphasizes that settler colonialism is a structure and not an event. In the process of settler colonialism, land is remade into property and human relationships to land are restricted to the relationship of the owner to his property. Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward. Made savage.

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[3] In using terms as "white" and "whiteness", we are acknowledging that whiteness extends beyond phenotype.

[4] We don't treat internal/external as a taxonomy of colonialisms. They describe two operative modes of colonialism. The modes can overlap, reinforce, and contradict one another, and do so through particular legal, social, economic and political processes that are context specific.

In order for the settlers to make a place their home, they must destroy and disappear the Indigenous peoples that live there. Indigenous peoples are those who have creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a particular place - indeed how we/they came to *be a place*. Our/their relationships to land comprise our/their epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies. For the settlers, Indigenous peoples are in the way and, in the destruction of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous communities, and over time and through law and policy, Indigenous peoples' claims to land under settler regimes, land is recast as property and as a resource. Indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made into ghosts (Tuck and Ree, forthcoming).

At the same time, settler colonialism involves the subjugation and forced labor of chattel slaves[5], whose bodies and lives become the property, and who are kept landless. Slavery in settler colonial contexts is distinct from other forms of indenture whereby *excess labor* is extracted from persons. First, chattels are commodities of labor and therefore it is the slave's *person* that is the excess. Second, unlike workers who may aspire to own land, the slave's very presence on the land is already an excess that must be dis-located. Thus, the slave is a desirable commodity but the person underneath is imprisonable, punishable, and murderable. The violence of keeping/killing the chattel slave makes them deathlike monsters in the settler imagination; they are reconfigured/disfigured as the threat, the razor's edge of safety and terror.

The settler, if known by his actions and how he justifies them, sees himself as holding dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal, and as more developed, more human, more deserving than other groups or species. The settler is making a new "home" and that home is rooted in a homesteading worldview where the wild land and wild people were made for his benefit. He can only make his identity as a settler by making the land produce, and produce excessively, because "civilization" is defined as production in excess of the "natural" world (i.e. in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world). In order for excess production, he needs excess labor, which he cannot provide himself. The chattel slave serves as that excess labor, labor that can never be paid because payment would have to be in the form of property (land). The settler's wealth is land, or a fungible version of it, and so payment for labor is impossible.[6] The settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even supernatural.

Settlers are not immigrants. Immigrants are beholden to the Indigenous laws and epistemologies of the lands they migrate to. Settlers become the law, supplanting Indigenous

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[5] As observed by Erica Neeganagwedgin (2012), these two groups are not always distinct. Neeganagwedgin presents a history of the enslavement of Indigenous peoples in Canada as chattel slaves. In California, Mexico, and the U.S. Southwest under the Spanish mission system, Indigenous people were removed from their land and also made into chattel slaves. Under U.S. colonization, California law stipulated that Indians could be murdered and/or indentured by any "person" (white, propertied, citizen). These laws remained in effect until 1937.

[6] See Kate McCoy (forthcoming) on settler crises in early Jamestown, Virginia to pay indentured European labor with land.

laws and epistemologies. Therefore, settler nations are not immigrant nations (See also A.J. Barker, 2009).

Not unique, the United States, as a settler colonial nation-state, also operates as an empire - utilizing external forms and internal forms of colonization simultaneous to the settler colonial project. This means, and this is perplexing to some, that dispossessed people are brought onto seized Indigenous land through other colonial projects. Other colonial projects include enslavement, as discussed, but also military recruitment, low-wage and high-wage labor recruitment (such as agricultural workers and overseas-trained engineers), and displacement/migration (such as the coerced immigration from nations torn by U.S. wars or devastated by U.S. economic policy). In this set of settler colonial relations, colonial subjects who are displaced by external colonialism, as well as racialized and minoritized by internal colonialism, still occupy and settle stolen Indigenous land. Settlers are diverse, not just of white European descent, and include people of color, even from other colonial contexts. This tightly wound set of conditions and racialized, globalized relations exponentially complicates what is meant by decolonization, and by solidarity, against settler colonial forces.

Decolonization in exploitative colonial situations could involve the seizing of imperial wealth by the postcolonial subject. In settler colonial situations, seizing imperial wealth is inextricably tied to settlement and re-invasion. Likewise, the promise of integration and civil rights is predicated on securing a share of a settler-appropriated wealth (as well as expropriated 'third-world' wealth). Decolonization in a settler context is fraught because empire, settlement, and internal colony have no spatial separation. Each of these features of settler colonialism in the US context - empire, settlement, and internal colony - make it a site of contradictory decolonial desires[7].

Decolonization as metaphor allows people to equivocate these contradictory decolonial desires because it turns decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation. In reality, the tracks walk all over land/people in settler contexts. Though the details are not fixed or agreed upon, in our view, decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, *all* of the land, and not just symbolically. This is precisely why decolonization is necessarily unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity. "Decolonization never takes place unnoticed" (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone.

[7] Decolonization is further fraught because, although the setter-native-slave triad structures settler colonialism, this does not mean that settler, native, and slave are analogs that can be used to describe corresponding identities, structural locations, worldviews, and behaviors. Nor do they mutually constitute one another. For example, Indigenous is an identity independent of the triad, and also an ascribed structural location within the triad. Chattel slave is an ascribed structural position, but not an identity. Settler describes a set of behaviors, as well as a structural location, but is eschewed as an identity.

Playing Indian and the erasure of Indigenous peoples

Recently in a symposium on the significance of Liberal Arts education in the United States, Eve presented an argument that Liberal Arts education has historically excluded any attention to or analysis of settler colonialism. This, Eve posited, makes Liberal Arts education complicit in the project of settler colonialism and, more so, has rendered the truer project of Liberal Arts education something like trying to make the settler indigenous to the land he occupies. The attendees were titillated by this idea, nodding and murmuring in approval and it was then that Eve realized that she was trying to say something incommensurable with what they expected her to say. She was completely misunderstood. Many in the audience heard this observation: that the work of Liberal Arts education is in part to teach settlers to be indigenous, as something admirable, worthwhile, something wholesome, not as a problematic point of evidence about the reach of the settler colonial erasure.

Philip Deloria (1998) explores how and why the settler wants to be made indigenous, even if only through disguise, or other forms of *playing Indian*. Playing Indian is a powerful U.S. pastime, from the Boston Tea Party, to fraternal organizations, to new age trends, to even those aforementioned Native print underwear. Deloria maintains that, "From the colonial period to the present, the Indian has skulked in and out of the most important stories various Americans have told about themselves" (p. 5).

> The indeterminacy of American identities stems, in part, from the nation's inability to deal with Indian people. Americans wanted to feel a natural affinity with the continent, and it was Indians who could teach them such aboriginal closeness. Yet, in order to control the landscape they had to destroy the original inhabitants. (Deloria, 1998, p.5)

L. Frank Baum (author of *The Wizard of Oz*) famously asserted in 1890 that the safety of white settlers was only guaranteed by the "total annihilation of the few remaining Indians" (as quoted in Hastings, 2007). D.H. Lawrence, reading James Fenimore Cooper (discussed at length later in this article), Nathaniel Hawthorne, Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, Henry David Thoreau, Herman Melville, Walt Whitman and others for his *Studies in Classic American Literature* (1924), describes Americans' fascination with Indigeneity as one of simultaneous desire and repulsion (Deloria, 1998).

> "No place," Lawrence observed, "exerts its full influence upon a newcomer until the old inhabitant is dead or absorbed." Lawrence argued that in order to meet the "demon of the continent" head on and this finalize the "unexpressed spirit of America," white Americans needed either to destroy Indians of assimilate them into a white American world...both aimed at making Indians vanish from the landscape. (Lawrence, as quoted in Deloria, 1998, p. 4).

Everything within a settler colonial society strains to destroy or assimilate the Native in order to disappear them from the land - this is how a society can have multiple simultaneous and conflicting messages about Indigenous peoples, such as all Indians are dead, located in faraway reservations, that contemporary Indigenous people are less indigenous than prior generations, and that all Americans are a "little bit Indian." These desires to erase - to let time do its thing and wait for the older form of living to die out, or to even help speed things along (euthanize) because the death of pre-modern ways of life is thought to be inevitable - these are all desires for another kind of resolve to the colonial situation, resolved through the absolute and total destruction or assimilation of original inhabitants.

Numerous scholars have observed that Indigeneity prompts multiple forms of settler anxiety, even if only because the presence of Indigenous peoples - who make *a priori* claims to land and ways of being - is a constant reminder that the settler colonial project is incomplete (Fanon, 1963; Vine Deloria, 1988; Grande, 2004; Bruyneel, 2007). The easy adoption of decolonization as a metaphor (and nothing else) is a form of this anxiety, because it is a premature attempt at reconciliation. The absorption of decolonization by settler social justice frameworks is one way the settler, disturbed by her own settler status, tries to escape or contain the unbearable searchlight of complicity, of having harmed others just by being one's self. The desire to reconcile is just as relentless as the desire to disappear the Native; it is a desire to not have to deal with this (Indian) problem anymore.

Settler moves to innocence

We observe that another component of a desire to play Indian is a settler desire to be made innocent, to find some mercy or relief in face of the relentlessness of settler guilt and haunting (see Tuck and Ree, forthcoming, on mercy and haunting). Directly and indirectly benefitting from the erasure and assimilation of Indigenous peoples is a difficult reality for settlers to accept. The weight of this reality is uncomfortable; the misery of guilt makes one hurry toward any reprieve. In her 1998 Master's thesis, Janet Mawhinney analyzed the ways in which white people maintained and (re)produced white privilege in self-defined anti-racist settings and organizations.[8] She examined the role of storytelling and self-confession - which serves to equate stories of personal exclusion with stories of structural racism and exclusion - and what she terms 'moves to innocence,' or "strategies to remove involvement in and culpability for systems of domination" (p. 17). Mawhinney builds upon Mary Louise Fellows and Sherene Razack's (1998) conceptualization of, 'the race to innocence', "the process through which a woman comes to believe her own claim of subordination is the most urgent, and that she is unimplicated in the subordination of other women" (p. 335).

Mawhinney's thesis theorizes the self-positioning of white people as simultaneously the oppressed and never an oppressor, and as having an *absence of experience* of oppressive power

[8] Thank you to Neoma Mullens for introducing Eve to Mawhinney's concept of moves to innocence.

relations (p. 100). This simultaneous self-positioning afforded white people in various purportedly anti-racist settings to say to people of color, "I don't experience the problems you do, so I don't think about it," and "tell me what to do, you're the experts here" (p. 103). "The commonsense appeal of such statements," Malwhinney observes, enables white speakers to "utter them sanguine in [their] appearance of equanimity, is rooted in the normalization of a liberal analysis of power relations" (ibid.).

In the discussion that follows, we will do some work to identify and argue against a series of what we call 'settler moves to innocence'. Settler moves to innocence are those strategies or positionings that attempt to relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility without giving up land or power or privilege, without having to change much at all. In fact, settler scholars may gain professional kudos or a boost in their reputations for being so sensitive or self-aware. Yet settler moves to innocence are hollow, they only serve the settler. This discussion will likely cause discomfort in our settler readers, may embarrass you/us or make us/you feel implicated. Because of the racialized flights and flows of settler colonial empire described above, settlers are diverse - there are white settlers and brown settlers, and peoples in both groups make moves to innocence that attempt to deny and deflect their own complicity in settler colonialism. When it makes sense to do so, we attend to moves to innocence enacted differently by white people and by brown and Black people.

In describing settler moves to innocence, our goal is to provide a framework of excuses, distractions, and diversions from decolonization. We discuss some of the moves to innocence at greater length than others, mostly because some require less explanation and because others are more central to our initial argument for the demetaphorization of decolonization. We provide this framework so that we can be more impatient with each other, less likely to accept gestures and half-steps, and more willing to press for acts which unsettle innocence, which we discuss in the final section of this article.

Moves to innocence I: Settler nativism

In this move to innocence, settlers locate or invent a long-lost ancestor who is rumored to have had "Indian blood," and they use this claim to mark themselves as blameless in the attempted eradications of Indigenous peoples. There are numerous examples of public figures in the United States who "remember" a distant Native ancestor, including Nancy Reagan (who is said to be a descendant of Pocahontas) and, more recently, Elizabeth Warren[9] and many others, illustrating how commonplace settler nativism is. Vine Deloria Jr. discusses what he calls the Indian-grandmother complex in the following account from *Custer Died for Your Sins*:

[9] See Francie Latour's interview (June 1 2012) with Kim Tallbear for more information on the Elizabeth Warren example. In the interview, Tallbear asserts that Warren's romanticized claims and the accusations of fraud are evidence of ways in which people in the U.S. misunderstand Native American identity. Tallbear insists that to understand Native American identity, "you need to get outside of that binary, one-drop framework."

> During my three years as Executive Director of the National Congress of American Indians it was a rare day when some white [person] didn't visit my office and proudly proclaim that he or she was of Indian descent...
>
> At times I became quite defensive about being a Sioux when these white people had a pedigree that was so much more respectable than mine. But eventually I came to understand their need to identify as partially Indian and did not resent them. I would confirm their wildest stories about their Indian ancestry and would add a few tales of my own hoping that they would be able to accept themselves someday and leave us alone.
>
> Whites claiming Indian blood generally tend to reinforce mythical beliefs about Indians. All but one person I met who claimed Indian blood claimed it on their grandmother's side. I once did a projection backward and discovered that evidently most tribes were entirely female for the first three hundred years of white occupation. No one, it seemed, wanted to claim a male Indian as a forebear.
>
> It doesn't take much insight into racial attitudes to understand the real meaning of the Indian-grandmother complex that plagues certain white [people]. A male ancestor has too much of the aura of the savage warrior, the unknown primitive, the instinctive animal, to make him a respectable member of the family tree. But a young Indian princess? Ah, there was royalty for the taking. Somehow the white was linked with a noble house of gentility and culture if his grandmother was an Indian princess who ran away with an intrepid pioneer...
>
> While a real Indian grandmother is probably the nicest thing that could happen to a child, why is a remote Indian princess grandmother so necessary for many white [people]? Is it because they are afraid of being classed as foreigners? Do they need some blood tie with the frontier and its dangers in order to experience what it means to be an American? Or is it an attempt to avoid facing the guilt they bear for the treatment of the Indians? (1988, p. 2-4)

Settler nativism, or what Vine Deloria Jr. calls the Indian-grandmother complex, is a settler move to innocence because it is an attempt to deflect a settler identity, while continuing to enjoy settler privilege and occupying stolen land. Deloria observes that settler nativism is gendered and considers the reasons a storied Indian grandmother might have more appeal than an Indian grandfather. On one level, it can be expected that many settlers have an ancestor who was Indigenous and/or who was a chattel slave. This is precisely the habit of settler colonialism, which pushes humans into other human communities; strategies of rape and sexual violence, and also the ordinary attractions of human relationships, ensure that settlers have Indigenous and chattel slave ancestors.

Further, though race is a social construct, Indigenous peoples and chattel slaves, particularly slaves from the continent of Africa, were/are racialized differently in ways that support/ed the logics and aims of settler colonialism (the erasure of the Indigenous person and

the capture and containment of the slave). "Indians and Black people in the US have been racialized in opposing ways that reflect their antithetical roles in the formation of US society," Patrick Wolfe (2006) explains:

> Black people's enslavement produced an inclusive taxonomy that automatically enslaved the offspring of a slave and any other parent. In the wake of slavery, this taxonomy became fully racialized in the "one-drop rule," whereby any amount of African ancestry, no matter how remote, and regardless of phenotypical appearance, makes a person Black. (p. 387)

Kim Tallbear argues that the one-drop rule dominates understandings of race in the United States and, so, most people in the US have not been able to understand Indigenous identity (Latour, 2012). Through the one-drop rule, blackness in settler colonial contexts is *expansive*, ensuring that a slave/criminal status will be *inherited* by an expanding number of 'black' descendants. Yet, Indigenous peoples have been racialized in a profoundly different way. Native American-ness[10] is *subtractive*: Native Americans are constructed to become fewer in number and *less* Native, but never exactly white, over time. Our/their status as Indigenous peoples/first inhabitants is the basis of our/their land claims and the goal of settler colonialism is to diminish claims to land over generations (or sooner, if possible). That is, Native American is a racialization that portrays contemporary Indigenous generations to be less authentic, less Indigenous than every prior generation in order to ultimately phase out Indigenous claims to land and usher in settler claims to property. This is primarily done through blood quantum registries and policies, which were forced on Indigenous nations and communities and, in some cases, have overshadowed former ways of determining tribal membership.

Wolfe (2006) explains:

> For Indians, in stark contrast, non-Indian ancestry compromised their indigeneity, producing "half-breeds," a regime that persists in the form of blood quantum regulations. As opposed to enslaved people, whose reproduction augmented their owners' wealth, Indigenous people obstructed settlers' access to land, so their increase was counterproductive. In this way, the restrictive racial classification of Indians straightforwardly furthered the logic of elimination. (p. 387)

The racializations of Indigenous people and Black people in the US settler colonial nation-state are geared to ensure the ascendancy of white settlers as the true and rightful owners and occupiers of the land.

> In the national mythologies of such societies, it is believed that white people came first and that it is they who principally developed the land; Aboriginal peoples are presumed to be mostly dead or assimilated. European settlers thus *become* the

[10] Native American, then, can be a signifier for how Indigenous peoples (over 500 federally recognized tribes and nations in the U.S. alone) are racialized into one vanishing race in the U.S. settler-colonial context.

> original inhabitants and the group most entitled to the fruits of citizenship." (Razack, 2002, p. 1-2; emphasis original.)

In the racialization of whiteness, blood quantum rules are reversed so that white people can stay white, yet claim descendance from an Indian grandmother. In 1924, the Virginia legislature passed the Racial Integrity Act, which enforced the one-drop rule *except* for white people who claimed a distant Indian grandmother - the result of strong lobbying from the aristocratic "First Families of Virginia" who all claim to have descended from Pocahontas (including Nancy Reagan, born in 1921). Known as the Pocahontas Exception, this loophole allowed thousands of white people to claim Indian ancestry, while actual Indigenous people were reclassified as "colored" and disappeared off the public record[11].

Settler nativism, through the claiming of a long-lost ancestor, invests in these specific racializations of Indigenous people and Black people, and disbelieves the sovereign authority of Indigenous nations to determine tribal membership. Dakota scholar Kim Tallbear (in an interview on the recent Elizabeth Warren example), provides an account that echoes and updates Deloria's account. Speaking to the many versions of settler nativism she has encountered, in which people say,

> "My great-great grandmother was an Indian princess." [or] "I'm descended from Pocohantas." What Elizabeth Warren said about the high cheekbones, I've had so many people from across the political spectrum say things that strange or stranger. And my point is, maybe you do have some remote ancestor. So what? You don't just get to decide you're Cherokee if the community does not recognize you as such (as quoted in Latour, 2012).

Ancestry is different from tribal membership; Indigenous identity and tribal membership are questions that Indigenous communities alone have the right to struggle over and define, not DNA tests, heritage websites, and certainly not the settler state. Settler nativism is about imagining an Indian past and a settler future; in contrast, tribal sovereignty has provided for an Indigenous present and various Indigenous intellectuals theorize decolonization as Native futures without a settler state.

Moves to innocence II: Settler adoption fantasies

Describing acts of passing, Sara Ahmed (2000) asserts the importance of being able to replace "the stranger", or take the place of the other, in the consolidation and (re)affirmation of white identity. To "become without becoming," is to reproduce "the other as 'not-I' *within* rather than *beyond* the structure of the 'I'" (p. 132). Sherene Razack, reading Ahmed, tells us that

[11] The 1940 Census only recorded 198 Indians in the State of Virginia. 6 out of 8 tribes in Virginia are currently unable to obtain federal recognition because of the racial erasure under the Racial Integrity Act (Fiske, 2004).

appropriating the other's pain occurs when, "we think we are recognizing not only the other's pain but his or her difference. Difference becomes the conduit of identification in much the same way as pain does" (Razack, 2007, p. 379). Discussing the film *Dances with Wolves* (a cinematic fiction of a Union soldier in the post-bellum Civil War era who befriends and protects the Lakota Sioux, who are represented as a noble, dying race), Ahmed critically engages the narrative, in which a white man (played by Kevin Costner) comes to respect the Sioux,

> to the point of being able to dance their dances...the white man in this example is able to 'to become without becoming' (Ahmed, 2000, p. 32)...He alone is transformed through his encounter with the Sioux, while they remain the mechanism for his transformation. He becomes the authentic knower while they remain what is to be known and consumed, and spit out again, as good Indians who confirm the white man's position as hero of the story...the Sioux remain objects, while Kevin Costner is able to go anywhere and be anything. (Ahmed's analysis, as discussed by Razack, 2007, p. 379).

For the purposes of this article, we locate the desire to *become without becoming [Indian]* within settler adoption fantasies. These fantasies can mean the adoption of Indigenous practices and knowledge, but more, refer to those narratives in the settler colonial imagination in which the Native (understanding that he is becoming extinct) hands over his land, his claim to the land, his very Indian-ness to the settler for safe-keeping. This is a fantasy that is invested in a settler futurity and dependent on the foreclosure of an Indigenous futurity.

Settler adoption fantasies are longstanding narratives in the United States, fueled by rare instances of ceremonial "adoptions", from John Smith's adoption in 1607 by Powhatan (Pocahontas' father), to Lewis Henry Morgan's adoption in 1847 by Seneca member Jimmy Johnson, to the recent adoption of actor Johnny Depp by the family of LaDonna Harris, a Comanche woman and social activist. As sovereign nations, tribes make decisions about who is considered a member, so our interest is not in whether adoptions are appropriate or legitimate. Rather, because the prevalence of the adoption narrative in American literature, film, television, holidays and history books far exceeds the actual occurrences of adoptions, we are interested in how this narrative spins a fantasy that an individual settler can become innocent, indeed heroic and indigenized, against a backdrop of national guilt. The adoption fantasy is the mythical trump card desired by critical settlers who feel remorse about settler colonialism, one that absolves them from the inheritance of settler crimes and that bequeaths a new inheritance of Native-ness *and claims to land* (which is a reaffirmation of what the settler project has been all along).

To more fully explain, we turn to perhaps the most influential version of the adoption narrative, penned by James Fenimore Cooper in 1823-1841. James Fenimore, son of "that genius in land speculation William Cooper" (Butterfield, 1954, p. 374), grew up in Six Nations territory that his father had grabbed and named after himself as Cooperstown, New York. In these Iroquois lakes, forests, and hills, James Fenimore, and later his daughter, Susan, imagined for themselves frontier romances full of tragic Indians, inventive and compassionate settlers, and virginal white/Indian women in virgin wilderness. Cooper's five-book series, collectively called

the *Leatherstocking Tales*, are foundational in the emergence of American literature. Melville called Cooper "our national author" and it was no exaggeration. His were the most widely read novels of the time and, in the age of the printing press, this meant they were the most circulated books in a U.S. print-based popular culture. Mass print established national language and identity, an "imagined community" (Anderson, 1991) from which emerges 'America' as a nation as opposed to just an assortment of former colonies. The *Tales* are credited with the constructions of the vanishing Indian, the resourceful Frontiersman, and the degenerate Negro: the pivotal triad of archetypes that forms the basis for an American national literature.

The Last of Mohicans is undoubtedly the most famous among the *Tales* and has been remade[12] into three separate television series in 1957, 1971, and 2004; an opera in 1977; a BBC radio adaptation in 1995; a 2007 Marvel comic book series; a stage drama in performance since 2010; and eleven separate films spanning 1912 to 1992. In a sense, *Last of the Mohicans* is a national narrative that has never stopped being remade[13].

Across all five books, Cooper's epic hero is Natty Bumppo, a white man 'gone native', at home in nature, praised for his wisdom and ways that are both Indian and white. In *Last of the Mohicans,* this hero becomes the adopted son of Chingachgook, fictional chief of the fictional tribe "Mohicans", who renames Natty, Nathaniel Hawkeye - thus legitimating and completing his Indigeneity. At the same time, Chingachgook conveniently fades into extinction. In a critical symbolic gesture, Chingachgook hands over his son Uncas - the last of the Mohicans - to the adopted, Indigenized white man, Hawkeye. When Uncas dies, the ramification is obvious: Hawkeye becomes without becoming the last of the Mohicans. *You are now one of us, you are now Native.* "The pale-faces are masters of the earth, and the time of the red-men has not yet come again" (Cooper 2000, p.407).

Cooper's books fantasize the founding and expansion of the U.S. settler nation by fictionalizing the period of 1740-1804, distilled into the single narrative of one man. The arc of his life stands in for the narrative of national development: the heroic settler Natty Bumppo transitions from British trapper to 'native' American, to prairie pioneer in the new Western frontier. Interestingly, the books themselves were written in reverse chronological order, starting with the pioneer, going backwards in time. Through such historical hypnosis, settler literature fabricates past lives, all the way back to an Indian past. 'I am American' becomes 'I was frontiersman, was British, was Indian'.

In this fantasy, Hawkeye is both adopter and adoptee. The act of adopting indigenous ways makes him 'deserving' to be adopted by the Indigenous. Settler fantasies of adoption alleviate the anxiety of settler un-belonging. He adopts the love of land and therefore thinks he belongs to the land. He is a first environmentalist and sentimentalist, nostalgic for vanishing

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[12] Tellingly, these remakes were produced in Canada, Britain, Germany and the United States.

[13] To include all the 'remakes' of the story in its different forms (e.g. the post 9/11 historical fiction G*angs of New York*, the 2009 film *Avatar*, or the 2011 film *The Descendants* - also discussed in this article), would require an exhaustive and exhausting account well beyond the scope of this article.

Native ways. In today's jargon, he could be thought of as an eco-activist, naturalist, and Indian sympathizer. At the same time, his cultural hybridity is what makes him more 'fit' to survive - the ultimate social Darwinism - better than both British and Indian; he is the mythical American. Hawkeye, hybrid white and Indian, becomes the reluctant but nonetheless rightful inheritor of the land and warden of its vanishing people.

Similarly, the settler intellectual who hybridizes decolonial thought with Western critical traditions (metaphorizing decolonization), emerges superior to both Native intellectuals and continental theorists simultaneously. With his critical hawk-eye, he again sees the critique better than anyone and sees the world from a loftier station[14]. It is a fiction, just as Cooper's Hawkeye, just as the adoption, just as the belonging.

In addition to fabricating historical memory, the *Tales* serve to generate historical amnesia. The books were published between 1823-1841, at the height of the Jacksonian period with the Indian Removal Act of 1830 and subsequent Trail of Tears 1831-1837. During this time, 46,000 Native Americans were removed from their homelands, opening 25 million acres of land for re-settlement. The *Tales* are not only silent on Indian Removal but narrate the Indian as vanishing in an earlier time frame, and thus Indigenous people are already dead prior to removal.

Performing sympathy is critical to Cooper's project of settler innocence. It is no accident that he is often read as a sympathizer to the Indians (despite the fact that he didn't know any) in contrast to Jackson's policies of removal and genocide. Cooper is cast as the 'innocent' father of U.S. ideology, in contrast to the 'bad white men' of history.

Performing suffering is also critical to Cooper's project of settler innocence. Hawkeye takes on the (imagined) demeanor of the vanishing Native - brooding, vengeful, protecting a dying way of life, and unsuccessful in finding a mate and producing offspring. Thus sympathy and suffering are the tokens used to absorb the Native Other's difference, coded as pain, the 'not-I' into the 'I'.

The settler's personal suffering feeds his fantasy of mutuality. The 2011 film, *The Descendants,* is a modern remake of the adoption fantasy (blended with a healthy dose of settler nativism). George Clooney's character, "King" is a haole hypo-descendant of the last surviving princess of Hawai'i and reluctant inheritor of a massive expanse of land, the last wilderness on the Island of Kauai. In contrast to his obnoxious settler cousins, he earns his privilege as an overworked lawyer rather than relying on his unearned inheritance. Furthermore, Clooney's character suffers - he is a dysfunctional father, heading a dysfunctional family, watching his wife wither away in a coma, learning that she cheated on him - and so he is somehow Hawaiian at heart. Because pain is the token for oppression, claims to pain then equate to claims of being an innocent non-oppressor. By the film's end, King goes against the wishes of his profiteering settler cousins and chooses to "keep" the land, reluctantly accepting that his is the steward of the land, a responsibility bequeathed upon him as an accident of birth. This is the denouement of

[14] His lament is that no one else can see what he sees, just as Hawkeye laments his failed attempts to rescue white people from bad Indians, and good Indians from ignorant white people. He is the escapee from Plato's Cave. The rest of us are stuck in the dark.

reconciliation between the settler-I and the interiorized native-not-I within the settler. Sympathy and suffering are profoundly satisfying for settler cinema: *The Descendants* was nominated for 5 Academy Awards and won for Best Adapted Screenplay in 2012.

The beauty of this settler fantasy is that it adopts decolonization and aborts it in one gesture. Hawkeye adopts Uncas, who then conveniently dies. King adopts Hawai'i and negates the necessity for *ea*, Kanaka Maoli sovereignty. Decolonization is stillborn - rendered irrelevant because decolonization is already completed by the indigenized consciousness of the settler. Now 'we' are all Indian, all Hawaiian, and decolonization is no longer an issue. 'Our' only recourse is to move forward, however regretfully, with 'our' settler future.

In the unwritten decolonial version of Cooper's story, Hawkeye would lose his land back to the Mohawk - the real people upon whose land Cooperstown was built and whose rivers, lakes, and forests Cooper mined for his frontier romances. Hawkeye would shoot his last arrow, or his last long-rifle shot, return his eagle feather, and would be renamed Natty Bumppo, settler on Native land. The story would end with the moment of this recognition. Unresolved are the questions: Would a conversation follow after that between Native and the last settler? Would the settler leave or just vanish? Would he ask to stay, and if he did, who would say yes? These are questions that will be addressed at decolonization, and not a priori in order to appease anxieties for a settler future.

Moves to innocence III: Colonial equivocation

A more nuanced move to innocence is the homogenizing of various experiences of oppression as colonization. Calling different groups 'colonized' without describing their relationship to settler colonialism is an equivocation, "the fallacy of using a word in different senses at different stages of the reasoning" (Etymonline, 2001). In particular, describing all struggles against imperialism as 'decolonizing' creates a convenient ambiguity between decolonization and social justice work, especially among people of color, queer people, and other groups minoritized by the settler nation-state. 'We are all colonized,' may be a true statement but is deceptively embracive and vague, its inference: 'None of us are settlers.' Equivocation, or calling everything by the same name, is a move towards innocence that is especially vogue in coalition politics among people of color.

People of color who enter/are brought into the settler colonial nation-state also enter the triad of relations between settler-native-slave. We are referring here to the colonial pathways that are usually described as 'immigration' and how the refugee/immigrant/migrant is invited to be a settler in some scenarios, given the appropriate investments in whiteness, or is made an illegal, criminal presence in other scenarios. Ghetto colonialism, prisons, and under resourced compulsory schooling are specializations of settler colonialism in North America; they are

produced by the collapsing of internal, external, and settler colonialisms, into new blended categories[15].

This triad of settler-native-slave and its selective collapsibility seems to be unique to settler colonial nations. For example, all Aleut people on the Aleutian Islands were collected and placed in internment camps for four years after the bombing of Dutch Harbor; the stated rationale was the protection of the people but another likely reason was that the U.S. Government feared the Aleuts would become allies with the Japanese and/or be difficult to differentiate from potential Japanese spies. White people who lived on the Aleutian Islands at that same time were not interned. Internment in abandoned warehouses and canneries in Southeast Alaska was the cause of significant numbers of death of children and elders, physical injury, and illness among Aleut people. Aleut internment during WWII is largely ignored as part of U.S. history. The shuffling of Indigenous people between Native, enslavable Other, and Orientalized Other[16] shows how settler colonialism constructs and collapses its triad of categories.

This colonizing trick explains why certain minorities can at times become model and quasi-assimilable (as exemplified by Asian settler colonialism, civil rights, model minority discourse, and the use of 'hispanic' as an ethnic category to mean both white and non-white) yet, in times of crisis, revert to the status of foreign contagions (as exemplified by Japanese Internment, Islamophobia, Chinese Exclusion, Red Scare, anti-Irish nativism, WWII anti-semitism, and anti-Mexican-immigration). This is why 'labor' or 'workers' as an agential political class fails to activate the decolonizing project. "[S]hifting lines of the international division of labor" (Spivak, 1985, p. 84) bisect the very category of labor into caste-like bodies built for work on one hand and rewardable citizen-workers on the other. Some labor becomes settler, while excess labor becomes enslavable, criminal, murderable.

The impossibility of fully becoming a white settler - in this case, white referring to an exceptionalized position with assumed rights to invulnerability and legal supremacy - as articulated by minority literature preoccupied with "glass ceilings" and "forever foreign" status and "myth of the model minority", offers a strong critique of the myth of the democratic nation-state. However, its logical endpoint, the attainment of equal legal and cultural entitlements, is actually an investment in settler colonialism. Indeed, even the ability to be a minority citizen in the settler nation means an option to become a brown settler. For many people of color, becoming a subordinate settler is an option even when becoming white is not.

"Following stolen resources" is a phrase that Wayne has encountered, used to describe Filipino overseas labor (over 10% of the population of the Philippines is working abroad) and other migrations from colony to metropole. This phrase is an important anti-colonial framing of a

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[15] E.g. Detention centers contain the foreign, non-citizen subject who is paradoxically outside of the nation yet at the mercy of imperial sovereignty within the metropole.

[16] We are using Orientalized Other in sense of the enemy other, following Edward Said's (1978) analysis of Orientalism.

colonial situation. However an anti-colonial critique is not the same as a decolonizing framework; anti-colonial critique often celebrates empowered postcolonial subjects who seize denied privileges from the metropole. This anti-to-post-colonial project doesn't strive to undo colonialism but rather to remake it and subvert it. Seeking stolen resources is entangled with settler colonialism because those resources were nature/Native first, then enlisted into the service of settlement and thus almost impossible to reclaim without re-occupying Native land. Furthermore, the postcolonial pursuit of resources is fundamentally an anthropocentric model, as land, water, air, animals, and plants are never able to become postcolonial; they remain objects to be exploited by the empowered postcolonial subject.

Equivocation is the vague equating of colonialisms that erases the sweeping scope of land as the basis of wealth, power, law in settler nation-states. Vocalizing a 'muliticultural' approach to oppressions, or remaining silent on settler colonialism while talking about colonialisms, or tacking on a gesture towards Indigenous people without addressing Indigenous sovereignty or rights, or forwarding a thesis on decolonization without regard to unsettling/deoccupying land, are equivocations. That is, they ambiguously avoid engaging with settler colonialism; they are ambivalent about minority / people of color / colonized Others *as settlers*; they are cryptic about Indigenous land rights in spaces inhabited by people of color.

Moves to innocence IV: Free your mind and the rest will follow

Fanon told us in 1963 that decolonizing the mind is the first step, not the only step toward overthrowing colonial regimes. Yet we wonder whether another settler move to innocence is to focus on decolonizing the mind, or the cultivation of critical consciousness, as if it were the sole activity of decolonization; to allow *conscientization* to stand in for the more uncomfortable task of relinquishing stolen land. We agree that curricula, literature, and pedagogy can be crafted to aid people in learning to see settler colonialism, to articulate critiques of settler epistemology, and set aside settler histories and values in search of ethics that reject domination and exploitation; this is not unimportant work. However, the front-loading of critical consciousness building can waylay decolonization, even though the experience of teaching and learning to be critical of settler colonialism can be so powerful it can feel like it is indeed making change. Until stolen land is relinquished, critical consciousness does not translate into action that disrupts settler colonialism. So, we respectfully disagree with George Clinton and Funkadelic (1970) and En Vogue (1992) when they assert that if you "free your mind, the rest (your ass) will follow."

Paulo Freire, eminent education philosopher, popular educator, and liberation theologian, wrote his celebrated book, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, in no small part as a response to Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth.* Its influence upon critical pedagogy and on the practices of educators committed to social justice cannot be overstated. Therefore, it is important to point out significant differences between Freire and Fanon, especially with regard to de/colonization. Freire situates the work of liberation in the minds of the oppressed, an abstract category of dehumanized worker vis-a-vis a similarly abstract category of oppressor. This is a sharp right

turn away from Fanon's work, which always positioned the work of liberation in the particularities of colonization, in the specific structural and interpersonal categories of Native and settler. Under Freire's paradigm, it is unclear who the oppressed are, even more ambiguous who the oppressors are, and it is inferred throughout that an innocent third category of enlightened human exists: "those who suffer with [the oppressed] and fight at their side" (Freire, 2000, p. 42). These words, taken from the opening dedication of *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, invoke the same settler fantasy of mutuality based on sympathy and suffering.

Fanon positions decolonization as chaotic, an unclean break from a colonial condition that is already over determined by the violence of the colonizer and unresolved in its possible futures. By contrast, Freire positions liberation as redemption, a freeing of both oppressor and oppressed through their humanity. Humans become 'subjects' who then proceed to work on the 'objects' of the world (animals, earth, water), and indeed read the word (critical consciousness) in order to write the world (exploit nature). For Freire, there are no Natives, no Settlers, and indeed no history, and the future is simply a rupture from the timeless present. Settler colonialism is absent from his discussion, implying either that it is an unimportant analytic or that it is an already completed project of the past (a past oppression perhaps). Freire's theories of liberation resoundingly echo the allegory of Plato's Cave, a continental philosophy of mental emancipation, whereby the thinking man individualistically emerges from the dark cave of ignorance into the light of critical consciousness.

By contrast, black feminist thought roots freedom in the darkness of the cave, in that well of feeling and wisdom from which all knowledge is recreated.

> These places of possibility within ourselves are dark because they are ancient and hidden; they have survived and grown strong through darkness. Within these deep places, each one of us holds an incredible reserve of creativity and power, of unexamined and unrecorded emotion and feeling. The woman's place of power within each of us is neither white nor surface; it is dark, it is ancient, and it is deep. (Lorde, 1984, pp. 36-37)

Audre Lorde's words provide a sharp contrast to Plato's sight-centric image of liberation: "The white fathers told us, I think therefore I am; and the black mothers in each of us - the poet - whispers in our dreams, I feel therefore I can be free" (p. 38). For Lorde, writing is not action upon the world. Rather, poetry is giving a name to the nameless, "first made into language, then into idea, then into more tangible action" (p. 37). Importantly, freedom is a possibility that is not just mentally generated; it is particular and felt.

Freire's philosophies have encouraged educators to use "colonization" as a metaphor for oppression. In such a paradigm, "internal colonization" reduces to "mental colonization", logically leading to the solution of decolonizing one's mind and the rest will follow. Such philosophy conveniently sidesteps the most unsettling of questions:

> The essential thing is to see clearly, to think clearly - that is, dangerously and to answer clearly the innocent first question: what, fundamentally, is colonization? (Cesaire, 2000, p. 32)

Because colonialism is comprised of global and historical relations, Cesaire's question must be considered globally and historically. However, it cannot be reduced to a global answer, nor a historical answer. To do so is to use colonization metaphorically. "What is colonization?" must be answered specifically, with attention to the colonial apparatus that is assembled to order the relationships between particular peoples, lands, the 'natural world', and 'civilization'. Colonialism is marked by its specializations. In North America and other settings, settler sovereignty imposes sexuality, legality, raciality, language, religion and property in specific ways. Decolonization likewise must be thought through in these particularities.

> To agree on what [decolonization] is not: neither evangelization, nor a philanthropic enterprise, nor a desire to push back the frontiers of ignorance, disease, and tyranny... (Cesaire, 2000, p. 32)

We deliberately extend Cesaire's words above to assert what decolonization is not. It is not converting Indigenous politics to a Western doctrine of liberation; it is not a philanthropic process of 'helping' the at-risk and alleviating suffering; it is not a generic term for struggle against oppressive conditions and outcomes. The broad umbrella of social justice may have room underneath for all of these efforts. By contrast, decolonization specifically requires the repatriation of Indigenous land and life. Decolonization is not a metonym for social justice.

We don't intend to discourage those who have dedicated careers and lives to teaching themselves and others to be critically conscious of racism, sexism, homophobia, classism, xenophobia, and settler colonialism. We are asking them/you to consider how the pursuit of critical consciousness, the pursuit of social justice through a critical enlightenment, can also be settler moves to innocence - diversions, distractions, which relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility, and conceal the need to give up land or power or privilege.

Anna Jacobs' 2009 Master's thesis explores the possibilities for what she calls *white harm reduction* models. Harm reduction models attempt to reduce the harm or risk of specific practices. Jacobs identifies white supremacy as a public health issue that is at the root of most other public health issues. The goal of white harm reduction models, Jacobs says, is to reduce the harm that white supremacy has had on white people, and the deep harm it has caused non-white people over generations. Learning from Jacobs' analysis, we understand the curricular-pedagogical project of critical consciousness as *settler harm reduction,* crucial in the resuscitation of practices and intellectual life outside of settler ontologies. (Settler) harm reduction is intended only as a stopgap. As the environmental crisis escalates and peoples around the globe are exposed to greater concentrations of violence and poverty, the need for settler harm reduction is acute, profoundly so. At the same time we remember that, by definition, settler harm

reduction, like conscientization, is not the same as decolonization and does not inherently offer any pathways that lead to decolonization.

Moves to innocence V: A(s)t(e)risk peoples

This settler move to innocence is concerned with the ways in which Indigenous peoples are counted, codified, represented, and included/disincluded by educational researchers and other social science researchers. Indigenous peoples are rendered visible in mainstream educational research in two main ways: as "at risk" peoples and as asterisk peoples. This comprises a settler move to innocence because it erases and then conceals the erasure of Indigenous peoples within the settler colonial nation-state and moves Indigenous nations as "populations" to the margins of public discourse.

As "at risk" peoples, Indigenous students and families are described as on the verge of extinction, culturally and economically bereft, engaged or soon-to-be engaged in self-destructive behaviors which can interrupt their school careers and seamless absorption into the economy. Even though it is widely known and verified that Native youth gain access to personal and academic success when they also have access to/instruction in their home languages, most Native American and Alaskan Native youth are taught in English-only schools by temporary teachers who know little about their students' communities (Lomawaima and McCarty, 2006; Lee, 2011). Even though Indigenous knowledge systems predate, expand, update, and complicate the curricula found in most public schools, schools attended by poor Indigenous students are among those most regimented in attempts to comply with federal mandates. Though these mandates intrude on the sovereignty of Indigenous peoples, the "services" promised at the inception of these mandates do little to make the schools attended by Indigenous youth better at providing them a compelling, relevant, inspiring and meaningful education.

At the same time, Indigenous communities become the asterisk peoples, meaning they are represented by an asterisk in large and crucial data sets, many of which are conducted to inform public policy that impact our/their lives (Villegas, 2012). Education and health statistics are unavailable from Indigenous communities for a variety of reasons and, when they are made available, the size of the *n*, or the sample size, can appear to be negligible when compared to the sample size of other/race-based categories. Though Indigenous scholars such as Malia Villegas recognize that Indigenous peoples are distinct from each other but also from other racialized groups surveyed in these studies, they argue that difficulty of collecting basic education and health information about this small and heterogeneous category must be overcome in order to counter the disappearance of Indigenous particularities in public policy.

In U.S. educational research in particular, Indigenous peoples are included only as asterisks, as footnotes into dominant paradigms of educational inequality in the U.S. This can be observed in the progressive literature on school discipline, on 'underrepresented minorities' in higher education, and in the literature of reparation, i.e., redressing 'past' wrongs against non-white Others. Under such paradigms, which do important work on alleviating the symptoms of

colonialism (poverty, dispossession, criminality, premature death, cultural genocide), Indigeneity is simply an "and" or an illustration of oppression. 'Urban education', for example, is a code word for the schooling of black, brown, and ghettoized youth who form the numerical majority in divested public schools. Urban American Indians and Native Alaskans become an asterisk group, invisibilized, even though about two-thirds of Indigenous peoples in the U.S. live in urban areas, according to the 2010 census. Yet, urban Indians receive fewer federal funds for education, health, and employment than their counterparts on reservations (Berry, 2012). Similarly, Native Pasifika people become an asterisk in the Asian Pacific Islander category and their politics/epistemologies/experiences are often subsumed under a pan-ethnic Asian-American master narrative. From a settler viewpoint that concerns itself with numerical inequality, e.g. the achievement gap, underrepresentation, and the 99%'s short share of the wealth of the metropole, the asterisk is an outlier, an outnumber. It is a token gesture, an inclusion and an enclosure of Native people into the politics of equity. These acts of inclusion assimilate Indigenous sovereignty, ways of knowing, and ways of being by remaking a collective-comprised tribal identity into an individualized ethnic identity.

From a decolonizing perspective, the asterisk is a body count that does not account for Indigenous politics, educational concerns, and epistemologies. Urban land (indeed all land) is Native land. The vast majority of Native youth in North America live in urban settings. Any decolonizing urban education endeavor must address the foundations of urban land pedagogy and Indigenous politics *vis-a-vis* the settler colonial state.

Moves to innocence VI: Re-occupation and urban homesteading

The Occupy movement for many economically marginalized people has been a welcome expression of resistance to the massive disparities in the distribution of wealth; for many Indigenous people, Occupy is another settler re-occupation on stolen land. The rhetoric of the movement relies upon problematic assumptions about social justice and is a prime example of the incommensurability between "re/occupy" and "decolonize" as political agendas. The pursuit of worker rights (and rights to work) and minoritized people's rights in a settler colonial context can appear to be anti-capitalist, but this pursuit is nonetheless largely pro-colonial. That is, the ideal of "redistribution of wealth" camouflages how much of that wealth is *land*, Native land. In Occupy, the "99%" is invoked as a deserving supermajority, in contrast to the unearned wealth of the "1%". It renders Indigenous peoples (a 0.9% 'super-minority') completely invisible and absorbed, just an asterisk group to be subsumed into the legion of occupiers.



Figure 1.1. If U.S. land were divided like U.S. wealth

For example, "If U.S. land were divided like U.S. wealth" (figure 1.1) is a popular graphic that was electronically circulated on the Internet in late 2011 in connection with the Occupy movement. The image reveals inherent assumptions about land, including: land is property; land is/belongs to the United States; land should be distributed democratically. The beliefs that land can be owned by people, and that occupation is a right, reflect a profoundly settling, anthropocentric, colonial view of the world.

In figure 1.1, the irony of mapping of wealth onto land seems to escape most of those who re-posted the images on their social networking sites and blogs: Land is already wealth; it is already divided; and its distribution is the greatest indicator of racial inequality[17]. Indeed the current wealth crisis facing the 99% spiraled with the crash in home/land ownership. Land (not money) is actually the basis for U.S. wealth. If we took away land, there would be little wealth left to redistribute.

[17] Wealth, most significantly in the form of home ownership, supercedes income as an indicator of disparities between racial groups. See discussions on the wealth gap, home ownership, and racial inequality by Thomas Shapiro (2004), in *The Hidden Cost of Being African American: How Wealth Perpetuates Inequality.*



NATIVE LAND: 100%. RESERVATION LAND: 2.3%.

Figure 1.2. If Native land were [is] divided like Native land

Settler colonization can be visually understood as the unbroken pace of invasion, and settler occupation, into Native lands: the white space in figure 1.2. Decolonization, as a process, would repatriate land to Indigenous peoples, reversing the timeline of these images.

As detailed by public intellectuals/bloggers such as *Tequila Sovereign* (Lenape scholar Joanne Barker), some Occupy sites, including Boston, Denver, Austin, and Albuquerque tried to engage in discussions about the problematic and colonial overtones of occupation (Barker, October 9, 2011). Barker blogs about a firsthand experience in bringing a proposal for a *Memorandum of Solidarity with Indigenous Peoples,*[18] to the General Assembly in Occupy Oakland. The memorandum, signed by Corrina Gould, (Chochenyo Ohlone - the first peoples of Oakland/Ohlone), Barker, and numerous other Indigenous and non-Indigenous activist-scholars, called for the acknowledgement of Oakland as already occupied and on stolen land; of the ongoing defiance by Indigenous peoples in the U.S. and around the globe against imperialism,

[18] The memorandum can be found at http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2011/10/29/18695950.php, last retrieved June 1, 2012.

colonialism, and oppression; the need for genuine and respectful involvement of Indigenous peoples in the Occupy Oakland movement; and the aspiration to "Decolonize Oakland," rather than re-occupy it. From Barker's account of the responses from settler individuals to the memorandum,

> Ultimately, what they [settler participants in Occupy Oakland] were asking is whether or not we were asking them, as non-indigenous people, the impossible? Would their solidarity with us require them to give up their lands, their resources, their ways of life, so that we – who numbered so few, after all – could have more? Could have it all? (Barker, October 30, 2011)

These responses, resistances by settler participants to the aspiration of decolonization in Occupy Oakland, illustrate the reluctance of some settlers to engage the prospect of decolonization beyond the metaphorical or figurative level. Further, they reveal the limitations to "solidarity," without the willingness to acknowledge stolen land and how stolen land benefits settlers. "Genuine solidarity with indigenous peoples," Barker continues, "assumes a basic understanding of how histories of colonization and imperialism have produced and *still produce* the legal and economic possibility for Oakland" (ibid., emphasis original).

For social justice movements, like Occupy, to truly aspire to decolonization non-metaphorically, they would impoverish, not enrich, the 99%+ settler population of United States. Decolonization eliminates settler property rights and settler sovereignty. It requires the abolition of land as property and upholds the sovereignty of Native land and people.

There are important parallels between Occupy/Decolonize and the French/Haitian Revolutions of 1789-1799 and 1791-1804, respectively. Haiti has the dubious distinction of being "the poorest country in the Western hemisphere" (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012); yet, it was the richest of France's colonies until the Haitian Revolution, the only slave revolution to ever found a state. This paradox can be explained by what/who counts as whose property. Under French colonialism, Haiti was a worth a fortune in enslaved human beings. From the French slave owners' perspectives, Haitian independence abolished not slavery, but their property and a source of common-wealth. Unfortunately, history provides us with the exact figures on what their property was worth; in 1825, "France recognized Haitian independence by a treaty requiring Haiti to pay an indemnity of 150 million francs payable in 5 years to compensate absentee slaveowners for their losses" (Schuller, 2007, p.149). The magnitude[19] of these

[19] 150 million Francs was the equivalent of France's annual budget (and Haiti's population was less than 1% of France's), 10 times all annual Haitian exports in 1825, equivalent to $21 billion in 2010 U.S. Dollars. By contrast France sold the Louisiana Purchase to the United States in 1803 for a net sum of 42 million Francs. The indemnity demand, delivered by 12 warships armed with 500 canons, "heralded a strategy of plunder" (Schuller, 2007, p.166), as a new technology in colonial reconquest.

reparations not *for* slavery, but *to* former slave owners, plunged Haiti into eternal debt[20]. Occupy draws almost directly from the values of the French Revolution: the Commons, the General Assembly, the natural right to property, and the resistance to the decolonization of Indigenous life/land. In 1789, the French *Communes* (Commons) declared themselves a National Assembly directly "of the People" (the 99%) against the representative assembly of "the Estates" (the 1%) set up by the ruling elite, and adopted the celebrated *Declaration of the Rights of the Man and the Citizen.* Not unlike the heated discussions at the December 4, 2011 General Assembly of Occupy Oakland that ultimately rejected the proposal to change the name to "Decolonize Oakland", the 1789 National Assembly debated at great length over the language of emancipation in the *Declaration*. Ultimately, the *Declaration* abolished slavery but not property, and effectively stipulated that property trumped emancipation. While rhetorically declaring men as forever free and equal (and thus unenslavable), it assured the (revolutionary) colonial proprietors in the assembly that their chattel would be untouched, stating unequivocally: "The right to property being inviolable and sacred, no one ought to be deprived of it..." (Blackburn, 2006, p. 650).

Table 1.
Outnumbers. Incommensurable.

French Revolution	99% French, 1% Slaves[21]
Haitian Revolution	90% Slaves, 10% Whites & Free Blacks

Decolonizing the Americas means all land is repatriated and all settlers become landless. It is incommensurable with the redistribution of Native land/life as common-wealth.

Table 2.
Outnumbers. Incommensurable.

Occupy	99% Occupiers, 1% Owners
Decolonize	0.9% Indigenous[22], 99.1% Settlers[23]

[20] Haiti has literally been in debt from the moment it was recognized as a country. Haiti paid off its indemnity to France in 1937, but only through new indemnity with the United States. Ironically, in contemporary times, the Paris Club has power over Haiti's debt, and thus maintains Haiti's poverty.

[21] At 28 million people, France was the 3rd most populous country in the world in 1789, after China and India. Haiti's slave population in 1791 was approximately 452,000 - a fluctuating number as the slave mortality rate exceeded the birth rate, requiring a constant supply of newly enslaved Africans; and approximately 200,000 slaves died in the revolution. 1% refers to this number of enslaved people in Haiti relative to the French population, and does not include those enslaved in France or its other colonies.

[22] According to the 2010 U.S. census, Native Americans comprise 0.9% of U.S. inhabitants.

Our critique of Occupation is not just a critique of rhetoric. The call to "occupy everything" has legitimized a set of practices with problematic relationships to land and to Indigenous sovereignty. Urban homesteading, for example, is the practice of re-settling urban land in the fashion of self-styled pioneers in a mythical frontier. Not surprisingly, urban homesteading can also become a form of playing Indian, invoking Indigeneity as 'tradition' and claiming Indian-like spirituality while evading Indigenous sovereignty and the modern presence of actual urban Native peoples. More significant examples are Occupiers' claims to land and their imposition of Western forms of governance within their tent cities/colonies. Claiming land for the Commons and asserting consensus as the rule of the Commons, erases existing, prior, and future Native land rights, decolonial leadership, and forms of self-government.

Occupation is a move towards innocence that hides behind the numerical superiority of the settler nation, the elision of democracy with justice, and the logic that what became property under the 1% rightfully belongs to the other 99%.

In contrast to the settler labor of occupying the commons, homesteading, and possession, some scholars have begun to consider the labor of de-occupation in the undercommons, permanent fugitivity, and dispossession as possibilities for a radical black praxis. Such "a labor that is dedicated to the reproduction of social dispossession as having an ethical dimension" (Moten & Harney, 2004, p.110), includes both the refusal of acquiring property and of being property

Incommensurability is unsettling

Having elaborated on settler moves to innocence, we give a synopsis of the imbrication of settler colonialism with transnationalist, abolitionist, and critical pedagogy movements - efforts that are often thought of as exempt from Indigenous decolonizing analyses - as a synthesis of how decolonization as material, not metaphor, unsettles the innocence of these movements. These are interruptions which destabilize, un-balance, and repatriate the very terms and assumptions of some of the most radical efforts to reimagine human power relations. We argue that the opportunities for solidarity lie in what is incommensurable rather than what is common across these efforts.

We offer these perspectives on unsettling innocence because they are examples of what we might call an ethic of incommensurability, which recognizes what is distinct, what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization in relation to human and civil rights based social justice projects. There are portions of these projects that simply cannot speak to one another, cannot be aligned or allied. We make these notations to highlight opportunities for what can only ever be strategic and contingent collaborations, and to indicate the reasons that lasting solidarities may be elusive, even undesirable. Below we point to unsettling themes that challenge the coalescence of social justice endeavors broadly assembled into three areas:

[23] Wayne would like to give special thanks to Jodi Byrd for pointing out this numerical irony.

Transnational or Third World decolonizations, Abolition, and Critical Space-Place Pedagogies. For each of these areas, we offer entry points into the literature - beginning a sort of bibliography of incommensurability.

Third world decolonizations

The anti-colonial turn towards the transnational can sometimes involve ignoring the settler colonial context where one resides and how that inhabitation is implicated in settler colonialism, in order to establish "global" solidarities that presumably suffer fewer complicities and complications. This deliberate not-seeing is morally convenient but avoids an important feature of the aforementioned selective collapsibility of settler colonial-nations states. Expressions such as "the Global South within the Global North" and "the Third World in the First World" neglect the Four Directions via a Flat Earth perspective and ambiguate First Nations with Third World migrants. For people writing on Third World decolonizations, but who do so upon Native land, we invite you to consider the permanent settler war as the theater for all imperial wars:

- the Orientalism of Indigenous Americans (Berger, 2004; Marez, 2007)
- discovery, invasion, occupation, and Commons as the claims of settler sovereignty (Ford, 2010)
- heteropatriarchy as the imposition of settler sexuality (Morgensen, 2011)
- citizenship as coercive and forced assimilation into the white settler normative (Bruyneel, 2004; Somerville, 2010)
- religion as covenant for settler nation-state (A.J. Barker, 2009; Maldonado-Torres, 2008)
- the frontier as the first and always the site of invasion and war (Byrd, 2011),
- U.S. imperialism as the expansion of settler colonialism (*ibid*)
- Asian settler colonialism (Fujikane, 2012; Fujikane, & Okamura, 2008, Saranillio, 2010a, 2010b)
- the frontier as the language of 'progress' and discovery (Maldonado-Torres, 2008)
- rape as settler colonial structure (Deer, 2009; 2010)
- the discourse of terrorism as the terror of Native retribution (Tuck & Ree, forthcoming)
- Native Feminisms as incommensurable with other feminisms (Arvin, Tuck, Morrill, forthcoming; Goeman & Denetdale, 2009).

Abolition

The abolition of slavery often presumes the expansion of settlers who own Native land and life via inclusion of emancipated slaves and prisoners into the settler nation-state. As we have noted, it is no accident that the U.S. government promised 40 acres of Indian land as reparations for plantation slavery. Likewise, indentured European laborers were often awarded tracts of 'unsettled' Indigenous land as payment at the end of their service (McCoy, forthcoming).

Communal ownership of land has figured centrally in various movements for autonomous, self-determined communities. "The land belongs to those who work it," disturbingly parrots Lockean justifications for seizing Native land as property, 'earned' through one's labor in clearing and cultivating 'virgin' land. For writers on the prison industrial complex, il/legality, and other forms of slavery, we urge you to consider how enslavement is a twofold procedure: removal from land and the creation of property (land and bodies). Thus, abolition is likewise twofold, requiring the repatriation of land and the abolition of property (land and bodies). Abolition means self-possession but not object-possession, repatriation but not reparation:

- "The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for humans any more than black people were made for white, or women created for men" (Alice Walker, describing the work of Marjorie Spiegel, in the in the preface to Spigel's 1988 book, *The Dreaded Comparison*).
- Enslavement/removal of Native Americans (Gallay, 2009)
- Slaves who become slave-owners, savagery as enslavability, chattel slavery as a sign of civilization (Gallay, 2009)
- Black fugitivity, undercommons, and radical dispossession (Moten, 2008; Moten & Harney, 2004; Moten & Harney, 2010)
- Incarceration as a settler colonialism strategy of land dispossession (Ross, 1998; Watson, 2007)
- Native land and Native people as co-constituitive (Meyer, 2008; Kawagley, 2010)

Critical pedagogies

The many critical pedagogies that engage emancipatory education, place based education, environmental education, critical multiculturalism, and urban education often position land as public Commons or seek commonalities between struggles. Although we believe that "we must be fluent" in each other's stories and struggles (paraphrasing Alexander, 2002, p.91), we detect precisely this lack of fluency in land and Indigenous sovereignty. Yupiaq scholar, Oscar Kawagley's assertion, "We know that Mother Nature has a culture, and it is a Native culture" (2010, p. xiii), directs us to think through land as "more than a site *upon* which humans make history or as a location that accumulates history" (Goeman, 2008, p.24). The forthcoming special issue in *Environmental Education Research*, "Land Education: Indigenous, postcolonial, and decolonizing perspectives on place and environmental education research" might be a good starting point to consider the incommensurability of place-based, environmentalist, urban pedagogies with land education.

- The urban as Indigenous (Bang, 2009; Belin, 1999; Friedel, 2011; Goeman, 2008; Intertribal Friendship House & Lobo, 2002)
- Indigenous storied land as disrupting settler maps (Goeman, 2008)

- Novels, poetry, and essays by Greg Sarris, Craig Womack, Joy Harjo, Gerald Vizenor
- To Remain an Indian (Lomawaima & McCarty, 2006)
- Shadow Curriculum (Richardson, 2011)
- Red Pedagogy (Grande, 2004)
- Land Education (McCoy, Tuck, McKenzie, forthcoming)

More on incommensurability

Incommensurability is an acknowledgement that decolonization will require a change in the order of the world (Fanon, 1963). This is not to say that Indigenous peoples or Black and brown peoples take positions of dominance over white settlers; the goal is not for everyone to merely swap spots on the settler-colonial triad, to take another turn on the merry-go-round. The goal is to break the relentless structuring of the triad - a break and not a compromise (Memmi, 1991).

Breaking the settler colonial triad, in direct terms, means repatriating land to sovereign Native tribes and nations, abolition of slavery in its contemporary forms, and the dismantling of the imperial metropole. Decolonization "here" is intimately connected to anti-imperialism elsewhere. However, decolonial struggles here/there are not parallel, not shared equally, nor do they bring neat closure to the concerns of all involved - particularly not for settlers. Decolonization is not equivocal to other anti-colonial struggles. It is incommensurable.

There is so much that is incommensurable, so many overlaps that can't be figured, that cannot be resolved. Settler colonialism fuels imperialism all around the globe. Oil is the motor and motive for war and so was salt, so will be water. Settler sovereignty over these very pieces of earth, air, and water is what makes possible these imperialisms. The same yellow pollen in the water of the Laguna Pueblo reservation in New Mexico, Leslie Marmon Silko reminds us, is the same uranium that annihilated over 200,000 strangers in 2 flashes. The same yellow pollen that poisons the land from where it came. Used in the same war that took a generation of young Pueblo men. Through the voice of her character Betonie, Silko writes, "Thirty thousand years ago they were not strangers. You saw what the evil had done; you saw the witchery ranging as wide as the world" (Silko, 1982, p. 174). In Tucson, Arizona, where Silko lives, her books are now banned in schools. Only curricular materials affirming the settler innocence, ingenuity, and right to America may be taught.

In "No", her response to the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq, Mvskoke/Creek poet Joy Harjo (2004) writes, "Yes, that was me you saw shaking with bravery, with a government issued rifle on my back. I'm sorry I could not greet you, as you deserved, my relative." Don't Native Americans participate in greater rates in the military? asks the young-ish man from Viet Nam.

"Indian Country" was/is the term used in Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq by the U.S. military for 'enemy territory'. The first Black American President said without blinking, "There was a point before folks had left, before we had gotten everybody back on the helicopter and were flying back to base, where they said Geronimo has been killed, and Geronimo was the code

name for bin Laden." Elmer Pratt, Black Panther leader, falsely imprisoned for 27 years, was a Vietnam Veteran, was nicknamed 'Geronimo'. Geronimo is settler nickname for the Bedonkohe Apache warrior who fought Mexican and then U.S. expansion into Apache tribal lands. The Colt .45 was perfected to kill Indigenous people during the 'liberation' of what became the Philippines, but it was first invented for the 'Indian Wars' in North America alongside The Hotchkiss Canon- a gattling gun that shot canonballs. The technologies of the permanent settler war are reserviced for foreign wars, including boarding schools, colonial schools, urban schools run by military personnel.

It is properly called Indian Country.


NEW YORK, SATURDAY, APRIL 8, 1882.

The Hotchkiss Revolving Cannon

which the cut represents, mounted on the field carriage, has been adopted by the United States for both Field and Naval purposes, and by nearly all the Governments of Europe.

They are made of 37mm., 47mm., and 57mm. calibre, and fire common and steel shell.

The 37mm. and 47mm. fire 60 to 80 shell per minute, giving 1,500 to 2,000 fragments. In service, with deliberate aim at moving objects, from 15 to 20, giving 1,200 dangerous fragments per minute.

The Naval gun is mounted on the non-recoil principle, and being aimed from the shoulder, with the ease of a musket, attains a greater accuracy at sea than any other cannon.

The range of the 37mm. gun is 3,000 yards, of the 47mm., 6,500 yards.

The steel shell from the smaller gun penetrates all torpedo boats up to 2,000 yards, and at acute angles up to 2,000 yards, and the 47mm. perforates all the unarmored ships now in service.

For Field service the accuracy of fire and regularity of range are unsurpassed.

(See Official Reports of Chief of Ordnance, U. S. A.)

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, ADDRESS

HOTCHKISS & CO., 21 RUE ROYALE, PARIS.

Or MESSRS. GRAHAM & HAINES,

113 Chambers Street, New York.

Figure 1.3. Hotchkiss Revolving Cannon

Ideologies of US settler colonialism directly informed Australian settler colonialism. South African apartheid townships, the kill-zones in what became the Philippine colony, then nation-state, the checkerboarding of Palestinian land with checkpoints, were modeled after U.S. seizures of land and containments of Indian bodies to reservations. The racial science developed in the U.S. (a settler colonial racial science) informed Hitler's designs on racial purity ("This book is my bible" he said of Madison Grant's The Passing of the Great Race). The admiration is sometimes mutual, the doctors and administrators of forced sterilizations of black, Native, disabled, poor, and mostly female people - The Sterilization Act accompanied the Racial Integrity Act and the Pocohontas Exception - praised the Nazi eugenics program. Forced sterilizations became illegal in California in 1964. The management technologies of North American settler colonialism have provided the tools for internal colonialisms elsewhere.

So to with philosophies of state and corporate land-grabbing[24]*. The prominence of "flat world" perspectives asserts that technology has afforded a diminished significance of place and borders. The claim is that U.S. borders have become more flexible, yet simultaneously, the physical border has become more absolute and enforced. The border is no longer just a line suturing two nation-states; the U.S. now polices its borders interior to its territory and exercises*

[24] See also Arundhati Roy (2012) in Capitalism: A Ghost Story

sovereignty throughout the globe. Just as sovereignty has expanded, so has settler colonialism in partial forms.

New Orleans' lower ninth ward lies at the confluence of river channels and gulf waters, and at the intersection of land grabbing and human bondage. The collapsing of levies heralded the selective collapsibility of native-slave, again, for the purpose of reinvasion, resettlement, reinhabitation. The naturalized disaster of Hurricane Katrina's floodwaters laid the perfect cover for land speculation and the ablution of excess people. What can't be absorbed, can't be folded in (because the settlers won't give up THEIR land to advance abolition), translates into bodies stacked on top of one another in public housing and prisons, in cells, kept from the labor market, making labor for others (guards and other corrections personnel) making money for states -human homesteading. It necessitates the manufacturing of crime at rates higher than anywhere in the world. 1 in 6 people in the state of Louisiana are incarcerated, the highest number of caged people per capita, making it the prison capital of United States, and therefore the prison capital of the world.

Table 3
Prison capital of the world[25].

	Prisoners per 100,000 residents
Louisiana	1,619
United States	730
Russia	450
Iran	333
China	122
Afghanistan	62

The Yazoo and Mississippi Rivers' delta flood plain was once land so fertile that it could be squeezed for excess production of cotton, giving rise to exceptionally large-scale plantation slavery. Plantation owners lived in houses like pyramids and chattel slavery took an extreme form here, even for the South, beginning with enslaved Chitimachas, Choctaw, Natchez, Chaoüachas, Natchez, Westo, Yamasee, Euchee, Yazoo and Tawasa peoples, then later replaced by enslaved West Africans. Literally, worked to death. This "most Southern on earth"(Cobb, 1992) was a place of ultimate terror for Black people even under slavery (the worst place to be sold off too, the place of no return, the place of premature death). Black and Native people alike were induced to raid and enslave Native tribes, as a bargain for their own freedom or to defer their own enslavibility by the British, French, and then American settlers. Abolition has its incommensurabilities.

The Delta is now more segregated than it was during Jim Crow in 1950 (Aiken, 1990). The rising number of impoverished, all black townships is the result of mechanization of

[25] Source: Chang (2012).

agriculture and a fundamental settler covenant that keeps black people landless. When black labor is unlabored, the Black person underneath is the excess.

Angola Farm is perhaps the more notorious of the two State Penitentiaries along the Mississippi River. Three hundred miles upriver in the upper Delta region is Parchment Farm. Both State Penitentiaries (Mississippi and Louisana, respectively), both former slave plantations, both turned convict-leasing farms almost immediately after the Civil War by genius land speculators-cum-prison wardens. After the Union victory in the Civil War 'abolished' slavery, former Confederate Major, Samuel Lawrence James, obtained the lease to the Louisiana State Penn in 1869, and then bought Angola Farm in 1880 as land to put his chattel to work.

Figure 1.4. "The Cage: where convicts are herded like beasts of the jungle. The pan under it is the toilet receptacle. The stench from it hangs like a pall over the whole area" John Spivak, Georgia N_____, 1932.

Cages on wheels. To mobilize labor on land by landless people whose crime was mobility on land they did not own. The largest human trafficker in the world is the carceral state within

the United States, not some secret Thai triad or Russian mafia or Chinese smuggler. The U.S. carceral state is properly called neo-slavery, precisely because it is legal. It is not simply a product of exceptional racism in the U.S.; its racism is a direct function of the settler colonial mandate of land and people as property.

Black Codes made vagrancy - i.e. landlessness - illegal in the Antebellum South, making the self-possessed yet dispossessed Black body a crime (similar logic allowed for the seizure, imprisonment and indenture of any Indian by any person in California until 1937, based on the ideology that Indians are simultaneously landless and land-like). Dennis Childs writes "the slave ship and the plantation" and not Bentham's panopticon as presented by Foucault, "operated as spatial, racial, and economic templates for subsequent models of coerced labor and human warehousing - as America's original prison industrial complex" (2009, p.288). Geopolitics and biopolitics are completely knotted together in a settler colonial context.

Despite the rise of publicly traded prisons, Farms are not fundamentally capitalist ventures; at their core, they are colonial contract institutions much like Spanish Missions, Indian Boarding Schools, and ghetto school systems[26]*. The labor to cage black bodies is paid for by the state and then land is granted, worked by convict labor, to generate additional profits for the prison proprietors. However, it is the management of excess presence on the land, not the forced labor, that is the main object of slavery under settler colonialism.*

Today, 85% of people incarcerated at Angola, die there.

Conclusion

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of *what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler?* Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework.

We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can't be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, "in the

[26] As we write today, Louisiana has moved to privatize all of its public schools http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/01/louisiana-makes-bold-bid-_n_1563900.html

exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content" (Fanon, 1963, p. 36).

To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas's, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability.

> *when you take away the punctuation*
> he says of
> lines lifted from the documents about
> military-occupied land
> its acreage and location
> *you take away its finality*
> *opening the possibility of other futures*
>
> -Craig Santos Perez, Chamoru scholar and poet
> (as quoted by Voeltz, 2012)

Decolonization offers a different perspective to human and civil rights based approaches to justice, an unsettling one, rather than a complementary one. Decolonization is not an "and". It is an elsewhere.

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LÁHI and ATTÁLDAT: the PHILOSOPHY of the GIFT and SAMI EDUCATION

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Abstract

This article explores the Sami philosophy of the gift as a basis for a transformative pedagogical framework. Grounded on the Sami land-based worldview, this philosophy calls for the recognition and reciprocation of gifts, whether gifts of the land, interpersonal gifts or giftedness of an individual. In particular, the article considers two Sami concepts, that of *láhi* and *attáldat* and explains how they can serve as a framework for a Sami pedagogy that takes into account the central role of the Sami worldview in contemporary education while simultaneously critically analysing the colonial structures that continue to impact Sami society and education.

Introduction

The process of "Indigenisation" of the academy and research is a multilayered enterprise comprising of practices of "researching back", claiming, remembering, rewriting as well as celebrating survival (see Smith, 1999). It is a joint endeavour of Indigenous scholars and others transforming academic spaces, challenging White privilege, power relations and collective amnesia (e.g., Barnhardt, 1991; Battiste, 1996, 2000, 2001; Battiste et al., 2002a; Battiste & Henderson, 2000; Binda & Calliou, 2001; Borrows, 2002; Castellano et al., 2000; Champagne & Stauss, 2002; Cook-Lynn, 2001; Dei et al., 2000; V. Deloria, 1999a; Findlay, 2000; Fixico, 2003; Grande, 2004; Graveline, 1998; Green, 2002a, 2002b; Guerrero, 1996; Hampton, 2000; Irwin, 1988; Kasten, 1998; Kelley, 1992; Kirkness & Barnhardt, 1991; Laenui, 2000; LaRocque, 2001; McConaghy, 2000; Medicine, 2001; Mgbeoji, 2005; Mihesuah, 1998, 2003; Mihesuah & Wilson, 2004; Moreiras, 2004; Oakes et al., 2001; Oakes et al., 2003; Smith, 1992; Suzack, 2004; Van Gerwen-Toyne, 2001; Waters, 2004). It is also about calling for the responsibilities of the academy toward the "other" (Kuokkanen, 2004). In terms of education, indigenising is defined "as a leading out, a fanning out, a spreading out" (Findlay in Battiste et al., 2002, p. 179). In other words, rather than being about exclusivity and containment, it seeks inclusion and validation of the concerns and knowledge of various, especially previously marginalised, communities.

Indigenising the academy and education is also about redefining Eurocentric concepts such as research, science and, most recently, humanities. According to Isobel Findlay (2003, Conclusion section, para. 3), "Indigenous humanities" is "a strategic labelling [which] is deliberately and unapologetically hybrid, collaborative, and interdisciplinary". It aspires "to dismantle the master's house by reinterpreting and exposing the foundational violences of the traditional humanities and their complicity in acts of delegitimation and dispossession". Indigenising the academy is similar to Derrida's idea of "new humanities" that calls for "opening up" the academy to the "forces from without". The notion of "new humanities" dates back at least to the late 1980s, when there emerged a common fear of losing humanities to economic rationalism characterised by reforms in higher education. Ruthven notes how, despite these fears, humanities is "alive and well" with newly established research centers and an expanding field of interdisciplinary research

that includes cultural, multicultural, cultural policy, feminist and gender, postcolonial and subaltern and legal studies. For some reason, Indigenous studies does not feature in Ruthven's list of fields included in the "new humanities" (Ruthven, 1992). For Derrida, there is a need to enlarge and re-elaborate the concept of the humanities. One of the first tasks of the new humanities "would be, *ad infinitum*, to know and to think their own history, at least in the directions that can be seen to open up" (Derrida, 2001, p. 240). Further, Derrida has suggested that in its profession of truth, the university "should remain an ultimate place of critical resistance – and more than critical – to all the powers of dogmatic and unjust appropriation" (Derrida, 2001, p. 235).

As a historical concept, humanism is rooted in Eurocentric and patriarchal (but universalising) notions of the humanity and the human being and therefore is highly exclusionary. Not only has it relegated any other than human realms insignificant, it has also excluded the vast majority of the globe's people from its definitions of human being. Humanism, therefore, is deeply implicated in the colonial project, especially in those involved in acts of epistemic violence and appropriation. Abdul R. JanMohammed and David Lloyd (1990, p.2) contend:

> Western humanism still considers us barbarians beyond the pale of civilisation; we are forever consigned to play the role of the ontological, political, economic, and cultural Other according to the schema of a Manichaean allegory that seems the central trope not only of colonialist discourse but also of Western humanism.

Thus, discussing or considering Indigenous (or any other) humanities, we need to remain vigilant not to reproduce its exclusions (for critiques of humanism by Indigenous scholars, see Allen 1986, p. 67; Smith, 1999, p. 26). Even if we focus on the more neutral understanding of humanities as the study of the liberal arts, it remains selective and repressive if it is not centered on various relations of domination and privilege (JanMohammed & Lloyd, 1990, p. 13).

From an Indigenous peoples' perspective, however, the perhaps most problematic aspect of humanism and thus humanities is that it actively seeks to eliminate the non-human reality and its significance by various binary oppositions established on the assumed superiority of reason (embodied by a White elite male). Not only does this go entirely against Indigenous ontologies and epistemes but these hierarchical dualisms have played a central role in the colonising project of Indigenous peoples (and other subjugated peoples and groups, including women). The question for today's Indigenous scholars is, then, whether we think the notion of humanities has the potential to be opened up and redefined in a way that will not only ensure the validation of Indigenous ontologies *en toto* but also counter the Eurocentric legacies of exclusion, hierarchical dualisms as well as elitism. For some, humanities may remain an elitist concept with too much baggage – something we can easily do without. For others, it offers new means of decolonising and indigenising the academy, research and education.

In this article, I explore the Sami philosophy of the gift as a basis for a transformative pedagogical framework. This framework emphasises the need to recognise both the gifts of the land (non-human environment) and of the student. Even if the two Sami concepts discussed in this paper, particularly that of *láhi,* are rooted in the Sami worldview which, especially in the older ethnographic literature has been referred to as "religion", this consideration is not to suggest a spiritual or "religious" framework to be introduced to contemporary Sami education. As many Indigenous scholars have pointed out, spirituality deriving from living in a close relationship with the land and manifested in various cultural, social and spiritual practices, differs in many ways from the institutionalised, so-called "world" religions such as Christianity or Islam. When discussing Indigenous peoples' "religions" we are, in fact, talking about their ontologies, cosmologies and philosophies (e.g., Ash Poitras, 1991; B. Deloria *et al.*, 1999; V. Deloria, 1989, 1999a, 1999b; Griffiths & Cervantes, 1999; Irwin, 2000; Kawagley, 1995). This is articulated by Marie Battiste and Sákéj Henderson as follows:

> From the beginning, the forces of the ecologies in which we live have taught Indigenous peoples a proper kinship order and have taught us how to have nourishing relationships with our ecosystems. The ecologies in which we live are more to us than settings or places; they are more than homelands or promised homelands. These ecologies do not surround Indigenous peoples; we are an integral part of them and we inherently belong to them. The ecologies are alive with the enduring processes of creation itself. As Indigenous peoples, we invest the ecologies with deep respect, and from them we unfold our structure of Indigenous life and thought (Battiste & Henderson, 2000, p. 9).

The Sami are the Indigenous people of Sápmi (Samiland), an area that spans from central Norway and Sweden through northern Finland to the Kola Peninsula of Russia. Previously called the Lapps or Laplanders by outsiders, the Sami have claimed their right for their own collective term deriving from their own languages (*sápmelaš* in Northern Sami). Moreover, the terms "Lapp" or "Laplander" are considered negative and derogative. A rough estimate of the Sami population is between 75,000 to 100,000, the majority of whom are in Norway. In Finland, the Sami population is

approximately 7,000. During the early Middle Ages, the surrounding kingdoms of Sweden-Finland, Denmark-Norway and Novgorod became interested in the land and natural resources of the northern territories. As in many other places in the world, Christianisation was one of the central means of the early colonisation of the Sami. This was followed by incentives and policies encouraging settlement of the north by farmers and others (for a more detailed discussion on history of the Sami people, see Broadbent, 1989; Kvist, 1991). Faced with similar colonial practices of assimilation, usurpation of territories and eradication of languages and cultures as other Indigenous peoples worldwide, the Sami have been engaged, particularly since the late 1960s, in a process of reclaiming their self-determination and rights to land, language and cultural heritage (e.g., Brantenberg, 1985, 1991; Corson, 1995; Eidheim, 1985, 1992, 1997; Eikjok, 2000; Gaski, 1997; Helander, 1999; Helander & Kailo, 1998a; Henriksen, 1999; IWGIA, 1987; Jernsletten, 1997; Joks, 2002; Jull, 1995; A.-I. Keskitalo, 1994; Korsmo, 1992, 1993; Kuokkanen, 2005; Kvernmo, 1997; Lehtola, 2002; Minde, 1996, 2001; Müller-Wille & Weber Müller-Wille, 1993; Olsson & Lewis, 1995; Pennanen & Näkkäläjärvi, 2004; Salvesen, 1995; Sami Council, 2002; Seurujärvi-Kari & Kulonen, 1996; Sillanpää, 1994).

Thus far, there has been fairly limited discussion on specifically Sami pedagogies. Until very recently, Sami education discourse has primarily centered on the question of the language of the instruction. Discussing Sami education, therefore, often focuses on instruction in the Sami language, not necessarily education based on and informed by Sami values and cultural practices (see Aikio-Puoskari, 1998; Balto, 1997a; Helander, 1990, 1991; J. H. Keskitalo, 1994; Todal, 1999). As Sami scholar Vuokko Hirvonen (2004, p. 146) notes, a large number of Sami schools remain at the "addition stage" where subtle forms of assimilation continue in the school and pedagogical practices. Moreover, she suggests that "Sámi schools lack general plans on how to promote Sámi culture and make it visible throughout the school" (2004, p. 149).

The reason for not being able to achieve the objectives set in the Sami curriculum can be found in Sami society that has, in various levels and ways, internalised the ideology of assimilation. Hirvonen (2004, p. 149) points out:

> The primary obstacle is the teachers' training, which has kept passing down the assimilation ideology to new generations (only 15 % of the present Sámi teachers have studies at the Saami University College). As a result of this assimilation ideology, it is hard to deviate from the official interpretations of the development of nation-states, and to examine instead how Sámi have influenced the Nordic societies and culture for at least the past thousand years.

The Sami University College was established in 1989 to train Sami teachers but it has since broadened its focus to facilitate Sami capacity-building also in the fields of journalism, Indigenous knowledge, multiculturalism, economic development, traditional Sami crafts, Indigenous art history, and others. At the moment, the College is in the process of developing into a full university. Hirvonen's research results echo the perspectives of many Sami scholars and educators of an urgent need for what Paolo Freire calls conscientisation – awareness-raising and development of critical understanding of the legacy and effects of Sami colonisation. This was discussed, for example, at a workshop on Indigenous Perspectives in Research and Education at the Sami College in October 2005 (Kuokkanen, 2005). I propose that a pedagogical framework inspired by the two concepts deriving from the Sami gift-centred worldview can assist us in the critical process of restoring our Sami episteme – the structures and systems of knowledge and values that have largely been decimated by the long history of colonisation. These two concepts, *láhi* and *attáldat,* serve as a crucial reminder in contemporary educational settings of the necessary relationships with the land and the community – relationships that continue to function as cornerstones of Saminess.

What is also needed in Samiland is a stronger awareness of the hidden curriculum and the effects of the colonial educational system – an understanding how historically, education has been a means for the governments to mold the colonised into roles serving the interests of the coloniser and to create and sustain "an inherently inequitable and unjust organisation of production and political power" (Carnoy, 1974, p. 3). Without a critique of colonial processes and understanding of the subtle ways in which colonialism and hegemony continue to operate, there is a danger of uncritically subscribing to the idea of schooling according to which "Western education brings people out of their ignorance and underdevelopment into a condition of enlightenment and civilisation" (Carnoy, 1974, p. 4). Critical perspectives to mainstream, (neo)colonial education strengthen the ongoing Sami attempts to make schools and curriculum to better reflect Sami needs and realities.

The historical context of Sami education

In general, the colonisation of the Sami was much subtler and thus arguably more perilous than, for example, the arrival of the settlers, colonisers and missionaries in North America. By the time of the early Sami cultural reawakening in the mid-nineteenth century, much of the traditional Sami cultural and spiritual practices had already been replaced by Christianity several generations ago. The Sami language, however, had not been decimated and systematically erased as among many other Indigenous peoples in the world.

It has become the strongest marker of Saminess and the main focus of the Sami ethnopolitical movement which began in the late 1960s. In some Sami areas, there are kindergartens and schools where the language of instruction is Sami. In those places, Sami is often used as a daily language of communication. At certain universities, there are Sami studies programs where it is possible to study and graduate in the Sami language. There are also newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasts and, more recently, TV programs available in Sami. Although insufficient in many ways, the Sami language acts in Finland and Norway passed in the early 1990s have also contributed to the public recognition of the Sami language.

There are several reasons for the relative survival of the Sami language. One is that the Sami boarding school experience was not as destructive as in North America where it was far more institutionalised and also was in place over several generations, effectively destroying not only the linguistic and cultural continuity of the Native peoples but also imposing a cycle of violence and abuse that continues today. This is not to suggest that violence and abuse were absent from Sami boarding schools. Thus far, however, there is very little research on Sami boarding school experience (for a comparative study on Sami and Nlakapamux boarding school narratives, see Kuokkanen, 2003). Moreover, even if the Sami language was regarded as one of the targets of colonisation and assimilation, there is also a long history of the church and, to some extent, state authorities attempting to interact with the Sami in their own language. This history reaches back to the seventeenth century when representatives of the clergy translated Christian texts into Sami for their missionary purposes.

Behind the apparently well-intentioned idea of producing religious services and texts for the Sami in their own language was a missionary strategy of undermining Sami culture and land-based spirituality from within. Some scholars have argued that there have always been two different approaches to Sami language and culture by the church and surrounding kingdoms: one of assimilation and eradication and another of preservation and protection (e.g., Salvesen, 1995). It is possible, however, to consider these apparently contradictory approaches as two sides of the same coin – insidious colonial practices promoting interests of the states over the Sami territory. Occasionally, there have also been representatives of the clergy who have candidly spoken against the assimilation of the Sami, especially during the official assimilation policies in the nineteenth century (e.g., Niemi, 1997). The active use of Sami language by the church was also an attempt to implement the principle of Protestantism by preaching gospel in the language of the people. While the churchmen indicated support of the Sami language, they were very clear on their intentions of overthrowing the Sami worldview of reciprocation characterised by the existence of various deities and spirits of the natural world to whom human beings were required to pay respect and express gratitude.

In the nineteenth century, however, assimilation pressures intensified as the Nordic countries sought to gain a stronger hold over their northern territories. The surrounding states justified their assimilation policies in the name of education: the only way for the Sami to become equal with the other citizens of the state was to know the official language of the country. Laws that prohibited the use of Sami language both in schools and at home were passed, particularly in Norway and Sweden. At the end of the nineteenth century, the first Sami writers and activists chose the Sami language as the symbol of Saminess and Sami identity that was required for the protection of Sami identity and self-representation. The right to one's mother tongue became a central issue for most of the first Sami organisations established in the first decade of the twentieth century. To date, the Sami language remains as the clearest, strongest measure of Saminess for the majority of the Sami. The official Sami definitions in the three Nordic countries vary slightly but are all based on linguistic criteria. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the details of the various definitions or recent developments and the implications of those definitions.

Both Norway and Finland have passed Sami language acts in 1992, making the Sami language official together with the dominant languages in the northernmost municipalities of both countries. This has meant, among other things, that road signs and places names are required to be in Sami as well in the officially defined "Sami home area". These language acts guarantee the Sami a right to use their own language at courts and with the authorities. Applying first and foremost to local and regional authorities working in the "Sami home area", the acts do not, however, obligate the authorities to know Sami but the rights are guaranteed through translation and interpretation.

In some ways, the language situation of the Sami is almost diametrically opposed to, for example, the First Nations situation in British Columbia where Indigenous languages were always relatively small in terms of numbers of speakers. A relatively short but very destructive colonial era characterised by generations of assimilative schooling and decimation of Native population by imported illnesses have seriously undermined the vitality of First Nations languages. Today, a number of West Coast First Nations languages are in a state of emergency with only a handful of speakers left, usually elderly people who will soon pass away. In this critical stage, many First Nations educators and scholars have started language revival programs some of which have already produced promising results and a change in the trend of the apparent language loss. Yet on the other hand, unlike among the Sami, many other First Nations cultural and spiritual practices remain strongly

manifested not only in traditional ceremonies such as the potlatch but often also as a part of individuals' work and daily activities.

Differences in policies and experiences of colonial educational institutions have also resulted in a situation where the Sami have perhaps always been less distrustful of formal education imposed by the governments. The focus of Sami education has been in creating and offering education for Sami children in their own language. Only recently more attention is being paid to the contents and curriculum of Sami education as well as the hidden values and norms delivered through text books of dominant societies some of which have been directly translated into Sami (see Hirvonen, 2004).

Sami gift philosophy

There are two concepts in the Sami language that relate to what I call the Sami gift philosophy or worldview: *láhi* and *attáldat.* In contemporary language usage, the term *láhi* is usually found in the phrase *Ipmil láhi,* meaning the God's gift or abundance. Due to the Christianisation of the Sami over many generations, *Ipmil* in everyday parlance almost invariably refers to the Christian God. It is, however, an old word that predates the arrival of Christianity and numerous studies on Sami "religion" show that the word has previously referred to Sami pre-Christian deities. Also its variant, *Jupmel,* is, at least in some Sami regions, one of the main deities in the traditional Sami panthenon. I argue that the concept of Sami "religion" refers, in fact, to the Sami land-based worldview. The topic of Sami "religion" has drawn the attention of scholars for centuries and it has been the subject of innumerable ethnographic, anthropological and religious studies (e.g., Ahlbäck & Bergman, 1991; Bäckman & Hultcrantz, 1978; Holmberg, 1987; Hultkrantz, 1962; Manker, 1938, 1950; Pentikäinen, 1995; Scheffer, 1751; Sommarström, 1991; Vorren, 1980). Today, the expression *láhi* is considered somewhat archaic, referring particularly to the God's gifts in the form of food. I suggest, however, that the concept reflects the Sami worldview that recognises the abundance of the land as gifts that, in turn, are actively acknowledged and reciprocated by various ceremonies and rituals. *Láhi*, then, is an expression of the relationships that the Sami have traditionally had with the natural environment.

The other concept related to the Sami gift philosophy, *attáldat,* is a derivative of the Sami verb to give, *addit.* Today, *attáldat* is usually defined as a skill or giftedness. For example, *lávlun-attáldat* would translate as good singing skills. I propose that this is a central concept when considering Sami education and pedagogical models. Moreover, I argue that the concept of *attáldat* needs to be interpreted in a much broader light which takes into consideration its roots in the aspect of giving. In many Indigenous worldviews and philosophies, gifts, including personal giftedness, exist primarily to be shared with others.

Okanagan educator and artist Jeannette Armstrong notes: "what you are gifted with, and what you have been given in terms of skills, doesn't only belong to you. It belongs to the community, and it is there for the benefit of the community" (Armstrong in Isernhagen, 1999, p. 162). The notion of responsibility of sharing one's gifts is also discussed by many other Indigenous artists for whom it is often the driving force behind their art (e.g., Fedorick in Lutz, 1991, p. 221). Not surprisingly, then, in Indigenous communities artists are often considered healers, visionaries and pathfinders of their communities (e.g., Ash Poitras, 1991, 1996; Helander & Kailo, 1998b, p. 165). I suggest, therefore, that if we want to develop Sami education and pedagogical frameworks grounded on Sami values and socio-cultural practices, there is a need to restore and reconsider the concept of *attáldat* in a light that foregrounds the gifts of the students (and sharing them) in relation to their communities as well as to their natural environments – that is, to the land-based Sami worldview.

Láhi

Like many other Indigenous worldviews, the traditional Sami perception of the world postulates that the land is a physical and spiritual entity. As human survival has depended on the balance and renewal of the land, the central principles in this understanding are sustainable use of and respect for the land and *láhi,* the earth's abundance that is given to human beings if the relationships are well maintained. These relationships with the land are maintained by collective and individual rituals in which the gift and giving back are integral. The intimacy and interrelatedness is reflected in the way of communicating with various aspects of the land which often are addressed directly as relatives. The close connection to the natural world is also evident in the permeable and indeterminate boundaries between the human and natural worlds. Skilled individuals can assume the form of an animal when needed and there are also stories about women marrying an animal (Porsanger, 2004, pp. 151-152).

The porosity of the boundary between the human and the non-human is sometimes seen as a reflection of shamanistic worldviews. In traditional Sami society, particularly *noaidis* or shamans – who were the spiritual leaders but also healers and visionaries of the community – were in contact with the spirit world where they travelled often in an animal form. As *noaidis* were among the most important members of the community as doctors, leaders and visionaries, they were the first ones to be exterminated amongst the Sami by church and state representatives (e.g., Laestadius, 1994; Paltto, 1998, p. 28). In a worldview in which survival and thus knowledge depend on

the intimate connection with the world, this kind of transformation is not considered supernatural but is rather a normal part of life. The Sami *noaidi* communicated with the spirit and natural worlds also with the help of the *goavddis,* a drum depicting the Sami cosmos on its surface. The Sami cosmos consists of a complex, multilayered order of different realms and spheres inhabited by humans, animals, ancestors, spirits, deities and guardians, all of whom traditionally have had specific roles and functions in the Sami socio-cosmic order.

An interesting, almost completely ignored aspect in the analyses of Sami cosmology is the role of the female deities in giving the gift of life (to both human beings and domestic animals, mainly reindeer) and the connection to the land. One could suggest that the Sami deity Máttáráhkká with her three daughters Sáráhkká, Uksáhkká and Juksáhkká signify the very foundation in the Sami cosmic order for they are the deities of new life who convey the soul of a child, create its body and also assist with menstruation, childbirth and protection of children (Ränk, 1955). In other words, the most significant gift of all, a new life, is the responsibility of these female deities. Further, Máttáráhkká could be translated as "Earthmother" (the root *máttár* refers to earth and also to ancestors). Words for "earth" and "mother" in the Sami language also derive from the same root (*eanan* and *eadni* respectively). Thus, when reconsidering the concept of *láhi,* we must recognise the central role of these female deities, Máttáráhkká and her three daughters, in giving not only new life but also assistance and guidance in important matters such as hunting and child-rearing.

As the physical and spiritual well-being of Sami society has traditionally been inseparably linked to a stable and continuous relationship between the human and natural worlds, knowledge of taking care of that relationship has been an integral part of Sami social structures and practices, including spiritual practices (cf. Mulk, 1994, pp. 127-128). In other words, what is central in this worldview is that well-being depends on *knowing*, not actively *changing* the environment (cf. Brody, 2000, p. 117). An important part of this knowing is the awareness of one's responsibilities and norms of behaviour. As "every geographical place was considered an entity in which the physical dimension was in balance with the spiritual one, [b]oth aspects needed to be taken into consideration when making a living" (Porsanger, 2004, p. 153).

Traditionally, one of the most important ways to acknowledge and thank for *Ipmil láhi* has been the practice of giving to various *sieidis. Sieidi,* a sacred place of the gift, usually consists of a stone or a piece of wood to which the gift is given to thank certain spirits for the abundance in the past but also to ensure fishing, hunting and reindeer luck in the future. Although the several centuries' long influence of Christianity has severely eroded the Sami gift-giving to and sharing with the land by banning it as a pagan form of devil worshipping, there is a relatively large body of evidence that the practice of *sieidi* gifting is still practiced (see Juuso, 1998; Kjellström, 1987).

The common location for *sieidis* are in the vicinity of sacred places, camp grounds or fishing and hunting sites. Stone or rock *sieidis* are usually natural formations of unusual shapes, functioning as natural landmarks particularly in the mountains. Wooden *sieidis* are either trees with the lowest branches removed, carved stumps or fallen trunks. For the Sami, *sieidis* were considered alive although many ethnographers interpreted them merely representing inert stones and structures. The Sami practice of giving back to *sieidis* involve spirits and guardians of the elements (e.g., wind, thunder) and various spheres of the natural world (animal birth, hunting, fishing). Sami reindeer herder Johan Turi describes the nature of the *sieidi* in the early twentieth century as follows:

> Some *sieidis* were satisfied if they received antlers, and others were content with all the bones, which meant every single bone, even the most wee ones. Fish *sieidi* did not demand less than a half of the catch but then it directed to the nets as much fish as people could collect. Some *sieidis* wanted a whole reindeer which needed to be embellished with all kinds of decorations, cloth, threads, silver and gold (Turi, 1987, p. 108) (my translation).

Sieidi gifts are, particularly in ethnographic literature, almost invariably referred to as "sacrifice", usually defined as a gift exchange with gods and nature. I contend that contrary to conventional interpretations, giving to *sieidi* cannot be completely understood through the concept of sacrifice. Even if *sieidi* gifts do have aspects of sacrifice, they are not and should not be regarded solely as such. They may have other dimensions that can be as significant – if not more so – as the aspect of sacrifice. Bones are given back, the catch shared and reindeer given to the gods and goddesses of hunting, fishing and reindeer luck represented by *sieidi* sites as an expression of gratitude for their goodwill and for ensuring abundance also in the future. In this sense, giving to *sieidis* appears involuntary as it is done for the protection and security of both the individual and the community.

On the other hand, *sieidis* are considered an inseparable part of one's social order and thus it is an individual and collective responsibility to look after them. While it may appear that such a gift is an exchange and a mandatory forfeit (especially when interpreted through the framework of a foreign worldview), I suggest that it rather is a voluntary expression of a particular worldview. *Láhi,* then,

is not an aspect or reflection of religion or even a spiritual framework that should be employed as a foundation of Sami education and pedagogy. The question is rather, how the concept of *láhi* can assist in laying a stronger emphasis on the necessary relationships and the recognition of the gifts (particularly of the land, on which the survival of the Sami is much dependent) in contemporary Sami educational practices.

Attáldat

The notion of ideal education as a pedagogical practice that focuses on encouraging, supporting and sustaining the different skills and strengths of individual students is far from new. In a narrow interpretation, this is also what the concept *attáldat* implies in an educational setting. Many Sami teachers stress the need to establish education that serves the needs and skills of individual Sami, especially as they relate to livelihoods such as reindeer herding.

At a week-long intensive seminar for Sami teachers on Sami and Indigenous Pedagogy held in June 2001, facilitated by Asta Balto and myself, one of the topics was to discuss how an ideal Sami education would look like from the perspective of Sami teachers who have been working in the field for several years. The seminar participants' perspectives on ideal Sami education are shared by many other Sami teachers as documented by Hirvonen (2004). The concept of *attáldat* featured in this discussion as the teachers pointed out that an ideal Sami education would not be tied to certain ages but schooling would start from the students themselves who would choose according their needs and phases when to study practical or theoretical issues. This, of course, would only be possible provided that Sami children had been raised according to traditional Sami upbringing that emphasises the child's independence from an early age on (see Balto, 1997b).

In this pedagogical approach, the teachers articulated, education would not need to be strictly tied to set curricula or time – that is, a school year would not need to start and end always at the same time but would rather reflect the seasons and needs and interests of the students. Obviously, the role of local livelihoods in education would be integral in a way that students would be able to participate in them according to annual cycles. In the current school system, this is possible at least in some Sami regions, but as Sami parents indicate, it is far from adequate (Hirvonen, 2004, p. 47).

Moreover, Sami students would be granted a broader responsibility of their own learning and work and that their knowledge and skills would be respected and recognised more than in the current system. As teachers put it, students should be able to enjoy their education and "have fun" in a constructive sense – an idea usually strongly opposed by teachers but as the Sami teachers pointed out, why is learning supposed to be serious and boring? Also the pedagogy of love and caring should be advanced in a way that instead of being enemies or the authorities on the top of a hierarchy, teachers would be students' collaborative partners. In other words, the philosophy of opposition would be replaced by a philosophy of co-existence. This would make it possible to compose a personalised plan of studies for each student in cooperation with their extended families.

While not implying that the more conventional understanding of *attáldat* is no longer important, I suggest that we need to consider the concept in a broader light that links it to the Sami gift philosophy of relationships as well as to the notion of responsibility of sharing one's gifts with the community for the well-being of all. After all, *attáldat* is rooted in the verb *addit*, to give. A translation of *attáldat* could be, for instance, "something that a person has to give or share". Understood this way, *attáldat* carries a very strong implicit collective dimension and a sense of responsibility toward others. To have certain skills or to be gifted with something is to give and share it with others, not to treasure it for the individual benefit only. It thus also carries an implicit criticism of hyper-individualism and selfishness that characterises much of contemporary mainstream society. *Attáldat* emphasises the significance of giving and sharing in order to sustain the needs of others.

The aspect of sharing was also stressed by the Sami teachers attending the seminar. For them, there is a need to integrate the entire society into the school system in a way that not only students would participate in schooling. On the same yard with the school, there could be an old people's home in order to maintain or improve the relationships and links between elders and children. There is also a need for stronger integration of the local elders and their knowledge and skills as a central part of education and school's practices. Hirvonen notes that "on the basis of the interviews with the teachers and statistics, it is obvious that making use of the local community and people has not yet become an established practice in the everyday activities of the school" (Hirvonen, 2004, p. 129). An ideal Sami education would also share the same curriculum in all Sami schools irrespective of national borders. Such a curriculum would integrate local oral traditions, knowledge and history and from where it would expand to deal first with issues in the entire Sami society and then the rest of the world, not forgetting the Indigenous world. One of the teachers also envisioned a joint Sami high school and student exchange programs with other Indigenous students "instead of always sending our kids to England". A natural extension of a Sami high school would, of course, be a Sami university, as one teacher put it, "in order to prevent our youth disappearing to the Western world". As the Sami teachers suggested, the

school environment could also incorporate local livelihoods in its immediate surroundings. The school yard could have a place for reindeer and a garden that would give students an opportunity to holistically work with one's natural environment. In this way, both social and natural environments would be an inherent part of education.

With regard to livelihoods combined with the concept of *attáldat* understood primarily as the skills of an individual, it is worth taking into account Hirvonen's concerns about a potential gender bias:

> Strikingly, the Sámi skills that one can find outside the classroom are, according to many interviews and examples, mostly skills that are linked with chores of boys or men. As a result of this, girls' and women's chores and traditions may be omitted from school education, if the schools do not examine their activities profoundly from the perspective of gender, too (Hirvonen, 2004, p. 129).

Considering how Sami women's tradition has been traditionally excluded also from ethnographic accounts resulting in a situation where recorded Sami tradition is, in fact, Sami men's tradition (Hirvonen, 1996), it is absolutely necessary to pay much closer and more critical attention to gender issues than thus far in considerations of Sami education and pedagogy. This is where the primary role of the female deities Máttáráhkká and her daughters in the Sami philosophy of the gift become critical. If we keep in mind that both the *láhi* and *attáldat* of these female deities form the very core of the Sami survival and well-being, we can no longer ignore or relegate girls' and women's skills and traditions insignificant or secondary.

Although the common perception – or myth (see Eikjok, 2000) – is of strong Sami women, the often negative influence of Christianity on general attitudes and perceptions of women in Sami society continue to be reality today. In *No beginning, no end: The Sami speak up* (Helander & Kailo, 1998a), an anthology of front line Sami artists and cultural workers discussing and analysing current issues affecting the Sami people and culture, several contributors address the influence of Christianity on women. Sami women writers Kirsti Paltto (1998) and Rauni Magga Lukkari (1998), and musician Inga Juuso (1998) suggest that Christian ideology has introduced a hierarchical understanding between genders, prioritising men and resulting in low self-esteem for many Sami women. Since the mid-1800s, particularly Laestadianism, an evangelical, revivalist movement inside the Lutheran Church influential in the northern parts of Scandinavia, has had a strong effect in Sami society. The movement was named after its founder, Lars Levi Laestadius (1800-1861) who was of South Sami ancestry and who travelled across Samiland preaching and delivering his healing sermons, which partly drew upon Sami culture and oral traditions. A central characteristic of the Laestadian faith is the confession of sins followed by absolution "in the name and blood of Jesus". Laestadianism requires an abstinence from alcohol and disapproval of contraception. It has introduced certain concepts of female piety and humility in addition to common Christian dualistic notions of women as either good or evil. Dualistic, simplistic descriptions of Sami women are evident, for example, in some of the works of male Sami writers (e.g., Guttorm, 1998). Female writers, on the other hand, have analysed the common images and representations of Sami women in a society strongly influenced by Christianity (Paltto, 1989).

Thus, in order to be able to be effective and successful, any consideration dealing with Indigenous humanities or any other processes of indigenising and decolonising the master narratives (of which education and the academy are naturally essential part), must also address the intersectionality of various forms of subjugation such as colonialism, racism, patriarchy and sexism. In order to restore the equanimity and socio-cosmic balance postulated in and required by Indigenous worldviews of the gift and reciprocity, it is necessary that envisioning Indigenous education and pedagogical models are able and willing to take a critical look at the erasure by the Christian Church of the goddess and the power of the female and her ability to produce life that was considered sacred in pre-Christian worldviews. *Láhi*, for example, can be considered to refer, among other things, to the gift of life given by the Sami female creators, Sáráhkká in particular (cf. Laestadius, 1994, p. 50).

In relation to Sami education, the concept of *attáldat* has to be reconsidered in a way that includes the skills, traditions and tasks of Sami girls and women. Drawing on the Sami gift philosophy of *láhi* and *attáldat,* we can do this by restoring the status of Máttáráhkká and her daughters as teachers and mentors of their own right. By reclaiming the life-giving and life-sustaining functions of the Sami female deities, we are able to reconnect with the indispensable spiritual and medical knowledge of women and also be reminded of the shared etymological roots of the Sami words for "mother" and "earth". We need this reminder not for a nostalgic romanticisation of the golden past but for a viable and strong contemporary Sami society as well as the survival of future generations.

I argue that reconsidering the two concepts of *láhi* and *attáldat* as forming the core of the Sami ontology or worldview, and establishing our pedagogical structures upon these core values, we are forging a firm path for Sami self-determination that is able to transform the conditions of assimilatory ideologies that in many cases still prevail in Sami and Nordic societies. This self-determination is not only intellectual, although it focuses on epistemological and pedagogical aspects.

The concepts of *láhi* and *attáldat* teach us the knowledge of the surrounding natural environment, of taking care of the relationship with the land, of our ancestors and relations in the spiritual realm, and of our responsibilities toward others. *Láhi* teaches us about the need to recognise the gifts of the land and reciprocate rather than take the abundance for granted and exploit it for profit, while *attáldat* teaches us to share our skills for the benefit of our communities and eventually, Sami society at large.

I suggest that *láhi* and *attáldat* are two guiding principles deriving from and rooted in Sami philosophy and worldview upon which we can build relevant and appropriate Sami education and pedagogical practices. An educational foundation that emphasises the significance of relationships (including with our ecosystems) and responsibilities toward recognising individual students' gifts teaches not only the necessary social skills but also provides Sami children with an understanding of central Sami values, that of interdependence and reciprocation. These values are closely linked to the notion of sustainability and their significance goes far beyond Sami culture and society.

The field of environmental education has flourished in the past two decades. One of the major factors contributing to this growth is the publication of the Brundtland Report, *Our common future,* in 1987, which triggered events such as the UN Earth Summits in 1992 and 2002, the International Climate Change Convention and worldwide Agenda 21 programs. The Brundtland Report calls for global awareness of the enormous environmental problems facing the planet and for the need for concerted global environmental action in the name of our common future. It proposes that human activities should "meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Brundtland, 1987, p. 43). Significantly, the report also recognises the sustainable ways of life of Indigenous and tribal communities and the role of Indigenous and tribal institutions and ideas in envisioning more sustainable futures for everybody on the planet. In short, incorporating the Sami gift philosophy into contemporary education would not be contradictory to the issues and concerns of contemporary society, but rather, quite the opposite. Education and pedagogical frameworks informed by Indigenous gift philosophies such as the Sami philosophy of *láhi* and *attáldat* function as implicit critiques of the dominant global economy that is predicated on exploitation, accumulation of capital and waste. The emphasis on the collective, they also expose the problematic nature of hyperindividualism that characterises much of contemporary mainstream society (see Christiansen-Ruffman, 2004; Feiner, 2003). The political economy of the gift thus serves as a sustainable, ethical and just alternative to globalised capitalism that is benefiting few and wrecking havoc in the lives of millions of people around the world (on globalisation and its effects on Indigenous peoples, see for example, Battiste & Henderson, 2000; Blaser et al., 2004; Gedicks, 1993; Guissé, 2003; Hall, 2003; Harry & Dukepoo, 2000; Howard, 2003; Indigenous Peoples and Globalization Program, 2003; Posey & Dutfield, 1996; Shiva, 1993, 1997; Smith & Ward, 2000; WGIP, 2003). As such, education established on the concept of the gift is far from being old-fashioned or nostalgic for the past, but rather extremely sophisticated and savvy with a critical understanding of the present that looks into sustainable futures while not forgetting the past. It provides students with values that stress the significance of giving instead of taking and in that way, it ensures that there indeed will be a future by taking into account the limited resources of our common globe.

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What's Normative Got to Do with It?

Toward Indigenous Queer Relationality

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Indigenous studies and queer studies have so far had a strange and disjointed intimacy, at times desiring and pursuing each other at the speed of land rushes and at the margins of whiteness, feminism, and queer of color critique.[1] At other moments, the two fields act as if the one does not exist at all for the other, not least because of queer investments in ongoing settler colonialism on the one side and an Indigenous commitment to illegibility and outright refusal of recognition on the other. Within the constraints of both fields, where it is either presumed that the Indigenous is always already queer to the normative settler or that the colonizing queer cannot and should not encapsulate Indigenous identities, genders, kinship structures, and sexualities that were only ever normative within their presumed-inclusive cultures of origin, what often emerges is an assertion of de/colonial difference enacted as and for the real. There are many reasons for such performative disjunctures and desirous pursuits that extend from genocide and the loss of languages and worlds those languages contained to the masculinist heteronormativity of some modes of Indigenous resurgence that has tried to overwrite, silence, and then speak for queer and feminist voices through homophobic gestures of liberalism.

In naming an impasse at the outset, I do not, however, want to suggest that queer and indigeneity do not go together, that they do not have vital points of intersectionality or methodology. They do, as research on the remaking of Indigenous kinship structures, genders, and sexualities into respectably recognizable Anglo-American heteronormative civility shows, or as the intervention Two Spirit makes to the hegemonic settler categories of LGBTQ demonstrates.[2] And yet, neither should one presume the queer and the Indigenous have anything to do with each

Social Text 145 · Vol. 38, No. 4 · December 2020
DOI 10.1215/01642472-8680466

other after all, especially as it is not entirely clear yet, as I have observed elsewhere, whether the queer in Indigenous studies bears even a remote passing similarity to the queer in queer studies. The disconnect might be ontological, a matter of living and being, surviving and thriving, resisting and resurging, or it could be that the need for materiality, for historical archives, for embodied identities, and for cultural and linguistic recovery within Indigenous studies continues to stand in for theory, for performance, and for disidentification within the queer. "It is in the unthinkability between queer and Indigenous," Driftpile Cree poet and scholar Billy-Ray Belcourt writes, "that some of us stage our lives. We are both nothing and everything at the same time."[3] Within the impasse between queer and Indigenous is an erasure that shadows the dispossessive regimes of settler colonialism that has already conditioned Indigenous presence, knowledge, and livability.

It is here in this unthinkability between queer and Indigenous, what Belcourt names a nothing and everything at the same time, that I want to instantiate both a space and the ground through which to consider further the challenges Indigenous studies and queer studies pose to each other at the sites of materiality, normativity, and relationality. These words, *materiality*, *normativity*, and *relationality*, have emerged lately as key concepts for both fields; they are routinely evoked, contested, and reaffirmed, and in their sustained critical usage, such words can give a sense that the two fields are actually speaking to and hailing each other. But in that delimiting and sometimes limited circulation, meaning can also be fraught and, at times, contrarian, giving the illusion that there is a conversation under way when, in fact, the shared vocabulary is a structural violence or outright disavowal after all. One of my hopes in chronicling such disconnects, failures, and refusals in this article is that, in doing so, I might first offer some provisional thoughts on how to hold the Indigenous and queer together and bind them through the concept of ground, not as identitarian categories to be revitalized and performed within ethnographic and linguistic records of colonial archives or as decolonially affirmative sexualities, but as a possible way to hold the simultaneous nothing and everything—and I want to add the spatiality of nowhere and everywhere to Belcourt's simultaneity—that the conjunction of Indigenous with queer might provide as a critical stance for eschewing recognition altogether. My secondary hope is to understand how the dispossessive logics of the nothing/everything and the nowhere/everywhere vectors of the Indigenous queer make legible exactly how central (dis)possession and its concomitant figuring of Indigenous bodies as material and immaterial manifestations of land and relationality are to how we understand ontology, embodiment, and subjectivity within the ongoing colonization of Indigenous lands.

Positioning the queer as a vital analytic within Indigenous studies might also allow, I hope, a return to the question, what is queer about queer studies now? that David Eng asked with Jack Halberstam and José Esteban Muñoz in 2005 to consider what is now left of queer within the dispossessions, retrenchments, and neoliberal g(r)aspings for relevancy that racial capitalism enables at the site of regressive white masculinist heteropatriarchal supremacy in the post-postracial, postqueer liberalisms that were only ever repressive logics at the heart of a brutal settler empire.[4] In arguing that queer epistemology "disallows any positing of a proper subject *of* or object *for* the field by insisting that queer has no fixed political referent," Eng, Halberstam, and Muñoz theorized a manifesto for a globally situated subjectless queer studies that, in decentering identity and the self, could offer sustained engagements with gender and sexuality, as both are constituted intersectionally at the site of race, empire, diaspora, militarism, and colonialism.[5] That lack of fixity is, however, still and importantly grounded through the ongoing dispossession of Indigenous lands. Ground—as land, as base, as territory, as wellness, and as center—persists as a guiding principle for decolonization, but it also becomes the locating authorization for claims, for meaning, for rightness, and for identity, subjectless or not.

In the decade plus since that state-of-the-field double issue was published in *Social Text* to take stock of queer studies' emergence and to assess queer's sustained political utility as a social critique of the normalization of meanings attached to sovereignty, democracy, rights, freedom, citizenship, immigration, kinship, belonging, and the human, Indigenous studies likewise arrived and transformed how scholars approached such questions by returning land, territoriality, and decolonization to the fundamental list of questions that might be posed to each and every subject-position imagined and enabled by settler colonial imperialism. Indigenous critique radically shifts the scales of interpreting the historical and political intent inherent within how self, subject, object, (dis)possession, and belonging are cohered within the context of ongoing settler colonialism. And, like the queer before it, indigeneity has had its own political utility, as well as its own internal debates about the politics and consequences of recognition and incorporation, culture and identity, sovereignty and nationalism, development and extraction, dislocation and movement, land and (dis) possession, labor and capitalism. I want to suggest that indigeneity itself functions similarly to queer as a means for interrogating how race, gender and sexuality, labor, possession, and rights are produced globally in relation to the ongoing occupation of Indigenous lands and the erasure of Indigenous peoples, in what I have elsewhere theorized as the queer politics of the transitive native.[6] Perhaps the reason Indigenous and queer continue to hold their boundaries and their ground against intersection-

alities is not just settler colonialism but the sheer magnitude of cognitive collapse that occurs when they occupy the same space at the same time.

While most efforts to bring these two fields into conversation have centered on Indigenous critiques of how the queer can often reify settler colonial dispossession, this article examines instead how Indigenous studies has subsumed the queer within Indigenous feminisms and how critiques of heteropatriarchy have queered all Indigenous peoples and have flattened Indigenous women's bodies into land. If there is anything for the queer to offer Indigenous studies, I want to suggest, it may be found in the quality of (im)materiality of the Indigenous body as the ground through which belonging and being are rendered, critiqued, and transformed.

I. Grounded Materiality

But what is the ground through which Indigenous bodily materiality is apprehended? When Maori scholar Brendan Hokowhitu theorizes material Indigenous physicality as the source of embodied Indigenous epistemologies, he does so through Foucault, through C. L. R. James, and through the sheer centrality of the Maori cis-male body playing rugby to argue that "the indigenous body symbolised the physical realm and, thus, was employed for its physical labour, observed for its performativity, and humanised through the physical pursuits of sport."[7] In calling for such a materially constituted Indigenous body at play, he further advocates for the immediacy of Indigenous existentialism as a necessary transformation of the fixity of Indigenous physicality to stand against the realm of a self-pitying and romanticized "pure pre-colonial past" as he asks a series of seemingly rhetorical questions:

> Are Indigenous bodies anxiety ridden in the present, lost between the pure past and the impure present; racked by tears over the actions of others upon us? Do we feel cheated of the future? Does the birth of our children lack responsibility; that is, will we pass on to them as part of our bodily "traditions," the tears of self-pity? Conversely, can we "jump for joy" in the knowledge that regardless of our facticity, we have choice, responsibility and freedom?[8]

Hokowhitu does not formally theorize Indigenous existentialism through an acknowledgment of gender, and by not doing so he reproduces and universalizes the materiality of the Indigenous body at the site of an Indigenous masculine heteronormativity that refuses tears for the joy and responsibility of generational futurity.

In his powerful critique of the institutionalization of "Indigenous masculinities" following a series of panels at the 2015 Critical Ethnic Studies Association Conference in Toronto, Belcourt affirms after Sara

Ahmed that "sometimes complaining is a life-or-death matter" and that Indigenous feminism

> was and is a world-building project, asking us to think about how to think about living differently without resorting to a kind of cruel nostalgia or to the putative givenness of qualifiers like "masculine." For queers who are native and in but not of Native Studies, our modes of intellectual production are often paranoid readings of the discipline or provocations of sorts to do things differently.[9]

The taken-for-grantedness of certain Indigenous bodies, according to Belcourt, presumes both a gender and a body that are able to cohere their materiality, their immediacy in the here and now, their fleshiness as solid ground against the traumas and violences of colonialism not least because they lack the interventions of feminist, transgender, and queer studies to disrupt the masculinist traditions that are rooted in much of the scholarship of the field. In other words, Indigenous studies has a queer problem.

Solving that problem, for some, has meant asserting a cascade of differently embodied genders, sexualities, and kinships as the traditionally rooted grounds for truly liberating resurgence. As Lenape scholar Joanne Barker points out,

> Critical Indigenous studies scholars have uncovered multiple (not merely *third* genders or *two*-spirits) identificatory categories of gender and sexuality within Indigenous languages that defy binary logics and analyses. Within these categories, male, man, and masculine and female, woman, and feminine are not necessarily equated or predetermined by anatomical sex; thus, neither are social identity, desire, or pleasure.[10]

But even that multiplicity in the nonalignment of bodies, anatomy, desire, pleasure, and identity runs the risk of asserting Indigenous difference as the very ground that both reproduces and then defies the binaries of settler genders. Belcourt's provocation to the field asks us to consider exactly who and what Native studies' Native actually is when it "emerges as if it didn't emerge at all. . . . Which is to say that the Native is the subject, intelligible in form, who comes into being prior to study in order to conduct that study."[11] The ontological turn to embodied materiality as always already decolonial in Indigenous studies asserts the queer even as it denies any ground for the difference the queer might make.

One of the many disciplinary challenges that transgender and nonnormative gender studies has offered to feminism and to queer studies is the need, first, to reassess how the "real" of bodily materiality functions beyond performativity, discursivity, and the embodied epistemological "sense" of gender and then to shift to denaturalize how the material of all

bodies functions within transnational labor, militarization, medicalization, colonialism, and racial capitalism to produce power over the always already racialized, subjugated, and jettisoned from the registers of the natural, the normal, the able, and the civil. As Gayle Salamon's engagements with phenomenology and queer theory suggest, transgender studies demonstrates not that "the transgendered body has a material specificity that marks it as different from a normatively gendered body, but rather that the production of normative gender itself relies on a disjunction between the 'felt sense' of the body and the body's corporeal contours and that this disjunction need not be viewed as a pathological structure."[12] In making legible the disjunction between corporeality and the felt sense of the body, transgender studies amplifies how we might, after Judith Butler, make bodies that matter.

But this concern with bodies mattering has always already haunted racialized and colonized bodies, and here Black feminisms and queer of color critique have (re)situated queer studies' concern with bodies mattering within the afterlife of slavery and the ongoing gendering of racialization. As work from Hortense J. Spillers and Sylvia Wynter to Christina Sharpe, Sarah Haley, and Omise'eke Natasha Tinsley reminds us, gender, queerness, and the body are produced in the "living laboratory" of captive, enslaved, and incarcerated flesh and labor that make gender for some bodies nonnormative, deviant, and pathological from the outset.[13] Gender, as Haley painstakingly demonstrates, "is constructed by and through race, and that the production of woman and other stable gender categories requires violence."[14] For Sharpe, antiblackness is the constitutive ground through which figuration occurs, and in the "Trans*Atlantic" that she theorizes as the wake of slavery, "Black has always been that excess. Indeed, blackness throws into crisis, whether in these places one can ever really think together, Black and (hetero)normative. That is, Black life in and out of the 'New World' is always queered and more."[15] However, in developing expansive forms of Black and queer femme-inism, Tinsley tells us, it is crucial to acknowledge "the different social situations of cis- and transfemmes."[16] Rather than collapsing transgender studies into Black feminist studies, Tinsley instead spatializes the intellectual genealogies they both provide to stage epistemological and ontological insights into how race and gender are coproduced on and through the body. With the masculinization through criminalization of Black women that Haley documents in her study of gendered racial capitalism, we can see how "the modifier 'black' indeed repudiated 'woman' but was also distinctly different from 'man.'"[17] But, as Tinsley additively stresses, "commonsense expectations of butchness for black queer ciswomen are *not the same* as commonsense expectations of heteromasculinity for black folk assigned male at birth, and black cisfemme-ininity and transfemininity resist gen-

der conformity in different, complementary ways."[18] In this way, Black feminisms hold in productive tension the material consequences of anti-blackness in which Black bodies are queered within racial capitalism and white settler heteronormativity without ever losing the material and lived particularities of the Black queer and trans body.

For its part, Indigenous feminisms have sought to intervene within and against the bodily matters of gendered racial capitalism by diverging from these questions of trans*corporeality to attest to an Indigenous alterity that does not and is not matter precisely because colonization stripped the ground from beneath our feet. After all, settler colonialism is, Leanne Betasamosake Simpson writes, "the force that has removed me from my land, it has erased me from my history and from contemporary life, and it is the reason we currently have thousands of missing and murdered Indigenous women and Two Spirit/queer people in Canada."[19] Rather than embodying labor or capitalist orders, Indigenous bodies are, according to Simpson, best understood as "political orders." Further, she continues,

> they represent alternative Indigenous political systems that refuse to replicate capitalism, heteropatriarchy, and whiteness. They are the embodied representation in the eyes of the colonizers of land, reproduction, Indigenous governance, and political systems. They reproduce and amplify Indigeneity, and so it is that these bodies must be eradicated—disappeared and erased into Canadian society, outright murdered, or damaged to the point where we can no longer reproduce Indigeneity. The attack on our bodies, minds, and spirits, and the intimate trauma this encodes is how dispossession is maintained.[20]

In other words, for Indigenous feminisms, the materiality of Indigenous bodies is not individual, or necessarily even gendered. Instead, it is relationally collective; what matters are the land and the alternative governance structures that that Indigenous collectivity signifies. Because indigeneity represents alternative modes of governance and existence, as Barker points out, "imperialism and colonialism require Indigenous people to fit within the heteronormative archetypes of an Indigeneity that was authentic in the past but is culturally and legally vacated in the present."[21] That process of legally vacating the present for an indigeneity authentically mattering only in the past is the killing force of genocide and has been just one of the ways that Indigenous bodies go missing as remains within the archives of the past that the imperial state produces as its end goal of dispossession. As those Indigenous bodies go missing, the queer Indigenous body is lost entirely from the outset.

In her recent work on settler governance, gender, and sorrow, Mohawk anthropologist Audra Simpson characterizes the imperial state as male, white—or, if not quite, then aspiring—and heteropatriarchal.

To clarify, she explains, "I say heteropatriarchal because it serves the interests of what is understood now as 'straightness' or heterosexuality and patriarchy, the rule by men. As well, it seeks to destroy what it is not. The state does so with a death drive to eliminate, contain, hide and in other ways 'disappear' what fundamentally challenges its legitimacy: Indigenous political orders."[22] In governing as a straight white man, the Canadian settler state enacts violences on Indigenous women by first attempting to define them and any children they might have completely out of existence through the 1876 Indian Act, which imposed patrilineal descent and used marriage to render Indian women not just the property of their husbands but the race of their husbands. Simpson's work shows how Indian women, stripped of any belonging to their community if they married out, literally disappeared into the limited enfranchisement of settler womanhood within the colonizing society that surrounded them. Then, when it became clear to the state that not all Indian women would vanish through such eliminatory projects, it targeted their bodies as excessively fleshy in their failure to disappear, to remain as Attawapiskat Chief Theresa Spence did when she began her hunger strike on behalf of her people in December 2012, robustly present as political actors embodying alternative governance to that of the settler state. "Women's bodies were to the settler eye, like land, and as such in the settler mind, the Native woman is rendered 'unrapeable' (or, highly rapeable) because she was like land, matter to be extracted from, used, sullied, taken from, over and over again, something that is already violated and violatable in a great march to accumulate surplus, to so called 'production.'" Indigenous women, Simpson concludes, "disappear" precisely because they are "killable, rapeable, expendable. Their bodies have *historically* been rendered less valuable because of what they are taken to represent: land, reproduction, Indigenous kinship and governance, an alternative to heteropatriarchal and Victorian rules of descent."[23]

Absent, erased, disappeared, vanished, and vacated bodies and genders are recurrent themes that circulate though Indigenous feminisms and in queer Indigenous cultural and literary productions, albeit toward significantly different ends. For Belcourt, a wound can become a world, and in the epilogue to his award-winning poetry collection, he reflects on work by Judith Butler and Lauren Berlant to juxtapose the violent erasure of Indigenous bodies with the condition of love as a poetics of the unbodied. "If I have a body," he writes,

> let it be a book of sad poems. I mean it. indigeneity
> troubles the idea of "having" a body, so if I am somehow,
> miraculously, bodied then my skin is a collage of meditations on love
> and shattered selves.[24]

Conjoining the queer quality of sex as undoing with what he sees to be the "co-constitutive categories" of death and indigeneity, Belcourt hovers in the traumatic spaces of mangled and undone bodies to consider an ontological possibility for indigeneity where "closeness to sadness and to misery enables a reworking of the codes of bad affect, enabling us to free them from the apoliticized cages of pathology and the private."[25] Rather than resisting the unbodied materiality of indigeneity, Belcourt inhabits the immateriality of Indigenous queer love as a way to remake the world through fluidity, collapse, heartbreak, and bodies coming back together again.

Though Audra Simpson does not outright say it, in reading the state as a heteropatriarchal straight white man, she suggests a nonnormative, nonstraightness for all Indigenous bodies and their flesh that resists settler governance in their excesses and refusals to be eliminated, disappeared, or rendered dead. The nondifferentiation of a possible queer or gender-nonconforming Indigenous body who does not or cannot reproduce is collapsed into the materiality of the Indigenous woman as already queer. What Simpson demonstrates in her pointed reading of settler violence is that there is a curious elision that both centers heteropatriarchy and conquest through its white, straight, and masculinist vectors and simultaneously and inadvertently deflects the Indigenous queer in the moment it is evoked as supplement to the category of Indigenous woman. In their enjambment of Simpson's return to fleshy corporeality with Spillers's distinction between body and flesh, Manu Vimalassery, Juliana Hu Pegues, and Alyosha Goldstein ask us to consider what "differential relational study [might] yield, particularly outside the limitations of what we might call white queer theory and its attendant focus on anti-reproductive futures" if we were to begin with "queer of color and queer Indigenous critiques [that] elucidate that Black and Native bodies are always already queered under the terms of colonialism."[26] Through the interventions of transgender, Black, and Indigenous feminisms, we can see how the differential mattering of bodies produce gender, queerness, and sexuality within the ongoing dehumanizations of criminalization, surveillance, hypervisibility, and erasure that have been built through settler governance's attempts to legally and materially clear the land of (and from) some bodies while denying other bodies a right to exist at all. There is a difference, though, between queer and erased that Indigenous studies has yet to address.

II. Grounded Normativity

In positioning *queer* as a referent that might "tack back and forth to situate Indigenous and Black genders and sexualities" as "the very terms consti-

tuted by and, in turn, constituting the human," Vimalassery, Hu Pegues, and Goldstein momentarily withdraw queer from both its identitarian and its antinormative imperatives.[27] In doing so, they invite us to consider further how identity, normativity, and antinormativity might function when queer does shift to the Indigenous and back again. Insisting on the heterogeneity of historical locations and cultural specificities for theorizing sexuality, women of color feminism resists the institutionalizations of queer studies that often reduce heterogeneity into singularities and universals as part of disciplinarity. "This material specificity," Roderick A. Ferguson observes, "produces a tension between theorizations of racialized sexuality and efforts to capture those theorizations within universalist enunciations of sexuality."[28] Ferguson further traces how, "as African American normative and national formations arose out of U.S. imperialism, African American elites learned the tactics of sexual and gender regulation from the itineraries of imperialism, imposing those tactics onto black poor and working-class folks."[29] Documenting what she terms gendercide in the Spanish genocidal colonization of what becomes California, Deborah A. Miranda observes something similar in the archival evidence of how the *joyas* were exterminated in the sixteenth century. When it became clear that Spaniards were targeting third genders as part of the campaign of conquest, some in the Indigenous community participated in identifying and rounding up *joyas* to be killed. "This tragic pattern in which one segment of indigenous population was sacrificed in hopes that others would survive," Miranda writes, "continues to fester in many contemporary Native communities where people with same-sex orientation are no longer part of cultural legacy but feared, discriminated against, and locked out of tribal and familial homes."[30] Such strivings for normative respectability cohere power for elites at the site of gender, sexuality, race, and class, and the historical differential specificities between centuries and racialized subjectivities within empire demonstrate the lasting cumulative force that emerged in the cauldron of violence and enslavement that demarcated freedom in the new world that Lisa Lowe analyzes as *The Intimacies of Four Continents*.

Within queer theory, the word *normative* functions as shorthand for the hegemonic power embedded within the structures of European white supremacist heteropatriarchy that draws lines of distinction between what is deemed normal and natural from what is aberrant and deviant at the site of raced, gendered, and classed bodies, as well as at the site of the ethics, politics, and morality that rule them. Normative circulates as a culture's and society's norms and, at its most basic definitional level, is the social contract through which governance supposedly enacts its good and righteous rule. Within the imperial United States, the normative manifests within institutional state structures of anti-Black racism, settler colonial

dispossession, racial capitalism, compulsory heterosexuality, misogynistic heteropatriarchy, Christianity, monogamy, and possession, to name only a few.

Thus, normativity, Robyn Wiegman and Elizabeth A. Wilson quip, "marks the spot where *queer* and *theory* meet."[31] "Normative sexualities, normative genders, normative disciplinary protocols, normative ideologies, normative racial regimes, normative political cultures, normative state practices, and normative epistemes: these figures of normativity have been the heart of queer theoretical inquiry for nearly three decades."[32] By calling into question the axiomatic critique of normativity within the field, Wiegman and Wilson ponder other possible disciplinary meanings and formations that could be missed "because normativity has come to stand as the negative force against which the field crafts its self-definition."[33] Advocating for an anti-antinormativity in the field of queer studies, Wiegman and Wilson finally wonder what is lost when a critique of norms becomes oppositional to merely instantiate opposition. What if not all norms are wrong, they seemingly want to ask. Norms are, they point out, "stochastic. Norms generate not sovereignties, but overdetermined relationalities. So, to stand against one part of a normative system would be to stand, comically, against oneself."[34] To which, Jack Halberstam has responded succinctly, "Without a critique of normativity, queer theory may well look a lot like straight thinking" where "straight thinking is characterized by a matrix of rhetorical operations that support the common sense of the moment, commit to foreclosing on critiques of the status quo and reinvest in the ordinary, the good and the true."[35]

In *Red Skin, White Masks*, Yellowknives Dene scholar Glen Sean Coulthard advocates for a resurgent theory of Indigenous resentment against the politics of recognition, liberal pluralism, and reconciliation that have defined the colonial relationship as "a form of structured dispossession" that the settler state maintains in perpetuity with Indigenous nations.[36] Critiquing the normative requirements of constructivist/inclusion paradigms for recognition that settler states offer as democratic and egalitarian if not progressive accommodations to Indigenous assertions of nationhood, Coulthard stresses that "when constructivist views of culture are posited as a universal feature of social life and then used as a means to evaluate the legitimacy of Indigenous claims for cultural recognition against the uncontested authority of the colonial state, it can serve to sanction the very forms of domination and inequality that anti-essentialist criticism ought to mitigate."[37] The settler state, in adjudicating its own violent past through attempts for its own reconciliation, further entrenches dispossession of Indigenous lands and Indigenous nations' self-determining authority. And though Coulthard does not cite queer theory, his critique resonates with those scholars who have questioned the

homonormative logics of marriage equality, military service, and LGBT civil rights within the settler state.

But instead of using queer theory to interrogate normativity, Coulthard locates his intervention at the intersection of political theory and Indigenous studies and centralizes norms and normative in his work to address the regulatory modes of governance within political orders. At times, he is critical of normativity, as he is when he reads against Seyla Benhabib's antiessentialist models for state recognition. Claiming to draw on gendered and feminist analysis as a backdrop for his concerns, he writes,

> Benhabib's anti-essentialist criticism includes two dimensions: it claims to be grounded on, first, an *empirical* understanding about the constructed nature of cultural identities, which she then, second, deploys in a *normative* argument in defense of gender justice for Aboriginal women and other marginalized members of cultural minorities. . . . In other words, what is convenient about the social constructivist position to the deliberative democratic project is that it justifies subjecting "the cultural" to the norms that guide deliberative conceptions of "the political."[38]

As an alternative, the core of his scholarly contribution to the articulation of Indigenous anticolonial relations to land centers on what he terms "grounded normativity," by which he means, "the modalities of Indigenous land-connected practices and longstanding experiential knowledge that inform and structure our ethical engagements with the world and our relationships with human and nonhuman other over time."[39] Elsewhere in *Red Skin, White Masks*, he writes that the "imperatives of capital accumulation signified an affront to our normative understanding of what constituted proper relationships—relationships between people, relationships between humans and their environment, and relationships between individuals and institutions of authority."[40] In upholding Indigenous normative understandings derived from relationships with land and with the human and nonhuman other on that land and over time as both the ground of authority and the grounding of being, Coulthard affirms the basis for Indigenous political governance and sovereignty that opposes that of the settler state and, in this way, deploys normativity strategically and in ways that would necessitate a nonoppositional anti-antinormativity (and is that straight?) engagement to resist the countercharge of engaging in colonialist thinking. Further, in forwarding Indigenous norms and normativities, Coulthard performs Indigenous statecraft that differentially parallels settler states in its ability to self-recognize and self-actualize Indigenous territorial sovereignty and governance.

That said, his use of normativity throughout *Red Skin, White Masks* raises substantial questions for two fields that have yet to find the ground through which queer and Indigenous might converge. In expanding his

theorization of grounded normativity as the basis for Indigenous political difference to settler colonial governance, Coulthard coauthored a response to David Roediger's 2015 presidential address at the American Studies Association Annual Meeting in Toronto with Leanne Betasamosake Simpson titled "Grounded Normativity/Place-Based Solidarity." In it, Coulthard and Simpson acknowledge the grounded normativity of the land that the conference was held on as providing the relationships, practices, and knowledges through which Nishnaabeg nationhood would be able to "critically interrogate capitalism, heteropatriarchy, and white supremacy. It provides them with the material culture to rebuild their political orders and conceptualization of nationhood without replicating heteropatriarchy or anti-Blackness normalized in our settler colonial reality."[41] Critiquing the normalization of heteropatriarchy and antiblackness, on the one hand, they position Indigenous grounded normativity as the pure decolonial and antiracist alternative, on the other. And in so doing, they return us to a fundamental conundrum: what is left of queer if the normative is no longer something to critique but to champion?

This is the question that, for me, discomfits some of the recent work in Indigenous feminisms that attempt to account for a radical possibility for Indigenous queer mobilization within in the field; the question not only troubles the straight thinking implied in the acceptance of the commonsense of the good but also raises the stakes by adding colonial thinking to the evocations of sovereignty, nationalism, and political governance that underscore Indigenous struggles for land-based decolonization. In her Indigenous resurgent manifesto, *As We Have Always Done: Indigenous Freedom through Radical Resistance*, Simpson returns again to Coulthard's "grounded normativity" as the rationale through which to locate Nishnaabeg political systems and original instruction, and in the process, she paradoxically posits "Indigenous queer normativity" as an additive good faith gesture of incorporation of the queer within Indigenous resurgent struggles. "We simply cannot accept a singular, shallow interpretation of Nishnaabeg thought and use it to shame, exclude, and degrade members of our nations," she writes. "Our thought systems within grounded normativity are fluid, dynamic, and responsive, and it is our responsibility to practice grounded normativity in the way it was intended: to build strong societies of individuals who are functioning as their best selves."[42] Into this notion of building strong societies of best selves, Simpson foregrounds Two Spirit and queer individuals, where *queer* is understood as solely identitarian, and the good centers on the self-actualization that comes when cultures and societies radically accept all individuals for exactly who they are. "While the intersections between queer theory and Indigenous Studies are interesting," Simpson explains, "I am more drawn to recovering how Indigenous theory, in my case how Nishnaabeg

theory, conceptualizes gender or can conceptualize gender and sexual orientation because my sense is that my Ancestors lived in a society where what I know as 'queer,' particularly in terms of social organization, was so normal it didn't have a name." More succinctly, she adds, "Queer Indigeneity has a place for straightness, and that's why we should center it."[43] It is a move that, while ostensibly advocating queerness as normative to Indigenous studies, nevertheless continues to require straightness as the ground through which the queer is made valuable.

It might be tempting to resolve the disciplinary and definitional tensions residing in Indigenous studies' use of normativity by affirming a liberatory intent and foregrounding the anticolonial imperative that figures Indigenous epistemologies, ontologies, and land-based practices as the basis and source for radical resistance against settler colonial theories of the queer. But the normative gesture of the so-normal-it-did-not-have-a-name, the *as we have always done* past tense and present perfect temporality of indigeneity that Simpson deploys itself erases and vacates that which has always been erased from and abjected in the deadly onslaught of colonialism. If Indigenous bodies matter as the embodiment of land, if they are always already political orders in the settler eye, as both Audra Simpson and Leanne Betasamosake Simpson claim, then how might we understand gender and sexuality, property and territoriality, consent and freedom differently if the land itself is the source of fluidity, authority, and groundedness outside the means of (re)production?

III. Grounded Relationality

I end with a series of questions and provocations: What if, instead of normalizing the queer within recovered Indigenous grounded normativities as a sign of Indigenous liberalism, Indigenous studies followed radical queer strategies to refuse legibility outright through the matrices of sovereignty and its norms, statehood and its recognitions, subjectivity and its rights, gender and its performances to assert instead the possibilities that emerge when the normative is resisted in each and all of those vectors? What if, instead of eliding the queer into that which was always already normal, Indigenous studies disrupted the normal of traditional practice and knowledge as the justification for the good, the just, and the queer? And what if, rather than because it has a place for straightness, queer indigeneity was centered as an analytic because it called into critical relation straightness in all its iterations?

In asking these questions, I seek to amplify a definitional possibility that already resides in Coulthard's grounded normativity and Simpson's place-based practices to offer a slight shift toward grounded relationality as a framework that is still left for the queer beyond normativity. Though

Wiegman and Wilson say that "norms generate not sovereignty but overdetermined relationalities,"[44] they fail to ever engage Indigenous thought in their critique of queer antinormativity, and in their iterations of normative and all its possible positivistic valences they do not elaborate further on this one-sentence observation. But if, as they claim, norm is merely a statistical category, stochastic, random, and leveling to a mean, then it is not about overdetermined relationalities at all but about assuming and then forcing into relation connections that might not otherwise exist; in a full circle, we tack back again to normativity as it is defined and then critiqued within queer theory. *Relationality*, on the other hand, is a word that emerges across a range of disciplines and finds origins in Karl Marx's relations of production, in the Black Atlantic and Caribbean poetics and discourses of Edouard Glissant, in Donna Haraway's cyborgs and kin in the Chthulucene, and in the Indigenous philosophies of North America and the Pacific. As Jason Edward Lewis, Noelani Arista, Archer Pechawis, and Suzanne Kite explain, "Relationality is rooted in context and the prime context is place. There is a conscious acknowledgement that particular world views arise from particular territories, and the ways in which the push and pull of all the forces at work in that territory determine what is most salient for existing in balance with it."[45] When Coulthard defines "grounded normativity" as "the modalities of Indigenous land-connected practices and longstanding experiential knowledge that inform and structure our ethical engagements with the world and our relationships with human and nonhuman other over time,"[46] it resonates with and draws on existing definitions of relationality already in use by the field.

In attempting to advocate a theory of anomaly that links Southeastern Indian philosophies to queer's antinormative imperative, Daniel Heath Justice observes that the upper, middle, and lower worlds of Mississippian cosmology are represented in our iconography "by flux, conflict, and an unending struggle for balance (not supremacy) between worlds of order, balance, and chaos. Humans share this dynamic cosmos with a diverse community of other-than-human beings, all of who have their own subjectivities and powers, and each of whom has a particular set of relationships with all other entities, some more intimate than others."[47] Justice emphasizes that, in the interplay between these worlds and the beings who inhabit them, it is the relations between them that matter the most. While most entities exist in one world or another, nothing is absolutely fixed in this cosmology, and there are moments when the boundaries break down altogether to allow crossings, transformations, and stealings away. However, there are also certain powerful beings who inhabit or move through the multiple worlds seamlessly and simultaneously, and Justice gives the examples of bats, flying squirrels, the pitcher plant, and the water panther as entities that defy and refuse expectations. These entities,

Justice suggests, might best be understood as anomalies to classificatory categories and, as such, could provide insights into how a Southeastern queer relationality might serve as an analytic method.

Delving into the quagmire of queer's relation to norm, Justice observes that "the anomaly isn't just in a conditional or circumstantial relationship to the normative body/category—the anomaly is absolutely *essential* to its ostensible opposite. In other words, the anomaly is constitutive of the norm, not outside it or insignificant to it." "If, however," he continues,

> we understand them to be in a relationship of complementary duality, with straightness as the normalizing category and queerness as the constitutive anomaly without which the norm (and the entire categorization system) ceases to exist, then the relationship is much more complicated and mutually interdependent—and thus more fully embedded in the widespread Indigenous values of kinship, community, and reciprocity, without eliminating the specificities of individual lives, loves, and experiences.[48]

These key words—*complementary duality*, *kinship*, *community*, and *reciprocity*—underscore Indigenous epistemologies of relationality, and though Justice foregrounds anomaly as the difference queer indigeneity might make to both fields, it is through relations the queer makes that difference matters materially.

All Indigenous bodies have been erased, vacated, and reduced to bones and caricatures; they have been targeted for sexualized violence, disciplined when they deviate from settler colonial standards of civility, disappeared on the margins of settler occupation, and temporalized to a long ago past that, we are told, has no bearing on the present. All Indigenous bodies are also materially land, water, and political orders; they are fluid, capacious; they transform over time; and they exist outside settler gender binaries, normativities, and even nonnormativities. And like land and water, they have agency, they embody kinships, they sustain communities of life that stretch from the human and the nonhuman, and they provide the material context for what it means to exist in relation. Though Indigenous and queer studies may not yet know exactly what the other means to their respective fields, what is left for both is to find the ground between the nowhere and nothing of the vacated Indigenous queer and imagine an everywhere and everything that the two fields might instantiate at the site of decolonization when they finally meet.

Notes

I first thank David Eng and Jasbir Puar for convening this special issue and generating the occasion for this article. I especially thank David for his time, generosity, and deeply reflective reading of drafts of this article—his feedback was invaluable in helping me think through and then make legible the ground of Indigenous (im)materiality. I also thank both reviewers for *Social Text* for their generative and thoughtful feedback and willingness to think with and beyond me in reading the article—though I was not able to incorporate all of their additive insights within the limited scope here, I appreciate the care with which they read and shared suggestions. Finally, I thank Juliana Hu Pegues, who is always a brilliant interlocutor, willing to help me better say what I mean when I get lost in the words.

1. One of the challenges that concepts such as indigeneity and queerness both pose is their expansiveness, as well as multitudinous contexts hailed in their invocation. For the context of this article and its intervention, I focus primarily on US- and Canadian-based Indigenous and queer studies, though the terms I use exceed that context. There is much more work for me to do to consider how both indigeneity and queerness transform in conversation with and through global souths and beyond the white settler colonies that have so often been the site of critical analysis.

2. See, e.g., Rifkin, *When Did Indians Become Straight?*; and Morgensen, *Spaces between Us*.

3. Belcourt, "Can the Other of Native Studies Speak?"

4. Eng, Halberstam, and Muñoz, "Introduction."

5. Eng, Halberstam, and Muñoz, "Introduction," 3.

6. Byrd, "*Loving* Unbecoming."

7. Hokowhitu, "Indigenous Existentialism," 110.

8. Hokowhitu, "Indigenous Existentialism," 116.

9. Belcourt, "Can the Other of Native Studies Speak?"

10. Barker, "Introduction," 13.

11. Belcourt, "Can the Other of Native Studies Speak?"

12. Salamon, *Assuming a Body*, 2.

13. Spillers, "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe," 208.

14. Haley, *No Mercy Here*, 8.

15. Sharpe, *In the Wake*, 30–32.

16. Tinsley, *Ezili's Mirrors*, 33.

17. Haley, *No Mercy Here*, 88.

18. Tinsley, *Ezili's Mirrors*, 33.

19. Simpson, *As We Have Always Done*, 7.

20. Simpson, *As We Have Always Done*, 41.

21. Barker, "Introduction," 3.

22. Simpson, "The State Is a Man."

23. Simpson, "The State Is a Man."

24. Belcourt, *This Wound Is a World*, 22.

25. Belcourt, *This Wound Is a World*, 58.

26. Vimalassery, Hu Pegues, and Goldstein, "Colonial Unknowing and Relations of Study," 1049.

27. Vimalassery, Hu Pegues, and Goldstein, "Colonial Unknowing and Relations of Study," 1050.

28. Ferguson, "Of Our Normative Strivings," 86.

29. Ferguson, "Of Our Normative Strivings," 98.

30. Miranda, "Extermination of the *Joyas*," 259–60.
31. Wiegman and Wilson, "Introduction," 1.
32. Wiegman and Wilson, "Introduction," 1.
33. Wiegman and Wilson, "Introduction," 5.
34. Wiegman and Wilson, "Introduction," 17.
35. Halberstam, "Straight Eye for the Queer Theorist."
36. Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 7.
37. Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 21.
38. Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 93.
39. Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 13.
40. Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 62.
41. Coulthard and Simpson, "Grounded Normativity," 255.
42. Simpson, *As We Have Always Done*, 122.
43. Simpson, *As We Have Always Done*, 138.
44. Wiegman and Wilson, "Introduction," 17.
45. Lewis et al., "Making Kin with the Machines."
56. Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 13.
47. Justice, "Theory of Anomaly," 218.
48. Justice, "Theory of Anomaly," 221, 222.

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Destitution and Creation: Agamben's Messianic Gesture

Kieran Aarons

Abstract

This article offers an account of the basic movement of Giorgio Agamben's ethical philosophy. The ethical gesture is stretched between two forms of messianism, a "paralysed messianism" associated with life under permanent state of exception, and the "perfected" nihilism of messianic fulfilment, which Agamben associates with the movement of revocation or "destitution". I argue that Agamben's concept of destitution cannot be accurately treated as a synonym for negation or destruction, as it envelops irreducibly creative elements. At the same time, the creation at issue here is of a peculiar sort, since it is modelled not on the act of production but rather on the restoration of a creative potential within sensibility. Special emphasis is here placed on Agamben's retrieval of the work of a relatively obscure French linguist, Gustav Guillaume, whose theory of "operative time" allows his messianism to subvert the extrinsic opposition between the suspended time of revolt's divine violence and the historical time of everyday life.

Keywords: Giorgio Agamben, Gustave Guillaume, Messianism, Destituent Power, Ethics

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The aim of this article is to describe, in a provisional and restricted manner, the movement of messianic destitution as an ethical and gnoseological strategy for neutralizing the mutilating "ban relation" that permeates lived experience under the current reigning order, without resubstantialising political subjectivity. Agamben's theory of destitution is neither nihilistic, nor can it be accurately summarized as a synonym for negation or destruction; in fact, the irreducibly creative movement it envelops is motivated precisely by an effort to overcome the paralyzing nihilism of our time. At the most general level, the wager of destituent ethics lies not in a search for new social or hegemonic grounds with which to reinvigorate or replace the withering political subjectivities of the 20th century, but rather in the effort to leverage and "fulfil" the an-archic, desubjectifying, and anonymous dimensions of contemporary life by converting them into new premises for experiencing and collectively inhabiting shared sensible worlds oriented around non-economic ideas of happiness. In this, Agamben's work

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contributes a new philosophical starting point for thinking communism in the 21st century. Obstacles to this process — the myriad mechanisms of capture, separation, and articulation Agamben groups together under the logic of the ban — issue not only from within the political and economic theology that underpin today's dominant order, but also permeate much of the 20th century revolutionary and avant-garde traditions that sought to jettison it.[1] As a result, while his political commitments are unwaveringly aligned with the revolutionary currents of his time, Agamben's effort, beginning roughly in 1999, to develop a positive concept of destituent power is motivated by an urgent search for new schemas of transformative creation, a new "image of thought" as Deleuze might have said, which is always also a schema for seizing upon lived experience and its unthought historical potentialities. Such an image will be modelled neither on the act of production, wherein an extant capacity for action is realized in an end or product, nor on managerial democratic paradigms that reinforce the metaphysical fiction of a *sui generis* subject of consent, but on the earthbound, vital, and sensible connection between perception, gesture, and time.

My argument unfolds in two main parts, moving from diagnosis to intervention. Part I outlines Agamben's reading of contemporary governance as a form of "imperfect nihilism", a term that encompasses both a post-political paradigm of rule as well as the characteristic form of desubjectivation that it engenders. Part II then shows how this nihilism assumes an inverse yet symmetrical expression in a "prophetic apparatus" into which the 20th century revolutionary project often sank. The critique of prophecy serves as the entry point into Agamben's theory of destitution, which, in my view, cannot easily be grasped apart from it. I argue that this theory gains its philosophical traction from the genetic conception of subjectivity in which it is anchored, allowing Agamben to re-situate the ethical tension within the hiatus between the fragmentary time of perception and the discursive representation of time. Special emphasis is placed on his retrieval of the work of a relatively obscure French linguist, Gustav Guillaume, whose importance for Agamben has, to my knowledge, remained largely overlooked. In spite of the former's undeniable influence upon every corner of his thought, in the final analysis it is neither Heidegger nor Benjamin who most directly enables Agamben to circumvent the limits encountered by the 20th century theory of the event. Rather, it is his mobilization of Guillaume's theory of "operative time", a time which subverts the extrinsic opposition between

[1] I address the presence of the ban structure within the logic of revolt in Aarons (2019: 1018–46).

the suspended time of revolt's divine violence and the historical time of everyday life.

I. Paralysed Messianism

Agamben's concept of messianism has two valences. Life under permanent state of exception is what he will refer to as a 'petrified or paralysed' messianism, the 'imperfect nihilism' of a ruling order that *cannot finish finishing*, which has nullified the law but 'maintains the Nothing in a perpetual and infinitely deferred state of validity' (1999: 171).[2] The "Nothing" at issue here is no obscure metaphysical element, but a mode of experiencing the world in which events 'happen without happening', a paradoxical relation of non-relation that causes time to slip from our grasp, and in which 'every gesture becomes unrealizable' (1999: 169, 174). Imperfect nihilism is the effect of a mode of governance that aims to ensure that (the) *Nothing* happens, *rather than the world*. Against such epochal paralysis, Agamben will oppose not the positivity of a non-alienated or integral form of subjectivity preserved from the destruction of experience, nor a retrieval of originary experience from the ruins of metaphysics, but the 'perfected' nihilism of messianic fulfilment, which achieves redemption by an 'overturning of the Nothing' of our time.[3] However, since the latter is nothing other than the reduction of the former, i.e. a way of inhabiting and repopulating the fringe of desubjectivation it installs in our relation to the world, the interpretive challenge consists in understanding how destitution can 'create' a new relation simply by exhibiting and neutralizing an absence. What does it mean to fulfil the Nothing of our age, to return Nothing to nothing, by exhibiting its emptiness? In what sense can 'exhibition' alone constitute a mode of creation? What is the relation between messianic time and the Nothing that our age guards at its centre? In order to answer these questions, we must better grasp the petrified nihilism that constitutes our present.

The state of exception and the "days of the messiah"

In its religious connotation, the 'days of the Messiah' refer to the period after the resurrection, yet prior to the abolition of history. Although earthly law remains "in force", the messianic event has left it in a state of suspension: 'the time under

[2] All authorless in-text citations refer to Agamben's works.

[3] On the impossibility of retrieving an "originary beginning", see Agamben, 2015b: 266.

the Law is over, and yet the Messiah has not yet come' (1999: 168). If Agamben sees in this an analogy to contemporary life under the permanent state of exception, this is because, from the moment that the juridical order 'grounds' itself directly in the emergency, not only does the law divest itself of any transcendent authority, but the very framework of prescription and proscription lose their meaning *tout court*. Like the 'original form of the Torah' in the Kabbalistic tradition, which is composed of a 'medley of letters without any order; that is, *without meaning*' — yet which, for the same reason, can be said to 'contain all possible meaning' — the self-derogation of law in the exception reduces the pronouncements of law to a senseless jumble of words, a 'commandment that commands nothing' (1999: 165–167; 1998: 52).

If life under the state of exception may be characterized as a "petrified" or "paralyzed" messianism, an "imperfect" nihilism, then this is first of all because, since the end of the First World War, Western societies have become constitutively incapable of even imagining, never mind actually working toward, a future that could look any different from the present. After its 'pure and simple relinquishment of all historical tasks', politics has been reduced to 'simple functions of internal or international policing in the name of the triumph of the economy', i.e., to the disordered and tautological administration of a social and economic order that has emptied itself of any positive reason for being, yet which continues an-archically to persist, 'without why' (2002a: 76).

Contrary to appearances, the depoliticization of law does not signal its disappearance but merely a shift in its way of exerting power over a subject. That it no longer speaks to us of prohibitions does not weaken, but in fact intensifies its hold over us. As Jessica Whyte observes, as soon as 'no act can be understood to be in accordance with the law', it follows that 'no space can safely be assumed to be outside its grasp' (Whyte 2013: 103). Once it has become *a priori* impossible to distinguish transgression from observance, the legality of an act becomes fundamentally undecidable. From the militarization of public space to the complete surveillance of the smallest minutia of private life, today everything conspires to remind us that the most innocent gesture can be criminalized at any moment, that inside the most harmless of citizens there lurks an anonymous potentiality for terroristic violence.[4] As Agamben distils it, 'the unspoken principle which rules our society can be stated like this: every citizen is a potential

[4] Agamben, 2009a: 22–23. See also 1998: 57: '[A] person who goes for a walk during the curfew is not transgressing the law any more than the soldier who kills him is executing it'.

terrorist'.[5] In actual fact, this lawless potentiality projected by securitarian logic into the life of every citizen must be seen as the symmetrical image of that groundless violence to which the reigning order subjects us.[6] To live under a permanent state of exception is to be perpetually "abandoned" to an unlocalizable authority whose jurisdiction is unlimited, yet whose demands are inscrutable (2005a: 38–39). Sovereign violence hovers like an indeterminate element over its subjects, a powerfully present absence that acts upon them no longer by means of delegation and interdiction but by *exposure:* to be governed today is to experience a graduated spectrum of vulnerability to a non-localizable potentiality for violence suspended over us, punishment becoming a mere afterthought, and perhaps even a relief, the confession of guilt having become the only way to bring our endless trial to its conclusion.

This petrified nihilism of our age generates a stalled or aporetic experience of time: a radical *futurelessness* in which all that is left to do is *wait*. However, unlike during the First World War, which, as Furio Jesi writes, for four years 'suspended the usual rhythm of life' by transforming 'every hour [into] an hour of waiting — waiting for the next move (one's own or the enemy's)', all of which 'were instants in a greater wait, the wait for victory', the current paradigm of global civil war waged through sovereign policing has no horizon of triumph or victory other than its own reproduction (Jesi, 2014: 46).[7] In the absence of any such *telos* or justification, the holding pattern of historical time gathers itself only through the *deferral* of its own imminent dissolution. If our society can be said to resemble a world that, having deposed the law, now expends every effort to delay the arrival of the Kingdom, this is because, after abjuring all relation to transcendence, it can no longer imagine its end as the end of *a* world, but only as the end of "*the* World" per se. The temporality of such decadence assumes the form of an endless end, or, in the words of Günter Anders, an 'apocalypse without kingdom': a world that cannot imagine itself carrying on, and yet for this reason is all the more incapable of having done with anything.[8]

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[5] For a deeper elaboration of this point, see Agamben, 2016.

[6] 'We are not, and will never be terrorists; but what you seem to designate by the word "terrorist", that we are' (2009b).

[7] On the terms 'global civil war' and 'sovereign policing', see Agamben (2015a: 1–3), and (1996: 103-107). As Agamben puts it, governance today 'aims at nothing other than its own replication' (2009a: 22).

[8] 'We are the first to expect not the kingdom of God after the end, but nothing at all'. See Anders (2019).

Desubjectivation and the administration of absence

In the Preface to his *De Cive,* Hobbes describes the 'state of nature' as an analytic principle that is revealed when the State is 'considered as if it were dissolved' (*ut tanquam dissoluta consideretur*) (Hobbes, 1998: 10).[9] If Agamben often characterizes our contemporary situation as one of 'global civil war', this is because, in the state of exception, any formal "togetherness" that might once have been associated with the notions of civil society or the state is today lived *as if* dissolved (2015a: 24). By administering all relations between human beings *as if* our lives lacked any internal form, as if we were nothing but surviving machines — bundles of self-interest surrounded by a void of relation — economic governance presides over the reproduction of a 'bare life that has been separated from its context' (1998: 100). Only once beings have been wrenched from their worlds, stripped of all lived attachments, can the political task of re-assembling the atomized particles make sense. What economy separates, classical politics serves to re-gather, only *as separate*.

If contemporary governance can operate in the mode of a *katechōn*, working tirelessly to conceal and 'delay the unveiling of the "mystery of [its own] lawlessness"', by rendering its subjects' 'every gesture unrealizable' (1999: 169; 2005b: 111), its day-to-day reproduction is only possible thanks to an immense administration of phenomenality intervening at every level of the subject's entrance into the "Open". Today, the entire surface through which subjects enter into contact with reality has been front-loaded with desubjectivizing apparatuses designed to attenuate ethical intensities, to suspend all decisive contact with the world, and to preempt any effort to desert the 'colossal parody' of our inert social tissue by capturing our 'all-too-human desire for happiness' and transporting it into a realm beyond our reach — e.g. the iPhone as a 'sophisticated absence outfit' (2009a: 16, 20-24; Invisible Committee, 2014: 31).

As Reinhart Koselleck's work helps us to see, this flooding of our lives with apparatuses in fact only completes the long process of depoliticization in which

[9] Translation modified to accord with that of Agamben (1998: 36).

the modern state found its point of departure.[10] With its final passage, in the twentieth century, away from the rule of law and toward a 'pure activity of governance' came the neutralization of the great political antagonisms that shaped the first half of the 20th century (2009a: 22; cf. 2007a). The 'real identities' that once defined the field of political polarization (Workers, Bourgeoisie, Subaltern, Pan-African)[11] have all inwardly collapsed, ceding their place to that 'docile and cowardly' citizen of post-industrial democracy that *Tiqqun* and Agamben have dubbed the *Bloom* (2009a: 22–23).[12]

The peculiar mode of alienation to which the concept of the Bloom points is important, as it forms the "subjective" premise of Agamben's destituent messianism. Bloom is the last man: the final outcome of capitalism's vast

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[10] See Koselleck (1988: 1-40). There is an inner link between statecraft as a technique of ethical neutralization and the rise of *moralism,* the latter being understood as a sphere of "inner conscience" stripped in advance of any relation to external action. In its effort to immunize the space of the political from the local ethical hostilities of vernacular and spiritual life, Koselleck shows how the modern state introduces a "break" within the ethical subject that dissociates it from its lived worlds. In this, he allows us to understand the historical genesis of the contemporary liberal subject, the impotent indignation of the "engaged citizen". If liberal moralism presupposes the neutralization of all ethical attachment, this is because in order to "denounce", we must first *exempt* ourselves. Liberal "critique" is inseparable from a gesture of ethical self-parenthesis.

[11] '[T]he society of the Spectacle […] [is] one in which all social identities have dissolved' (Agamben, 1996: 87–88, 110). On the one hand, it is legitimate to be concerned about Agamben's neglect of questions of race, gender, queer identity, and the variegated forms that suffering takes in the modern world. On the other hand, if he is right that the various social contradictions and oppressions that, in the mid-twentieth century, managed to harden into antagonistic points of political subjectivation can no longer crystalize into counter-subjectivations in the ways they once did, then what they primarily serve to mark off is the intensity and quality in which a generalized void of law expresses itself according to this or that social positionality. There are, we might say, many "imperfect nihilisms" depending on the complex grammar of negativity that structures different identities. However, since messianism begins *from where one already is*, and deposes social conditions without founding a new identity, it arguably does not need to *first* address this difference in order to offer a logical schema for undoing the Nothing, even if it remains the case that its implementation will look different across different experiences. This point is, admittedly, a sticky one. Some preliminary considerations of this problem — beginning from the side of critical race theory, and working backwards to Agamben — have been proposed in Aarons (2016).

[12] *See also* Tiqqun (2012), *passim*. On several occasions, Agamben has publicly acknowledged his involvement in both volumes of the journal, as well as in the revisions of the 2008 edition. See Agamben (2004: 120). As a matter of historical reference, it will be recalled that the second of the lecture series that became *The Time that Remains* was delivered at the University of Verona in the winter of 1998–99, while Volume 1 of *Tiqqun* was first published in Venice (an hour's drive away) in January 1999. In the Luria Kabbala, the word *Tikkun* means "messianic restoration" or the "mending of the world". See Agamben (2004: 120), and (2001, *passim*).

campaign of social violence directed against any immediately shareable experience of the world, the war of annihilation it waged against what Ivan Illich calls 'vernacular communities'.[13] He is the self-fulfilling prophecy of the modern state form, which, through four centuries of colonization, forced migration, slavery and exile, has finally managed to perfect in practice the atomization it always presupposed in theory, by stamping out all non-marketized forms of collective belonging. As such, Bloom is not an identity, but a way of giving a name to the paradigmatic *Stimmung* of the age of petrified nihilism: the experience of no longer coming from anywhere, of being a foreigner everywhere, 'a guest in one's own family' (Invisible Committee, 2008: 29–43). In phenomenological terms, it describes the experience of inhabiting a body whose mutilated corporeal schema immunizes it from all meaningful attachments to the people, places, and beings around us. It signals less the absence of all taste or inclination, than a 'taste for absence', an *inclination* to nothingness, a way of abstracting or exempting ourselves from any decision on our lived situation (Tiqqun, 2010: 19). It is akin to what Arendt calls 'the desert': a habit of becoming spectators of our own experience, of relating to the world *as if* we did not belong to it, as if we were not *party* to it — 'spectators who look at the time that flies by without any time left, continually missing themselves' (2005b: 68).[14] In this, Bloom sets the stakes for what messianic destitution must "fulfil".

Agamben offers an important distillation of the concept, which simultaneously points in the direction of its overturning: Bloom, he writes, is the name for 'the new anonymous subject, these "whatever singularities" that are emptied out, open for anything, which can diffuse themselves everywhere and yet remain ungraspable, without identity, but re-identifiable at each instant' (2004: 120). It is decisive to note that the anonymity of this contemporary man without content is not defined by an absence of identity *per se*, but by the presence of a destabilizing *nothingness* that insinuates itself between the subject and each of its

[13] From the sharing of traditional knowledges such as medicine, contraception and child-rearing, to collective forms of reproduction such as commoning and informal exchange, Ivan Illich shows how the emergence of capitalism implied a ruthless war on any material and linguistic complicity or cooperation that proved incompatible with the wage relation. This entailed a shattering of experience, a replacement of 'sustenance derived from reciprocity patterns embedded in every aspect of life [with a] sustenance that comes [exclusively] from exchange or from vertical distribution' (Illich 2013, Ch. 1).For Agamben's remarks on Illich, see Agamben (2014: 73).

[14] As Arendt observes, the true "political crisis" of our time lies in our inability to even *feel* the depoliticized desert to which we have been consigned, 'the modern growth of worldlessness, the withering away of everything *between* us' (Arendt 2005: 201–204).

factical-juridical predicates or qualities. This Nothing is not reducible to a biographical or sociological epiphenomenon, for it touches all who live in our time to greater or lesser degrees. It is the introjected mirror of the anarchic groundlessness of an age in which all the hegemonic fantasies that once stabilized the economy of presence have either withered or been systematically trampled-out. As Reiner Schürmann observes, 'the rallying point of moderns, their home and focal point — the "I think" — undergoes displacements somewhat in the manner of [...] a childhood memory wandering off in a conversation, continuing, in the new site, but no longer going without saying' (Schürmann, 2013: 562).[15] The contemporary colonization of interiority by the Spectacle shatters the coherence of the "I" through its incessant proliferation of artificial and abstract (*viz.* uninhabitable) images of selfhood. The emptier these ascriptive socio-institutional predicates become, the more we are pressured to 'identify' with them, to the detriment of our own singular reading of the situation. However, at the same time as it empties identities of their historical substance, Bloom's nothingness allows the subject to be *re*-identified at each moment. It is precisely because our dis-located interiority forces us to remain continually on the lookout for schemas of identification that we harbour the potential for a different mode of reattachment, a different mode of relation: new ways of sharing gestures, of moving together, new practices that would permit us to once again inhabit the spectral world into which we have been born. Bloom does not spell the end of identity *tout court*, but the opening up of a newly non-substantial and purely contextual-strategic relationship to it.

The question posed by contemporary desubjectivation is certainly not "how can we breathe new life into the great political subjectivities of yesteryear?" As Marcello Tarì reminds us, 'the exhaustion of the possibilities of this world also includes the forms of political action that accompanied it' (Tarì, 2016: 7–8, own translation). The sad Trotskyists hocking their century-old workerist newspapers outside Whole Foods offer a routine reminder that, 'unless we wish to persist in the mode of the undead, as zombies, a political identity that (like this world) has exhausted every possibility can only be laid to rest' (ibid). Of the mask that revolutionary militancy once was, only fragments and ruins remain. While its courageous legacy is deserving of our respect and admiration, it is Agamben's

[15] On this point, see Stephanie Wakefield, 'Reiner Schürmann's Faultline Topology and the Anthropocene', in Blumenfeld (2013), Ch. 10: 'When the great sheet of constellations that fix things in constant presence folds up, closes in on itself, the principial reference still exists, we still have the sense of identity of self with self, but it is dislocated, plurified and decaying'.

view that its operative premises — its historical tasks, but also its image of life and happiness — can no longer be our own.

Our question must be different: how can we imagine a politics that would not be grounded in a pre–existing subject?[16] As Agamben observes, 'what is often lacking, also [in today's] movements, is […] the awareness that every time one takes on an identity one is also subjugated. Obviously this is also complicated by the fact that modern apparatuses not only entail the creation of a subjectivity but also and equally processes of desubjectivation' (2007a). The real problem is how to *intervene* in this process so as to redirect it toward an increase in our power of thinking, sensing, and acting: 'what, in the processes whereby a subject somehow becomes attached to a subjective identity, leads to a change, an increase or decrease of his/her power to act'? (ibid). How, without resubstantialising the subject by means of yet another new-fangled mythologeme, can our anonymity make the 'leap beyond itself' that would allow it to be converted into a 'zone of communal life' that maintains its own non-coincidence with itself, abiding in the 'no-man's-land' between identity and non-identity (2004: 120). How can the anonymous desubjectivation to which we have been reduced recover a common power that is nonetheless singularly its own? How, *without re-constituting subjectivity*, can we deactivate the fixed vocations to which our social situations consign us, opening them to an anonymous and common *use*? If messianic life describes the experience of a subjectivity 'only within the framework of a strategy or tactic', then what is this strategy, and on what gestures does it depend? (2004: 117)[17]

II. Against the end of the world

> The coup d'état is a nothingness against which we must oppose our own nothingness.
>
> Maurice Blanchot[18]

[16] 'Political theories were always built on the premise that there was a subject bearing some sort of meaning, with certain needs and certain desires connected to them. [Today] it seems very important to me to attempt to re-think political action without the anthropological reference to a subject', Agamben (2009b). On this point, see also Agamben (2004: 116).

[17] See also (Agamben, 2007a): [T]he outcome of conflicts depends on this: on the power to act and intervene upon processes of subjectivation, in order to reach that stage that I would call a point of ungovernability.'

[18] *Autour du Groupe de la rue Saint-Benoît de 1942 à 1962,* cited in Blanchot (2010: 182 fn.28).

> Winning the struggle between the time of the end and the end of time is *the* task allotted to us today and to all who come after us.
>
> Günter Anders[19]

If the archaeological significance of messianism consists in its having brought to light for the first time the *arcanum imperii* of the law, its ethical significance lies in the response to it which it enables, the disposition by which it takes up its condition. The fulfilment that characterizes 'perfected messianism' has nothing to do with a theological-metaphysical conceit concerning the existence of the Divine.[20] Agamben is not a theological thinker. What is at stake, rather, is the search for an ethical and epistemological schema by which a deactivation of the sovereign exception can be enacted from *within* historical time. The Messiah is 'the figure through which religion confronts the problem of the Law, decisively reckoning with it' (1999: 163; 1998: 56). What Agamben is after is a non-dialectical schema for confronting and annulling the destructive "emptiness" of the state of exception, of which Bloom's ethical nullity constitutes the subjective expression. At issue is not the foundation of a new law, but a *mode of relation* to the groundlessness of law under which we already live: messianism relates to the nullity of law through the lens of its "passing-away". Against the managed disorder of the state of exception and its diffuse ethical paralysis, 'fulfilled' or destituent messianism responds by introducing a clarifying disposition that experiences its contact with the world as a call to *decision*.

Prophecy, eschatology, transition

From the earliest phase of his work, Agamben's theorization of revolutionary violence has centred on the internal form through which it transforms the experience of time (1993: 91). Revolutionary violence, in his view, must not simply usher in but *coincide* with a new temporalization of experience. We should therefore not be surprised to see him claim that the essence of messianic community can only be grasped in terms of the 'internal form of the time [that Paul] defines as *ho nym Kairos*' or now-time, the latter being importantly understood as a 'paradigm of *historical* time' (2005b: 3).

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[19] Anders (2019).

[20] 'I believe the messianic is always profane, never religious' (2004, 120).

A false alternative has long organized the temporality of the revolutionary theory of action: do we intervene now and accelerate the coming collapse (activism, voluntarism), or must we refuse all separations between ourselves and "the working class" and wait for the masses to act on their own (objectivism, historicism)? Vanguardism, or mass movement? The Great Evening, or the process? Or else do we hedge our bets, by regarding our interventions here and now as positive or negative "prefigurations" of the ideals and practices that will shape the world we wish to see emerge "after" the collapse, in the hopes that our little oases of radical culture will function like seeds that germinate and generalize when the time is ripe, or at least leave us a little better prepared?[21] At bottom, the debate is theological in origin: do we wait for the coming of the Messiah, and remain in the post God has assigned to us, or do we hasten the second coming, the *eschaton*?[22] In either case, the arrival of the Kingdom is construed as an exceptional event; redemption coincides with a sudden and cataclysmic bisection of history by an intransitive and intransigent *other* time that either breaks it in half, or abolishes it.

The Pauline *klēsis* or "calling" responds by dividing this division. In contrast to the polarization of "normal time / suspended time" of the sort one finds not only in Furio Jesi's *Spartakus,* but likewise in Agamben's own early account of class violence published the same year, *The Time that Remains* seeks to show that there is another experience of historical time in which its linear or historio-graphical representation of life is, in a certain respect, already "suspended" (although this term will ultimately prove inadequate, as we shall see below).[23] Importantly, if it is already suspended, it is so not *extraneously*, as occurs when the quasi-eternity of revolt deactivates or "mutes" the progressive time of history, but rather *internally* at every moment. Historical time envelops a remainder, a 'remnant' that divides the opposition between chronology and "the end of time", thereby allowing time to be seized upon and brought to an end. As I will argue, the decisive originality of *The Time that Remains* resides in the fact that the division between messianic time and historical time does not assume the exceptional character of a sudden

[21] For a positive take on prefiguration, see Milstein (2010); on 'negative prefiguration', see Bernes (2012); for the hardline objectivist position, see Dupont (2009).

[22] On this point, see The Accused of Tarnac, 'Live Communism, Spread Anarchy', in Blumenfeld (2013: 277).

[23] On Jesi's theorization of the suspension of historical time, see Aarons (2019b). On Agamben's early formulation of revolutionary class violence, written the same year as Jesi's *Spartakus,* see Agamben (2009c).

interruption, nor is it a fact to be instigated or anticipated, but *already* has an existence. If the Kingdom is already here among us, then the apostolic calling is neither the projection of an event to come, nor the effort to instigate one by *fiat* (with the attendant dangers of "technicisation"), but assumes the character of a *response.*[24]

To what is the calling a response? And what is the nature of this response, what is the messianic vocation?

In *The Courage of Truth*, Foucault reminds us that prophetic epistemology and temporality are marked by a double extraneity, affecting both their relation to speech and their temporal logic. Unable to speak in his or her own name, the prophet's 'mouth serves as intermediary for a voice which speaks from elsewhere. […] He does not reveal without being obscure, and he does not disclose without enveloping what he says in the form of the riddle' (Foucault, 2011: 15). On the one hand, the prophet announces a message that *originates* elsewhere ("thus speaks Yahweh"); on the other, the message itself *anticipates* an event located elsewhere, in the future, in a time still-to-come. Although he (or she) may insist on having an immediate relation to the spirit of God from whom the message arrives, the prophet 'receives a word that does not belong to him' (2002c: 1). Like Rimbaud, who declares in the 'Drunken Boat' that he has '*seen* what other men believe they have seen', the prophet *evokes* a truth that cannot itself be presented.[25] Prophetic truth arrives in the mode of withdrawal: it is unrealizable in the present, suspended at a distance from us in an "other" world from which it descends. Prophetic time stretches us toward a "coming" time whose reality remains inaccessible, and which nothing in the actual situation could ever suffice to break open. The prophesized event will come *soon,* and we are invited to make use of historical time to prepare ourselves for it. Ultimately, though, what we must do is *wait*.

The "prophetic apparatus" is defined by the twofold condition of mythic "evocation" and temporal deferral. Not unlike the floating indeterminacy of the law's being-in-force — which is likewise predicated on a ground it can only "evoke" but never present — the vital significance of prophecy lies in its power to position us in relation to a truth we cannot properly *assume*. It allows only two

[24] On the concept of 'technicised myth', see Aarons (2019a), and Andrea Cavalletti's introduction to Jesi (2014). On the limitations of Jesi's concept of revolt, see Aarons (2019b).

[25] *…j'ai vu quelquefois ce que l'homme a cru voir!* 'The Drunken Boat', in Rimbaud (2001, 127). On the prophetic character of this formulation, and the mythological machine upon which it relies, see Jesi (2019).

questions in response: "has the prophet seen the truth?" (i.e. is the mythological machine full or empty?); and, if the prophet speaks the truth, "how long must we wait?" (2005: 2).

In the same lecture course, Foucault distinguishes the *prophet* — who speaks not in his own name, but in the name of an ulterior future — from the *parrhesiastes,* who has the courage to say what is true today in his own name (Foucault, 2011: 15). Whereas Foucault did not regard them as fundamentally separable figures, Agamben prises them apart, identifying his own messianic politics exclusively with the latter (2004: 120).[26] The motivation for this separation is less ontological than historical, and serves to highlight a key political dimension of his messianism. There is, Agamben argues, an intimate link between the disappearance of the figure of the Prophet in our contemporary epoch and the exhaustion of a revolutionary politics premised on programmes (or ends) and the Party-form:

> The figure of the prophet was that of the political leader until fifty years ago. It has completely disappeared. But, at the same time, it seems to me that *it is no longer possible to think a discourse addressing the future.* It's the messianic actuality, the *kairos*, the now-time that must be thought. […] Benjamin writes somewhere that Marx secularized messianic time in the classless society. This is completely true. But at the same time, with all the aporias this engenders — the transitions, etc. — it is a type of snag on which the Revolution failed. We don't have a model of time available that permits us to think this. (2004: 120, my emphasis)

Agamben's reading of Paul responds to this exhaustion of futurity by separating the messianic deposition of law from eschatological and transitional logic. The Pauline calling is neither a 'perpetually deferred' *eschaton* (the liberal interpretations of Scholem and Derrida, which only mirror the imperfect nihilism of our time) nor is it a 'transitional time' situated between two epochs, one from which it departs, the other it strives to fulfil (the "dictatorship" phase of Marxism-Leninism). In the end, both approaches lead to the same impasse: neither can *deliver* or seize hold of the actuality of the experience on which they are nevertheless premised. Either we perpetually delay the decisive moment, or we bend our idea of happiness toward an 'end' that seems designed to place it out of reach: 'every transition tends to be prolonged into infinity and to render

[26] The claim that Foucault did not fully separate the two figures of the prophet and the parrhesiast is Agamben's. While it is perhaps debatable, I will not enter into it here.

unreachable the end that it supposedly produces' (2005b: 70). There is no greater misunderstanding of messianism than to equate the time that "remains" with a waiting, an anticipation of what is to come at some *later* time (2005b: 62).[27]

To refuse the schema of prophecy means that there is no *preliminary* to communism. Taken to its logical conclusions, this implies that whatever we mean by communism, it clearly cannot refer to a new institutional schema for the distribution of wealth, the organization of labour, or the representational management of society. Strictly speaking, it cannot be an ideal or ideology at all, since this too would have to await its realization in a state of things. A thorough refusal of preliminaries only leaves us with two options: either we renounce the communist project entirely, or else we understand it as an *ethical disposition*, a way of entering into contact with, and being affected by, a common potentiality that is communicated in what is taking place (2015b: 232, 237, 211).[28] For those who adopt the latter approach, the exigency to which the term 'communism' responds can only be situated within the occurring of the present, in the concrete situation in which we find ourselves. By contrast, if the time of "transition" leaves it suspended and unreachable, this is because it continues to be understood as a transition *toward* an end. For Agamben, the problem of communism has nothing to do with a future society; it names an ethical process that proceeds from sparks or fragmentary potentials already operative in the present. It is transitional, but not "toward" anything else — it is *pure transition,* the accomplishing of shared worlds in the process of their own construction, and never a *fait accompli.*

From apocalypticism to operative time

Paul is not a prophet, but an apostle. For him, the Messiah has already arrived; the age of the prophets is over. To live in the days of the Messiah, is to live *ho nyn kairos*, in the time of the now. Yet if the prophecy has been concluded, if the decisive event is now behind us, are we not at the end of history? Is time concluded? How can we distinguish the Pauline calling from the apocalyptic announcement of the eschaton?

To live in the apostolic calling is, Agamben tells us, to experience not the 'end of time, but the time of the end' (2002c: 2; 2005b: 62–64). It is 'not the instant in which time ends, but the time that contracts itself and begins to end […] [i.e.]

[27] In spite of its many merits, this is the mistake that frequently unravels Jessica Whyte's otherwise insightful study of Agamben. See Whyte (2013).

[28] See also footnote 56 below.

the time that remains between time and its end' (2005b: 62). What does it mean for time to have *not yet* concluded, but to have *already* "begun to end"?

Messianic time is not a time anticipated, but one that is "seized" and "contracted", grasped and rendered *habitable.* It is 'a bit of time taken from the profane that, all of a sudden, is transformed' (2005b: 120). Since revolutionary violence is bound up for Agamben with the transformation of time, quite a lot rides on the difference between the eschatological concept of the "end" and the messianic "event". Moreover, the Pauline *hōs mē* (deactivation, revocation) offers the most fleshed-out positive example of destituent power in the 'Epilogue' to *The Use of Bodies.* Hence, if 'it is because messianic *klēsis* caught up in operational time that it can take on the form of the *as not*, the constant revocation of every vocation', then it is no exaggeration to say that Agamben's entire conception of destitution hangs on this distinction (2005b: 68). In what follows, I will therefore attempt to work through the argument in detail, before drawing some provisional conclusions in the final section.

As Bergson highlighted already a century ago, the attempt to think time often involves a troublesome reliance on spatial schemata: time is figured as a line, one end of which is represented by the past, the other by the future, with the present forming a caesura down the middle [p—— /$_{pr}$——f]. If we rely on such a schema, the messianic event will be forced to appear either as one punctual occurrence or "point" among others in the chronological sequence of historical time, or else as the abstract contemplation of the *last* day (the day of Wrath) on which the series is finally abolished (the "end of the line", as it were). As Agamben observes, this appears to be the alternative presented by the apocalyptic Jewish rabbinic tradition, which associates the distinction of two worlds (*olamin*) with that of two temporal orders (*aiones*). On the one hand, there is the *olam hazzeh,* the chronological time extending from the creation of the world to its conclusion (*aion touto, ho kosmos outos*: this world, this time); on the other, the *olam habba,* the next world to come, the *eschaton* that abolishes the series (*ho aion mellon*) (2005b: 62; 2002c: 2–3). While both *olamin* appear in Paul's writings, Agamben is insistent that the time to which the apostolic calling responds is neither that of a point on a sequential line, nor that of a world subsequent to history's conclusion. In neither case could the event, strictly speaking, be *experienced.* The deeper meaning of messianic time is precisely to call into question 'the very possibility of drawing a clear distinction between the two *olamin'* (2002c: 3). If it cannot be represented either as a line, point, or "end" of time, this is because the time of the remnant, holds itself out *between* the two.

Still, even if it is neither a point nor an end-point, the "betweenness" of Messianic time would, at face value anyway, still appear to imply a progressive development. For example, in its religious connotation, the idea of "arrival" can easily lend itself to a tripartite division: (t^1) the profane time of *chronos* extends in linear fashion until the event of the resurrection, whereupon (t^2) time 'contracts itself and begins to finish'; henceforth, it "remains" in the *ho nyn kairos* until the *parousia* (t^3), or the full presence of the Messiah at the end of time. To represent this schema on a line, we would present a straight line which, broken by a caesura, continues in contracted form until it breaks off:

———————————//- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

profane time Event contracted time

Given this schema, messianic time could be conceived of as the contracted space "between" the broken points. The *ho nyn kairos* would here refer not simply to the transitional chronological span that falls "after" the resurrection and "before" the *parousia*, but to the mutation of chronological time itself that the event introduces. There is a sense in which Agamben accepts this schema; or rather, he thinks it gets at something essential, namely, that messianic time is 'not exterior to chronological time' but is a *portion of secular time* that undergoes a 'transformative contraction' (2002c: 3; 2005b: 64). The trouble is that, since this figuration of time remains spatial, it is impossible to appreciate the *vital* significance of this contraction without relating it to the course of the line, which would fall back once again into a form of futural "anticipation". What can never be grasped in the spatial schema is the reality of its lived experience. Yet the lived experience of transformed time is the core of the revolutionary problematic for Agamben. Another approach must therefore be found.

Agamben turns to the work of linguist Gustave Guillaume for a solution, and in particular to the two studies collected in his book *Temps et verbe* (1929, 1945), which offer the first worked-out theory of what Guillaume calls 'operative' or 'chronogenetic' time, a time interior to chronological time, on which the latter relies without being able to encompass it representationally in a time-image. While a fuller account of Guillaume's important influence on Agamben's work must be reserved for another occasion, I will attempt to outline the essentials here, which concern the presence — within thought and perception — of an *evaluative* and preindividual genetic dimension of experience wherein time has not yet settled into the constituted tense relations that characterize discursive speech and the spatial paradigms of time reliant upon it.

According to Guillaume, traditional linguistics tended to consider language only from the point of view of the meaning-effects that appear at the level of its actuality in speech, by systematizing the formal rules that obtain at the level of its signifying effects in discourse. This overlooks 'the true reality of a form' that is not located in the 'multiple and fleeting effects of meaning that result from its employment [*emploi*]' but in the 'operation of thought […] that presides over its definition in the mind' (Guillaume, 1968: 132–133).[29] The 'multiplicity of consequences' that the linguistic sign generates in real speech must be referred back to the 'secret operations' in 'the virtuality of *langue'* [*la langue virtuelle*] (Guillaume, 1968: 133). These cannot be studied by directly consulting phenomena, but are accessible only by analysis: if the 'direct observation of sensible phenomena can offer linguistics only "meaning effects" of form', this is because 'it only becomes possible at the moment where form has been incorporated into thought [*la forme à pris corps dans la pensée*], which is to say, after its mental expression'. What the direct observation of the actuality of discourse misses is the '*preparation of form* […], the operations of thought that create them' (ibid, emphasis added). The latter 'necessarily elude the speaking subject studied by traditional linguistics', since 'once we attempt to become aware of these operations, they have already taken place and disappeared', without leaving any memory of them (Guillaume, 1968: 133). The true domain of temporal form in language is therefore not that of 'pensée *pensée'* in which things present themselves already formed and conceived, but what Guillaume describes as the 'deeper and to some extent pre-existent one of pensée *pensante',* wherein things — still in their genesis — are not yet sufficiently incorporated to 'leave an imprint on our memory' (ibid).

As with Benveniste's distinction between the *semiotic* and the *semantic* — which forms the basis of Agamben's conception of 'infancy', or the human being's thrownness into language, and which internally separates us from our own speaking being — for Guillaume the two domains are separated by 'language itself, which creates, so to speak, the wall between them' (1993: 51-56; Guillaume 1968: 134). As soon as language is expressed, what we have before us is *pensée pensée,* whereas the *pensée pensante* that gave rise to it is closed and dead. The

[29] See also Guillaume (1984). The latter is a collection composed of excerpts from Guillaume's seminars, and includes several valuable discussions of operative time, especially Part IV, 'The Act of Language', and Part IV, 'Thought and Language'. In an effort to distinguish Guillaume's conception of *langue* from that of Saussure, editors Hirtle and Hewson render Guillaume's use of the term as 'tongue' (see p.*xx-xxi*). Finding this unhelpful, I have opted to retain the French term throughout.

constituted actuality of discourse everywhere depends on an ideal systematic plane, the properties and laws of which linguistic analysis must discover. Guillaume therefore proposes to study the existence of expressive forms in their genetic phase, prior to their actualization in speech.[30] For this, we must seek, now on the side of thought, the 'morphology of the inside' that serves as both the cause and the integrating mechanism of the system's diachronic transformations.

The spatially-flattened or 'panoramic' time-image that we encountered above, and which we represent with the line/point schema, is an image of time in its already-constructed state. What it misses is the experience of time as it is 'still being constructed in thought', as well as the various states it must pass through along the way. As Agamben observes, what Guillaume adds to the chronological representation of time is a 'a projection in which the process of forming the time image is cast back onto the time image itself':

> In so doing, he comes up with a new representation of time, that of chronogenetic time, which is no longer linear but three-dimensional. The schema of chronogenesis thus allows us to grasp the time-image in its pure state of potentiality (time *in posse*), in its very process of formation (time *in fieri*), and, finally, in the state of having been constructed (time *in esse*). (2005b: 66)

Not only speech, but the very experience of action and thought have their genesis in the three-dimensional or triphasic zone of pure praxis or operativity. On the basis of this pre-thetic field composed of virtual or potential problems, there issue *pure acts of chronothesis* or time-positing 'within which the human mind establishes itself' (Guillaume, 1984: 7). What is at issue in chronothesis is not a voluntary act carried out by a pre-existing subject, but an act that itself delineates the perceptual coordinates on which the conscious subject relies: in order consciously to construct a representational or linguistic schema of time, chronothesis must

[30] To the two "faces" of the phenomenon of language, external and internal, corresponds a methodological distinction between "mechanistic" and "psychological" explications. On the one hand, signs can be grouped into formal systems by virtue of their respective base oppositions and parts of speech. These formal traits can be traced historically or diachronically by attending to the 'phonetic accidents' and variations that allow this or that form to become ascendant at a given moment, either within or between languages. However, according to Guillaume, although such a study has its relative scientific validity, it fails to explain the divergences and resistances that give rise to this variation itself. See Guillaume (1968: 1–6).

intercept the field of chronogenesis though what Guillaume calls a 'prehension' or 'cross-cut':

> Chronogenesis is the genesis of the potential to construct time, and chronothesis is the exploitation of this potential as it is being acquired. Every time such potential is exploited, the process of acquiring it is intercepted at a characteristic point and a cross-section taken. Each cross-section thus obtained constitutes a mood. (Guillaume, 1984: 7)

A first decisive consequence of Guillaume's theory now comes into view: there is no one "synthetic" time in which the mind inheres, but only partial operations of sectioning, interrupting, and cordoning-off. The genesis of the subject is positioned within the 'transitional operation' between chronogenetic time and the chronothetic construction of time-images that issue from it, an operation that takes place through our impersonal contact with the problematic potentialities of the situation in which thought finds itself embedded. Chronogenetic time is never itself representable, since the time-images that we produce by *means* of it cannot themselves "say" the time of their own construction.[31] Consequently, there is, as Agamben puts it, a 'disjointedness and delay […] in the very foundation of subjectivity and consciousness', a 'lapse' (2005b: 66–67). If the thought of time and its representation never actually coincide, this is because there is an 'act of thought' within us that moves along another time, a 'time within time — not ulterior but interior — which measures my disconnection with regard to [chronology], my being out of synch and in non-coincidence' with it (2005b: 67). This delay is not necessarily a sign of a powerlessness on the part of subjectivity, but points instead to an *impersonal activity of evaluation* enveloped within every instance of discourse, representation, and perception, one which is capable — when affirmed — of rendering the experience of the results of action, language, and bodies inoperative. In fact, Agamben will turn things around: it is *only* because operative time is out of synch with chronology, that time can be 'taken hold of' and 'achieved' (ibid).

In fact, Guillaume's thesis is even more radical than we have let on. The concept of chronogenesis refers to a field of tensions out of which issue acts that, prior to speech or representation, *evaluate* the pure potentialities of our situation,

[31] As Guillaume reminds us, that operative time has no representation does 'not mean that it has no existence in human thought, but that it exists in thought only as our experience does'. Guillaume (1984: 6).

that seize them and construct sense out of them. At this level, time is not yet unified into a coherent whole or "panorama", but merges with the very procedure of evaluation itself. Operative time itself *is* an evaluation that coincides completely with the experience of time at its deepest level. This means that, prior to their being posited, neither time nor sense are formally unified or systematized, but are bound up in a partial process or "operation" that synthesizes and constructs germinal forms out of meaning-potentials, gathering shards of time. It is for this reason that — in an extremely bold assertion — Guillaume later follows his own argument to its logical conclusion: 'the representation of time differs only because the representation of space differs' (Guillaume, 1984: 7). In other words, the shape of the time-images inscribed in our language depend upon the regional and historical shape of our lived *world,* whose meaning-potentials they respond to.

There is a common *World* only at the level of representation; at the level of experience, there are *worlds,* and the time-images that proceed on their basis tacitly testify to the genetic plurality that they simultaneously efface in their actuality. At this point, we must draw the unavoidable conclusion: the time that is seized, the time of evaluation from which all overt external action proceeds, is never a unified time, but is irreducibly *fragmentary*, modulated in accordance with the encounter between thought and its lived situation (it will be recalled that what Agamben calls a "remnant" is neither general nor particular, but the division of this difference — a fragment).

Restoration through fragmentation

Fragmented time is 'the only real time, the only time we have' (2005b: 68). It is the time by means of which we construct the meaning of the situation in which we find ourselves, on the basis of the 'meaning potentials' of sense that it envelops at a virtual level. If ethics for Agamben has a "visionary" component, this is because what is in question here is the fluctuating genesis of our *attention* to our lived situation, an attention on the basis of which we first of all come to be able to speak and act. In what Guillaume refers to as the 'viewing universe' of lived time, what we "see" are not the constituted forms that we eventually become conscious of, but the preparation of form itself; not possibility as the abstract and

probabilistic mirror of the factical given, but *possibilities of life.*[32] If operative time is tri-phasic, the order of its genesis refers,

(1) to an evaluation of the *liveable,* the *thinkable,* and the *sayable;*

(2) to the 'exploitation' of this potential that is *expressed* as possibilities of life, shards or fragments of 'living form' in the process of being assembled and evaluated (life *becoming-form*, or "assembled evaluations");[33] and finally:

(3) to their actualization in this or that act, statement, gesture, or representation.

At the level of operative time, it is not yet possible to detach the form of time from the time of thought's own lived operation, since the formal division between *quid facti*? and *quid juris*? has not yet been accomplished — it will be so only at the moment of its interruption or 'sectioning' by chronothetic prehension (Guillaume, 1984: 6). We might say, following David Lapoujade's felicitous formulation that, in its first two phases, operative time dramatizes a different question: *quid vitae*? (Lapoujade, 2017: 32–38). This question receives its answer not, first of all, through the explicit representational time-image that eventually results from it, but is already dramatized by our mode of attending to the *liveable*, the *thinkable*, and the *sayable*. This dramatization, which affects our body like a *clinamen*, is the living soil of messianic ethics:

> If every body is affected by its form-of-life as by a clinamen or a taste, the ethical subject is that subject which constitutes-itself in relation to this clinamen, the subject who bears witness to its tastes, takes responsibility for the mode in which it is affected by its inclinations.

[32] For a usage of this term that resonates with our present reading, see Zourabichvili (2017: 156-157): '[A] possibility of life expresses a mode of existence. […] It is never a signification or a collection of significations. It is an evaluation: not simply the evaluation of the possibilities of life, once we have already apprehended them as such; but the possibility of life itself as evaluation, a singular manner of evaluating or apportioning the good and the bad, the distribution of affects. A possibility of life is always a difference. The invention of new possibilities of life therefore presupposes a new way of being affected. […] Politics is therefore first of all an affair of perception.'

[33] This corresponds to what Guillaume calls 'acts of expression' (1984: 6).

> Modal ontology, the ontology of the how, coincides with an ethics (2015b: 232).[34]

There is no "attention in general", only this or that way in which we are led to seize upon, and are seized by, the potentialities of the pre-individual milieu from which thought and gesture draw their power, in this or that factual situation. Every lived perception envelops a selection and distribution of the interesting/uninteresting, alluring/repugnant, a sensitivity to this or that set of signs, a characteristic way of being affected by our contact with the world, etc. Between the virtual potentiality of chronogenesis and the constituted actuality of representation, there is the expression of *possibilities of life*, the larval forms dramatized by our pre-individual attention to our situation, which draw together shards of time edge-to-edge, fragment-to-fragment. It is within the frame or coordinates opened up by these expressive forms that representational time-images are in each case inscribed; they draw up the logical-existential plane or zone within which the human mind establishes itself. As Agamben observes, all attention 'brushes up against an impersonal power, something both surpassing us and giving us life' (2004: 124).[35] It is at this level — always singular, always situational — that what we have in common must be sought.

How does this impersonal activity of evaluation bear upon the messianic calling in its difference from the prophetic apparatus? How does the concept of chronogenesis allow us to complicate the time-image of politics?

As Agamben argues, to live in the apostolic calling is to experience not the 'end of time, but the time of the end'; it is 'not the instant in which time ends, but

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[34] The chief disagreement between *Tiqqun* and Agamben concerns whether the singular ethical "assumption" of this *clinamen* across asymmetrical forms-of-life can be adequately grasped by the grammar of war. Whereas *Tiqqun* identifies the perspective of the political with civil war understood as 'the free play of forms-of-life […], the principle of their coexistence' (Tiqqun 2010: 32), for Agamben *stasis* remains but one threshold of politicization among others, but does not exhaust the field of politics. At the same time, and while it is beyond the scope of this article to pursue this question thoroughly, it seems to me equally certain that the relation between forms-of-life cannot be reduced to a problem of "democratic" tolerance. For this reason, I cannot agree with Sergei Prozorov's recent claim that 'the political meaning of the concept of form-of-life consists in the reconstruction of democracy in terms of affirmative biopolitics' (Prozorov 2017: 154).

[35] Among clearest statements of how Agamben understands this pre-individual 'zone of non-consciousness' may be found in his essay 'Genius' (2007b: 9-18). His concept of this 'impersonal' or 'opaque' zone draws upon Deleuze's concept of a plane of immanence (1999: 220-240), Simondon's theory of individuation (2007b: 8-19) and Furio Jesi's practice of 'constitutive esotericism' (2019b; 2002a: 89-92; 2007b: 113-114).

the time that contracts itself and begins to end'. The meaning of this contracted remnant may now be specified: it is operative time that insinuates itself in chronological time, 'working and transforming it from within' (2002c: 2). This time exhibits a 'uni-dual structure […] comprised of two heterogeneous times, one *kairos* and the other *chronos* […], coextensive, but which cannot be added together' (2005b: 62–64). The prefix "uni-" should not mislead us: messianic time is not unified in itself but refers to an individuating temporal form (a shard, fragment, or 'remnant') that has *not yet divorced and detached itself* from lived experience. If the Pauline calling is not a 'third aeon' situated between two *olamin*, but rather fractures or 'divides' the representational division between the present and the "end", thereby causing chronological time to 'begin to end', the destituent ethical gesture that affirms it refers to a specific sort of comportment in which we seize upon our representation of chronology and 'take it for a remnant', thereby *restoring form* to its internal fragmentation (2005b: 83).[36] If messianic *kairos* is nothing other than 'seized *chronos*', that is because it refers to a gesture that restores our lived experience of time to the partiality of a form-under-construction, and which has the effect of destituting the illusion of a unitary historical World. *To inhabit messianic time coincides with the gesture of fragmenting time.* It is to strip representational time of its power to generate the illusion of a *single* common world, the mask of totality that allows it to conceal, in plain sight, the evaluative asymmetries that continuously clash within it. Messianism is neither "another time" that would signal the total effacement of chronology, nor "just another day homogenous with the others", but a way of seizing upon the operative time that presses upon chronology from within it, its 'internal pulsation', in order to fragment it (2005b: 72).

Agamben reproaches the revolutionary tradition with failing to distinguish between messianic and apocalyptic time. The vital significance of apocalypticism lies in its capacity to 'generate a kind of time, in which we dwell, that in itself prevents us from experiencing it'.[37] Once the discrepancy between the experience of time and its representation is taken into account, the eschatological notions of "progress", "development", and the "end of history" are all shown to stem from a common amputation or impotence. Under the guise of optimism or "hope", they work to maintain us in a condition of passivity.

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[36] In spite of many other agreements, I therefore cannot follow Roberto Mosciati in his recent characterization of Agamben's ethics as reliant on an ontology of 'amorphousness'. (Mosciati 2019: 50).

[37] The quotation is from Giorgio Manganelli. Cited in Agamben (2005b: 70).

For instance, reflecting on the recent climate strike movement headed by Greta Thunberg, Agamben criticizes not the movement itself, but the blind faith that certain of its participants appear to have in the power of scientific prediction, which allows the latter to assume a markedly prophetic and eschatological posture:

> Like any religion, even the religion of science could not do without an eschatology, that is, an apparatus that, by keeping the faithful in fear, strengthens their faith and, at the same time, ensures the dominion of the priestly class. Apparitions like those of Greta are, in this sense, symptomatic: Greta blindly believes in what scientists prophesy and expects the end of the world in 2030, just as millenarians in the Middle Ages believed in the imminent return of the Messiah to judge the world. (2019a)

If apocalypticism traps us within a form of ethical paralysis, this is not only because it asks us to wait on what is still-to-come, but because to orient ourselves around the "end of time" is already to begin *too late*. It offers us only a knowledge of time in its already-constructed state — a knowledge that, in this case, is then outsourced to professional prophets through a thinly-veiled secularization of the priestly function — and which therefore cannot possibly be *experienced*.[38] By substituting a time-*image* for our experience of time, apocalypticism directs action toward an uninhabitable abstraction, distancing us from the potentialities of our own lived situation, which alone can be seized-upon. Since *there is no* experience of the "end of time", the horizon of action is always infinitely postponed. In short, there is only an "end" of time provided that time has first of all been conceived of as a homogeneous, spatialized panorama. It is the same with the forced choice between "activism/mass movement", "voluntarism/objectivism". In both cases, it is first necessary to imagine the locus of action as a homogeneous temporal field, which will either develop sequentially of its own internal accord (the unfolding of the historical contradiction) or else must be subjected to a shocking interruption aimed at "hastening the end". Like all time-images, their alleged self-sufficiency has in reality the status of a mutilated idea, an illusion premised on the effacement

[38] For this reason, Kelly Oliver's recent claim that Agamben has 'replace[d] the opposition between man and animal with the opposition between religion and science' (i.e. that he champions a religious discourse against science) misses the essential, namely, their common participation in the prophetic apparatus. See Oliver (2009: 239). For a critique of Oliver's argument, see Mosciati (2017: 574–575).

of their own genetic conditions of emergence. Too often, once we restore the vital significance of the evaluation that attended their genesis we find the same ethical impotence of a need to "believe" in another world, the believer having at some point or another become incapable of *assuming* this one.

In fact, the problem should be reversed: when we consider the genesis of time-images in experience, it is not operative or messianic time that interrupts chronology; rather, it is chronological time that interrupts, sections-off, and detaches itself from the immanent multiplicity of operational time that constructs it. Only once we have detached ourselves from the affirmative evaluations of operative time *that we are,* only once we have placed our own becoming in parentheses, does it then become necessary to imagine political possibility through the schema of a cataclysmic rupture of chronology. In reality, such a rupture can never truly be lived, but can only assume the status of an abstract article of faith. Both activism and historicism therefore betray a common reliance on the hypothesis of a global or encompassing chronological time, yet the latter is, in reality, merely a conclusion divorced from its premises.

Just as Guillaume's methodology proceeds by converting 'the observed result back into […] a genetic process', Agamben's messianism decomposes the unity of homogeneous time, not by breaking it in half or suspending it through a prophetic or mythic epiphany arriving from elsewhere, but by exhibiting the nullity of the unity of representational time, thereby allowing time once again to be seized upon and fulfilled (2005b: 70). It is therefore precisely because chronological time is defined by an amputation of its internal multiplicity that messianic destitution can take the form of a *restoration through fragmentation*.

It has been a perennial mistake of the far-Left to believe that the beginning of politics lies in posing the "correct" question, of extracting ourselves from the corruption of the world by initiating an epistemological break that will free our thought from ideology. In fact, such ideological beginnings always begin too late, and only re-entrench an abstract and disembodied conception of politics that deprives us in advance of the very tissue of what is shareable between us. In the long run, this mistake is only the latest symptom of the amputated image of political life on which the Western tradition is founded. The West construed politics as 'the assembly that […] gathers all human beings *in abstraction from their respective worlds',* disconnected from 'the network of things, habits, words, fetishes, affects, places, solidarities that make up their world, their sensible world, and that

gives them their specific substance'.[39] It was in keeping with this image that Hobbes began his *Elements of Law* by first asking us to annihilate the world, in order to then proceed to its nominalist reorganization at the level of images and concepts alone (Hobbes 2008: I, Ch. 1, 8). The problem of community, of the *common*, must begin by reversing this Hobbesian gesture. This implies that we learn how to disentangle the experience of a collective *attachment* (loyalty, reciprocity, trust, credence, a shared experience of power and possibility, as well as mutual defence and protection) from its juridical entanglements in the *arcanum imperii* of sovereignty (2005b: 115–117).

The problem is not merely archaeological, but bears immediately on how we approach ethical questions and conflicts in everyday life. Every question we explicitly pose is already a response to a *way of seeing* what lies before us — the dramatization of a regime of attention. If we were to take this messianic insight seriously, then what matters is not the identities that power has ascribed to us, nor who subscribes to the same "radical" or ideological discourse, for neither tells us anything decisive about how that person in fact perceives the lines of force arrayed before us here and now. What really matters is, within a substantive situation, who *sees* the same lines of force, whose attention is drawn to the same potentialities as ours is? Whose gestures respond to a problem in a way that resonates with our own? Whose dispositions testify to the presence of an impersonal demand that places us on a common plane? Only substantive situations, with their worldly entanglements, can tell us this — provided we learn how to look within them correctly. And, often enough, it will not be those whom we might have expected.

Critics often accuse Agamben of being vague or abstract when he proposes we redefine politics as the site in which 'the event of anthropogenesis — the becoming human of the human being — is still happening' (2015: 208). In fact, there is nothing more concrete: it means not only that politics is exhaustively situational, but that our situation does not have the finality or coherence we often attribute to it. What messianism "achieves" is not a magical transfiguration of this world into another one, but a change in our mode of *contact* with this one. Agamben's message is this: stop waiting for another world, learn how to *look* within your situation for the potentialities that allow you to *hold a world in common,* and respond to their call by seizing upon them. In this way, he directs us to where we already are, and tells us something simple: the world is *ours,* but only 'for *use as not-ours*' (Hurley, 2018: 5). What there is of communism will be worked-out here

[39] Anonymous, "The Call" (2003). The text is a collectively-authored manifesto written in Rennes, France, in 2003, the title of which consciously indicates its messianic intention.

and now, in our capacity to *perceive* a common world and to engage our concrete situation on the basis of this shared perception through a common use without ownership.

All perception envelops lived forms. It is the imperfect nihilism of our time that, by rendering all gestures 'unrealizable', by making all futurity unthinkable, maintains us, suspended, apart from them. If revolutionary violence must enact and coincide with a transformation of time, and if the theory of destituent potential constitutes Agamben's contribution to such a theory, it is because the general movement of a destituent ethics consists in subjecting the unity of chronology to a movement of decomposition, a positive fragmentation of *the* World (singular) that exhibits its fictitious unity, returning the Nothing to nothing. The asymmetry of operative time with respect to chronology provides the transcendental condition for a destituent elaboration of *common sensible worlds* (plural). Yet, what is still needed is a gesture through which to *assume* this time, to restore contact with the *preparation of form* that our attention to the world, our lived experience, already envelops within it. This is precisely the significance of the Pauline *hōs mē*, which functions like a 'perceptual machine', a regime of attention designed to dislocate our ascriptive historical vocations and identities (e.g. our impoverished conception of happiness as "self-interest") and to restore our contact with the operational time of a world-in-construction.[40]

The destituent gesture

Let us return to what Agamben regards as "our question," which we posed at the end of Part I: given the desubjectivation to which Bloom attests, can we think a politics that would not depend on a resubstantialisation of the subject? What would political polarization look like if we were to destitute both the identity of the insurgent *and* the resubjectivising pole of the "enemy"? Can we think a politics in which the subject is subject only of its own desubjectivation?

Paul says, 'let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called [*en tē klēsei he eklēthē*]. Art thou called being a slave? care not for it: but if mayest be free, use it rather' (1 Corinthians 7: 17–22 in Agamben, 2005b: 19). The elementary misunderstanding of this passage would be to see it as telling us to wait for the coming of the Messiah, to remain patient and docile, in the hope of a future redemption. On the contrary, the Pauline gesture consists precisely in *not sidestepping* the situation we find ourselves in. That there is no preliminary to

[40] On this usage of the term "perceptual machine," see Moses Dubruška, "Preface," in Rafanell i Orra (2017: 18–20)

communism means that it is a potentiality in every situation, anywhere time takes form in a factual condition. This is the first point: "to remain" means to begin not from an ideal state of political action, the hallowed moment in which the time is "ripe", but from right where we are, from the factical condition in which we find ourselves.

What does it mean to "begin" from the calling we are given? How should we relate to the roles, identities, and social determinations to which this world has consigned us?

Paul describes the messianic event as follows:

> brethren, time contracted itself, the rest is, that even those having wives may be as not [*hōs mē*] having, and those weeping as not weeping, and those rejoicing as not rejoicing, and those buying as not possessing, and those using the world as not using it up. For passing away is the figure of this world. But I wish you to be without care. (1 Cor. 7: 29–32 in Agamben, 2005b: 23)

Messianic life lives its worldly vocations "as not". The *hōs mē* does not oppose one referent, predicate or ideology with another ("anarchism" versus "capitalism"), nor does it 'entail substituting a less authentic vocation with a truer vocation' (2005b: 23). Nor, finally, does it refuse to speak, remaining in silent withdrawal from all reference to itself or to the world, as if in contemplation of an obscure God awaiting us at the end of history. Instead, it induces a movement which allows the subject to place its predicates in *contact* with the operative time of its lived experience of the situation, the time they take to be constructed. At issue is an 'anaphoric gesture' that induces an 'immobile shifting' in our relation to our own identities (2005b: 22–23).[41] The term "immobility" should not mislead us: it signals not that nothing has occurred, but rather that what has occurred has not based itself on an ulterior or presupposed ground. If the *hōs mē* is immobile, this is because the messianic vocation has no external or particular content of its own. It does not construct a new political or mythic identity to replace the ones we are offered: it is 'nothing but the repetition of those same factical or juridical conditions' (2005b: 23).

The only way in which a 'movement *sur place*' can induce a change is if the situation in which it operates is already out-of-place, dis-located, outside of itself.

[41] Cf. Agamben (2004: 121): It is a "question of thinking a flight that would imply no evasion, a movement on the spot, *in the situation itself*" (my emphasis).

As we have seen, since Bloom is nothing other than a dislocation of all identity, it is to this condition that the Pauline *hōs mē* responds. Through it, our vocation does not change; rather, a repetition takes place that introduces a difference in our relation to it, one that — by introducing a new perspective upon it, a *new evaluation* — 'works it from within and hollows it out, nullifying it in the very gesture of maintaining and dwelling in it' (2005b: 24). That a repetition is needed in order for this revocation to take place indicates the origin of the change: it is by re-attaching our factical condition to the singular evaluation of the meaning-potentials that pass between us and the world, that we succeed in *situating* the nothingness of our identities within the operative time of the world. It is by inhabiting our condition, by restoring (in thought) the operative time it takes to construct itself, that we 'revoke [our] condition from top to bottom' (ibid).

The *hōs mē* is the *becoming-situational,* the becoming-operative, the becoming-practice of the world. To 'inhabit' is not to negate our condition, but, first of all, to exhibit the always-partial and incomplete operations on which its power relies, and thereby to win a *point of entry* (a "small door') into our historical epoch through which a strategic perspective can be taken up. If *kairos* is nothing other than "seized *chronos*", its role cannot be to exhibit a deeper or "truer" meaning to us, but to allow our non-coincidence with our ascriptive identities to be *felt* and affirmed. By allowing us to "dwell" in our condition, the *hōs mē* enacts a peculiar sort of relation, one which *distances* us from time-images of ourselves, by *de-distancing* us from the time of their construction.

While Agamben turns to medieval grammar for an explanation (2005b: 24), Marcello Tarì offers a fruitful example of this tensor in the context of the revolutionary tradition. On the one hand, militant revolutionary subjectivity will certainly not return the way it left — the exhaustion of the possibilities of our world also brings with it the exhaustion of the subject that struggled within this framework. However, as what Guattari called the 'winter years' of the 1980's and '90's demonstrated, such exhaustion can lead to the dangerous temptation to discard the problem of revolution *tout court,* to throw the baby out with the bathwater, ending up in a tacit apology for the status quo. Against this slippage toward reformism or quietism, Tarì points to the need simultaneously to assume *and* to nullify the identity of the revolutionary, to nullify it without distancing ourselves from it:

> Let's be careful to not pit ourselves *against* the militant, whose history deserves our respect. Instead, let us adopt the Pauline strategy of the "as not": militants are *as not* militants […]. In the first place, this would

> mean freeing those who live in that form from the obligation of being *someone*, or, what amounts to the same thing, to live *as if* they were something they are not, something never really present but positioned ahead of them as an exterior end. To live "as not" means for the militant to dissolve the spell that invests him in an *infinite task* and an *absolute delegation.* Mask and face can no longer be superimposed and separated at will, at least if we do not wish to repeat the tragedy of the professional revolutionaries […]. There is no need, therefore, to flee our vocation. Militancy, as the philosopher might say, can be "made use of". It must be placed in tension with revolutionary temporality, deactivating its inclination to become a tyrannical identity, a form separate from life, the conducting thread of a moral substance from which one proceeds by means of gestures and behaviour so easily separable from the subject who performs them. (Tarì, 2016: 8)

However, if an "exhibition" of the nullity of our identities were the only aim, deconstruction's deferral of all presence would be a satisfying strategy. This is not Agamben's view: the introduction of non-coincidence into chronological time through the restoration of its "contact" with operative time does not simply allow our factical identities to appear as the "masks" that they are; it also allows them to be seized upon, inhabited, and thereby *decided.* The messianic calling is not a perpetual deferral of decision, a distantiation of the subject from all identity.[42] On the contrary, by introducing a non-coincidence into the ascription of predicates to our life (worker, queer, anarchist, "terrorist", etc.), the *hōs mē* nullifies language's allusion to its own pre-existing ground, transposing our relation to these determinations onto a field of 'pure praxis' (2005b: 28). Nor should the 'revocation of every vocation' that 'nullifies the entire subject' be understood, in the fashion of contemporary left-communism, as a process of 'self-abolition' (2005b: 41). Instead of abolishing the subject, messianism transforms the experience of identification into a *problem* to be broached exclusively from within a situational strategy. When Agamben writes that the 'messianic vocation is not a right, nor does it furnish an identity', we may understand him as saying that *identity is never wider than its deployment within a situation,* where every situation refers to a field of operations in which we are called, not to stake a "claim" to legitimacy, but to take up a *position* (2005b: 41).

[42] On the "thwarted messianism" of Derrida, see Agamben (2005b: 103).

Conclusion

How, in the process of deserting one's own ascriptive identity and vocation, does Agamben imagine an experience of community emerging among others? How does one pass from the messianic ethical gesture to a destituent politics? By way of conclusion, I would like to sketch four provisional traits of such a politics:

(i) From the asymmetry of messianic time within history flows an *asymmetrical model of conflict*. Just as we must be "in but not beholden to" history, where it becomes necessary to fight, we must fight obliquely, rather than head-on, and with a different idea of the meaning and stakes of war itself. For this reason, destituent partisanship does not confront the state directly, but only from a perspective of intimate exteriority. Instead of defining the community of resistance negatively through its opposition to its enemy, it is a matter of seeking a genuinely autonomous premise for collective life, an asymmetry between incommensurable ideas of life, of happiness, and of the meaning of collective power, and of discovering the *gestures* that permit us to inhabit them (1996: 59, 114). As Fred Moten recently put it, we must 'organize ourselves in relation to ourselves, before we organize ourselves in relation to them' (Moten, 2018). However, even once we do, the aim cannot be to seize the offices of power and to replace an illegitimate totality with a legitimate one, but to affirm the autonomous and positive value of the fragment, and to expand it outwards.

(ii) *Zones of inhabitation*. The messianic *klēsis* or "calling" does not negate existing law and social institutions in order to constitute new ones a moment later, but 'coincides completely and constitutively with their destitution' (2015b: 277). At the same time, once the violence that deactivates bourgeois society ceases to be conceived as 'maieutic', i.e. as resulting in a product or 'work', it loses its strictly negative or destructive character and becomes a process that we immediately *inhabit*.[43] If destitution is not the prelude to a future order, but the very means through which a common idea of life becomes liveable, than the existence of the messianic community cannot have the status of a substantive: it cannot be a factual event or 'state' that occurs at a given moment or at which we have finally 'arrived', but names the experiential process through which time is actively seized

[43] On Agamben's earlier view of revolutionary violence as a destructive maieutic process of self-abolition, a perspective eclipsed and abandoned by the theory of destituent power, see Agamben (2009c). On the ethical significance of inhabiting and inhabitation, see Agamben (2019c): "To inhabit means to create, to conserve and intensify habits and customs, that is, ways of being" (my translation).

upon and constructed from fragment to fragment. Its modal exteriority vis-à-vis the reigning order is won not by abruptly suspending historical time but by *intensely* inhabiting it through non-coincidence, by moving along *another plane* of perception, informed by another idea of happiness and living.

(iii) *Shared perception.* As Agamben insists, if messianic communism cannot locate what is "common" between singular beings in an abstract ideological unity introduced from without, yet nor can it be premised on the 'free association' of a 'union of egoists' (thereby re-entrenching their separateness), the only alternative is to *displace the centrality of the subject altogether* (2005b: 32–33). It is not the individual's egoic desires, nor their ideological agreements that form the basis of a common plane of perception, but the *world* to which their perception attends and around which it is oriented. At the centre of the communist project lies a *shared perception of the world* that outstrips individuals, yet which exists only in the crossing and recrossing of their mutual encounter with each other, *in situ*. This cannot assume the status of an ideal form of political organization or society that we then attempt to realize in practice, but has the character of a *response* to the experience of potentiality harboured by our encounter with our situation, and with one another. If there is no communism without the existence of 'communes', the latter must be understood not as a factical institution or a "collective" *oikos* but as an ethical process through which diverse individuals come together and make a decision to *face the world* together, come what may. A communist world is nothing other than the *attentive gathering* or "composition" of convergent processes of desertion that allows them to co-exist across their singular differences in a mode of communion that Agamben calls 'exile' (2015b: 234–39).[44]

(iv). *Exile.* From a certain point of view, the concept of exile represents the pinnacle of the Homo Sacer series, since it explains how messianic community is able to reconcile the singular and the common. According to a first and more loose sense of the term, to *situate* politics is always to "exile" ourselves from the petrified nihilism of classical politics. For Agamben, such exile is not a renunciation of political life, but is in fact the point of departure for a new image of politics: 'exile from politics cedes its place to a politics of exile' (2015b: 326). However, in a more technical sense, exile names the process whereby the restoration of operative time at the individual level opens onto the plane of ethical composition with others. As we have seen, the messianic destitution of identity is the process through which we depose our historical vocations, press into our operative evaluations or "form of life", and remain stuck to them. Toward the

[44] On the concept of 'composition' in territorial struggle, see Mauvaise Troupe (2018: Ch. 3).

end of *The Use of Bodies*, and following a neo-Platonic turn of phrase, Agamben will interpret this process as the "exile of one alone to one alone" [*phygè monou pros monon*], a process through which we become "inseparable from ourselves" (2015: 236).[45] The difficulty lies in understanding how becoming 'inseparable' from myself — i.e. from the impersonal evaluative *presence to the world* that configures the space of my consciousness — can form the basis of my cohesion with others. How does the messianic perceptual machine not collapse into a subjectivism or individualism? Here Agamben will engage in a delicate conceptual manoeuvre: on the one hand, he decomposes the notion of form-of-life into 'singular' points of entry ('side doors'), yet he *immediately* (i.e. without any mediating representation) links them to one another through what he calls 'contact':

> it is in a contact — that is, in a void of representation — and not in a relation that forms-of-life communicate. The 'alone by oneself' that defines the structure of every singular form-of-life also defines its community with the others. And it is this *thigein*, this contact that the juridical order and politics seek by all means to capture and represent in a relation. Western politics is, in this sense, constitutively 'representative', because it always already has to reformulate contact into the form of a relation. It will therefore be necessary to think politics as an intimacy unmediated by any articulation or representation: human beings, forms-of-life are in contact, but this is unrepresentable because it consists precisely in a representative void, that is, in the deactivation and inoperativity of every representation. To the ontology of non-relation and use there must correspond a non-representative politics.
>
> 'Alone by oneself' is an expression of intimacy. We are together and very close, but between us there is not an articulation or a relation that unites us. We are united to one another in the form of our being alone. (2015b: 237)

What we share always departs from what is most singular in us, and never from the encompassing unity of a homogeneous condition. It is from the moment that

[45] At an 'individual' level, this ethical movement of exile is characterized as an "intimacy without relation", since, having overturned our separation from the operative time that *we are,* from the evaluation of the liveable and the tolerable that envelops and develops itself in our contact with the world, there is precisely no sense in which we can speak of a "relation" between our form of life and ourselves — 'our' life is inseparable from our form of life.

we refuse to be separated from our singular *form of life* that we pass through the side door that allows us to compose a *form-of-life* with others. It is precisely what is singular in us that most calls to be shared, since this is never what belongs to me "peculiarly", but what 'attaches me to the world, and which is therefore not reserved for me, [having] nothing to do with a private property nor with what is supposed to define an identity' (Anonymous, 2003). At the limit, "what there is to be shared" is not a "what" at all, since it is not an "X" detached from us, but our *way* of entering into contact with the world. The commune in exile proceeds through the sharing of our own singular mode of coming-into-presence. It is only by assuming this singular "how" of our existence that we come into contact with the shared power of encounter with other beings, allowing a compositional matrix to unfold between us that will nonetheless be destroyed by any effort to "constitute" or represent it.

There is no integral communist life, nor was there ever: communism is the free play of forms-of-life, from the point at which the latter manage to take on a local and experimental *consistency without constituency.* What Agamben's ethics offers us is not a new social order, but a side door by which we flee the disaster of the present course of the world. The result is not a 'chronologically more originary unity, nor a new and superior unity, but something like a *way out.* […]. [I]f one reaches it and holds oneself there in it, the machine can no longer function' (2015b: 239).

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Let's talk about Class, and Art

Mike Watson

What we mean when we say we want to talk about social class and art:

When I first decided to talk about social class in the art world I knew I would face a difficult task. Two years on from that point—when I began organizing a forum on social class held at Open School East and The Royal College, London in December 2015—I am more convinced than ever of the need to address the issue of social class division within the arts, as well as the need for creative discussion to be applied to issues of class in wider society. What follows are some of the difficulties I have identified in talking about social class over the last two years. Many of these points back up experiences in the art world, academia and in my wider life experience. Indeed, class is not really a quantifiable science, which in itself can be a cause of frustration when trying to state to middle or upper class peers the importance of talking about social class and of realigning the class makeup of the arts. Though this should be no deterrent and I would urge working class art professionals to draw on the passion they feel for the subject of class inequality and to bring that passion to bear in conversation with their peers, for whilst not being measurable, that passion is tangible. As such, it is a positivist manifestation of the reality of social class as a materially inscribed fact. Indeed, such passion, emotion, anger or fear has been the motor for the greatest movements in history both for social change and against it. One only has to see the contorted and mean spirited postures and faces of David Cameron and George Osborne in YouTube footage of the two dismantling the mechanisms of social justice to see to what level emotion is crucial to the politics of class, at both ends of the scale.

Moving on to the difficulty in talking about class in the art world: Firstly, I have found that it is generally only the working class who think we need to talk about class; the middle and upper classes treat the subject as little other than a bearable annoyance, a fact of birth, or of history, but nothing one can do anything about. This is clearly carried over into a lack of interest in the political debates which surround issues of wealth inequality. Whilst, to be fair, a good number of middle

and upper class people do hold a broadly leftist political world view, this tends to be channeled via the softening touch of social democratic values, which airbrushes the rough edges of the leftist cause, so that revolution becomes a more palatable adherence to 'social values'. There are two problems here, firstly it is all too easy to talk casually about class: we all have class backgrounds and we all know someone who is richer than us. Consequently, conversations on social class are engaged in with an air of 'oh dear', as participants who are not really underprivileged pose as if they are. Of course, these conversations are not liable to reach any incendiary conclusion, not least as they often take place within the comfy surroundings of a gallery, museum, coffee shop, restaurant or other dinner table. This leads neatly into the second point, which is that the middle-class art practitioner does simply not know what it is like to wonder where the next meal is coming from or how one is going to pay the rent, or run a phone or internet connection or buy a new pair of shoes as the last remaining wearable pair (i.e. without holes in the soles) broke. Therefore, one of the problems with talking about social class in the art world is a woeful ignorance which makes people talk as if they are underprivileged whilst they bask in a level of comfort that means it is unlikely that they'll ever muster the anger to really do anything about their underprivileged position. This problem has been exacerbated by—and is brilliantly, yet unwittingly, conveyed via—the 99% movement, as discussed in Towards a Conceptual Militancy (Zero Books, 2016):

> "The same syndrome can be seen in the largely 'gestural' oppositions to the global economic crisis and its causes. The 99% slogan – 'we are the 99%', popularised by the Occupy Wall Street movement – which highlights the vast accumulation of wealth in the hands of an elite 1%, ignores the vast differentiations of wealth amongst the 99% 'poorest' people on Earth. This blindness to the privileged position of some of the 99% in comparison to the poorest people within the global whole – and all of the stratifications between – highlights yet another attempt to create distance and ascribe blame. It is a classic case of Nietzschean ressentiment (or 'resentment', whereby the aggrieved re-feel their grievances to the detriment of their ability act to change their position). As Nietzsche argued in A Genealogy of Morality, the characterisation of the oppressor as 'bad' cannot automatically imply that the oppressed are 'good'. Yet as applied to the anti-war and anti-finance protest the logic of resentment takes on a different complexion, for even as – for example – the gap between rich and poor grows, class stratifications are arguably far more varied in Western society today than in Nietzsche's time. We are witnessing a middle-class resentment at both its complicity with and distance from power." (TACM, pp17-18)

Put simply, the teeth of any potential working class movement are blunted because a great many of the people with an apparent vested interest in class politics are not really working class, are not underprivileged and do not care to start any meaningful course towards societal reform, because they are too comfortable to care. This can be seen in the art world by anyone who is genuinely from a poor background and who

has frequented some of the plethora of endless talks, screenings, dances, poetry readings and now (popularly, as if we needed another 'trend') 'walks' around political themes held in the name of art. The hands off, ineffectual manner of so many of these events (not naming any, as they involve too many respected colleagues) is enough to make one spit or pull their hair out. If this reaction seems aggressive, just spare a thought for the poor dying refugees that are trying to enter fortress Europe as tens to hundreds of middle class artists, curators and art lovers engage in talks, walks, and dances on 'borders/Syria/climate change/capitalism/gentrification/etc' at any given point on any evening of the week across Europe.

The great gulf between what needs to be done and what is being done is in itself enough reason to try to talk not only about class in the art world, but about how the art world's resources can be used to address class issues in the wider world. Though this needs to be a real discussion on social class in which people appreciate their relative level of comfort or discomfort and open up to a radical restructuring of the labour practices of the art world so that the class structure can become more evenly differentiated. That differentiation is crucial so that the art world can speak with a maximum diversity of voices from across all social backgrounds, all genders, all ethnic groups and all sexual orientations.

This leads nicely to a crucial next point, and that is that conversations on social class in the art world are often interrupted by people who argue that we should be talking about gender, race or sexual orientation instead of class. Whilst one can understand this sentiment as the directed anger of people who are also aggrieved by oppression and intellectually moved to declare their own plight as important, it also sadly derails the leftist project. All too often the well-intentioned practices of identity politics do the work of the ruling class for them by forsaking solidarity in the name of individual grievances. Granted, it is vital that specific maligned groups are represented within the voyage towards a more equal society. In this light, the Black Panthers and the Combahee River Collective are among the most outstanding leftist movements in the recent history of the West. However, they did not specifically aim to supplant a class discourse. Indeed, The Combahee River collective, formed in 1974 by amongst others, Barbara Smith, Beverly Smith and Demita Frazier in order to give a voice to Black women—who felt marginalized both by the anti-racist and working class movements—issued a statement in 1980 in which it was written:

> "The most general statement of our politics at the present time would be that we are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class oppression, and see as our particular task the development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking. The synthesis of these oppressions creates the conditions of our lives. As Black women, we see Black feminism as the logical political movement to combat the manifold and simultaneous oppressions that all women of color face."

Often taken as the first group to specifically use the term 'identity politics', the Combahee River Collective—named after a military action along the Combahee River in South Carolina undertaken by a female Commander Harriet Tubman in 1863—clearly saw the promotion of black women's rights as essential to overcoming the shortcomings of the male dominated leftist and black power movements, though, crucially, within interlocking systems of oppression. Now, within that, sometimes one will need to talk about race, and sometimes gender, sexual identity or class. That is to say, within an interlocking system of oppression we need to strengthen the oppressed in all walks of life, so that they can join forces and challenge the ruling elite together. This also means that there will be times when we need to speak simultaneously of all our discontents, but when I'm talking about social class and my own discontents I'd ask that people don't interrupt me with theirs as if our discontents are mutually exclusive, because they're not.

Another reason why we shouldn't posit social class politics in opposition to race, gender or sexual identity issues is that doing so risks leaving working class people of all genders, races and sexual orientations behind whilst potentially promoting only the interests of middle to upper class people from racial minorities, exploited genders or non-normative sexual orientations. One might think here to the figure of Okwui Enwezor, who curated the 2015 Venice Biennale around the theme of Marx's *Capital*. To be fair, symbolically such an event had enormous potential. Yet Enwezor himself moved with the airs and graces of nobility, and British nobility at that. This was a man schooled in evading questions, who when asked about the Marxist mission in the Guardian, just prior to the Biennale, dropped the ball, answering:

> "His programme was to use capitalism to achieve social equality," says Enwezor. "I don't think that Marx, had he lived, would have wanted capitalism to end." [1]

With friends like these one doesn't need enemies though, above all, this is evidence that class needs talking about openly and seriously in the art world, because until that point is reached political art will just be used to make middle class people feel less guilty and to whitewash (or 'artwash') global capital. In fact, we need to address the social makeup of the art world so that the global art world does not become a mere sop to globalization itself. Indeed, if global political art, or political art on a global level is not actually acting in any directly political way, and is only representing politics whilst continuing to operate an unequal system of privilege, it will be used by corporations to whitewash what they are up to whilst giving jobs to bored middle and upper class art enthusiasts. The loser will continue to be the poor.

In this sense, there is a certain responsibility in saying one is a political artist or curator. You cannot just wear the badge of being a political artist, something more has to happen, though it felt that was what Enwezor was doing.

This leads to a next consideration, namely, that the art world is dominated by people from privileged backgrounds who employ a certain code of behavior out of habit, and that this code excludes people who are underprivileged. This can most clearly be seen when an exchange or money or discussion about payments is involved between an institution or privileged individual and someone who is categorically from a poorer background. In some exchanges the poorer person, needing payment, is often seen as vulgar, pushy and, ironically (or perhaps, better put, *disturbingly*), over concerned with money. Indeed, asking that payment be made promptly, and in line with prior agreements, can appear to underscore a lack of love for the work itself, or a lack of concern for art or culture. This accords with the fact that a great many people who work in senior positions in museums, in academia, in galleries, etc., don't actually need their stipends in order to live. This varies from country to country but is certainly the case in Italy (where I live), a country lacking in meritocratic structures. Of course, it is actually the case that the person who is quick to ask a payment is often needing money to get through to the next day, having sacrificed everything to work in the arts.

This basic misunderstanding is linked to a more fundamental misunderstanding of the values of working class people, who are often seen as living rather irresponsibly, hand to mouth, instead of amassing, however slowly, savings. This argument was played out publicly in 2014 in the UK as Tory peer Lady Jenkins argued:

> "We have lost a lot of our cookery skills. Poor people do not know how to cook," before continuing to say, "I had a large bowl of porridge today, which cost 4p. A large bowl of sugary cereals will cost you 25p."[2]

This not only misses how damaging it would be to eat only cereal all day every day, but the fact that the particular situation of a freelancer in the art world with no savings or no family or other help (often unable to secure a loan or credit card) often means that shopping with any long-term plan in mind is impossible. There is never enough money at hand to do a large weekly shop, whilst the number of hours worked for low pay necessitates quick daily shopping trips in order to buy just enough food to make it to the next low payment from a client. Living in this environment of uncertainty—frequently from childhood, i.e. from birth—of course develops in the individual a tendency to grab when money is there (or is due to be paid), and then a tendency to go on a spending spree when a decent (though still low) amount of money arrives. It also leads to intense resourcefulness on a community level as a kind of unofficial communism arises between friends and family, who lend and give each other a large percentage of their income, regularly and without second thought.

It is coming from this a poor artist or curator enters into the baffling financial and social rites of the art world, with the potential for embarrassment always on hand. Most confusingly, I have found, is the fact that vast amounts of food and drink are often shared, but often with little in the way of friendship being exchanged. In fact, the more lavish the display of hospitality, the stiffer the people are and the less

they seem to want to know anything about their guests. One can appreciate that a certain level of reservedness goes hand in hand with power and wealth. It certainly wouldn't make sense for the wealthy to exclaim surprise at their own hospitality, yet often the food and drink is provided by faceless sponsors, just to be consumed by dour faced art world acolytes, bored of the constant rounds of cocktails. Thus, after we talk in an art space about politics, and maybe go for an art walk, and do a dance on the theme of poverty, we eat food given to us by strangers, drink alcohol and talk on the whole coldly with associates. In these situations, I learned long ago to return to my hotel (if staying away, paid by faceless entities at a museum of art foundation) to eat a kebab, watch football and drink cheap lager (at least knowing it wasn't given to me by a faceless corporation seeking publicity or a proud host throwing a lavish display of personal wealth). And here we see the vast gulf between the spontaneous and uncalculated giving, sharing and celebrating of the working class and the calculated patronage of the powerful.

Against given sensitivities, the question of what social class a person might come from could appear uncouth. Indeed, it is something that only a working-class person would ask in part as they have the generosity of spirit to reciprocate and divulge their own class background, in part as they have nothing to hide or lose. Though above all the question of social class, raised by a working-class person, could be seen as led by resentment and jealously. However, I could say wholeheartedly that this is not the case for me or any of my politicized working class colleagues in the art world. In fact, conversations never revolve around how much money 'they' have and how much 'we' want. Working class people who want money generally don't work in the arts (with few exceptions). The issue that a leftist has with the rich isn't that they should give more of their money to us, the issue they have is that the rich and powerful place too much emphasis on the importance of gaining and maintaining wealth and power, to the detriment of the enjoyment of life and of the fostering of community. We don't want the money or the power of the rich, we want the rich to stop involving the whole world in their obsession with money, power and greatness (which would appear to be a major principle of Corbynism, and the reason for its success). We want the rich to stop involving the rest of the population in their notion of a deferred gratification and a stiff upper lip, and to stop nullifying the value of art by bringing it under this rubric. Though, above all, we want to talk about social class in the art world as social class stratification and its attendant promise of class mobility—providing one behaves like the upper classes—is the tool by which the powerful spread their love of power and make their perversion our concern.

More than all this we need to talk about class division in the art world as art helps to provide us with the symbolic tools for conveying who we are, and right now those symbolic tools are in the hands of the elite. Though above all we need to leverage the tools of the art world to open a more transparent debate about social class across society, because if we're not careful social class divides—which one could argue underpin every concern from terrorism, to immigration, to climate change to economic crisis—will tear us apart this century just as they did in the last.

Since beginning to talk about social class within the arts, the worlds of art and academia suffered the loss of a cherished figure who gave people from low income backgrounds tremendous hope - Mark Fisher. Beyond simply pointing to the disproportionately middle and upper class composition of the cultural fields, Mark Fisher made it feel that it's ok to be working class in the academic and cultural fields, and that feeling beaten down at times by your peers is a normal reaction to an abnormal environment. At one point, he wrote on social media of the anguish felt at 'coming up against' a social class superior within the university environment. He understood that however hard one tries, the baggage of a life lived struggling to deal with inadequate finances whilst attempting to master strange social conventions will always be to some extent limiting. He understood the feeling when words fail you and muscles tighten so as to make movement and speech awkward in the face of peers raised and schooled for the professional way of life. A feeling confounded by the patronising pity of the bourgeois leftist. And none of this is based on merit. Quite the opposite, in fact: the socially disadvantaged art world or academic worker must perform a gargantuan feat of stamina and mental acuity whilst hiding their broken feelings on a daily basis. Meanwhile, the bourgeois peer play acts for pocket money.

That Mark was subject to long term depression which recurred and ended with him taking his life was a cruel blow for those who joined him in the condemnation of an academic and cultural system that weighs heavily on the energies and health of its most deprived employees. Of course, it would be simple to blame the capitalist and academic system for pushing Mark to the edge, though the point will be made and discounted in equal measure. After all, it is in line with depression as a condition that its sufferers feel victimised and blame others for their state. As such, the logic that the sufferer of depression (or anxiety) need to simply pick themselves up and carry on easily takes hold.

Though in part to dismiss such callousness I would like to reflect via personal anecdote and broader fact on the very real material correlate between the social structure in the cultural and academic fields and stress, anxiety and depression. I would like to do this so that the problem of these conditions can be located in a resolvable exterior which can be changed, thereby drawing upon the hope that Mark brought to the public via his writing and through his actions, not least evidenced in his openness to young academics, students and creative practitioners.

Starting with this latter point I wish to pinpoint a 'closed-door phenomenon' within academia and the arts that operates both in the UK and Italy (the two countries I have most experience of as a student, visiting lecturer, curator, critic and adjunct professor). Put simply, for reasons of culture and history (i.e. due to a rigid class system) one is taught from an early stage in their career that the door (metaphorical but also physical) is closed as a matter of course. Access to academics is by invite and acceptance into circles where successful academics convene is rare. Further, acceptance as 'one of them' (a viable person who understands *what is there to be*

understood) is hard won, signaled by a complex system of body and verbal language traits that excludes people who grew up in non-white middle class environments. Indeed, at one of London's (and Europe's) most prestigious graduate schools in philosophy where I studied at some point in the '00s it was the norm for students to be made to feel stupid by professors who knew more than they did. This sensation was tangible and reflected by a number of my student colleagues in what was seen as a Pythonesque situation whereby the guardians of knowledge would zealously protect it even from the people they were obligated to pass it on to. In what would appear to be an inheritance of the private schooling system professors would over time select students they particularly favored for special treatment, encouraging them onto the Ph.D. program and into a career in the same department or another one within the same network. This was the state of the academic left which gave rise to Mark Fisher, though he battled long to get a position himself, having taught until the late part of the '00s in a further education college and only gaining a full-time position at Goldsmiths, University of London, relatively recently. On the way there, his popularity arose largely for his willingness (and perhaps accurately for the necessity) to circumvent the barrier which separated those 'in the know' from the rest.

In part this was due to Mark being an early adopter of internet blogging via his site K-Punk, which correctly identified the fact that the staid and closed form of academia that operated in the UK at that time could not continue. Or, rather, at the least, it couldn't continue as the only sphere for leftist academic debate. The internet enabled geeks and enthusiasts of every variety to 'talk' – or, more commonly, type – endlessly on subjects which might otherwise have caused intense boredom or irritation to their partners, friends or family. This led to an era of blogging in which, for example, new philosophical movements were founded or consolidated online through the interaction of students with academics who were often from outside their own institutions as well as between academics living in different countries and on different continents. Some of the most important academic friendships and feuds of our time were formed and fomented in this environment. Indeed, Speculative Realism, Object-Oriented Philosophy and Object-Oriented Ontology all grew up in this way in a short space of time.

Whilst optimism for the political potential of the internet has waned in many respects (not least as it has been instrumental in the rise of the far right and of the disturbing phenomena of Trump and Brexit) we can't overlook a phenomenon which has allowed students to bridge a gap in tuition by appealing directly to a young generation of blogging tutors from other institutions (such as, notably, the very prolific blogger and philosopher Graham Harman, Mark Fisher and Nina Power). Whilst blogging proved fairly ineffective for tackling the actual problems inherent to the academic system itself, at a structural level it can't be doubted that a new generation owes much to that time of ferment and the openness of a few thinkers unrestrained by social class protocol. The trouble is that so long as a broad class system still prevails there will always be a sensation of superiority and inferiority within academic departments as well as in the cultural field.

Simply, if one is outside the dominant social class in a given field there will always be something that differentiates them from their peers. On the surface this manifests in behavioral traits and in a studied casual yet elegant manner of being that is beyond emulation for any period of time. One either has the affectations of the upper classes or does not, but if they do it's because they were born with them and then further schooled in them. Beneath the surface there is a material aspect. One either has someone holding their back (or considerable savings or a house owned outright) or does not. If one does not have these things life will be more stressful and fitting in with one's upper class peers will be virtually impossible on any sustained level.

Of course. there are token working class people in the arts (Tracey Emin, Damien Hirst), but they are put there specifically to be working class for the entertainment of the wealthy. This is not a path open to many people and not one that can be planned for or deliberately obtained and these few working-class superstars are closer to Wayne Rooney than Peggy Guggenheim. For the rest of us upward mobility is a hamster wheel. One never really arrives where they think they should and the constant thought that 'by now I have done surely enough to rest, to relax, to have the ease of my peers' is always met with disappointment. What's worse is that the need for enterprising young working class cultural practitioners to establish themselves is often exploited. I have worked in an art foundation nearly entirely staffed by unpaid and underpaid labor. At one point during the six-month run of a politically themed exhibition an illegal immigrant worker spent several hours in the attic of the arts foundation bailing out water as it was raining and the roof was broken. Beneath people watched videos on capitalism and climate change. This is for me the best visual metaphor of the art world I have ever seen, only it was real. Everyone in that foundation was bound into compliance with its corrupt functioning by their need to get ahead. This is something repeated throughout the arts and academia and can be seen in the adjunct professor system operative in American universities.

Now, on a physical level sustained stress without relief leads to depression. This is a material reality: life conditions create mental illness. What then, on a scientific basis is the likely fate of a working class academic or arts practitioner who repeatedly finds themselves in the same place despite working harder and achieving more year on year? Clearly the facts speak for themselves.

We need to look out for each other and open doors instead of closing them. We need to fill the halls of academia and the art world with people of diverse backgrounds such that no one feels excluded. In some small way that path has begun.

Let's talk about class, let's do it proudly! Let's talk about what social class I am and what social class you are.

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References

1 The question actually asked, by correspondent Charlotte Higgins, was "Did not Marx foresee the end of capitalism, inevitably brought down by its internal contradictions?" Full text: https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2015/may/07/das-kapital-at-venice-biennale-okwui-enwezor-karl-marx

2 https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/dec/08/poor-cannot-cook-peer-eats-words

INVISIBLE FENCES: EGALITARIANISM, NATIONALISM AND RACISM

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With its specific combination of a bureaucratic welfare state and an open, globalized capitalist economy, Norway, along with the other Nordic countries, provides a particularly interesting context for the examination of the relationship between egalitarianism, nationalism, and racism in Europe. A racialization of difference takes place, as immigration emerges as a site for racial and racist discourse, and as a site of conjuncture between the welfare state and its citizens. By presenting an analysis of the contemporary debate on immigration in Norway, this article demonstrates how equality conceived as sameness ('imagined sameness') underpins a growing ethnification of national identity. Widely different utterances and points of view refer to metaphors of home and family life, a close link between territory and generalized kinship, and the renewed importance of Lutheran Christianity in contrast to Islam. A model of group identity and relationship is therefore suggested, in which organizational boundaries and cultural substance inflect one another, rather than being the bases of different or even opposed approaches. It is also argued that anthropologists need to take a more serious interest in the European majority populations.

Despite different historical traditions and political cultures, present debates about 'immigrants' are surprisingly similar in many European countries. At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s a general shift took place in the direction of more 'realism', implying that the migrant presence is generally regarded as deeply problematic. In this article I want to discuss European debates about 'immigrants' through the specific particularities of the Norwegian case. The first point I want to make is that there are close relations among egalitarian cultural themes, majority nationalism, and racism. My contention is that there is currently a popular reinforcement of the ethnic dimensions of majority nationalism, with a focus on common culture, ancestry, and origin. Analytically, my task is to pinpoint a contested hegemonic 'fixity' (Bhabha 1999), without unduly essentializing or reinforcing it. In other words, I want simultaneously to identify and to historicize an emerging doxic field.

The second point is that the process of ethnification needs to be understood in terms of cultural content as well as in terms of boundaries and relationships. In the rightly famous introductory essay to *Ethnic groups and boundaries*, Fredrik Barth (1969: 15) argued for a focus on 'the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses'. In partial contrast to Barth's formulation, this article suggests a more intricate analytical relationship between

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organizational form and cultural content. In Norwegian debates about 'immigration', the boundary is not only organizational, but also cultural. Furthermore, in contrast to Barth's one-sided focus on the self-ascription of ethnic identity, I also want to emphasize the role played by the power to categorize others (see also Jenkins 1997).

The discussion starts with a theoretical presentation of egalitarian individualism, supplemented by a short overview of immigration to Norway. Then follows an interpretative analysis of the underlying categories and ideas of five empirical examples. My interpretation is informed by many years of experience as a native anthropologist. Like all interpretations, it is partial, localized, and not the only possible one. It is therefore meant to be provisional, to contribute to the reader's own production of knowledge from locations different from mine.

The five examples are selected so as to be markedly different with regard to points of view and intentions. They present different genres, uttered in different contexts for different audiences. The first example is an extract from an anonymous letter written by a man who expresses vehement hostility to the presence in Norway of inhabitants with a Pakistani background. The second example is a story told informally by a male university professor of linguistics. The third is a set of quotations from an academic book for a general readership written by a female university professor of social anthropology. The two last examples are the reflections (in an oral interview conducted by a journalist for the popular press and in a book for the general reader) of two Labour party politicians with a Pakistani background. With the exception of the anonymous letter, all the examples are utterances by people who might be classified among the Norwegian cultural and political elite, in a wide sense. All the examples have been translated from the Norwegian by me.

Imagined sameness

While 'egalitarian individualism' is often said to be a characteristic feature of the Western world (Dumont 1986; 1987; Kapferer 1988), many researchers have suggested that a special emphasis can be found within Norway and the other Nordic countries (see, among others, Barnes 1954; Gullestad 1984; 1992; 1996; Jonassen 1983). Alexis de Tocqueville (1969 [1835-40]) suggested that the idea of equality easily leads to a search for identity, in other words to the idea that people have to feel that they are more or less the same in order to be of equal value. This tendency is particularly strong in the Nordic countries, and can be analysed as a culturally specific way of resolving tensions between the individual and the community.

In previous studies (Gullestad 1984; 1985; 1992; 1996), I have formed a set of ideas about egalitarianism in Norway, based on how 'ordinary people' relate to differences in way of life and lifestyle.[1] The central value concept is *likhet*, meaning, 'likeness', 'similarity', 'identity', or 'sameness'.[2] *Likhet* is the most common translation of 'equality', implying that social actors must consider themselves as more or less the same in order to feel of equal value. When they thus manage to establish a definition of the situation focusing on same-

ness, each of the parties – paradoxically – also gains confirmation of their individual value. In order to have their desired identities confirmed, people need relevant others who are able and willing to recognize and support them. According to the logic involved, the relevant supporters are other people who are regarded as similar. This logic often leads to an interaction style in which commonalties are emphasized, while differences are played down. In this way the sameness cannot always be observed but is, rather, a style that focuses on sameness. For the sake of simplicity I call it 'imagined sameness'.

The egalitarian logic can be woven into both egalitarian and hierarchical models of society.[3] It is not only tied to the term *likhet*, but also to a whole range of other expressions such as 'to fit in together' (*å passe sammen*) and 'to share the same ideas' (*ha sammenfallende synspunkter*). Often it implies that there is a problem when others are perceived to be 'too different'. Then the parties often avoid each other. Open conflicts are seen as a threat to other basic values, such as 'peace and quiet'. Avoidance can happen prior to the establishment of imagined sameness, and when it is no longer possible to maintain. In this way differences are concealed by avoiding those people who, for one reason or another, are perceived as 'too different', and by playing them down in social interaction with those who are regarded as compatible. The result is that the dividing-lines between people in terms of social class have become blurred. At the same time the differences between 'Norwegians' and 'immigrants' have become discursively salient.

Norway, a case in point

In my current research, I examine how elite people employ egalitarian strategies in relation to 'immigrants'. In the late 1960s immigrants from Third World countries started to enter Norway, a nation-state of about 4.5 million inhabitants. An immigration ban was imposed in 1975. Since then, newcomers have only been admitted on the basis of being experts, family members (family reunification), students (with the expectation that they would return home after completing their education), and, last but not least, refugees and asylum-seekers. The 'immigrant' proportion of the population (including refugees and asylum-seekers) has increased steadily, from 2.0 per cent in 1980 to 5.5 per cent in 1998. In 1970, 6 per cent of the 'immigrant population' came from Asia, Africa, and Latin America; in 1998 the figure was 49.5 per cent. Between 1977 and 1998, 109,000 foreign incomers became Norwegian citizens.[4] Their countries of origin are multiple, with the largest number originating from Pakistan, followed by Sweden, Denmark, and Vietnam. One-third of all 'immigrants', and 41 per cent of 'non-Western immigrants', live in Oslo.[5] In this city their presence is highly visible, particularly in certain inner-city neighbourhoods. Many 'non-Western immigrants' work in unskilled and semi-skilled occupations as taxi-drivers, hotel personnel, cleaners, and so on, doing many of the jobs that 'Norwegians no longer want'. Educated 'immigrants' often experience difficulties in obtaining employment that fits their educational level.

Although the relative number of 'immigrants' is smaller than in countries such as Sweden, Germany, or France, the debates about them are extensive

and polarized. The groups of political extremists (such as self-defined racists and neo-Nazis) are small, comprising only a few hundred individuals (Bjørgo 1997; 1998; Fangen 1998). On several occasions, thousands of people have demonstrated publicly against the actions of these marginal groups. At the same time anti-immigrant sentiments are also strong. The Progressive Party (Fremskrittspartiet) – a right-wing populist party fighting for lower taxes, fewer regulations, more money to care for the aged, more police, and a more restrictive immigration policy – can be compared to the Freiheitspartei in Austria and to the Front National in France. The leaders of the Progressive Party do not use explicitly Nazi, neo-Nazi, or traditional racist arguments. But as this article will show, many other symbolic resources are available.

Despite their North Sea oil wealth, this specific point in time in Norway is one in which many people feel insecure about where their society is heading. The Cold War is over, leaving Western countries with no clear outside enemy. As in many other European countries, the debates about the European Union split the population in two, with those opposing the EU on the winning side. The so-called 'modernization' of the welfare state has triggered much opposition, as does the proliferation of neo-liberal ideas and practices. Unlike many other European countries, unemployment is not extensive, but significant numbers of people still experience the loss of their jobs as a result of downsizing and restructuring in many workplaces. This resistance often takes the form of ethnic nationalism. The way migration is currently interpreted brings out and exacerbates the ethnic subtext in the imagining of the nation.

Hatred of 'Pakistanis' expressed by a person with anti-immigrant opinions

My first example exemplifies a line of argument used by people who are vehemently against 'immigrants'. It is taken from an anonymous letter. The author claims that he has sent to a Pakistani-Norwegian Labour Party politician named Rubina Rana.[6] In 1999, Rana chaired the organizing committee for Oslo's Constitution Day celebrations on 17 May.[7] When it became known that Rana had been elected to chair the committee, she received anonymous letters, including death threats. This particular letter sets out the sender's views on the relationship between 'Norwegians' and 'Pakistanis', as seen from a relatively marginal position of little authority:

> In Norway 17 May is the day when we celebrate our liberty, the day when we express our love for our country.
>
> Most of us associate Pakistanis with people who have as their aim a long-term occupation of Norway through their rapidly growing numbers, thereby slowly transforming Norway into a Muslim state.
>
> This is the precise opposite of liberty.
>
> You are doubtless proud to have come one step closer to this goal.
>
> Nothing is worse than having a Pakistani in the 17 May procession.
>
> You have so little contact with ordinary Norwegians that you have not yet understood that Pakistanis have become a despised and unwelcome group in Norway and that you are 'frozen out' here in Norway. The most obvious sign of this is that the last thing a Norwegian would

> do is to give a Pakistani a job. This is the reaction of the Norwegian people to the manner in which you are acting.
>
> It may be of interest for you to have a description of how the vast majority of Norwegians regard Pakistanis and why we do not want you here.
>
> The relationship between us broke down from the first day of your arrival. Later it became progressively worse. The most important reason for this is that you have little ability or desire to adapt to our country.
>
> It is clear and evident to every Norwegian, and it has also been stated clearly and precisely from the Pakistani side, that you are proceeding to develop a Pakistani state on Norwegian soil and to isolate yourselves from most of that which is Norwegian.
>
> We will not submit to this self-righteous attitude within our small but close-knit Norwegian family. We love our country too much for that.

This letter contains no direct mention of 'race', and no references to Nazism or neo-Nazism. It is a matter of course that Norway is 'our' country, and that 'we' have the right to determine that 'we do not want you here'. The 'Pakistanis' are homogenized, regardless of citizenship, way of life, and political opinions, and so are 'we'. In Norwegian, the word *familie* ('family') means, depending on context, both kinship relations and the group of people living together in a household. By his choice of words ('our small and close-knit Norwegian family') the letter-writer plays on both meanings. Generalized kinship and the intimacy of the home constitute 'us', the ethnic nation, as a *moral community*. Implicitly, the moral community is also based on Lutheran Christianity in opposition to Islam.

For many Norwegians, the word 'occupied' contains a reference to the Nazi occupation during the Second World War.[8] At the same time, the term also conveys the idea of the immigrant as an 'occupant' in the sense of being a guest who does not conform to the expectations of the host. The author's fear of a transformation of Norway into a Muslim state plays on rhetorically forceful themes of popular sovereignty and self-determination. According to the author of the anonymous letter, 'Pakistanis' bear all the blame for the country's perceived problems. Indeed, the letter seems actually to endorse practices of discrimination and harassment.

The aim of this first example is to put the four that follow into relief by comparing them with something which is both markedly different and based on similar frames of interpretation. These frames are a marked boundary between 'us' and 'them', a tendency to blame the victims, and to imagine the nation as a moral community, based on family metaphors and generalized kinship. My contention is thus that moderate utterances are based on similar doxic forms of imagined sameness as the uncompromising opinions in this letter.

The shifting meanings of the terms 'immigrant' and 'Norwegian'

My second example is my own retelling of a story first conveyed to me by an emeritus professor of Nordic languages.[9] It is an account of a personal experience originally described to his colleagues from his majority perspective, but it involves the reactions and feelings of a conversation partner with

an immigrant background. Some time ago, the professor received a telephone call from a woman he did not know. She wanted to discuss the notion of the *innvandrer* (immigrant) with somebody proficient in the Nordic languages. The professor was friendly and ready to converse. She told him that she had been born and brought up in India but had lived in Norway for many years. According to the professor, 'she spoke Norwegian well, but not perfectly'. 'Now I have lived in Norway for a long time', she told him. 'I know Norway, and I have become a Norwegian citizen. Therefore I want to know if am I still an immigrant (*innvandrer*)?' 'Yes', answered the professor, on the basis of his lexical understanding of the problem. 'You were born and bred in India, and this makes you an immigrant to Norway.' The woman, who had apparently hoped to throw off this label, voiced her disappointment and posed a further question. 'But for how long will I then continue to be an immigrant?' 'All your life', answered the professor. The conversation then reached its peak, as he later explained it, in that the woman became angry. The professor, who is an amiable person, was sorry to disappoint her, but found that the meaning of this word in Norwegian did not allow him to do otherwise. In order both to explain his view, and to comfort her, he therefore added: 'This is the way it was for the Norwegians who emigrated to America, too. You just have to accept it.'

The conversation was a private one, in that the professor did not himself seek out a public situation to publish his point of view. At the same time the woman had sought him out because of his formally sanctioned academic knowledge. He thus spoke from a position of authority when he explained the meaning of the word *innvandrer* to her. In order to understand the woman's anger one needs a broader cultural analysis of the word's connotations, the surrounding networks of concepts and their contexts of use, and the range of ideas, images, and associations it currently sets in motion. *Innvandrer* is today not only a word in the dictionary, but a rhetorically powerful concept. Within such a frame of analysis, *innvandrer* has become a stigmatizing way of labelling 'them'. In the dictionary (and for the professor), the term denotes all those who come from outside Norway, including Swedes, Danes, and North Americans. But in the streets and the mass media, a more restricted use is emerging. The meaning of the word now seems to oscillate between an implicit code based on 'Third World' origin, different values from the majority, 'dark skin', working class (unskilled or semi-skilled work) and a dictionary definition in which these characteristics are irrelevant. This span of ambiguity is the basis of considerable rhetorical power. For example, the leader of the right-wing Progressive Party often implicitly plays on the term's restricted and racialized meaning, but when he is accused of racism, he shifts to the wider lexical meaning.

When the woman in the episode became disappointed and angry, it was presumably because she perceived the label, *innvandrer*, as conveying a meaning of 'not Norwegian', and excluding her from the community of unmarked citizens. The term is often used in a totalizing way, covering many nationalities of origin, and overriding other statuses and identities. For the professor, being a Norwegian citizen did not overrule the woman's status as an 'immigrant'. The term locks her conceptually into a position she thought she had long since left, and it does so for 'all her life'. It thus ties her to a perpetual present

based in the past. She is not somebody who once entered, but is perpetually entering. The professor obviously wanted to treat the woman as an equal. His reference to the Norwegian immigrants in America can be interpreted as a way of attempting to establish sameness between himself and her. In the situation, he did not see his imposition of the term *innvandrer* as contributing to an existing hierarchy of power. The effect of this hierarchy is that the woman in the episode – and others like her – are treated as outsiders. As a matter of course, the identity she wants for herself is not confirmed; she is forced to accept an identity she does not want, and she has no choice when other people make this unwanted identity relevant. For her, one may assume, this means being denied dignity, recognition, and respect. In addition, as someone who was apparently a well-educated, middle-class person, she was probably also offended by the lower-class connotations of the term *innvandrer*. Other 'immigrants' to Norway are not well educated, and many do not want to become Norwegian citizens. It is precisely the extremity of her case (her citizenship, her wish to participate as an unmarked citizen, her long residence in Norway, and her proficiency in the Norwegian language) which makes visible the invisible fences inherent in egalitarian interpretative frameworks. Nevertheless, there are more extreme cases: young people who are born in Norway and are native speakers of Norwegian feel that they are not accepted as 'ordinary Norwegians'. The category 'second-generation immigrants' is now reified in official statistics.

Such unacknowledged frames of interpretation operate, so to speak, behind people's backs. Even when the intention is equality and dialogue, the interpretative frames may still contribute to anger and distance. Such frames are not accidental ornaments, but intrinsic parts of any argumentation. Talking about the relationship between 'immigrants' and 'Norwegians' means that a specific frame of interpretation is applied, constructing a difference, which then has to be bridged.

The anthropologist as native

Similar invisible fences can also be teased out of my next example, which comes from the work of the social anthropologist Unni Wikan (1995*a*, 1995*b*; 1999). Wikan is well known for her many years of anthropological scholarship in predominantly Muslim societies. She has recently published a book on Norwegian immigration policy for the general public, *Mot en ny norsk underklasse: innvandrere, kultur og integrasjon* [*Towards a new Norwegian underclass: immigrants, culture and integration*] (1995). In addition, she has contributed to public debate in Norway through many newspaper articles, interviews, appearances on television talk-shows, public lectures, and so on. Her main message is that the Norwegian authorities do a disservice to the children of immigrants, and especially to girls. The Norwegian authorities practise foolish generosity (*snillisme*), she argues, by supporting the power of Muslim men, and by providing welfare without expecting anything in return. This is 'doing evil in the name of good' ('gjøre ondt i godhetens navn') (Wikan 1995*a*: 193).

It is easy to appreciate Wikan's focus on gender, her concerns about children, and her wish to avoid the creation of a permanent 'underclass' in

Norway. But her argumentation also contains a number of ideas and thought figures which invite closer examination. In the following analysis I have attempted to tease out the cultural knowledge that a reader needs in order to understand her arguments. Thus I do not focus on her well-meaning intentions, but on the ideas and categories which make her arguments work rhetorically. Wikan's ideas have had considerable political influence in the 1990s, articulating and legitimizing ideas and opinions that were already in circulation.[10] She has thereby contributed to framing the debates on immigration in certain ways.

The following quotations are duplicated in two different sources, the book mentioned above (Wikan 1995*b*) as well as an article (Wikan 1995*a*):

> 'Immigrants' and the 'immigration problem' have virtually become synonymous with Muslims.
> Why?
> Let me state immediately: I do not think that this is due to 'racism'.
>
> When so many Norwegians – including myself – regard Muslims as a problem, there is a reason for this: Muslims in Norway are problematic in many ways: one has the impression that they distance themselves further from basic Norwegian values than do other groups. Many practise segregation. Many oppose their children having Norwegian friends. This does not apply to all, but it applies to far too many (1995*a*: 85-6; 1995*b*: 26).
>
> Every choice has its price, and the price for living in Norway is that one must accept that one's children become Norwegian – if they themselves so wish. For no one 'owns' his or her children … for me it is also unacceptable that people who have come here and benefited from Norwegian possibilities, such as freedom and material welfare, so readily denounce aspects of the 'culture' we have built up, and that provides the basis for the welfare which immigrants take advantage of. The majority of immigrants to Norway have had a choice – they were not among the worst off in their home country … They have also had the possibility to return: to go back home. The choice they have made bears its obligations. (1995*a*: 91; 1995*b*: 30-1).[11]

These quotations (and the texts from which they are drawn) are well written and pointed. The perspective is with the majority, and the texts are directed towards majority people as implicit readers. At the same time the 'Muslims' are the ones to be criticized. 'Muslims' are assigned the whole blame for the stereotypes about them, without any reflection on the possibility that 'orientalism' (Said 1978) might be an unrecognized part of Norweigan thought habits. In addition, as in much current European discourse, racism is mentioned by way of being denied (van Dijk 1993). The expression 'basic Norwegian values' implies that all variations in Norway are homogenized into a single set of values. But what are these 'basic Norwegian values' other than 'the culture' we have built up? While Muslims, according to Wikan, ought not to be condoned on the basis of culture, the Norwegian-ness they have to adopt is all the same implicitly defined in cultural terms. In her writings, Wikan does not consider the possibility that some of the reasons why immigrants keep to themselves might be related to the familism and home-centeredness of Scandinavian social life which make it difficult for outsiders to be included, that immigrants encounter discrimination in Norwegian society, and that the inward turn of some people may partly be an attempt to retain material and emotional support, as well as dignity and self-respect. She

also does not focus on how integration might be conceived, seen from the point of view of Muslim individuals. The effect of her text is therefore not only to reinforce common stereotypical constructions of 'Muslims', but also, and perhaps as much, to strengthen the national imagination of the Norwegian 'us' as an unmarked, normative, and homogeneous entity in an hierarchical relationship to 'them'.

For me, the most interesting questions are nevertheless the following: what are the criteria to be included in the Norwegian 'we', and what does it mean to have 'built' the '"culture"' which 'provides the basis for the welfare which immigrants take advantage of'? In the two quoted passages it is taken for granted that the Muslims who began arriving in Norway in around 1970 have not participated in 'building the "culture"', and that they are thus essentially excluded from the Norwegian 'we'. Similar expressions, such as 'building the country', are often used in public debates in Norway, suggesting the closeness of 'culture', 'country', and 'welfare state' on the conceptual level.

Let me try to bring out what I think are the underlying assumptions in these formulations.[12] National history is important, perceived as extending far back over the centuries. Norway was ruled by Denmark for 400 years, and was then in a union with Sweden from 1814. In more recent history, the secession from Sweden in 1905 and the experiences of the Second World War, when Nazi Germany occupied Norway, are central. In many local communities the Constitution Day celebrations focus on monuments commemorating those who died or suffered during the war. In addition, the 'building' of the welfare state in the first three decades after the Second World War is crucial. These years are often perceived as a gigantic national project (*dugnad*).

Wikan's formulation suggests that people perceive culture as being an achievement, and this might imply that they could potentially also perceive it as something which continues to be built, and that anyone who participates becomes part of it. This does not seem to be the case. Instead, the 'culture' is somehow regarded as completed. This point of view may be related to a perceived threat to the welfare state. In contemporary politics it appears for many people as something to be defended, rather than something to be continuously expanded.

While 'immigrants' are excluded from those who 'built the country' in contemporary discourse, young and middle-aged 'Norwegians' are not.[13] The claims of 'Norwegians' coming of age after about 1970 generally rest on kinship to those who did this. Symbolic kinship is thus indirectly crucial to the imagined sameness of having 'built the country'. Accordingly, being 'Norwegian' is basically an innate quality, not something to be achieved. While the reference to generalized kinship is direct in the anonymous letter, here it is indirect.

It is also interesting that Wikan attaches importance to the fact that the immigrating parents have chosen to come to Norway. The ability to choose is central to modernity. But in her text, choice seems to signify yet another dimension of being excluded from the innate quality of ethnic belonging: 'We' who have not chosen Norway apparently have a more direct, organic, and primordial relationship to the country and its culture. In addition, I am tempted to suggest a parallel to the missionary language of conversion here. The 'immigrants' have, so to speak, converted to a new life in a new nation, and this entails certain obligations. The secularized religious tone in Wikan's

prose ('doing evil in the name of good') supports this interpretation. The unacknowledged religious flavour is, I would argue, fairly typical of public debates in Norway.

The exclusion of 'immigrants' from the national 'we' can be detected in other ways in the quoted passages. For example, Wikan criticizes Muslims for criticizing everything Norwegian. I would argue that the implicit opposite of criticism is not neutrality, but rather praise. Thus, if it is unacceptable to denounce, this might be because it is expected that one should instead extol the country's virtues. Similar demands are rarely made of other Norwegians, except when they are representing Norway abroad. I interpret refraining from criticism as an anticipated compensation for the lack of belonging in terms of ancestry. Citizenship is never quite enough, but if one compensates by not criticizing, and – even better – by praising, the lack of ethnic belonging can be compensated for in part.

This interpretation is supported by Wikan's condemnation of 'passports of convenience' (*beleilighetspass*) in other parts of her book. 'My opinion is that one is not Norwegian in practice (*i gavnet*), only in name (*i navnet*), if one has a Norwegian passport, but distances oneself from fundamental Norwegian values and does not learn Norwegian' (Wikan 1995*a*: 177-85). On the one hand, it seems to be possible to become Norwegian 'in practice' (*i gavnet*). On the other hand, it seems as if 'immigrants' need to act in ways which make '*Norwegians'* perceive them as both loyal and proud to be Norwegian, in order for them to be to be accepted (Wikan 1995*a*: 177-85; 1999: 61). Thus 'Norwegians' have the power to set the rules, take part in the game, and act as judges as well.

One might also ask if it is not implicitly demanded that 'immigrants' should be particularly grateful for having been allowed to enter Norway. This interpretation is supported by the fact that in several places in her book, Wikan categorizes 'immigrants' as 'guests who arrive uninvited (*uinnbudt*) on their own initiative' (1995: 178). The metaphor of a host-guest relationship is often applied to immigration in Norway (Gullestad 1997*b*: 53), as well as in other European countries.[14] The relationship between the Norwegian majority and the 'immigrants' is like a host receiving guests in his home. Even if the metaphor of the guest may seem both well intended and self-evident, it can have serious consequences for the distribution of power. Given the everyday interpretations of the rights and duties involved, a host has the right to control the resources of the home, to decide on the rules of the visit, and, accordingly, to 'put their foot down' when the guest does not conform. The centrality of this metaphor in the debates naturalizes the ethnic boundary as a relation of power. A guest has to be grateful for the hospitality received by not provoking the host by calling attention to his or her difference from the host (see also Hervik 2000). There is thus an expected exchange implied in the host-guest metaphor. The host provides 'freedom and material welfare'; the guest is expected to adopt 'basic Norwegian values'. If 'the Muslims' do not become 'like us', they had better return 'home', Wikan writes. 'Muslims' thus belong somewhere else. This point of view reflects, as do many contributions to these debates, what Liisa Malkki (1995: 495) calls 'the national order of things'. Within an ethnic-national interpretative framework, 'Muslims' in Norway often represent something extrinsic and strange, and not something

internal and essential in relation to 'us'. They are 'matter out of place' (Douglas 1966).

If the guest does not adapt to the rules of the host, they might be reclassified as an intruder (*inntrenger*). Wikan's choice of words when she emphasizes that the 'Muslims' have arrived 'uninvited' is particularly interesting. In the Norwegian language the notion of uninvited guests is usually used about criminals stealing somebody's property. In neutral contexts the expression is rather 'unexpected guests' than 'uninvited guests'. I want to argue that when an uninvited guest stays on, he easily becomes not only an 'intruder', but an 'occupant' and an 'enemy' as well. There is thus an intertextual link between the notion of 'occupation' in the anonymous letter and Wikan's notion of 'uninvited guests'. These very different categories seem to belong together in a cluster. The degree to which the cluster is experienced as self-evident can be tied to the central position of the home as experiential grounding and metaphor for the nation (Gullestad 1997*b*). The home as a metaphor establishes sharp boundaries between the nation (the home) and the outside world (the foreign guests). The very categories 'host society' and 'guests' thus construct a hierarchical relationship with the 'immigrant' at the receiving end.

The three examples I have analysed thus far draw on similar underlying frames of interpretation, whether the speaker's opinion is mildly critical or vehemently anti-immigrant. Nevertheless, both of the academic commentators demonstrate what I think is a crucial point: the unintended consequence of a particular set of ideas may be the erection of 'invisible fences', even though the original, or conscious, motivation was precisely to eliminate them.

The reflections of an 'immigrant woman'

In a number of press interviews, the Labour party politician Rubina Rana reflected upon the threatening letters she received before 17 May 1999, and on her situation as a Muslim in Norway. She is drawn into the same metadiscourse revealed in the examples already discussed, a discourse that she partly inhabits and partly resists. The following comprise selected extracts from the interviews conducted both before and after 17 May 1999:

> I have found my own rhythm after all these years in Norway. It suits me and Norwegian society, I believe. Even though I have been resourceful, it has not been easy for me. Integration is a difficult process. By moving to Norway I have also lost much. Among other things I miss my family. But on the other hand I have gained new insights. It has been enriching (*Aftenposten* 8 May 1999: 45).

The following passages are taken from an interview immediately after the Constitution Day Procession on 17 May:

> This has been a happy day. It was particularly warming when people called out to me, 'Rubina', as I walked with the children in the procession. I felt as if every one was looking at me as a person, not just as an immigrant woman.
>
> (Journalist: You speak about a colourful community on Norway's national day, in front of the Royal Palace. Were you not worried that this might be felt to be provocative?) First, let me say that it was a great honour for me to chair the committee responsible for National

> [Constitution] Day celebrations in Oslo. This was a double honour, as I am an immigrant. And I would add that I am pleased to have started a debate on integration. These processes are not simple, and it can be good for children of immigrants to see a person with their own skin colour at the head of the procession. (*Aftenposten*, 18 May 1999: 3).

One year later, on 17 May 2000, Rubina Rana was interviewed on the Norwegian public television channel NRK1. She then emphasized that she had grown in the process, she had become 'more Norwegian' during the celebration of 17 May the year before, 'this most Norwegian days of all days'. 'I did not have historical ties to Henrik Wergeland[15] and Norway, but now I have developed such ties.' She also said that she was 'proud to be an inhabitant of Oslo', and that she 'loves Oslo' (NRK1, 17 May 2000).

Rubina Rana speaks from a very ambiguous position, as an 'immigrant' politician receiving anonymous death threats because she was given a task with high symbolic value. The pleasure of being 'a person and not an immigrant woman' reveals some of the pain of seldom being able to participate inconspicuously, but being treated as a representative of a category.[16] Like the woman in my second example, she conducts a struggle in order to be recognized as a unique citizen.

In her diplomatic way Rubina Rana reveals some of the reasons why she has been able to advance in Norwegian society. As I have indicated in the analysis of Unni Wikan's text, 'immigrants' need to be more positive than 'Norwegians'. There is nevertheless a mild plea in one of the interviews, suggesting the existence of fences with closed gates ('I could have wished Norwegians to be a bit more open towards us'). It is also interesting that Rubina Rana explicitly mentions 'skin colour', implying that Pakistani immigrants and their children are subjected to racialized discrimination.

Rubina Rana is one of many Norwegians with an immigrant background who demonstrates that social realities are not well understood by means of a simple discursive division between 'Norwegians' and 'immigrants'. Nevertheless, for me the most disturbing moment when working with these texts was when I discovered the racialized nationalism in the journalist's question on 17 May ('You speak about a colourful community on Norway's national day, in front of the Royal Palace. Were you not worried that this might be felt to be provocative?'). The very question reproduces the extremist view that 'coloured' Norwegians do not have a place in the 'white' nation, and that the king of Norway is not the king of all citizens. My unease was not first and foremost to discover that the journalist gave voice to such prejudices. The most disturbing was that I had myself overlooked this aspect on initially reading and even re-reading this interview. Ethnic nationalism with racial implications seems inevitable, even for a native anthropologist who has set herself the task of examining underlying doxic themes.

'Decency' and 'dregs'

In order to make sense of the many diverse opinions in the debates on immigration, large sections of the political and cultural elite now discursively limit xenophobia and racism to an imagined part of the population. They characterize this part of the population through metaphors such as the 'undercur-

rents' (*understrømmene*) and 'the dregs of the depths of the popular masses' (*grumset i folkedypet*). In order to exemplify this, I present here a quotation from a book intended for general readership written by a young politician named Kadafi Zaman (1999):

> In the future Islam must be debated even more than today, not in terms of history, but in terms of the situation in present-day Norway. We have to relate to the Norwegian Muslim, not to the fundamentalist in Teheran. The dregs in the Progressive party, who barely know their own history, are not qualified to participate in such a debate. Their interpretation is only for the closed room, not for the general public. No, it is the learned people, the writers, the politicians, the artists, the musicians, and the performers who must start building bridges. Xenophobia has now become hatred, even among those who conduct, and establish the premises for, the public debates. Therefore one has to start with this elite, this is the only way to obtain a decent dialogue, a way of communicating which is based on knowledge, not rumours and lies (Zaman 1999: 95-6).

Zaman writes as a Muslim whose parents had emigrated to Norway from Pakistan, as a Labour party politician, as a democrat, as an intellectual, and as a genuine Norwegian national. As a Norwegian Muslim he wants to build bridges between religious groups. As a Labour party politician he sees the 'dregs' as limited to the Progressive party. This party has been demonized in Norwegian debates, and this demonization has made it possible for politicians in other parties to gloss over the xenophobia and racism in their own parties, not least in the Labour party. As a democrat, Zaman wants more public debate. As an intellectual, he has faith in 'learned people, writers, artists, musicians, and performers'.

Zaman's remarks are typical of the thoughts of many elite Norwegians. It is organized around a contrast between 'the dregs' (*grumset*) in the Progressive party and a 'decent dialogue'. The words 'dregs' (*grums*, *bunnavfall*, *berme*) and 'decency' (*anstendighet*) implicitly carry two different models of social life, the one elitist and hierarchical, the other a little more egalitarian. In order to identify these two models, one also needs to take into account the notions to which the twin notions 'dregs' and 'decency' are opposed: 'dregs' is linked to its antithesis 'clarity', and 'decency' to 'indecency'. The word 'dregs' is implied in an elitist model of social life. One is invited to see society as a container filled with liquid. Close to the bottom are 'dregs', people with misgivings and hate. The word is associated with something worthless, impure, and superfluous. Close to the surface one finds people with clear thoughts, knowledge, and the ability to build bridges and conduct dialogues. By constructing mental boundaries between 'dregs' and 'clarity', and between 'the depths of the people' and the people with clear minds, elite responsibility for discrimination, exploitation, and exclusion disappears. Discrimination is safely placed in the 'dregs' from which one explicitly distances oneself. This social model makes it possible for elite people to avoid reflecting about their own frames of interpretation.

The word *anstendighet* ('decency') implicitly conveys a somewhat different image of what goes on. The opposite of 'decency' is 'indecency'. In Norwegian discourses these words are often associated with sexual morals, and suggest the existence of an overwhelming desire which needs to be tamed. When the word 'decency' is used in 'immigration debates', elite people in principle have the same feelings as 'the depths of the people'. The only difference is that they

tame their feelings a little better, and provide, so to speak, a facade, in order for the feelings to be less harmful. Sometimes this is coupled with the idea that raw feelings and manners can be polished into something more refined. The social model implied in the contrast between 'decency' and 'indecency' thus allows for the existence of fundamental similarities across different political opinions and class positions. Concerning sexuality, desire is the common denominator. In this article I have attempted to identify some of the common ideas and metaphors of the 'immigration debates'. This social model is thus closer to my argument.

A passion for boundaries

Before concluding, I need to make two caveats. The first is that the five examples in this article do not represent the full discursive universe of Norwegian public debates. There are differences of opinion related to age, generation, gender, educational background, and identification with the city as opposed to the countryside. The younger one is, and the more one identifies with urban life, the more likely one is to welcome 'europeanization', 'globalization', and 'diversity' (*mangfold*) as positive challenges. For example, many Norwegian anthropologists express more 'cosmopolitan' positions in relation to 'immigrants' than that adopted by Wikan.

The other caveat is that it is not only on the discursive level that differences are negotiated and lived in Norway today. A dynamic relationship exists between rigidification at the level of categories and in everyday life practices. Recent literature presents many interesting cases of everyday social life which does not follow fixed dichotomies. In Norway, Viggo Vestel, among others, shows how young people in co-operative housing estates create new forms of action and syncretic symbolic expressions bringing together elements from many different cultural traditions (Vestel 2000). Hilde Lidén has demonstrated that the discourses about 'us' and 'them' constitute only one of many frames of reference shaping how children with different experiences interact at school, and the kinds of common ground they are able to construct together (Lidén 1999). While the discursive dichotomies between 'Norwegians' and 'immigrants' now appear to be rigid and fixed, new spaces for reflection and innovation thus continuously open up.

In the episode involving the Indian-Norwegian woman and the professor, the woman resisted the professor's hegemonic labelling of her as an 'immigrant'. Her anger induced him to turn the incident into a story. Without the anger there would have been nothing to tell, or at least a very different story. The professor's expressions of surprise and uneasiness in the face of the woman's anger demonstrate a destabilization of his sense of the 'natural' or self-evident, and the opening-up of a space for new kinds of reflection. Hegemony is thus contested in everyday life encounters as well as in public discourse.

At the same time, I maintain that by linking the voices of people who can be expected to argue with each other, doxic fields of underlying values and perceptions can be identified. In other words, I do not locate the horizon of understanding in particular types of people, but wish instead to emphasize that

these are *signs* that circulate and are available to all. The frames of interpretation which I have teased out in this article exist as symbolic resources which in given situations might potentially be employed more or less by anyone, regardless of gender, age, class, skin colour, and so on. In addition, I would argue that people in the cultural and political elite are actually instrumental in formulating, reformulating, promoting, and legitimizing such frames of understanding.

Many Norwegians now turn to the simultaneous production of differences and call for sameness. In many contexts the ideal of imagined sameness produces a solution (demands for sameness) to a problem it has itself contributed to creating. It is as though an outsider must be created, in order for the internal sameness, unity, and sense of belonging to be confirmed. History, ancestry, religion, and morality are intertwined in this form of nationalism, ethnicizing the state as an expression of collective identity. 'Immigrants' are asked to 'become Norwegian', at the same time as it is tacitly assumed that this is something they can never really achieve. 'They' are often criticized without much corresponding consideration of 'our' knowledge of 'their' traditions, or 'our' ability and willingness to reflect critically upon 'our' own. 'We' ('Norwegians'), are thus considered more advanced and hierarchically superior to 'them' ('Muslims', 'Pakistanis', 'Vietnamese', 'Tamils', 'our new countrymen from other cultures', and so on).

What seems to be at stake for many 'Norwegians' is not so much a threat from 'immigrants' as socio-economic competitors, as a threat to the imagined moral community and the Norwegian welfare state as the incarnation of this community. In cherished narratives, Norway is a victim of colonization (from Denmark), and not a colonizer.[17] Norway has played an important role in peace negotiations in various regions such as the Middle East, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, and Colombia. And Norway's rate of per capita expenditure on development aid to the Third World is one of the highest in the world. 'Immigrants' who do not play down their difference are perceived as provoking hostility, and thus to threaten such narratives about Norway as a homogeneous, tolerant, anti-racist, and peace-loving society.

Norwegian ideas about sameness, generalized kinship, and the host-guest metaphor can be seen as specific combinations and permutations of ideas which can also be found elsewhere. The consistent and growing use of these ideas is in my view one of the main problems, politically and culturally, in Europe today. Almost everywhere 'race' is a pervasive element of contemporary discourse, often signalled through hints and indirection, as in denials of racism. As ideologies, racism and nationalism have a common historical origin and formal characteristics that may simultaneously overlap and contrast with one another (Miles 1993: 53-79). In contemporary debates, the focus on culture and ancestry often provides an overlapping common ground between racism and nationalism in current signifying practices. The focus on ancestry and cultural sameness implies an invisible fence for the acceptance of 'immigrants' as unmarked citizens who 'belong' in Norway. For many theorists (e.g. Balibar 1991; Barker 1981; Goldberg 1993; Hervik 1999; Rex 1986; Stolcke 1995; Tagieff 1988; Van Dijk 1992; Wieviorka 1995) 'culture' now replaces 'race' in the rhetoric of the political right. According to these ideas, discrimination is increasingly justified by the existence of irreconcilable cultural

differences rather than by hierarchical 'races'. I see the egalitarian logic as one of the reasons why the perception of incompatible cultural differences has so quickly entered the general common sense. On the basis of the analysis presented here, one might ask, first, if the reinforced ethnification of majority nationalism is not the main foundation of contemporary forms of racism in Europe, and, secondly, if it is not just wishful thinking to limit these ideological elements to the political right.

With very few exceptions, European anthropologists have not been at the forefront of theoretical developments about racism in Europe, but rather sociologists, philosophers, and political scientists. In her recent work Unni Wikan is one of the few anthropologists who has addressed these issues.[18] In my examination of her texts as native texts, I have focused on the fact that Wikan draws not only on her knowledge as an anthropologist, but also on her common sense as a Norwegian national. The lack of analytical distance in this (and many other) cases is only possible because of the resistance in North European and North American universities to the anthropological study of majority life worlds 'at home'. This resistance implies that, when it is done, it is often without the same depth of knowledge and scholarly rigour as elsewhere.

Nevertheless, the problem is in my view not most interestingly put as a slippage between acting as a specialist and acting as a native informant. Rather, I would argue, it is a question of talking from a position which, like all positions, simultaneously enables and makes blind. Every anthropological text, even the most theoretical, may be read the way I have read Wikan's recent work in this article. For example, I have argued elsewhere (Gullestad 1997*a*: 35) that Fredrik Barth's position as a Norwegian native is an interesting context for understanding why he was able to advance the study of ethnicity by focusing on boundaries. The emphasis on imagined sameness, and the passion for boundaries it implies, may have made him more able than others to see that ethnic boundaries are maintained because of, not in spite of, intensive social interactions between ethnically diverse individuals and groups. It can also be argued that the cultural climate in Norway, with its emphasis on sameness and consensus, might have influenced his lack of interest in the 'cultural stuff' and the power differentials and conflicts of ethnic identity. On the basis of the analyses presented in this article, I want to suggest a more dialectical model of ethnicity. In this model, first, organizational boundaries and 'cultural stuff' inflect each other, rather than being the bases of different or even opposed approaches. Secondly, the effects of power differentials and the categorization by others are acknowledged.

To be reflective about one's location is not only a question of personal will-power, but of the status of these areas of knowledge in the discipline. Because anthropologists have traditionally carved out their research objects as the romantic study of the exotic and the different, few anthropologists have studied the current upsurge of xenophobia and racism in Europe. The study of discrimination and racism necessitates asking new kinds of questions, and framing studies in ways that differ from the conventional study of this or that minority group. It is high time for anthropologists to turn their analytical gaze to the majority populations 'at home', including the anthropologist at work.

NOTES

This article draws on work in progress on Norwegian debates on immigration, funded by the IMER programme in The Research Council of Norway. I have presented previous versions to the Anthropology of Europe Workshop, University of Chicago, 9 November 2000; the Ethnicity and Nationalism Symposium, Santiago de Compostela, 17-19 April 1999; as a guest-lecture in the Department of Anthropology, University of Bergen, 6 April 2000; and at a course for doctoral students at the University of Tromsø, 12 April 2000. I thank Nina Dessau, Jan Terje Faarlund, Jim Fernandez, Peter Hervik, Helge Høibraaten, Hilde Lidén, Anne Krogstad, and Unni Wikan for valuable comments on the first drafts. The article is dedicated to the memory of Sharon Stephens, a dear friend and an outstanding anthropologist.

[1] In Gullestad (1984; 1992), I have also shown how since the 1970s egalitarian ideals have come increasingly to be used between spouses inside the household.

[2] These ideas have also been useful elsewhere, including Denmark (Hervik 199: 248). It would seem that Danish debates on immigration are based on ideas similar to those underlying debates in Norway, though the ethnic nationalism is more explicit.

[3] See also Gullestad (1992: 93-112; 1996: 178-80).

[4] One can become a Norwegian citizen on the basis of having lived continuously in Norway for a period of seven years.

[5] The source for the figures in this paragraph is Bjertnæs 2000. Since 1994, the official statistical analyses in Norway use the following definition of 'immigrants': 'The population of immigrants comprises persons with two parents born abroad. The population of immigrants includes *first-generation immigrants* who have themselves immigrated, and *second-generation immigrants*, who are born in Norway from two parents born abroad' (Bjertnæs 2000: 10, translated from the Norwegian). The statistics also distinguish between immigrants form 'Western' (Western Europe, US, Canada, and Oceania) and 'non-Western' countries (Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, Central and South America). Turkey is classified among the 'non-Western' countries. The statistical categorizations demonstrate the privileged status of kinship over citizenship in Norway (and Denmark). In contrast, Sweden, classifies inhabitants according to citizenship.

[6] The writer sent a copy of this letter to me, asking me to make use of it in my research.

[7] Constitution Day is often called National Day in Norway. It is celebrated throughout the country with children's parades, speeches, and parties. But since the royal family reside in Oslo, the celebrations there are especially significant, and to chair the Oslo committee is a prestigious task.

[8] Some war veterans in Norway stress that they are now against immigration for the same reason that they once were against the German occupation.

[9] I thank Professor Dag Gundersen for permission to use his story and for his valuable comments.

[10] This political influence is emphasized by Wikan herself: 'I believe I have played some part in making the government change its course' (Wikan 1999: 59).

[11] This and other quotations have been translated from the Norwegian by me.

[12] Nineteenth-century Norwegian nation-building constructed an imagined sameness which failed to take into account the many immigrants to Norway over the centuries. German merchants and mining engineers, Scottish craftsmen, Swedish construction workers, American, French, and British oil workers, as well as migrant workers and refugees from many countries, have actually contributed very concretely to 'building the country'. Yet this history of immigration has not become part of Norwegian popular imagination.

[13] One exception is Erlend Loe's novel *L* (Loe 1999) in which he plays with these ideas.

[14] Peter Hervik (2000) has made an interesting analysis of the host-guest metaphor as a 'figured world' for majority-minority relations in Denmark. Based on canonical texts, Jacques Derrida (in Derrida & Dufourmantelle 1997) has discussed the idea of hospitality as an ethical, and not as a political, notion. In 'pure hospitality' the guest arrives unexpectedly.

[15] Henrik Wergeland is the poet hailed as creator of this celebration honouring the constitution as a patriotic symbol.

[16] 'Immigrant women' are at the centre of current popular constructions of difference in Norway, articulated, among other things, in heated debates about arranged marriages. What is most at stake for 'Norwegians', it seems, is the valued personal independence of Norwegian egalitarian individualism, including the degree to which Norwegian women have become

emancipated over the last thirty years, as well as the existence of a public sphere outside family life and kinship.

[17] The colonial ideas brought home by sailors and missionaries seem to be important for how immigrants from the Third World are perceived. In addition, habits of thought in relation to various internal others, such as the Sami, are still at work.

[18] In Gullestad 2000 I have discussed Unni Wikan's ideas about 'race and culture' in Norway (Wikan 1995*a*; 1999).

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Barrières invisibles: égalitarisme, nationalisme et racisme

Résumé

Avec sa combinaison spécifique d'un État providence bureaucratique et d'une économie globalisée et ouverte, la Norvège, ainsi que les autres pays nordiques, offre un contexte particulièrement intéressant pour examiner la relation entre l'égalitarisme, le nationalisme et le racisme en Europe. Une racialisation de la différence se produit, alors que l'immigration émerge comme un terrain propice à un discours racial et raciste, et comme lieu de conjoncture entre l'État providence et ses citoyens. En présentant une analyse du débat contemporain sur l'immigration en Norvège, cet article démontre comment l'égalité conçue comme similitude ('similitude imaginée'), sous-tend une ethnification croissante de l'identité nationale. Les différences sont marquées dans les proclamations et les points de vue se rapportant aux métaphores sur la maison et la vie domestique, à un lien étroit entre le territoire et la parenté en général, et à l'importance renouvelée du Christianisme luthérien en contraste avec l'Islam. En conséquence, un modèle de l'identité et des relations de groupes est avancé, selon lequel les limites organisationnelles et la substance culturelle sont conjuguées au lieu de servir de bases pour des approches différentes ou même opposées. Il est aussi avancé dans cet article que les anthropologues doivent s'intéresser plus sérieusement aux populations majoritaires d'Europe.

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Science Fiction Futures and (Re)visions of the Anthropocene

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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Technology
Edited by Shannon Vallor
Online Publication Date: Apr 2021
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190851187.013.2

Abstract: This chapter discusses how humans envision futures, especially environmental futures, including the climate crisis, the Anthropocene, and mass extinctions. Although the philosophy of technology has traditionally examined the forecasting of technological risk and arguments about whether to embrace or reject the growth of technological mediation of human lives, the field has yet to fully investigate environmental futurisms and imagination. To begin a conversation for the philosophy of technology, philosophies of science fiction narrative discuss the different roles that imagination plays in projecting our concerns with the present onto futures that have not occurred and future generations who are not yet living. One of the key issues that the chapter explores is how science fiction imagination is based on assumptions and values about the history of technological change, including industrialization, capitalism, and colonialism. These issues reveal ways in which technology, future narrative, and climate justice are related.

Keywords: environmental futures, science fiction, climate justice, colonialism, future narrative, environmental imagination, Anthropocene, philosophy of technology

1. Introduction

The idea that global climate change—and the environmental injustices connected to it—signal or represent a new epoch of geological time has transfixed those in the sciences and the humanities. The Anthropocene, as some have proposed calling the moment we

are now in or soon to enter, is a discourse that grapples with the ways in which human beings intentionally or inadvertently affect ecological systems on a global scale. A cluster of literatures, all deeply invested in diagnosing what went wrong and envisioning what can and ought to be expected of the future, has emerged alongside these ecological and ideological developments. As ecocritics have observed (e.g., Otto 2012; Gaard 2014; Rigby 2015), the genre of science fiction has established itself as a distinct facet of this conversation within and beyond the academy. Anthropocene futurities represent a particularly rich site of overlap connecting the philosophy of technology with philosophical and creative literatures on futurism, climate change, science fiction, and environmental justice.

Here, as elsewhere, technologies are often bound up with technological visions. Moreover, concepts of climate change or the Anthropocene are portrayals of technologies as technological systems. Such technologies include the physical infrastructure that drives certain anthropogenic forms of climate change, but also the associated human technological behaviors that are incentivized by culture, such as pollution. Andrew Feenberg claims, for example, that "technology is the medium of daily life . . . every major technical change reverberates at many levels, economic, political, religious, cultural" (1999, vii). In this sense of technology, visions tied to climate change or the Anthropocene present assumptions and beliefs about and aspirations for the future that affect multiple dimensions of society. Unfortunately, as with the Anthropocene discourse in general, much of the science/climate fiction that attends to environmental issues or crises has a rather singular vision of humanity, nature, apocalypse, and futurity that is

incompatible with anti-colonial, anti-racist, and/or feminist approaches to environmental justice in the time of global climate change.

To a degree, philosophers of technology have played important roles in evaluating philosophically how futures are envisioned. For example, some philosophy of technology has examined how people's values shape their assumptions about future risks that they may be exposed to or how ethical processes should be established for people to gather and assess the weight of risks (e.g., Asveld et al. 2012; Floridi 2014). Philosophers have thought critically about how visions of the future motivate loss and change of certain traditional values and ethical commitments or create new forms of perception and cognition (e.g., Borgmann 1987; Ihde 1990). Sometimes research on future risks has been part of an analysis of environmental justice (Shrader-Frechette 2002), systems of power (Feenberg 1999), or sustainability (Thompson 2010). Importantly, work of this kind in the philosophy of technology has not fully examined the very nature of what it means to construct a technology future or vision of the future. Although risks, perils, and the foresight of harms are covered, there is little coverage of what such visions are or do in relation to technological systems like climate change. Often, technological visions are environmental visions, presupposing certain future states of ecosystems and the implications of those states of affairs for human existence and well-being. Risk perception often assumes certain beliefs, values, and knowledge about how the environment responds to pollution, for example; visions of technological transformation of traditional values are based on assumptions of how humans ought to relate morally and skillfully to non-human worlds.

One reason that more philosophical and expansive understandings of visioning and the future are absent from the philosophy of technology is the field's lack of diversity. Yet philosophers of technology can do more to ensure broader philosophical perspectives, especially ones that are not rooted primarily in a particular tradition of western philosophy (there are, of course, many traditions that might respectfully be called "western" in different ways). In the philosophy of technology, it is sometimes true that research on risk perception, visioning, and environmental justice relies on very particular thinkers or theoretical frameworks, such as Paul Thompson's focus on Thomas Jefferson's agrarian philosophy, Kristin Shrader-Frechette's avoidance of Indigenous and other non-western conceptions of justice, or Albert Borgmann's and Feenberg's being influenced by phenomenological and critical theory traditions emanating largely from Europe. Science fiction too has historically been less than friendly to women, persons of color, and others who would challenge its sense of realism and, relatedly, tends to rely on similarly narrow ideological frameworks.

The philosophies and narratives we are emphasizing here have different arguments and concepts pertaining to issues as diverse as knowledge and ethics; they also focus on different forms of oppression. For example, colonialism, as a form of oppression, is rarely taken up by philosophers of technology or in complex/intersectional ways by mainstream science fiction. Yet in Indigenous philosophy and science fiction alike, when the topic of oppression is discussed, colonialism is among the central topics. And often colonialism is discussed intersectionally in relation to different forms of discrimination and violence, such as racism, patriarchy, and capitalism. Indigenous philosophical discussions about the future connect themes of technology, the

environment, and colonialism, among others. The idea, for example, that climate change is an intensified form of colonialism certainly provides important insights—especially in contrast to how climate change is defined in other fora—about how some people think about the future in ways that draw out their experiences and point to gaps in the work of others. Colonialism, of course, is a technological system and has the features of technological systems and power that some philosophers of technology, especially Borgmann and Feenberg, have covered in their work. It is also true that while some philosophers of technology have taken up climate change, climate change is rarely (if at all) examined as a technological system itself in this literature. Strangely, even within the sub-genre of climate fiction or "cli-fi," this analysis is often lacking or seriously oversimplified.

In response to these limitations of the philosophy of technology and science fiction alike, this chapter explores the work of mainstream climate fiction in contrast with those of Indigenous, Afrofuturist, and/or feminist science fiction narratives. Rather than envisioning a monolithic cataclysm driven by technology or nature's whims, these alternative narratives situate environmental injustice and catastrophe within a complex web of intra- and inter-species politics. Their thoughtful world-building enables such stories to imaginatively mirror our own worlds such that the past, present, and future are transformed. In this way, Indigenous, Afrofuturist, and/or feminist science fiction narratives contribute ethical and political observations, theories, and visions crucial for the philosophy of technology.

2. Science Fiction on the Brink

Anthropocene discourse encourages us to think of humanity and the planet as being on the brink of a new epoch in which earth systems and thereby life will be radically altered. In geological terms, the proposed Anthropocene epoch is understood as a time in which the collective actions of humans began/begin to influence earth systems—including but not limited to climate—in marked, unprecedented ways. Though the precise start date and causes of the Anthropocene are continually up for debate, more recent theories link the proposed epoch to the onset of colonialism and global trade, particularly that of coal (Lewis and Maslin 2015). Since then, ever-expanding human economic activities and consumer lifestyles have become major co-drivers of ecological destabilization through their dependence on burning fossil fuels and certain kinds of land use; for example, deforestation. Scientists and environmental ethicists have tended to characterize Anthropocene futures in increasingly grim terms, most commonly by warning of or envisioning a world in which the very existence of certain ecosystems, plants, and animals is threatened by climate destabilization (Kolbert 2010; Thompson and Bendik-Keymer 2012; Vaidyanathan 2014; Sandler 2014). Some conservationists argue that we will inevitably have to learn to live with these changes, make careful decisions about conservation priorities, and, in some cases, learn to let go of certain ecosystems and species (Kareiva and Marvier 2012). Yet others in the conservation community adamantly frame these losses, especially extinctions, as morally dreadful and, frequently, environmentally catastrophic (Vaidyanathan 2014; Cafaro and Primack 2014).

One of the authors (Whyte 2018) has written on some of the ways in which academics, journalists, artists, and writers alike have conjured apocalyptic and dystopian

portrayals of perilous futures involving mass species extinctions, ecosystem degradation, and social upheaval. Much of recent science fiction—new or familiar—is adept at making readers feel as though the time, society, or the planet on which they live is balanced on the edge of a knife. The drama of such stories revolves around characters working to prevent, manage, navigate, or survive the tipping point (e.g., Garrard 2012; Otto 2012; Morton 2013; Gaard 2014; Anson 2017; Whyte 2018). The trope of the tipping point is especially prevalent in the sub-genre of climate fiction, whose narratives tackle the threat or reality of global climate change (more or less) head-on. Kim Stanley Robinson's (2004–2007) *Science in the Capital* trilogy, for example, revolves around the lives and efforts of scientists and politicians in early 21st-century Washington, D.C. to warn of, stave off, and eventually mitigate or adapt to anthropogenic climate change by advancing (primarily) technological solutions. Due to their specificity and particular style of realism, cli-fi narratives like Robinson's are particularly adept at cultivating the impression that the tipping point is *right now* and that very soon everything could change or fall apart.

In the context of most mainstream sci-fi and, in particular, cli-fi, the brink is a threshold that should not be crossed at all costs. Beyond this tipping point lies apocalypse, the end of the world. The apocalypse of such narratives manifests as societal collapse, ecological collapse, or some combination of the two (Otto 2012). Causes for collapse vary, and the triggers for tipping points and/or apocalypse are imaginatively depicted in several key—and often overlapping—ways:

- Extraction-driven ecological devastation; for example, *The Lorax* (Seuss 1972), *Avatar* (Cameron 2009), *Fern Gully* (Kroyer 1992), and *Dune* (Herbert 1965)
- Natural catastrophes or acts of god; for example, *Armageddon* (Bay 1998), *Noah* (Aronofsky 2014), and *Interstellar* (Nolan 2014)
- Pollution; for example, *Once Upon a Forest* (Grosvenor 1993)
- Nuclear fallout or winter; for example, *Doctor Strangelove* (Kubrick 1964), *Z for Zachariah* (O'Brien 1974), and *The 100* (Morgan 2013))
- Weakness or evil of humans; for example, *Noah*, *Doctor Strangelove*, and *The Bone Clocks* (Mitchell 2014)
- Technology run amok; for example, *The Day After Tomorrow* (Emmerich 2004) and *The Carbon Diaries: 2015* (Lloyd 2009)

The apocalypses depicted in mainstream science/climate fiction are a mix of "tragic" (i.e., apocalypse is inevitable and redemption from human guilt or evil is to be found in sacrifice) and "comic" (i.e., apocalypse is avoidable and redemption from human error is to be found through recognition), with an emphasis on the latter (Garrard 2012). Either way, however, apocalypse lies in the future, just over the horizon.

Ecocritics, at times reluctantly, recognize the power of the apocalyptic trope—presumably in its comic form—to awaken readers to their close proximity to the brink and thereby inspire action (Garrard 2012; Otto 2012; Schatz 2012). Framing environmental quandaries and losses through the lens of apocalypse imparts a sense of urgency that can be distinctly motivating. The sense readers get from the bulk of these narratives is that humanity can pull itself and, thereby, the world back from the brink of

apocalypse—or, at least, avoid the worst of it—if only we put our minds to it and try hard enough. It's not too late, not yet. Likewise, ecocritics maintain that many works of science/climate fiction articulate innovative solutions of their own for averting the worst of apocalypse and surviving the rest. Whether or not they locate the causes of apocalypse with technology, much of this genre skews strongly toward technologically oriented solutions and strategies. When it comes to averting or forestalling ecological and societal collapse, science/climate fiction tends to advocate either for embracing—for example, *Star Trek* (Roddenberry 1966–1969, 1987–1994) and *Armageddon* (Bay 1998)—or abandoning technology; for example, *The Queen of the Tearling* series (Johansen 2014–2016). In the science fiction disaster film *Armageddon*, for example, a team of deep-sea oil drillers detonates a thermonuclear bomb in an asteroid hurtling toward earth in order to avert a cataclysmic extinction event. However dubious the science and overblown the narrative, the film aptly portrays the belief that—in the hands of good men—technology can surely overcome any threat to humanity.

Other science/climate fiction narratives, such as the *Science in the Capital* trilogy (Robinson 2004–2007), explore what surviving the apocalypse could look like. Much like stories in which apocalypse is averted, survival narratives often foreground exaltations or critiques of technology. Robinson's trilogy is of the former type and strongly advocates for science and technology to take charge in the face of apocalypse. Yet despite the fact that climate change is far from averted in this series and ecological changes abound (e.g., the Gulf Stream has stalled out), societal changes are distinctly muted. Nations, gender roles, institutions (governmental agencies and NGOs alike), racial categories, international governing bodies, economic systems, etc. all remain largely unchanged. In

this way, Robinson's trilogy aptly demonstrates the tendency of mainstream science/climate fiction to "end" the world while managing to keep it recognizable to environmentally privileged readers in the global North. Such narratives travel past the brink and yet somehow fail to fall into it.

Through their exploration of what surviving environmental apocalypse could look like, science/climate fiction narratives also weigh in on or even theorize about what parts of the world are worth salvaging and what and who are not. As we have seen, modern technology may or may not be worth carrying forward into the future, but it is not the only aspect of the pre-apocalyptic world to be considered and ultimately rejected or accepted onto the ark. Contemporary gender roles, capitalist economic arrangements, settler-coloniality, modern racial hierarchies, among others, are all recurrent ticketed passengers on the ark or manage somehow to hitch a ride. Even when mainstream narratives frame apocalypse as more or less inevitable and devastating, conflict tends to revolve around the fight for certain ideological fixtures of western democratic societies. Preserving the last shreds of human freedom and humanity itself, for instance, are crucial priorities in the futures envisioned by tragic science/climate fiction; for example, *Planet of the Apes* (Schaffner 1968) and *Mad Max: Fury Road* (Miller 2015). Whether by building an ark or by fighting to keep afloat precious flotsam in the storm, these texts make normative and political claims regarding the types of futures that should be desired and aimed for (Otto 2012; Tuck and Yang 2012; Gaard 2014).

Although science/climate fiction does not always explicitly reference the Anthropocene by name, these narratives feed off of and grapple with the same anxieties regarding global climate change and other anthropogenic environmental harms and

injustices that preoccupy the nonfictional literatures of the Anthropocene discourse. Moreover, these stories and the broader discourse are placed into conversation by ecocritics (e.g., Otto 2012; Rigby 2015), environmental ethicists (e.g., Whyte 2018), and those in the environmental humanities (e.g., Anson 2017). Perhaps the most important overlap for our purposes, however, lies with the value assumptions that mainstream science/climate fiction shares with the broader discourse. In the next section, we explore how the values that shape and motivate the futures depicted by these narratives serve as an expression of Anthropocene futurity.

3. A Singular Vision

When conceived and executed well, science fiction can gesture toward or suggest ways to grapple with environmental injustice, technological challenges, and climate change. Such guidance is likely to go awry, however, when narratives rely upon problematic value assumptions and incomplete or inaccurate descriptions of the politics and technologies behind the anthropogenic phenomena in question. Ursula Le Guin (1976b) reminds us that science fiction is a descriptive—rather than predictive—endeavor but strongly cautions (2004, 218–219) against "timid and reactionary" science fiction fantasy storytelling. She writes, "The imaginative fiction I admire presents alternatives to the status quo which not only question the ubiquity and necessity of extant institutions, but enlarge the field of social possibility and moral understanding" (Le Guin 2004, 219–220). Although mainstream apocalyptic science/climate fiction may indeed succeed in waking some readers up to the urgency of potential and ongoing environmental and social ills, they tend to offer a problematically totalizing, reductive description and vision. As with the Anthropocene discourse at large, it is easy to walk away from these narratives with

the impression that there is but one humanity, one nature, one apocalypse, one history, and one future. This section considers each of these normative and/or political assumptions in turn while also attending to the ways in which they influence each other.

Mainstream science/climate fiction has an unfortunate tendency to gloss over or fail to attend to considerations of gender, race, sexuality, disability, and, in particular, coloniality. Moreover, when such narratives do explore social dimensions (most commonly, class) in more depth, intersectional dynamics are still largely neglected (Gaard 2014). As a result, environmental threats and apocalypse get framed as problems that all of humanity (must) face together. The existence and exacerbation of preexisting vulnerabilities and the disproportionate impact of environmental crises such as global climate change are often lost (Cuomo 1998; Morton 2013; Rigby 2015). Likewise, culpability for "anthropogenic" crises is generally portrayed somewhat simplistically and without consideration for historical and ongoing violence and oppression. Just as humans are all in the same boat when it comes to confronting environmental calamity together, "we" are also all to blame as a species for mucking up the environment, climate, biosphere, etc. (Whyte 2017). The "we" that is given face, voice, and agency in science/climate fiction, however, tends to be white, male, environmentally privileged, and technologically "advanced" (Gaard 2014). Thus, these narratives frame humanity as a whole as at odds with nature (writ large) in terms of both vulnerability and culpability, while often only considering a narrow slice of human experiences and identities.

Nature, for its part, gets defined in opposition to or in contrast with humanity and technology (Cuomo 1998; Haraway 2008; Gaard 2014). That being said, there are many different instantiations of the nature versus humans/technology trope that crop up

throughout science/climate fiction, Anthropocene literature, and beyond. Some narratives reduce nature to a set of natural resources that humans (via technology) must make sure to use wisely. Thusly instrumentalized and de-animated, nature recedes into the background, a cluster of material resources that need not take up any further human attention if their supply is not threatened. When nature is not more or less backgrounded, it tends to take on the narrative role of the victim or villain against which humans/technology must prevail. As a victimized object/entity—often femininely gendered—nature is romanticized and reduced to a passive system of species and habitats that humans have the unique responsibility to save. In this framing, the loss of nature is tragic given its innocence and lack of complicity in its own destruction. Often these renditions of nature suggest humans derive spiritual sustenance from features of nature, one common example being a giant or sentient tree; for example, *Pocahontas* (Gabriel and Goldberg 1995) and *Avatar* (Cameron 2009). As a villain, nature can be reduced to a dormant power whose fury and violence are unleashed when humans abuse or neglect it. Species, elements, or systems may all of a sudden overwhelm humans when they fail in their responsibilities. Such fictional accounts of nature often suggest a human ambivalence toward nature, in the sense that nature cannot ultimately be trusted and nature has no accountability to human life. Of course, such framings of nature can be mixed together. Sometimes the passive, romanticized nature is pushed too far and transforms into an aggressive villain. Other times, the various notions stay in their own lanes.

Ultimately, such conceptualizations reinforce the idea that nature (singular) interacts with a humanity (also singular) and the technology at “our” disposal. Most

fictional accounts, for example, portray humans as responding to a monolithic nature, whether instrumentalized or victimized, romanticized or villainous. Some science/climate fiction accounts complicate this picture by orienting the narrative around conflict that has arisen between different groups of people who view nature and technology differently, such as conflicts between those who value nature as a pure instrument and those who invest spiritual value in nature. Unfortunately, these narratives generally resolve with all sides coming to appreciate—as humans united—the same view of nature and/or the proper uses of technology, as in stories involving purely instrumental valuers of nature realizing that the non-human world is indeed sacred. Other times, environmental apocalypse can only be averted when the proper balance between nature and technology is arrived at either by consensus or, more commonly, heroic action/force (Gaard 2014). Rarely is the "problem" of technology framed in terms other than the root cause of or sole hope to avoid environmental catastrophe.

When narratives portray a single humanity and technology interacting with a single nature, environmental catastrophe can likewise be conceptualized as singular and, all too often, monolithic in nature. Apocalypse, then, is the destruction of a single world, which here refers to the coupling of human and natural systems. The presumption of a singular shared world supports the idea that both science/climate fiction apocalypses and the nonfictional environmental catastrophes they "describe" are unprecedented in human and, as anthropogenic phenomena, planetary history. Add to that the failure to grapple with varying degrees and kinds of vulnerability and culpability across space, time, embodiment, and identity and the causal mechanisms of apocalypse tend to get obscured. Oversimplified or confined to ill-fitting allegories, the fictional causes of environmental

destruction and destabilization do not typically map well onto reality. Likewise, such apocalypses are temporally distorted. Science/climate fiction apocalypses tend to happen for everyone all at once, with the time leading up to the tipping point being relatively stable, however imperfect. Although inequalities may exist in pre-apocalyptic science/climate fiction worlds, these narratives typically give the impression that what looms on the horizon (or has just hit home) is like nothing anyone has seen before. Apocalypse is new and it is now.

Coupled with the oversimplification and misrepresentation of apocalypse's agents, causes, and victims, this temporal collapse frequently results in monolithic science fiction futurities. (Post)apocalyptic narratives are generally designed to make the reader or viewer feel anxious or unsettled about the past and present through the guise of the future. That being said, while science/climate fiction may not be predictive, the genre can and does offer warnings about what is likely to happen in the future if the status quo persists. Even then, however, such warnings are perhaps better read as critiques of the present—via counterfactual thought experiment (Whyte 2018)—than commentary on the future itself. One way in which science and, in particular, climate fiction can weigh in on the future is *prescriptively*. When it comes to the world's future the commentary articulated by and through science fiction concerns not what *will* be but what *could* be. Such stories ask—and sometimes answer—questions regarding the kind of worlds we ought to be building. But with the "we" of humanity and the world it occupies framed so singularly or monolithically, the futures imagined in science/climate fiction are similarly warped. When humanity wears a problematically narrow range of faces, so too do the denizens of future worlds. The most generous interpretation of such futurities would be to

say that they are incomplete. A more critical analysis reveals that a byproduct—or, perhaps, implicit goal—of many dystopian and/or (post)apocalyptic narratives is the rescuing of white, settler, environmentally privileged, etc. futurities (Tuck and Yang 2012: Gaard 2014). Although these communities/forms of life are disproportionately responsible—in the real world if not in fiction—for environmental destabilization and injustice, when writing themselves into the future few stop to question whether they should be there and, if so, in what forms. Mainstream science/climate fiction thereby refuses to contemplate a world in which the communities, values, technologies, and lifeways responsible for the cataclysm do not survive unchanged or at all.

These monolithic conceptualizations of humanity, technology, nature, apocalypse, and future are at odds with the complex politics responsible for and expressed by the phenomena known collectively as the Anthropocene. Crucially, however, much of what is troubling about mainstream science/climate fiction is precisely what many have already identified as being problematic about the Anthropocene discourse and the concept itself. As critical Anthropocene scholars have argued, a single Anthropos does not exist (Cuomo 2011, Gaard 2014 Haraway 2015). Likewise, a single nature with which to contrast it does not exist (Plumwood 1993; Lepori 2015; Vogel 2015). Furthermore, vulnerability to and responsibility for global environmental injustices vary widely from community to community, human or otherwise (Cuomo 2011; Lepori 2015). In fact, disproportionate vulnerabilities and responsibilities are a defining feature of climate change, thus working against the idea of there being *an* Anthropocene, as does the reality that environmental apocalypse has already happened or is currently

happening—for the first time or all over again—for many, in particular Indigenous/colonized communities and the descendants of enslaved peoples.

Heather Davis and Zoe Todd see an insidious irony in the different ways Indigenous and non-Indigenous persons approach the Anthropocene and climate crisis. They describe colonialism as a seismic shockwave that "kept rolling like a slinky [as it worked] to compact and speed up time, laying waste to legal orders, languages, and place-stories in quick succession. The fleshy, violent loss of 50 million Indigenous peoples in the Americas is something we read as a 'quickening' of space-time" in a seismic sense (Davis and Todd 2017, 771–772). Davis and Todd then point out that "the Anthropocene or at least all of the anxiety produced around these realities for those in Euro-Western contexts—is really the arrival of the reverberations of that seismic shockwave into the nations who introduced colonial, capitalist processes across the globe in the first half-millennium in the first place" (Davis and Todd 2017, 774). Although frequently framed as an epoch of unprecedented human flourishing and technological advancement (Rockstrom et al. 2009), the (tail "end" of the) Holocene was an especially brutal time for much of humanity. The entire endeavor of carving up geologic time into planetary epoch, eras, etc. has also been critiqued as a deeply colonial project (Cuomo 2014; Mitchell 2015; Davis and Todd 2017). All in all, it is perhaps not surprising that fictional narratives attempting to describe and respond to the Anthropocene end up reproducing similar frameworks and logics with regard to time, place, technology, and life.

4. Visionary Alternatives

Fortunately, there are numerous science fiction writers and artists who do not couch their observations, critiques, and recommendations for redressing environmental apocalypse and injustice in terms of the Anthropocene. Instead, their narratives articulate values, descriptions, and futurities that stand in stark contrast to those commonly employed within mainstream science fiction and Anthropocene discourse alike. The stories discussed in this section are what Adrienne Maree Brown and Walidah Imarisha[1] (2015) would describe as "visionary fiction," that is, "a term . . developed to distinguish science fiction that has relevance toward building new, freer worlds from the mainstream strain of science fiction, which most often reinforces dominant narratives of power" (4). Visionary fiction encompasses stories within science fiction, fantasy, speculative fiction, magic realism, etc. whose purpose is social change and transformation. The elements of visionary fiction include exploration of current social issues; consciousness of identity and intersections thereof; the centering of those who have been marginalized; an awareness of power inequalities; demonstration of change from the bottom up achieved collectively; and realism that is hard but hopeful (279).

In recognition of the fact that critiques of Anthropocene discourse tend to be mobilized along lines of gender, race, and/or coloniality, narratives in this section are organized under these headings. This is not to suggest that these are the only salient dimensions of identity and power when it comes to environmental injustice. Likewise, the intention is not to imply that these "axes" of oppression do not intersect. They surely do.

[1] Together Brown and Imarisha edited a volume of science fiction short stories written by social justice organizers. Imarisha writes, "All organizing is science fiction. Organizers and activists dedicate their lives to creating and envisioning another world, or many other worlds" (Brown and Imarisha 2015, 3).

Each subsection here is intended to build upon the last, and our effort to achieve focus should not obscure the reality of interconnection and intersection. Nevertheless, many science fiction narratives—even visionary ones—tend to focus on certain intersections and power dynamics more than others. This can be, although certainly not always, done well; that is, in ways that do not serve to erase or perpetuate violence along backgrounded or secondary axes. Even when well implemented, however, the results often highlight what Tuck and Yang (2012) refer to as the incommensurability of different anti-colonial and social justice projects. The division of texts in this section is also intended to help make that incommensurability—and the resulting implications for solidarity—more visible.

5. Visions of Gendered Environmental Injustice, Resistance, and Liberation

Much praised and analyzed, Margaret Atwood's (2003–2013) *MaddAddam* trilogy is perhaps the best-known example of feminist climate fiction (e.g., Ullrich 2015; Traub 2018). Atwood's trilogy details the post-apocalyptic struggles of the last human(s) on earth following a plague engineered by the world's best scientist(s) to wipe the species from the planet. Our protagonists' and anti-hero's worlds are not small, however. Through frequent flashbacks we learn of the time before "the flood" in all its glorious, heart-rending detail. The pre-flood world is both deeply disturbing and utterly recognizable. The rampant abuses of capitalism and technology, gendered and racialized violence and inequality, and increasingly destabilized climate all seem like the next logical incarnation of the environmental, gender, economic, and racial injustice that abound in today's world. The plague may have decimated humanity, but Atwood makes clear that its development and implementation are but one strand in the apocalyptic web.

Moreover, the plague is the least of the characters' concerns when it comes to surviving amidst and upon the detritus of a world torn asunder and extremely reluctant to die.

One aspect of these novels that has made them successful and useful for theorizing climate justice is Atwood's skill at depicting characters "dancing with" and adapting to disaster as it unfolds over time (Rigby 2015). As in the pre-flood world (although to varying degrees and in various ways), nothing about their survival is assured. To the very end, these novels leave the fate of the protagonists' efforts to (re)establish community uncomfortably uncertain. Without being saccharine, however, the trilogy vividly conveys how worthwhile and beautiful the work of transformation can be in spite of this. Unfortunately, Atwood's trilogy also falls prey to some of the same problems that crop up in mainstream climate fiction. For one, there is very little (de)colonial awareness; Indigenous people simply are not present in either the pre-flood or post-flood worlds. Not only does this make Atwood's narratives descriptively inadequate, but also the futurities represented therein are thereby suspect. What does it mean for a ragtag bunch of former sex workers, anarchists, and hackers to survive alongside a new genetically engineered sapiens species and human-pig hybrids on the eastern seaboard of North America when (apparently) the Indigenous inhabitants of this place did not survive? Many readers of the *MaddAddam* trilogy will not even think to ask this question; the narratives do nothing to prompt it.

By contrast, Ursula Le Guin's (1976a) *The Word for World Is Forest* certainly does not neglect the racial and colonial dimensions of environmental (in)justice. Despite being published several decades before the Anthropocene was formally conceptualized, Le Guin's novella thoughtfully explores how colonial logics and epistemologies of

ignorance make technology-intensive, extractive capitalism seem like the only viable option. Set on the alien planet of Athshe, the narrative centers around three characters: Captain Davidson, the military commander of a human logging operation; Raj Lyubov, the mission anthropologist, also human; and Selver, a native Athsean and formerly a slave in a logging camp, whose wife is raped and murdered by Davidson. While the native Athseans are humanoid, they are considerably smaller and furrier than humans. These qualities—and their seeming laziness and lack of ability or inclination to make use of the forest—lead the human colonists to believe they are sub-persons who can be justifiably enslaved. Having come to know Selver in the camp, Lyubov begins to doubt this assessment at the same time that Selver organizes an insurrection against the colonists. Despite Lyubov's entreaties, Davidson refuses to halt logging and the Athseans are forced to resort to violent tactics not previously practiced in their society. Following their victory, Selver remarks of the future he helped create, "Sometimes a god comes . . . He brings a new way to do a thing, or a new thing to be done. A new kind of singing, or a new kind of death. He brings this across the bridge between the dream-time and the world-time. When he has done this, it is done. You cannot take things that exist in the world and try to drive them back into the dream, to hold them inside the dream with walls and pretenses. That is insanity. What is, is. There is no use pretending, now, that we do not know how to kill one another" (Le Guin 1976a, 188–189).[2]

Although critiqued for not being as complex as some of Le Guin's other science fiction works, *The Word for World is Forest* offers an unflinching examination of the violence (technological and otherwise) inherent in colonialism, anthropocentrism, racism,

[2] To clarify, Selver is speaking of himself here as a 'god,' not Davidson, Lyubov, or humanity collectively.

sexism, and capitalism and of the linkages between them. Much of this is illustrated through Davidson's characterization and inner monologue. There is no doubting that this antagonist's views about race, gender, and nonhumans are responsible for his inability to see Athshe—and its humanoid inhabitants—as anything other than resources for the taking. Although Davidson is depicted as unquestionably loathsome, he is not a one-dimensional character. His villainy may not be remotely ambiguous, but the reader is provided with extensive detail regarding how and why Davidson is the way he is. Through Lyubov's practice of anthropology, Le Guin is also careful to explore how science and technology are implicated in colonialism, as well as potential resources and sites within science for doing anti-colonial work. Thus, beyond the descriptive adequacy of the text, it articulates theories for understanding and resisting environmental injustice in the world beyond the page. The aspect of the novella that may be troubling for some readers is the fate of the Athseans. As the coordinator of the rebellion and god of war, Selver feels certain that even after the Athseans regain their forest, life within it will never be the same for having known such deliberate violence. In addition to the questionable decision on the part of a non-Indigenous author to circumscribe Indigenous futurity so definitively, one might wonder what makes the violence of liberatory insurrection temporally distinct (i.e., a "there's no going back" affair) from that of rape and slavery under colonialism.

The line between colonist and colonizer is somewhat murkier, although no less important, in Kameron Hurley's (2017) *The Stars Are Legion*. A bizarrely brilliant space opera, Hurley's novel takes place in the outer reaches of a fictional star system populated by living "world-ships"—collectively known as the Legion—and their all-female

inhabitants. The accelerating decay of these living vessels/planets has led to perpetual conflict among the surface-dwelling humanoid "rulers" (and their armies) of various planetary clusters. Star-crossed lovers Zan and Jayd aim to put things to rights by obtaining access to a world-ship rumored to possess the power to regenerate itself and other worlds. The crucial problem—and the driving narrative force of the novel—is that Zan has recently been resurrected from the dead with (intentionally) little memory of her previous life/lives. After Jayd is married off to broker peace, Zan finds herself driven to the (living) core of her world-ship and undertakes a perilous journey back to the surface. Along the way she encounters numerous allies and foes among the societies that call the various subterranean levels of the world-ship their home, many of which doubt the very existence of the surface Zan seeks. As she climbs, Zan gradually regains piecemeal memories that indicate this isn't the first time she's encountered the lower levels of the world-ship, causing her to doubt Jayd, their mission, and who she understands herself to be.

Hurley's choice to populate the Legion exclusively with women could easily have backfired spectacularly. Instead of a simplistic utopic vision, however, *The Stars Are Legion* offers a (literally) multilayered apocalyptic landscape that "imaginatively mirrors" the politics of climate change all while retaining its gendered realities despite the total absence of men (Little 2007). For example, all women of the Legion have wombs but each give birth to different sorts of entities (e.g., organic hardware, monstrous creatures, food) that/who are of more or less use to the world-ships and the people and societies who call them home. In addition to framing the womb as a site of technology, the novel encourages readers to contemplate (re)production in a context in which birth is

not the purview of an "inferior" gender. But as Hurley's narrative suggests, on/in worlds where colonial logics produce violent, unsustainable forms of life and death, the politics, ecology, and technologies of birth are no less disturbing. And yet hope remains. Indeed, the novel produces bold feminist futurities that revolve around the nexus of memory, birth, death, and loss. For both Zan and others, memory is dangerous, emotionally devastating, and necessary for building a better world. At the end of her journey Zan narrates, "We are two women standing at the edge of the Legion, our armies dead, our people broken, with a history between us that I no longer want filled in any further. Instead, in my mind I construct a future . . . It's a potential future for us, as real as the potential of the child I sacrificed to get here, as real as the dreams of the people who helped to get me this far" (Hurley 2017, 380). The future can neither dwell in nor forget the past, no matter how much it might want to.

6. Visions of Racialized Environmental Injustice, Resistance, and Liberation

Afrofuturist and climate fiction classics, Octavia Butler's (1993, 1998) *Earthseed* duo—*Parable of the Sower* and *Parable of the Talents*—tell of the life of Lauren Olamina, founder of the Earthseed religion. Having been raised in a gated community turned semi-commune, Lauren is spared from the worst of southern California in the 2020s in the wake of climate, political, and economic destabilization. Born with "hyperempathy," Lauren is able to share the emotions and sensations of others in close proximity, thus making outings beyond the walls of her community into the city extremely unpleasant and often painful. In other stories hyperempathy might be counted as a blessing, but for a young black woman in a dystopic society rife with suffering, Butler is clear to frame it as a liability. As she grows up, Lauren is unsatisfied with her father's Baptist teachings and,

instead, begins to imagine a faith organized around the principle of change and the idea that humans are destined to leave the planet. When outsiders attack and destroy her home, Lauren flees north to begin again, drawing followers with her talk of Earthseed along. The group founds the community of Acorn and lives happily for several years. In the conclusion of the series, however, Acorn is occupied by Christian fundamentalists—emboldened and empowered under a xenophobic zealot in the White House—who separate the children (including Lauren's) from their parents and place them in Christian homes. The residents of Acorn eventually rise up and escape their captors, but Lauren is unable to reunite, if not reconcile, with her daughter until much later. By the end of Lauren's life, Earthseed is flourishing and human settlers are traveling into space.

With Earthseed, Butler highlights both the destructiveness and necessity of change. As she explains in a 1999 interview, "Lauren Olamina says that since change is the one inescapable truth, change is the basic clay of our lives. In order to live constructive lives, we must learn to shape change when we can and yield to it when we must. Either way, we must learn and teach, adapt and grow" (Butler 1993, 336). When Lauren's first community was destroyed she founded another, bringing with her what she valued about the old and discarding the rest. Indeed, the theme of community is perhaps just as important to the Earthseed series and religion as change. These narratives highlight the material, emotional, and spiritual necessity of community, as well as the ways in which oppressive power-structures seek to undermine it. Between her fledgling Earthseed faith and the value she places on building and maintaining community, Lauren quickly learns to be an activist, embodying what it means to be a prophet for apocalyptic times through ideological and tangible ways.

Tan-Tan, the protagonist in Nalo Hopkinson's (2000) *Midnight Robber*, is also a harbinger of change. The novel takes place on the planet of Toussaint, an alien world settled by the survivors of white imperialism and colonialism who left Earth to start anew. This world, however, was not empty upon their arrival, but by the time Tan-Tan is born, all of the remaining Indigenous inhabitants of Toussaint seem to have been relegated to a mirror dimension—New Half-Way Tree. The daughter of a wealthy and powerful man who commits murder and is sentenced to exile, young Tan-Tan finds herself on New Half-Way Tree when her father (illicitly) takes her with him. Upon arrival, Tan-Tan meets the douen Chichibud—a native of the place the humans call New Half-Way Tree—who guides her to a human settlement and, years later, takes a pregnant Tan-Tan to live with his family after she kills her abusive father. In the village, Tan-Tan is trusted to learn and keep the secrets of the douen, who have successfully managed to hide many aspects of their existence from the (unwilling) colonists. But willing or not, most of the humans consider the douens an inferior species and pose an increasing threat to them and their way of life. Suffering from trauma and the foolishness of adolescence, Tan-Tan convinces Chichibud's young daughter, Abitefa, to help her implement vigilante justice throughout the human settlements as the Robber Queen, eventually leading enemies back to douen. As a result, the village is tragically forced to relocate and Tan-Tan and Abitefa are made to live on their own. In the end, the birth of her child (and sibling) forces Tan-Tan to confront her external and internal demons. She rejoins human society but retains the mantle of Robber Queen, working always to build the life that she and all the inhabitants of New Half-Way Tree—douen, human, or otherwise—deserve.

Through *Midnight Robber*, Hopkinson constructs a fascinating context for contemplating the relationships between settler and Indigenous persons and communities, especially those involving unwilling colonizers. When pushed through the dimensional veil, the new human inhabitants of New Half-Way Tree bring with them all sorts of hitchhikers. Some manifest as "invasive" species (e.g., grains, fruits, livestock). Interestingly, however, the douen are not engaged in efforts to eradicate these new lifeforms, even though they can be disruptive. Instead, they work to incorporate them into native ecosystems and develop relationships with them such that they can leverage more power among the humans. Other tag-alongs are not so easy to work with. So pervasive are gendered, raced manifestations of colonial violence that female douens—large birdlike creatures very different in form from the more humanoid males—do not reveal themselves to humans as either members of the same species or capable of speech. Similarly, the douens do not share much of their knowledge of the forest flora and fauna with the humans out of concern for the way these exiles have cultivated extractive relationships with their environs. Only Tan-Tan, who comes to New Half-Way Tree as a small child, questions the corrosive social norms of the penal colony—including the subhuman categorization of the douens—enough to learn from the Indigenous inhabitants and attempt to foster new ways of life among the humans. And through Tan-Tan, Hopkinson provides a critique of the tensions between formerly enslaved persons, communities, and native peoples, as well as a possible roadmap for navigating them moving forward.

In contrast with Atwood's series, N. K. Jemisin's (2015–2017) *Broken Earth* trilogy is a science fiction tour de force that heartbreakingly highlights the intersections

of gendered, racialized, colonial, heteronormative, and environmental violence and injustice through the lens of Afrofuturism. These novels take place in a world of tectonic upheaval literally held (mostly) together by an enslaved class of humans with the ability to work magic on rock and earth. The efforts of these mages or "orogenes," however, is not enough to hold back massive geologic ruptures that the "evil earth" manages to unleash every few hundred years that trigger cataclysmic climate changes or "fifth seasons." As a result, the dominant society has been organized around making oneself and one's community as fit as possible in preparation. The events of the trilogy begin with the deliberate triggering of an unprecedentedly devastating fifth season and a father's murder of his young son, who is discovered to be an orogene. The plot of the trilogy follows the boy's mother, Essun, in search of her daughter, Nassun, who has been abducted by her father in the wake of the murder. Unfolding across a vast supercontinent and various decades and millennia, Essun's and Nassun's stories force readers to confront the repeated world endings experienced by enslaved and marginalized persons, as well as the question of whether those whose worlds have ended repeatedly have any obligation, given the choice, to keep the larger world from burning. This choice is put before several orogenes throughout the novels, ultimately culminating in Nassun's decision to allow the scattered fragments of humanity to remake the world together.

The Fifth Season (Jemisin 2015) opens with the passage, "Let's start with the end of the world, why don't we? Get it over with and move on to more interesting things . . . But this is the way the world ends. This is the way the world ends. This is the way the world ends. For the last time." And even though by the end of the trilogy this passage takes on a great deal of nuance, Jemisin never abandons her critique of frameworks—like

the Anthropocene—that are unable to accommodate the complex temporality, spaciality, and subjectivity of apocalypse. This idea is echoed in Kathryn Yusoff's (2018) work entitled *A Billion Black Anthropocenes or None*, which builds off of Jemisin's narratives and black feminism more generally. These novels situate climate change as one among many sorts of apocalypse to unfold within and from complex assemblages of oppressive power structures. The world has ended just as surely when a young Essun takes the life of her own child rather than see him an enslaved orogene like she was, as it ends years later when the child's father, Alabaster, tears a continent asunder. And so when Essun discovers that the (sentient) Earth is just another parent whose child (the moon) has been ripped away from them, she fights tooth and nail for a solution that will see them both reunited with their offspring for a future in which both can flourish.

7. Visions of (De)colonial Environmental Injustice, Resistance, and Liberation

Indigenous peoples have already endured harmful and rapid environmental transformations due to colonialism and other forms of domination.[3] As Davis and Todd (2017) articulate so clearly, these environmental transformations—"the fleshy violent [losses]"—seem actually a lot like what many other people in the world fear will happen with climate destabilization when these same people portray apocalyptic and dystopian science fiction futures. Whyte cites Lee Sprague, who says that we already inhabit what our ancestors would have understood as a dystopian future (Sprague 2017; Whyte 2017). Larry Gross writes that "Native Americans have seen the end of their respective worlds . . . Indians survived the apocalypse" (2014, 33). Sprague's and Gross's framing of

[3] The majority of text and analysis in this section is adapted from Whyte (2018), including many identical sentences. Whyte is an author of this chapter too. It would have been unnecessary to take pains to avoid repetition between the 2018 article and this chapter given that the section does not constitute the major contribution of this chapter.

today's times come out in Indigenous science fiction expression. In her short story anthology *Walking the Clouds*, Grace Dillon (2012) interprets Indigenous futurisms in literature and the arts as expressing how Indigenous peoples are currently living in a "post-Native Apocalypse" (Dillon 2012, 10). Building on Dillon's research, Conrad Scott's recent study discusses how "Indigenous literature, following the culturally destructive process of colonial European advancement and absorption of what are now called the Americas, tends to narrate a sense of ongoing crisis rather than an upcoming one" (Scott 2016, 77).

Cutcha Risling Baldy describes Indigenous histories and experiences of colonialism as suffering through the television zombie series *The Walking Dead* (Risling Baldy 2014). It is not hard to see why historic and contemporary persons and institutions who participate in settler colonialism are not different from a zombie apocalypse. Like in dystopian science fiction, our ancestors would have seen us living in a situation in which the conditions of our individual and collective agency are almost entirely curtailed. But our ancestors and future generations are rooting for us to find those secret sources of agency that will allow us to empower protagonists that can help us survive the dystopia or post-apocalypse. And there is quite a bit of creativity involved in figuring out who the protagonists will be. The literature on Indigenous science fiction discusses the range of protagonists that Indigenous authors introduce in their narratives, from non-humans to spirits to women to youth (Dillon 2012; Lempert 2014; Monani 2016). Consider the work of Salma Monani in her analysis of Danis Goulet's (2013) science fiction short film *Wakening*.

The sci-fi/horror movie is set in a dystopian time in which a colonizing group, the occupiers, have destroyed the environment and make it illegal for anyone else to possess land. Several protagonists emerge in this dystopia, the first being Weesageechak, a longstanding Cree trickster portrayed as a contemporary warrior woman in the film armed with archery equipment and protective medicine. She enters a theater in which people who once were captivated by the images on the stage or screen are now gone, with the few remaining asking to be saved from death. The initial reason for this dystopia is the violent actions of the other protagonist, Weetigo, a legendary Cree monster, who is portrayed as a forest elk hybrid creature who lives in the theater and is initially seen as the cause of the suffering. Yet Weesageechak, in seeking Weetigo in the theater, says that the occupiers have tricked Weetigo into being so destructive, and that it is the occupiers who are more powerful, Weetigo now being forgotten. Weetigo eventually turns away from ensnaring and killing Weesageechak and kills two occupiers who are about to kill a person. The film ends with both protagonists staring into each other with the noise of the occupiers in the background, as Weetigo disappears and Weesageechak stares into a brighter horizon with a wistful look.

In her interviews with Goulet, Monani (2016) discusses how the struggle of the protagonists arises from Cree storytelling. Goulet sets this story in the dystopian times of the occupiers. In the film, the protagonists are women and non-humans who have to figure out how to relate to each other again to resist the genocide and environmental destruction of the occupiers who are the true force of destruction and injustice. Both protagonists occupy social identities that are disrespected or villainized in Canadian or US settler colonialism, whether owing to gender, Indigeneity, or being nonhuman. The

film emphasizes and honors the positive agencies of Weesageechak and Weetigo. In this sense, Weetigo is not entirely anthropomorphized and acts according to an agency that humans cannot fully comprehend or control but must respect. The film expresses Weesageechak's responsibility to respect and confront Weetigo and Weetigo's responsibility not to be fooled by the occupiers. Of course, the solution to surviving the dystopia lies in the reciprocal responsibility of both protagonists to work together in ways that honor each other. One way of interpreting *Wakening* is as an unfolding narrative of dialogue with ancestors and descendants, where what becomes apparent is the importance of reestablishing a relationship of reciprocal responsibility between the two protagonists, and emphasizing gendered and nonhuman agencies (see also Nelson 2013 for another example of this type of narrative relating to climate change).

In her analysis of Indigenous science fiction, gender, and futurism, Danika Medak-Saltzman (2017) writes, "Indigenous futurist work can and does also explore a variety of dystopian possibilities, which allows for critical contemplation about the dangerous 'what ifs' we might face and, more pragmatically, can aid us in our efforts to imagine our way out of our present dystopic moment to call forth better futures" (143). Medak-Saltzman focuses on how Indigenous science fiction works empower women and non-human protagonists. Looking at Nanobah Becker's (2012) *The 6th World*, a futuristic film about the Navajo Nation working with the Omnicorn Corporation to create a colony on Mars, Saltzman-Medak claims that "it is women who are endowed with the ability to usher forth our collective futures, but it does so in a manner that complicates this notion and delinks it from being understood only through the lens of biological reproduction . . . [expanding] women's roles and value beyond the limits imposed by patriarchy,

colonization, and heteronormativity" (163). The film also brings out the protagonist agency of Navajo traditional corn, which plays multiple roles in the film through its spirituality, place in Navajo cultural heritage, association with sound scientific knowledge, and motivational value for imagining better futures (Medak-Saltzman 2017). Thus, *The 6th World* follows a long tradition of Indigenous science fiction that "promotes deeper understandings of biodiversity, cultural diversity, and refugia" (Adamson 2016, 219).

The short stories contained in *Love Beyond Body, Space, and Time: An LGBT and Two-Spirit Sci-Fi Anthology* (Nicholson 2016) further both these ends and more. Contributor Grace Dillon (2016) understands this anthology to be about "persistence, adaptation, and flourishing in the future, in sometimes subtle but always important contrast to mere survival" (9). These are what Gerald Vizenor (2008) calls native survivance stories. He explains:

> The native stories of survivance create active presence, more than the instincts of survival, function, or subsistence. Native stories are the sources of survivance, the comprehension and empathies of natural reason, tragic wisdom, and the provenance of new literary studies. Native stories of survivance are prompted by natural reason, by a consciousness and sense of incontestable presence that arises from experience in the natural world, by the turn of seasons, by sudden storms, by migrations of cranes, by the ventures of tender lady's slippers, by change of moths overnight, by unruly mosquitoes, and by the favor of spirits in the water, rimy sumac, wild rice, thunder in the ice, bear, beaver, and faces in the stone. (11)

That survivance is curated here through two-spirit love stories makes their science fiction futurities that much more powerful.

8. Conclusion

Science fiction narratives such as those explored here are innovatively philosophical in their engagement with technologies as systems. Their imaginative mirroring of climate

change—and other drivers of the so-called Anthropocene—in particular represent (re)descriptive analyses of technological systems. Moreover, the articulation of these technological systems is laden with careful visions of the future. Whereas the futurism of the philosophy of technology has focused on perceptions of risk or concerns about perils on the horizon, the literatures we have described offer diverse philosophical formulations of futures and the roles of/for technology therein. The futurities generated by these narratives accept the weight of past/present endings without being defined by them. Cultivating nonlinear and pluralistic temporalities, visionary science fiction frames technological systems holistically and contextually. In these worlds, the relationship between technologies and climate change (analogs) refuses reductive descriptions such as genesis and savior.

Visionary narratives such as these also have much to offer the philosophy of technology insofar as they are helpful for moving the literature beyond the Anthropocene discourse and colonial logics. "In a perilously warming world," Kate Rigby (2015, 2) writes, "the kinds of stories that we tell about ourselves and our relations with one another, as well as with nonhuman others and our volatile environment, will shape how we prepare for, respond to, and recover from increasingly frequent and, for the communities affected, frequently unfamiliar forms of eco-catastrophe." Toward these ends, (post)apocalyptic Indigenous, Afrofuturist, and/or feminist science fiction narratives are invaluable for their ability to frame environmental injustice intersectionally and (re)imagine just worlds. They do so by carefully attending to the intersections of gender, race, class, sexuality, etc. and the politics and technologies that produce and are produced by them (Otto 2012; Gaard 2014; Anson 2017). In addition to centering

positionalities and identities too rarely encountered in mainstream science fiction, such stories work skillfully to thoroughly contextualize these "atypical" characters and their narrative perspectives. Even when the (post)apocalyptic conditions these characters experience do not mirror climate change explicitly or even metaphorically, their worlds and stories can be helpful so long as the anthropogenic causal mechanism and injustice of these breaking points remain central (Schatz 2012; Rigby 2015; Anson 2017). Regardless of the precise mechanism(s), the results are the same. If the characters and communities in these worlds cannot go backward, they must go forward.

Rather than looming on the horizon, here apocalypse occupies the present and, especially for post-apocalyptic worlds, the past. As "a moment of grave danger that also harbors liberating potentials," apocalypse is not The End but an ending, which, although tragic, offers the possibility of positive radical transformation (Dillon 2014; Rigby 2015). That the end of the world is already well under way only enhances these stories' moral/political applicability, for they imaginatively mirror how, for many peoples, environmental dystopia–apocalypse is hardly a new phenomenon (Whyte 2017). It is not only the temporal orientation of these worlds, but also whose futures are envisioned that set them apart. Indigenous, Afrofuturist, and feminist visionary narratives intentionally (re)center those on the receiving end of climate change and intersecting injustices. Rather than envisioning how those most responsible might redeem themselves or survive, these narratives refuse to reassure the privileged that their futures are secure. Quite the opposite, the stories—at their most radical and hopeful—reveal how privileged futurities must "give way" in both the stories themselves and the world beyond the page or screen (Vizenor 2008; Tuck and Yang 2012). The primary narrative arc, however, does not

typically revolve around competing or incommensurable futurities but around conflicts internal to (re)imagining oppressed and marginalized futurities (Vizenor 2008; Dillon 2012). Instead, here we have characters and communities navigating the temporally, ecologically, and politically fraught (post)apocalyptic landscape by moving forward on their own terms (Vizenor 2008).

Thus, visionary science fiction works to (re)describe the present and past, as well as to (re)imagine the future. By engaging with visionary fiction, the philosophy of technology can refocus its efforts from pulling "us" back from the brink to initiating transformative climate justice moving forward. Both these strategies are necessary for departing from Anthropocene discourse so as to better align philosophy of technology with anti-colonial, anti-racist, and feminist approaches to justice. Although surely there are many reasons that the stories we tell about climate change matter, their ability to resist, undermine, and propose alternatives to master narratives of technology associated with the Anthropocene must be counted among them.

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SETTLER COLONIAL STUDIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2020.1794211

The Deatnu Agreement: a contemporary wall of settler colonialism

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ABSTRACT
The Deatnu River, located in Northern Scandinavia in the heart of Sápmi, is often regarded as one of the finest salmon rivers in Europe. In the 1751 Strömstad Peace Accord, the Deatnu river was made into an international boundary, becoming one of the oldest political borders in Europe. Since 1873, salmon fishing in the Deatnu River has been regulated by bilateral agreements negotiated between Norway and Finland. The most recent agreement was reached in 2017, in spite of a very strong, uniform opposition of the local population, Sámi and non–Sámi alike. This article considers the nature, effects and objectives of the 2017 Deatnu Agreement in the context of an international boundary. I suggest that the 2017 Deatnu Agreement is a figurative wall erected by the states of Norway and Finland in the context of the post–Westphalian order. The 'post–Westphalian order' is characterized by the erection of walls to define nation–state boundaries. Drawing on Elizabeth Strakosch' analysis of policy as a key strategy of settle colonialism and Lorenzo Veracini's concept of transfer, the article considers how this figurative wall is intended to target the Sámi people and how it is an emblem of Nordic settler colonialism.

KEYWORDS
Indigenous-settler relations; Sami people; Nordic settler colonialism; Scandinavia borders

The Deatnu River, located in Northern Scandinavia in the heart of Sápmi,[1] is often regarded as one of the best, and last wild Atlantic salmon rivers in Europe. The Sámi have been living and fishing for salmon along the nearly 300-kilometer long Deatnu for thousands of years, building deep knowledge of and connection with the river and its fisheries, as well as developing specific fishing methods, gear and practices of salmon stewardship and governance. For Sámi, the river is also a strong bond and unifying force that ties families and genealogies together and to the place, and to the river itself. Yet for the past 250 years, Deatnu has also served as an increasingly dividing element as an international boundary.

Deatnu has long been a popular and well-known river for recreational fishing, which began in the 1850s when English anglers – members of the British nobility and upper classes – arrived and introduced the now common fly fishing methods to the river.[2] The 'tourist fishing', as it is locally called, increased rapidly after the road was built on the Finnish side of the Deatnu valley in 1957 and has skyrocketed since – so much so that

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there is a common local Sámi saying according to which the river is black with tourists.[3] While local businesses (many of them Sámi-owned) benefit from and in many cases, depend on the 'tourist season' on the Deatnu, many feel aversion to the reality of 'their' river has been taken over by fishermen from southern Finland and Norway.

Since 1873, salmon fishing in the Deatnu River has been regulated by bilateral agreements negotiated between Norway and Finland. For the local Sámi, the agreements have signified a gradual external control of fishing rights and erosion of traditional harvesting. For example, the first agreement in 1873 marked the prohibition of the fishing practices of goldin, duhásteapmi and rastábuođđu.[4] These bans, however, were ignored to a degree for several decades, demonstrating the dominance and perseverance of Sámi law and norms in the region at least up until the mid-twentieth century.[5] Each Deatnu agreement has introduced new restrictions on fishing gear, methods and the length of the fishing season.[6] The most recent fisheries agreement was reached in 2017, in spite of a strong opposition to and almost universal disavowal by the local population, Sámi and non-Sámi alike.[7]

This article examines the Deatnu Agreement regime as a case of Nordic settler colonialism, with a specific focus on the most recent accord endorsed in 2017. Taking cue from political theorist Wendy Brown's work of walls and sovereignty,[8] it argues that the agreement erects a new wall (in addition to the existing boundary) as an effort to reinforce state borders in response to global post-Westphalian insecurities. The article begins by providing an overview of the history of the border and Sámi governance in the Deatnu region, followed by an outline of the 2017 Deatnu Agreement. It suggests that rather than a disinterest conservation strategy, the Deatnu Agreements represent a policy framework employed as a tool of settler colonial domestication.[9] In order for settler colonialism to gain access to lands and resources, it needs to eliminate Indigenous peoples from those lands. The elimination takes many forms, involving a number of strategies that Lorenzo Veracini calls transfers.[10] In the final section of the article, two forms of transfers pertinent to the most recent Deatnu Agreement are examined. The ultimate goal of this article is to convey that forming a continuum from 1873 to present, the Deatnu Agreement regime is an emblem of settler colonialism in its different iterations.

The border and the river

Borders, as scholars have pointed out, are 'complex social institutions' characterized by multiple tensions, ambivalence of power and its contestations. Borders divide and connect.[11] Rivers frequently serve as 'natural' borders and they are seen as having 'either a strongly unifying or a dividing element in human environmental relations'.[12] In the 1751 Strömstad Peace Accord between Denmark and Sweden, the Deatnu river was made into an international boundary, becoming one of the oldest existing political borders in Europe.[13] The effects of the border, however, were not strongly perceived for a long time. An addendum to the Peace Accord called the Lapp Codicil granted free passage across the border for reindeer herding Sámi and their herds migrating between winter and summer pastures.[14] The Codicil also established a system of local Sámi courts as a community dispute resolution mechanism and along the Deatnu, the authority to approve collective fisheries.[15]

Traditionally, Sápmi was organized into dozens of siidas, the Sámi social and political organization comprising of a small number of extended families and their territories. Hunting and fishing took place both collectively and within the family units, depending on the method and season. The Deatnu valley was governed by three siidas, Ávjovárri, Deatnu and Ohcejohka, which in the seventeenth century banned non-siida members (Sámi and non-Sámi) fishing in the river. The imposition of state borders in Sápmi did not eliminate these established practices and regimes.[16] As part of the siida governing structure, the Sámi Court approved the collective salmon fisheries in the Upper Deatnu Vuovdaguoika region up until the mid-nineteenth century. Some of the fisheries was a major collective undertaking in which participants came from several villages and in which the river was closed with nets for a certain period.[17]

On the Finnish side of the Deatnu, the Sámi lived in isolation from the rest of Finland until after the Second World War. After the return from their evacuation to central Finland, Sámi in the region restarted their lives mainly with the help of their links with Norway.[18] Unlike in many other places, there was no lack of food along the Deatnu, because it was available in nearby towns on the Norwegian side. People also relied on the health services available in those towns. A Norwegian hospital operated in the Vuovdaguoika school on the Finnish side of the river for some years, admitting patients from the region regardless the border. Only after the construction of roads after the World War II and growing post-war geopolitical tensions,[19] the two states established a more permanent presence in the region and the border was patrolled more closely. The first Finnish border post was established in the region in 1945; after that, formal connections with the other side of the Deatnu gradually weakened.[20] People were required to settle down more permanently on one side of the river, which also determined their citizenship.

The Deatnu Agreement

The bilateral framework agreement negotiated between the governments of Norway and Finland has governed the fisheries in the Deatnu river since 1873. The most recent negotiations between Norway and Finland commenced in 2012 to heed some fisheries scientists' warnings of declining salmon stocks and to address the fishing rights of non-local property owners in Finland.[21]

Negotiations culminated in a new Deatnu Agreement in Spring 2017 which replaced the previous agreement from 1989. According to the governments of Finland and Norway, the agreement provides a framework for regulating sustainable fishing for salmon stocks in the Deatnu River basin and the means to restore them to levels that meet spawning stock targets. The management and regulation of salmon stocks are based on the recommendations of the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO) and the application of the precautionary principle, which makes them compatible with the objectives of the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy.[22]

Consisting of six chapters, the agreement stipulates the purpose and scope of the agreement; regulation and logistics of the fisheries; monitoring, research, reporting and catch statistics, and conservation of fish stocks. The objective of the agreement is to promote the ecologically, economically and socially sustainable use of the fish stocks and management based on the best available information, including traditional knowledge.[23] In addition, the agreement comprises of fishing regulations consisting provisions

on, inter alia, fishing permits and quotas, authorized gear, fishing seasons, closed days, closed areas, technical characteristics of fishing gear, registration of boats and pre-agreed measures to reduce fishing for salmon. There is no reference to Sámi fishing rights in the agreement although the importance of traditional fishing methods is mentioned.

The fishing regulations contain a complex (and confusing for many) array of fishing permit categories which differ considerably between Norway and Finland. There are two main categories of fishers; those who are entitled to fish on the basis of their rights and those who fish with license. The rights in the first category derive from land ownership along the river. These are mostly Sámi individuals whose families have been living along Deatnu for several generations, who have developed a unique fishing culture and for whom salmon has been one of the main sources of livelihood. There is, however, a growing number of non-local property owners who have purchased a parcel of land (with or without a holiday cabin) with fishing rights.[24]

On the Finnish side of Deatnu, fishing rights attached to property go back to the land reform process that took place between 1932 and 1962 in which households and farmsteads were allotted individual parcels of land. Since fishing was the main source of income along the Deatnu river, households were allotted also certain areas of the river with fishing rights. A related process focusing on water areas between 1975 and 1982 continued the distribution of fishing rights on the Deatnu after which roughly two thirds of the waters ended up in private ownership and the rest was considered as belonging to the Finnish state. Collective siida rights to fisheries were neither addressed nor resolved in either of these processes. Households with fishing rights constituted the fisheries cooperatives. This rights framework is overlaid by the Deatnu agreement that takes precedence over individual fishing rights and the fisheries cooperatives.[25]

On the Norwegian side of Deatnu, the right holders, called 'salmon letter holders', are those residing less than 2 kilometers away from the river and annually harvest minimum 2000 kilograms of hay. Part of Norway's colonial policy to assimilate the Sámi passed in 1888, these rights were conferred to those Sámi who settle and became farmers along Deatnu. The purpose of the policy was to encourage agriculture in Sápmi, and it recompensed Sámi who produced enough hay for one cow per year (2000 kg) 'with right to fish with nets and for commercial purposes'.[26] Other locals are eligible to purchase a seasonal permit for rod fishing. The salmon letter holders are also entitled to fish with nets. The third category in Norway is non-permanent residents.[27] Even though Norwegian legislation recognizes traditional Sámi fishing rights in Deatnu, the water ownership remains unaddressed.[28]

The agreement seeks to restore the salmon stocks to a 'sustainable level' by decreasing fishing by 30%.[29] The impact of the restrictions, however, are not equally distributed. Whereas tourist fishery was restrained by 40%, traditional Sámi fishing methods and fishing rights were cut by 80%. Most drastically, the agreement eliminated traditional fishing rights of those Sámi who no longer permanently live in the Deatnu valley, further eroding their connection to their community and culture.[30] Excluding this group from customary Sámi fisheries has far-reaching negative effects to Deatnu Sámi fishing culture. Restrictions have detrimental consequences to Sámi traditional knowledge and the intergenerational transfer of this knowledge, including the loss of specific Sámi terminology related to salmon fisheries. On the other hand, the agreement created a new

category on the Finnish side of the river; non-local property owners whose rights were strengthened and augmented.[31] The inconsistency between the stated conservation goals and creation of new category of rights holders whose fishing rights were expanded was not missed at the local level.[32] What has further raised the ire of local Sámi is the practice of non-local cabin owners to lease their fishing rights to other anglers, which the Deatnu Fisheries Management Board has requested a Parliamentary Committee in Norway to scrutinize as a violation of the 2017 Deatnu Agreement.[33]

Nordic settler colonialism

In his detailed treatise of settler colonialism, Lorenzo Veracini shows that colonialism and settler colonialism are two distinct forms although they frequently coexist interact with one another.[34] Colonialism typically refers to a relation of external domination by a minority over a native majority population. It is premised on the persistent reproduction of mutually exclusive hierarchies in which the dominant group maintains its superiority.[35] Classical colonialism has also been defined as the exploitation of resources and people in the established colonies, whereas the goal of settler colonialism is about land and access to territory.[36]

In the settler colonial situation, the dominant group has become native by settling and unilaterally imposing its sovereignty over another jurisdiction. Obtaining the land for the purposes of establishing a new society invariably requires getting rid of the Indigenous peoples and their societies through various means. In settler colonialism, Indigenous people 'progressively disappear in a variety of ways: extermination, expulsion, incarceration containment, and assimilation for indigenous peoples (or a combination of all these elements)'.[37] If colonialism is about exploitation, settler colonialism is a structure of replacement informed by the logic of elimination targeting Indigenous people.[38]

As a structure of replacement, settler colonialism applies to the Nordic context, past and present. Traditionally, Sápmi was divided into siidas, local Sámi governance and social institutions with carefully demarcated territories. Within siidas, lands and waters were separated into family or individually owned territories. Within the kingdom of Sweden (i.e. northern parts of present-day Finland and Sweden), the Sámi land ownership was universally recognized and upheld by Swedish authorities and courts up until the late eighteenth century. Sámi livelihoods of fishing, hunting and reindeer herding (in historical legal documents, the so-called Lapp livelihoods) were the only legal forms of land use in Sápmi. North of the so-called 'agricultural border' farming or establishment of farms was not allowed until the royal decrees in 1673 and 1695, which opened up the possibility of farming and cattle breeding above the agricultural border. The decrees stipulated very clearly, however, that settling or farming was not allowed to take place on Sámi-owned territories and that settler livelihoods were not to disturb the Lapp livelihoods.[39]

Settlement in the Sámi territory within the kingdom of Sweden initially sought to protect Sámi rights and livelihoods. The 1749 decree continued to emphasize the separation of Sámi and settler livelihoods. Growing settlement resulted in the gradual development of a two-tier property regime. Those practicing the so-called Lapp livelihoods belonged to the traditional Sámi siidas, and the settler farms established a new village system.[40] Gradually, growing state interests in both land and resources in Sápmi led to actively targeting siida governance structures and land ownership through administrative and legislative measures.

In 1809, Finland became the Grand Duchy of the Russian empire which implied the delineation of the international boundary between Finland and Sweden (with a final closure in 1889), splitting siida territories up and giving rise to numerous new policy and legislative changes. Disagreements between the colonial powers over privileges and access to resources led to the firm closure of the already existing border between Finland and Norway in 1852, part of which trespasses the Deatnu river. The reorganization of colonial borders had drastic consequences for the siida system and reindeer herding.[41] Combined with new administrative arrangements such as the establishment of the municipal and regional governments in late 1800s, it resulted in the demise of Sámi social and political organization.[42] When Norway and Finland obtained independence (1904 and 1917 respectively), the international border along the Deatnu was cemented in a range of legislation and political agreements between the two states and 'gradually dividing the Sámi into "Finnish", "Russian" and "Norwegian" citizens'.[43]

The Nordic countries have garnered an international reputation as progressive nation-states actively promoting gender equality, social welfare, minority affairs or Indigenous rights. They are not typically considered settler colonial states – in fact, there are historians who maintain neither colonialism nor assimilation has taken place in the Sámi territory.[44] Some suggest there is a difference between colonial subjugation and national integration policies,[45] disregarding political theory analyses according to which national integration has been a key assimilation strategy of colonial states world over.[46] Others reduce critical analyses of colonialism in Sápmi into 'extremely militant' views and 'moral indignation' rather than 'scientific research'. They further argue that scientifically, the concepts of settlers and Sámi are incompatible because 'the former refers to occupation, the latter to ethnicity';[47] an argument that attests to a misreading of the concept of the settler, as established in the field of settler colonial studies.

Some scholars view colonialism through the narrow prism of agriculture and argue that colonialism exists only when an Indigenous population is forced to make space for non-Indigenous settlers and farmsteads. There was no colonialism in Sápmi, their argument goes, because Sámi also settled and became small-scale farmers.[48] For many Sámi, however, settling as a farmer was the only way of securing some rights to their lands and waters, even if this came at the cost of losing other rights and privileges.[49] According to Patrick Wolfe, denying colonialism because Indigenous people became farmers relies on a settler colonial discourse viewing Indigenous peoples by definition as non-agricultural. For him, 'settler-colonial discourse is resolutely impervious to glaring inconsistencies such as sedentary natives'.[50]

Others still suggest that if there was colonialism, it was internal to Sámi society, whereby wealthier reindeer herding Sámi colonized their less prosperous neighbors when migrating to new pastures with their herds. These accounts omit the history of border closures and other (settler) colonial impulses such as state driven or sanctioned mining, forestry and hydro development, which have not recognized Sámi land rights and thus forced reindeer herding Sámi to relocate from their territories. These colonial processes made practicing the traditional livelihoods of hunting and fishing increasingly difficult, thus leading to many Sámi to settle as farmers.[51]

Throughout history, settler states have sought to restructure and incorporate Indigenous polities while removing all bona fide power and authority from them. Sometimes this has occurred through explicit physical violence and genocide, sometimes through less

obvious structural coercion.[52] I suggest that the gradual administrative and political consolidation of state control and authority over several centuries and the concomitant erasure of the Sámi social, political and legal order structured as the siida system is a case of settler colonial domestication and destruction of an Indigenous society in order to replace it by its own. The Deatnu Agreement regime has played a significant role in this domestication in the Deatnu region. The remainder of the article considers the Deatnu Agreement as an institution of settler colonialism.

Conservation and harvest management regimes as settler colonial

Disputes pitting environmental regulators against local resource users are common and frequently provoke resistance from certain local user groups. Throughout the world, the enactment of conservation regulations on wildlife has generated political disputes: 'peasants versus wealthy landowners, local "squatters" versus elite sport hunters, indigenous people versus colonial authorities, and rural wildlife harvesters versus urban naturalists and wildlife enthusiasts'.[53] It might be tempting to label the opposition to the 2017 Deatnu Agreement as an ordinary conflict about environmental policy, conservation and harvest management. To suggest that the bilateral Deatnu Agreement is simply a reflection of conservation targets put into place by NASCO, established in 1983 to protect Atlantic salmon, however, is misleading for a number of reasons. Conservation goals and policy-making do not exist in a vacuum outside political contexts and ideas. Whether implicit or explicit, they are informed by and display broader social, cultural and ideological influences prevailing in society. From the global south to the global north, conservation bureaucrats have, for centuries, adopted and championed colonial doctrines and ideas to advance state control of lands (ecosystem/habitat conservation, establishment of parks), and wildlife (protection of species) used by other peoples. In essence, conservation policies and officials have long sought to save the ecosystems and wildlife from the very people to whom they belong and who have harvested and managed them for generations.[54]

Locally, many people were critical of the science motivating the agreement. Dr. Eero Niemelä, scientist with a long career studying salmon in the Deatnu, questioned the validity of scientific evidence regarding declining salmon stocks. In his view, of the 35 salmon species in Deatnu most are doing well. Criticizing the failure to consider the complexity and variety of factors contributing to the apparent decline and the negotiators' rush to finalize the agreement, Niemelä suggested the agreement should rather have emerged out of genuine collaboration with local Sámi fishers and fisheries organizations.[55] Former member of the Sámi Parliament in Finland Pentti Pieski, from the Deatnu river, asserted that the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had not deployed the most recent fisheries research on Deatnu salmon in the negotiations. According to him, the publication of a study by the Natural Resources Institute in Finland showing the levels of salmon smolt as good in Deatnu in 2014–2015, was for some reason delayed.[56] The agreement has also been criticized for not adequately considering a range of factors impacting the salmon stocks in Deatnu, such as seals and other predators eating salmon in the sea, waterbirds consuming smolts, climate change raising the average temperatures of the river, and the growing number of salmon farms in the Norwegian sea.[57]

Conservation policies and regimes are constituted through and deeply predicated on colonialism and its ideologies.[58] The driving force of the conservation regime has long been based on assumption that both Indigenous people and the wildlife they harvest need 'the rational guidance of state wildlife managers in order to have any chance of survival'.[59] Such denigration of Indigenous peoples' harvesting and stewardship practices serves 'an important legitimating function' for authorities and conservation officials and justifies the assertion of state control over people and their ecosystems.[60] Imposed state control in turn compromises the ability of Indigenous communities to engage in their livelihoods and to maintain their communities, cultures and traditional territories.[61]

For the governments of Norway and Finland, scientists and conservation agencies (NASCO, the Norwegian Scientific Advisory Committee for Atlantic Salmon and many others), the Deatnu Agreement and its fishing regulations is an application of the necessary safeguards to protect the biological diversity of the salmon.[62] Since its inception in late nineteenth century, the Deatnu Agreement regime has undermined Sámi people's capacity to practice their way of life and subsistence. The Deatnu fishery remains a central part of mixed economy and identity for many people. For this reason, there are very few Sámi who oppose salmon conservation and stewardship initiatives and some engage in them voluntarily.[63] The current agreement is opposed on the grounds of it disproportionately targeting the rights of local Sámi to their customary fisheries, considered an integral part of their culture and thus is constitutionally protected, while creating new rights to non-Sámi, non-local property owners. State conservation goals are not questioned although the science behind them has been criticized and the one-sided course of action to achieve the goals disputed. Rather than conservation, the conflict involves the marginalization of the Sámi from the drafting of the agreement and the inequitable measures that disproportionately penalize Sámi who engage in their customary way of life. The agreement is a classic case of paternalistic government policy seeking to protect wildlife and ecosystems from local users, but also of settler colonialism in the name of conservation. I further suggest that the Deatnu Agreement regime represents an enactment of state sovereignty upon Sámi, their ecosystems and key resources.

The structures and strategies of contemporary settler colonialism on the Deatnu River

Government fisheries management regimes frequently undermine contemporary efforts of Indigenous autonomy and self-determination.[64] The Deatnu Agreement has functioned as a mechanism for appropriating the river and also erasing Sámi autonomy and self-determination.[65] The erosion of Indigenous self-determination is not an unfortunate consequence of disinterested policy-making. Policy, Elizabeth Strakosch points out, is a way of asserting settler jurisdiction and sovereignty. It is one of the many strategies of settler colonialism equal to legal decisions and treaty making. For Strakosch, state sovereignty is not something that is to be acquired before policy-making can take place but rather, policy is a way of imposing and asserting sovereignty. If sovereignty is a practice of political domestication, policy embodies 'one of the most critical sites and performances of this domestication'.[66]

Strakosch's focus is on Australia where policy has been a central strategy of colonization instead of legal approaches such as treaties like in other Anglophone settler states. This is

also the case with the Nordic countries where there are no treaties between states and the Sámi. When a group is framed as a target of state policy, Strakosch suggests, it is considered already within state jurisdiction, and 'acting upon Indigenous groups as subjects of policy denies and attempts to erase their sovereignty'.[67] When an Indigenous people is conceived as a subject of policy by a settler authority, the political independence of this people is declared extinct. These acts, Strakosch emphasizes, do 'not make these assertions true, but concrete policy actions may seek to make them truer than they were before'.[68]

Fisheries management systems embody and express state claims for sovereignty. Strakosch' analysis corresponds to circumstances pertaining to the Deatnu Agreement regime that typifies a continuum of policy-making and domestication by settler authorities. The first Deatnu Agreement in 1873 was a strategy of imposing state sovereignty upon Sámi self-determination, previously recognized in documents such as the Lapp Codicil. In order for the imposition to be successful, however, it was preceded by the deliberate disruption of Sámi social, cultural and political structures including the undermining of the siida sovereignty, discussed above. The agreements adopted since have been a means of affirming state sovereignty in the region and erasing the remaining Sámi practices of governance and stewardship of the river and its fisheries. Through the Deatnu Agreements, Sámi have been domesticated, made into objects of settler policy and control and consequently, their sovereignty denied.

National legislation in Finland and Norway as well as international agreements, including the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), require state authorities to adequately and meaningfully consult the Sámi people in matters involving them. In Finland, there is also a so-called 'deterioration ban' requiring authorities to ensure that the material foundation of Sámi culture is safeguarded in all land and resource use activities in the Sámi region and that the conditions to practice Sámi culture must not be undermined. The two main means to comply with the deterioration ban include meaningful, substantial consultations and impact assessment processes.[69] Similarly, Norway has recognized that the conception of Sámi culture necessarily includes the material basis it depends on.[70] Former Chief of Justice of the Supreme Court of Norway Carsten Smith has pointed out that considering how fishing is a traditional Sámi occupation and important part of Sámi culture, the government is obligated to safeguard Sámi fisheries (with positive discrimination if necessary) and ensure it is not threatened by fisheries regulations or eliminated as a corollary of other measures.[71]

Nationally and internationally stipulated protections of Sámi culture were overlooked in negotiating the 2017 Deatnu Agreement. Intended to provide a balanced process and outcome, the eight-member negotiation teams comprised of equal numbers of state and Sámi representatives.[72] The negotiation process was, however, characterized by a number of irregularities and oversight of established norms and legislation. Sámi representatives involved in negotiations contend they were frequently either barred from or not informed about the meetings where government officials discussed and drafted the agreement.[73] The local representatives submitted a dissenting opinion to the proposed agreement in 2016 which asserts that Sámi members did not have a bona fide opportunity to negotiate with the state representatives and that the proposed agreement violates the constitutional rights of the Sámi along the river. The dissenting opinion emphasizes that considering how Sámi fishing tradition in Deatnu and related rights are a major aspect of

the Sámi culture in the region, they enjoy the protection of Finnish constitution and several international human rights instruments and ought to have a central position in the agreement. The letter further claims that the drafts of the agreement were not discussed at the plenaries and Sámi representatives were not provided with the minutes of meetings held without them. Instead, they received a copy of the final draft of the agreement via email a day before the final meeting.[74]

The Sámi Parliament in Finland was consulted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the main party in the negotiations, only after concluding the negotiations.[75] Consequently, the Minister was requested by two Expert Members of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues to provide details about the consultation process for obtaining the Sámi people's 'free, prior and informed consent [FPIC] consistent with the established international norms'.[76] In its response, the government of Finland replied FPIC implies that the Sámi, as an Indigenous people, 'are entitled to make demands concerning the procedures'.[77] This is in stark contrast with the common interpretation of FPIC in international law according to which at the minimum, states are obligated to meaningfully consult with Indigenous peoples on all matters affecting them.

The Sámi Parliaments of Norway and Finland appealed to their respective national governments for failing to adequately consult the affected Sámi and their representative bodies.[78] In Finland, the Deputy Chancellor of Justice concluded that the parliamentary process leading to the new Deatnu Agreement was unconstitutional due to the inadequate consultation of the Sámi, and according to the Constitutional Affairs Committee, the agreement fell short on securing Sámi rights.[79] Notwithstanding the disproving views of major judiciary bodies in Finland, lawmakers dismissed the calls to reconsider the agreement.[80] Referring to the inadequate Sámi participation in the negotiations, the local municipalities, fisheries cooperatives, two Sámi Parliaments and Deatnu Fisheries Management Board[81] requested three UN high-level officials for help to abandon the Agreement before it was approved by the national parliaments.[82]

In addition to the two Sámi Parliaments, the agreement was widely opposed by the local municipalities, fisheries cooperatives, local business owners (including tourist operators) and traditional rights holders and other local individuals. During the negotiations, they lobbied extensively various state officials and agencies, pointing out the number of unconstitutional paragraphs in the agreement, contravening local Sámi property rights, Sámi cultural rights, non-discrimination, and state obligations for cultural heritage and the environment.[83] A group of mostly young Sámi set up a protest camp called Čearretsullo moratorium on an island in the Deatnu River near the town of Ohcejohka (Utsjoki). They declared autonomy on the island and the waters surrounding it, governed instead by customary Sámi law. They further announced a moratorium on tourist fishing. According to the moratorium, fishing around the island was allowed only with permission of local Sámi rightsholders.[84] For many, the new agreement threatens the survival of Sámi identity, way of life, language and culture in the Deatnu Valley, which are seen as inextricable from the river.[85] They suggest that the ongoing erosion of a unique fishing culture with its own traditional knowledge and skills will intensify as the younger generation are deprived of a range of skills and knowledge related to various traditional fishing practices, including weir, gill net, seine and drift net.[86] In the words of the Upper Deatnu Fisheries cooperative in its letter to the Parliament of Finland: 'The agreement robs Sámi of their rights and kills Sámi culture'.[87]

The most recent Deatnu Agreement is distinctive from previous agreements in that it overtly conflicts with the states' constitutional obligations, national legislation, and international human right protections adopted by Finland and Norway. I contend that as such, the agreement constitutes an erection of a wall, signifying the decline of state sovereignty in Sápmi. Political theorist Wendy Brown suggests that the proliferation of walls and other barriers in the contemporary post-Westphalian political order is a symptom of the crisis and transformation of state sovereignty. In the post-Westphalian world, state sovereignty has been challenged globally by numerous transnational relations and weakened by the global capital. Consequently, nation-states are no longer the only political actors or proprietors of sovereignty. States whose borders are becoming more unstable and permeable due to Westphalian conditions will take steps to bolster their borders against transnational actors such as Indigenous peoples. The erosion of state sovereignty, however, does not imply that sovereignty of the nation-state has been rendered insignificant. 'Post' does not signify an end, explains Brown, but 'a temporal after'. Nonetheless, the gradual separation of sovereignty and states characterizing the post-Westphalian order creates anxieties manifested in a wall-building frenzy. The new walls perform sovereignty that the nation-states in reality do not exercise or possess.[88]

Although the 2017 Deatnu Agreement is not a physical wall, I argue that it is a powerful figurative wall with very tangible, lived consequences in the local context where it exists. The anxiety felt by the Nordic states – in the case of the Deatnu Agreement, the governments of Norway and Finland – is created by the transnational movement for Indigenous rights that has gained momentum since the adoption of the UNDRIP in 2007 by the UN General Assembly, and the growing global significance and influence of Indigenous self-determination (including FPIC) as a key norm in international law. In the post-UNDRIP era of Indigenous rights globally gaining strength and political and legislative leverage, the Nordic countries increasingly feel that their previously steadfast sovereignty claims in Sápmi are no longer fully legitimate.[89] This uncertainty drives the 2017 Deatnu Agreement to inordinately curb Sámi customary rights, and thus their culture, in comparison to the rights of the non-Sámi. As a figurative wall, the agreement compensates for the waning of the (ostensible) nation-state sovereignty in the region, with real-life negative effects for local Sámi. In the words of the chair of Vuovdaguoika fisheries cooperative, 'soon all the Sámi will be on the banks of the river' – implying that with passing of the agreement, local Sámi will no longer be able to go on the river.[90]

If access to territory is the primary motive of settler colonialism, preventing access to that territory from the Indigenous others is co-constitutive of that objective. This does not necessarily involve physical removal, as Veracini demonstrates in his analysis of a range of settler colonial strategies of replacement and dispossession. He calls these strategies 'transfers', some of which overlap and are concurrent while others are mutually exclusive. Two types of transfers are most prominently at play in the 2017 Deatnu Agreement: transfer by coerced lifestyle change, which takes place when 'Indigenous way of life and social and political organization' are uprooted and obliterated, and administrative transfer, occurring 'when the administrative borders of the settler polity are redrawn and indigenous people lose entitlements they had retained in the context of previous arrangements'.[91] These two transfers seek to prevent local Sámi accessing their river and the concomitant system of knowledge, skills and culture.

Transfer by coerced lifestyle (or livelihood) change on the Deatnu eliminates Sámi fisheries and fishing way of life. To illustrate, days before the final approval of the Deatnu Agreement, Aslak Holmberg, a young Sámi man who grew up fishing with his father in the Deatnu, pleaded in social media for international support in a filmed statement:

> Our way of life as Indigenous Sámi salmon fishers is being criminalised. … It feels like [the governments of Norway and Finland] are killing us … not by guns but slowly and silently. They're claiming that we don't have any knowledge of the river or the salmon in it. They say they're protecting the salmon from us.[92]

To protect the salmon from local Sámi and to deny them of having knowledge of salmon or the river amounts to erecting a metaphorical wall that, with time, becomes a material reality – a literal wall – in consequence to having no opportunities to employ or transfer knowledge and skills pertaining to not only customary fisheries but also related activities such as boat making and net repairing.

While the Tana Research Group (TRG), the scientific advisory group for governments of Norway and Finland, denies ignoring Sámi traditional knowledge of Deatnu fisheries, this knowledge is framed as a relativistic and descriptive belief system. According to the TRG, only 'natural sciences are concerned with finding objective truths'.[93] Notwithstanding the extensive research globally on the integration of science and traditional or Indigenous knowledge and a number of examples of fishery scientists successfully collaborating with local fishers,[94] TRG researchers have been largely disinterested in traditional knowledge and remain uncertain of ways of employing and utilizing Sámi knowledge.[95] The incorporation of Sámi traditional knowledge has been extremely limited and according to some Sámi, has taken the form of listening local concerns and taking note of reported catch statistics.[96] Overall, there has been little evidence that scientists, fisheries officials or governments of Finland and Norway are interested in adopting a new approach to governance of salmon fisheries.[97]

Related to transfer by coerced lifestyle change, administrative transfer in the Deatnu Agreement implies the unilateral settler polities' capacity to impose regulations and transfer rights as they see fit. The administrative borders of the settler polity are being redrawn by transferring the fishing rights of the local Sámi to settlers who, as a result, consider themselves even more entitled to the river. The local Sámi are not physically displaced but their rights are transferred to others; a form of settler colonial displacement. As the result, Sámi people 'progressively disappear', either as Sámi (i.e. they are assimilated) or literally, through migration to urban centers, leaving the river for tourists as their frontier summer playground who 'carry their sovereignty and lifestyles with them'.[98] Many Sámi have already had to leave the region for study or work reasons; in Finland, 65% of the Sámi live outside the Sámi region. Lamenting how she no longer can teach her children traditional fishing practices, Rauna Guttorm, a woman who herself grew up fishing the river, notes that as the result of the agreement, the last Sámi will move away from the Deatnu valley.[99] In this way, the river becomes fishing tourists' Ultima Thule, with a certain site specificity. To paraphrase Wolfe, the region is emptied of its Sámi past and present in order for it to be re-envisioned as a fisherman's paradise in 'the True North'.[100] As non-local recreational anglers 'move towards what amounts to a representation of their world, as they transform the land into their image, they settle another

place without really moving'.[101] Simultaneously, local Sámi are being moved out of the way without a physical removal – they are simply legislated out of existence as rights and traditional knowledge holders.

Conclusion

This article has considered the Deatnu Agreement, a bilateral fisheries accord negotiated between Norway and Finland since 1873. For most Sámi in the Deatnu region, the most recent agreement was ostensibly negotiated and approved in 2017 to stop the collapse of salmon stocks but aimed at deterring Sámi from engaging in their customary fishery while extending the fishing rights of non-local (and non-Sámi) property holders. I have discussed the strong, ubiquitous opposition to the agreement by locals (Sámi and non-Sámi) and a range of Sámi institutions, local municipalities and fisheries bodies. The article has challenged the rendition of the Deatnu Agreement as an ordinary dispute pitting environmental or fisheries regulators against local resource users. With help of the analysis of policy and Indigenous peoples by Elizabeth Strakosch, I have discussed how state policy is never a neutral instrument but a specific strategy of settler colonialism which, in the case of Deatnu Agreement has served distinct purposes at different times. If the Deatnu Agreement was exclusively about conservation or protection of species, local Sámi rightsholders would have not borne the brunt of the new restrictions put into place. The right of the Sámi people to practice their culture is constitutionally protected in Norway and Finland, and fisheries is, in the Deatnu valley, the most prominent element of Sámi culture. Conservation cannot trump constitutionally protected rights and any environmental measures need to take such rights into consideration.

Notwithstanding the 250-year old international boundary dividing the river in the middle, Deatnu has long been an ecologically, economically and culturally continuous region for local Sámi. The 2017 Deatnu Agreement has disrupted Sámi fisheries and interfered with customary harvesting practices. The article has argued that for these reasons, the agreement erects a wall that seeks to separate local Sámi from their river. I have drawn on the work of Wendy Brown to consider how, like other walls in the post-Westphalian world, the Deatnu Agreement performs state sovereignty, which in the past few decades have been diminished by a range of transnational actors and relations. One increasingly powerful transnational actor since the adoption of UNDRIP in 2007, has been the global Indigenous rights movement and the growing force of Indigenous self-determination with its recognition of Indigenous peoples possessing rights to their territories and resources. As Brown suggests, the global, rapid increase of walls is indicative of state and popular anxieties of losing sovereign control. Similarly, the 2017 Deatnu Agreement, as a figurative wall, responds to Nordic anxieties about the effects of the growing foothold of Indigenous self-determination and the growing contestation of state sovereignty by Indigenous peoples both at the national and global arenas.

The article has examined the Deatnu Agreement as an instance of settler colonialism that seeks to erase the presence and rights of the Sámi in the river, leading to the loss of cultural and subsistence relations to the ecosystems and species (salmon). I have employed Lorenzo Veracini's theory of transfers as a settler colonial strategy of replacement and dispossession and demonstrated how the Deatnu Agreement regime has engaged in settler colonialism, since 1873, particularly through two forms of transfers.

First, transfer by coerced lifestyle change has attempted to eliminate Sámi way of life and their social and political organization (Deatnu fishery and the siida structure). Second, administrative transfer re-delineates the administrative boundaries of the settler polity (Finland and Norway) in such ways that Sámi on Deatnu lose rights they have held previously.

In November 2019, the government of Norway requested Finland to commence negotiations to amend the Deatnu Agreement, specifically referencing the fishing rights of non-local property owners and the practice to lease fishing rights to others. A month later, the Sámi Parliament in Finland proposed to the government of Finland to annul the agreement on the grounds that it violates the rights of the Sámi and considerably harms traditional Sámi fisheries.[102] November 2019 also marked the 30-year anniversary of the collapse of the Berlin Wall, a wall that most people had hard time imagining of ever coming down.[103] Celebrating the anniversary, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated, 'No wall that keeps people out and restricts freedom is so high or so wide that it can't be broken down'.[104] This may serve as an important reminder to people on the Deatnu river as well. If the wall of the Deatnu Agreement is an emblem of the fading state sovereignty, taking it down remains an open possibility.

Notes

1. Sápmi refers to the Sámi territory. Sápmi is today divided by the borders of four nation-states, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia. For the history of and state policies relating to the partitioning of Sápmi, see Patrik Lantto, 'Borders, Citizenship and Change: The Case of the Sami People, 1751–2008', *Citizenship Studies* 14, no. 5 (2010): 543–56.
2. Aage Solbakk, *"The Salmon Lords" Take over Deatnu/the Tana River* (Kárášjohka: ČálliidLágádus, 2011).
3. Solveig Joks, '"Laksen trenger ro". Tilnærming til tradisjonelle kunnskaper gjennom praksiser, begreper og fortellinger fra Sirbmá-området' (PhD diss., UiT Norges arktiste universitet, Tromsø, 2015).
4. In duhásteapmi, a torch is employed to lure the fish which is then caught with a spear. Rastábuođđu is a weir across the river, a collective fishing method sometimes involving several villages. Goldin involves a weir across the river combined with driftnets and seines (Aslak Holmberg, 'Bivdit luosa – To ask for salmon. Saami Traditional Knowledge on Salmon and the River Deatnu in Research and Decision-making' (MA thesis, UiT The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø, 2018).
5. Johannes Helander, *Liite: Tenojoen vesistön kalastusoikeuksista. Tenojoen kalastustoimikunnan mietintö* (Helsinki: Maa- ja metsätalousministeriö, 1985).
6. For restrictions in the 1980s, see E. Niemelä, M. Länsman, E. Hassinen, S. Brørs, S. Sandring, M. Johansen and R. Muladal, *Den Atlantiske laksen i Tanavassdraget. Svingninger i fangstmengder i kilo og antall etter fangstmetode samt faktorer som påvirker fangsten, no. I* (Vadsø, 2009). In the past decades, the number of those engaging in traditional fishing methods has declined substantially (see Aage Solbakk, *Buođđu. Utviklingen av garnfisket in Tanavassdraget med vekt på perioden 1984–2015* (Fanasgieddi: Tanavassdragets Fiskeforvaltning, 2016)).
7. Some Sámi fishers upstream Deatnu initially praised the new agreement for potentially increasing their catch because, thanks to the restrictions downstream, salmon have a better chance to swim upstream. When this was discussed at a public meeting in Kárášjohka, it was argued that what is at stake in the new Deatnu Agreement is much greater than individual catch. At the meeting, some supporters of the agreement eventually revised their views. (The author attended the meeting, held on 17 July 2017.) Martta Alajärvi, '"Miige Beassat Luosa Borrat" – Badje-Deanus Gávdno Doarjja Deanu Ođđa Guolástannjuolggadusaide', June

30, 2017, https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/sapmi/miige_beassat_luosa_borrat__badje-deanus_gavdno_doarjja_deanu_oa_guolastannjuolggadusaide/9697112 (accessed May 1, 2020), Martta Alajärvi and Linda Tammela, 'Juohkašuvvan Sámeálbmot Ságastahtii Kárášjogas – "Dál Ii Šat Sáhte Smiehttat Iežas Sállašiid"', August 17, 2017, https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/sapmi/juohkasuvvan_samealbmot_sagastahtii_karasjogas_dal_ii_sat_sahte_smiehttat_iezas_sallasiid/9727870 (accessed April 6, 2020).

8. Wendy Brown, *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty* (Boston, MA: MIT Press, 2010).
9. Elizabeth Strakosch, *Neoliberal Indigenous Policy. Settler Colonialism and the 'Post-Welfare' State* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
10. Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism. A Theoretical Overview* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
11. Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013).
12. Ludger Müller-Wille and Samuli Aikio, 'Deatnu. River United, River Divided: Living With the Border in Ohcejohka, Sápmi', in *The North Calotte. Perspectives on the Histories and Cultures of Northernmost Europe*, ed. Maria Lähteenmäki and Päivi Maria Pihlaja (Inari: Kustannus Puntsi, 2005), 40–53.
13. Ibid.
14. In addition to transboundary rights, the Codicil included provisions on, inter alia, Sámi internal autonomy, citizenship and taxation Mattias Åhrén, 'Indigenous Peoples' Culture, Customs, and Traditions and Customary Law – The Saami People's Perspective', *Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law* 21 (2004): 63–112; Steinar Pedersen, , *Lappekodisillen i nord 1751–1859. Fra grenseavtale og sikring av samenes rettigheter til grensesperring og samisk ulykke* (Tromsø: Universitetet i Tromsø, 2006).
15. Aage Solbakk, *Joddu. Deanu luossabivdohistorjá, bivdobiergasat, doahpagat* (Kárášjohka: Čálliid-dLágádus, 2003).
16. Steinar Pedersen, 'Salmon Sans Borders', *Samudra, Triannual Report of the International Collective in Support of Fishworkers* no. 54 (2009): 4–7.
17. Steinar Pedersen, *Laksen, allmuen og staten. Fiskerett og forvaltning i Tanavassdraget før 1888* (Guovdageaidnu: Sámi Instituhtta, 1986); Solbakk, *Joddu*.
18. Northern Finland was evacuated toward the end of the so-called Lapland War (1944–1945), when the German army occupied the region and then burned what they could when they retreated northwards.
19. Northern Norway was liberated from German occupation by the Soviet Army. By contrast, Finland had been a German ally at the end of the war.
20. Veli-Pekka Lehtola, *Saamelainen evakko. Rauhan kansa sodan jaloissa* (Vaasa: City Sámit, 1994).
21. NOU, *Til laks åt alle kan ingen gjere: Om årsaker til reduksjonen i den norske villaksbestanden og forslag til strategier og tiltak til å forbedre situasjonen* (Oslo, 1999), Eduskunta, 'Hallituksen esitys HE 239/2016 vp', November 10, 2016, https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/HallituksenEsitys/Sivut/HE_239+2016.aspx (accessed May 3, 2020).
22. Ibid.
23. Tenosopimus (2017). Suomen ja Norjan välinen sopimus kalastuksesta Tenojoen vesistössä. 42/2017.
24. Kaisa Aikio, Pirita Näkkäläjärvi and Gabriela Satokangas, '"Tenon uusi sopimus loukkaa perustuslaillisia oikeuksia" – Utsjokelaisten eriävä mielipide', November 11, 2016, https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-8998183 (accessed October 28, 2019); and Juha-Pekka Turunen, Lasse Peltonen and Timo Karjalainen, *Tenon kalastussopimuksen vaikutukset – sopimuksen toimivuuden arviointi eri osapuolten näkökulmasta* (Helsinki, 2020).
25. Helander, *Liite: Tenojoen vesistön kalastusoikeuksista*; Holmberg, 'Bivdit luosa'.
26. Gro B. Ween, 'Resisting the Imminent Death of Wild Salmon: Local Knowledge of Tana Fishermen in Arctic Norway' in *Fishing People of the North: Cultures, Economies, and Management Responding to Change*, ed. C. Carothers, K.R. Criddle, C.P. Chambers et al. (Fairbanks: University of Alaska Fairbanks & Alaska Sea Grant, 2012).

27. Tenosopimus (2017). Suomen ja Norjan välinen sopimus kalastuksesta Tenojoen vesistössä. 42/2017.
28. Holmberg, 'Bivdit luosa'.
29. Aikio, Näkkäläjärvi and Satokangas, '"Tenon uusi sopimus loukkaa perustuslaillisia oikeuksia"'.
30. In the agreement, the category 'non-permanent residents with specific fishing rights' refers to Sámi from the Deatnu River, who have moved elsewhere for study or work but whose families continue to have traditional fishing rights in the river.
31. Coincidental or not, one of the key negotiators in the Finnish team was a non-local property owner in the Deatnu river. The 2017 Deatnu Agreement entitles this group to purchase inexpensive day permits, the number of which depend on the extent of the fishing right attached to their property. Despite this group was the only one whose rights were extended, they also oppose the agreement because the rights granted to them are 'only crumbs' even though they should be granted the same rights as the locals (see Tapani Leisti, Pirita Näkkäläjärvi and Martta Alajärvi, 'Olgobáikegoddelaš Deanu giddodatoamasteddjit vuođđudan searvvi', 2016, https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/sapmi/olgobaikegoddelas_deanu_giddodatoamasteddjit_vuoudan_searvvi/9023169 (accessed May 10, 2020)).
32. Susanna Vilpponen, 'Taistelu Tenon hopeakyljestä', August 13, 2017, https://www.kansanuutiset.fi/artikkeli/3760578-taistelu-tenon-hopeakyljesta (accessed October 29, 2019).
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49. Lehtola, 'The Saami Siida and the Nordic States from the Middle Ages'; and Tarja Nahkiaisoja, *Asutus ja maankäyttö Inarissa ja Utsjoella 1700-luvun puolivälistä vuoteen 1925* (Helsinki: Oikeusministeriö, 2006). A royal decree in 1762 stipulated that 'settled Sámi' will lose their traditional rights and privileges, leading to a gradual disappearance, in official records, of the distinction between non-reindeer herding Sámi and the non-Sámi settlers (Lehtola, above). The disappearance reflects the settler colonial discourse's fixation on Indigenous peoples as non-agricultural and resulted in another, contemporary and ongoing settler colonial impulse of enabling many settlers the use of these indeterminate official records to claim their Indigeneity, which Veracini, in *Settler Colonialism*, identifies as one form of the narrative transfer. (For details of this in contemporary Finland, see Laura Junka-Aikio, 'Can the Sámi Speak Now? Deconstructive Research Ethos and the Debate on Who is a Sámi in Finland', *Cultural Studies* 30, no. 2 (2016): 205–33). Enforced sedentarization is also another form of settler colonial transfers. Veracini notes: while enforced sedentarization may appear as a transfer, 'efforts to immobilise indigenous people necessarily imply a degree of displacement' (*Settler colonialism*, 45). What is more, there is scholarship demonstrating that cultivation has been part of traditional Sámi economy (see Ingela Bergman and Greger Hörnberg, 'Early Cereal Cultivation at Sámi Settlements: Challenging the Hunter–Herder Paradigm?', *Arctic Anthropology* 52, no. 2 (2015): 57–66).
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Acknowledgements

The author wants to thank Philip Burgess, Aslak Holmberg and Deborah Simmons for their comments and suggestions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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Trolldomssak mot en samisk noaide– Anders Poulsen, Vadsø, 1692

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Innledning

Rettssaken mot Anders Poulsen i Vadsø, 1692, har i flere tiår fanget forskeres interesse.[1] Dette skyldes flere forhold: For det første er saken interessant kronologisk som trolldomssak betraktet. Det er den siste sak under trolldomsprosessene i Finnmark der den anklagede mister sitt liv. For det andre er saken interessant fordi det i sakens løp ikke anføres at Poulsen hadde skadet noen ved sin trolldomsutøvelse. Anders Poulsen ble anklaget ”formedelst hand haver hafft oc brugt it instrument Runnebomen Kaldet. Oc derved øvet dend Sleme U-gudelige Throlddoms Kunst”.[2] Anders Poulsen var en gammel noaide som eide og brukte runebomme, og denne ble konfiskert før rettssaken startet. Endelig dom i saken vites ikke, da det etter saken på bygdeting skulle innhentes avgjørelse fra København og Anders Poulsen ble holdt i rettslig forvaring i påvente av dette svaret. Imidlertid ble Poulsen drept med øks av en mentalt ustabil person dagen etter at rettssaken mot ham i lokal rett var over. For det tredje er rettsreferatet fra denne saken intakt. Poulsens bekjennelse er nedskrevet i et referat på 16 sider, et meget fyldig dokument. Rettsreferatet i denne saken er dermed også interessant som historisk kilde betraktet, med et rikt tilfang av stoff. For det fjerde er saken interessant som dramatisk hendelse betraktet, da den har et anslag av sterk urett fra begynnelsen av og får det verst tenkelige tragiske utfall. Alle disse forhold underbygger at rettssaken mot Anders Poulsen har fanget interesse ut fra et historiefaglig perspektiv.

Imidlertid er saken mot Anders Poulsen også interessant ut fra et religionshistorisk perspektiv, og det er nødvendig i den sammenheng å klargjøre hvordan jeg forholder meg til to problemfelt; for det første problematikk knyttet til den delen av religiøs praksis som ofte omtales som sjamanisme, for det andre problematikk knyttet til overgangen fra eldre samisk religionsutøvelse til kristendom.

I henhold til religionshistoriker James R. Lewis tolket Mircea Eliade i sin bok om sjamanisme fra 1951 sjamaisme som ”a complex of particular ideas and practices that were widespread but not universal” [3] mens senere forfattere som Carlos Castanda og Michael Harner bruker sjamanisme som en betegnelse for en viss form for religiøs praksis brukt i tradisjonelle samfunn over hele verden.[4] Begrepet samisk sjamanisme vil ikke bli benyttet i denne artikkelen, da jeg anser det for å være et meget problematisk begrep. Det er vanskelig å hevde at en viss form for sjamanisme kan kalles samisk sjamanisme, noe som er et hovedsynspunkt i Håkan Rydvings religionshistoriske arbeider.[5] Min oppfatning er at man kan snakke om paralelle former for religiøs praksis, men aktivert innenfor forskjellige sosio-kulturelle rammer.[6] I stedet for samiske sjamanisme vil her den nordsamiske termen noaidevuohta anvendes. Siden dette er et nordsamisk ord, er det unødvendig å sette inn det bestemmende ordet samisk først. Noaidevuohta er den aktuelle formen for religiøs praksis som omtales i artikkelen, der begrepet er å forstå som den delen av religiøs praksis i et samisk samfunn som innbefatter en noaides bruk av runebomme. Jeg vil heller ikke anvende ordet sjaman, men bruke noaide, som er den norske formen for det samiske ordet noaidi. Jeg forstår noaidevuohta som en del av et sett av religiøse praksiser utøvd i nordsamiske områder, og som kan la seg integrere i sammenheng med andre religiøse tradisjoner. Noaidevuohta er ikke i seg selv å forstå som en religion, og begrepet brukes i artikkelen ikke synonymt med termen førkristen samisk religion.

Det andre problemfeltet som berøres i analysen av det rettsdokumentet som tas opp til drøfting i artikkelen. er overgangen fra førkristen samisk religion til kristendom. Denne overgangen har trolig gått gjennom mange stadier, noe også Håkan Rydving påpeker i sin doktorgradsavhandling. Dette medfører at enkeltpersoners religiøse identitet ikke nødvendigvis forholder seg kun til én religiøs tradisjon, det kan kan være snakk om gradvise overganger før en person gir sin fulle tilslutning til en ny religion. I mange tilfeller kan dette ha influert opplevelse av egen religiøs identitet i et spenningsfelt mellom førkristen samisk religion og kristendom. Jeg har respekt for dette synspunktet, men min analyse av det konkrete rettsdokumentet fra saken mot Anders Poulsen fører i en annen retning. Jeg vil fremsette det synspunkt at Anders Poulsens utleggelse av runebommens symboler ikke framstår som et resultat av en overgangsfase når det gjelder religiøs innsikt og tilegnelse, men som en bevisst strategi i en faktisk gitt – og meget truende – rettslig kontekst.

Som enhver historisk kilde er en analyse av dette rettsdokumentet avhengig av fortolkning. Ikke minst er fortolkningen interessant når det gjelder spørsmålet hva dette

dokumentet sier om førkristen samisk religion. Det er i 1993 blitt hevdet av Einar Niemi at rettsreferatet fra Anders Poulsens sak er ”den mest omfattende førstehånds samtidskilde vi har om tradisjonell samisk religionsutøvelse, og især av bruken av trolltromme”.[7] Niemi legger senere til at dette ”er en av de viktigste kilder overhodet til vår kunnskap om samisk sjamanisme”.[8] Rune Blix Hagen refererer i flere artikler til Niemis uttalelser uten å ta avstand fra oppfatningen om at Anders Poulsens tilståelse gir kunnskap om genuin noaidevuohta og tradisjonell førkristen samisk religiøs praksis. Hagen hevder: ”Som en studie i samisk sjamanisme kan vi lese tekstene fra Poulsen-saken som en slags innfallsport til 1700-tallets forestillinger om magi.”[9] Hagen hevder også, igjen med referanse til Einar Niemi, at saken mot Anders Poulsen er den beste kilde til kunnskap om noaidevuohta i nordlige del av Skandinavia.[10] Også Hagens artikkel ”Samer er trollmenn i norsk historie”, som hovedsakelig handler om rettssaken mot Anders Poulsen, er fundert på det synet at utlegningen av runebommens symboler i denne saken er troverdig fordi det er trommens eier som kommer med utsagnene; det er snakk om ”en av de ytterst få trommene der vi har eierens egen forklaring av trommens symboler og figurer”.[11] Niemi og Hagen fortolker rettsreferatet ut fra pålydende verdi, som et dokument som kan gi direkte innsyn i tradisjonell samisk førkristen religiøs praksis og noaidevuohta . Jeg ønsker i denne artikkelen å imøtegå påstandene om at rettsreferatet er en uovertruffen kilde til kunnskap om noaidevuohta og heller spørre om i hvor stor grad man kan feste lit til Anders Poulsens utlegninger. Hvorvidt står Poulsens forklaring av trommens symboler til troende? Det sikreste svaret finnes etter min mening i en analyse av hva Poulsen selv i sin tilståelse for retten uttaler. En slik analyse må innbefatte ikke bare selve rettsdokumentet, men også ta hensyn til konteksten, en rettssak der den anklagede er hardt presset.

Rettssaken mot Anders Poulsen er en trolldomssak. I de aller fleste trolldomssaker er mønsteret at den anklagede til slutt tilstår det som vedkommende tror forhørerne ønsker å høre; de tilstår det som blir forventet av dem. Noe slikt er trolig tilfelle i saken mot Anders Poulsen også. Mange av symbolene på runebommen forklares av Anders Poulsen ut fra kristendommen, noe som kan være et resultat av hva han tror forhørerne vil oppfatte som gunstig og dermed kan bidra til å påvirke utfallet av saken. Det som kommer fram under rettssaken er nødvendigvis ikke den kunnskapen om noaidevuohta som Poulsen selv sitter inne med, et synspunkt fremmet av Ernst Manker allerede i 1950: «Die auffallend christlichen Elemente in dieser Deutung von Poulsen weisen darauf hin, dass er die Figuren so christlich wie möglich erklären wollte, wobei er wahrscheinlich vieles über die ursprüngliche

Bedeutung verschwieg.»[12] Ut fra en slik fortolkning av Poulsens tilståelse forblir den genuine kunnskap om trommens symboler en hemmelighet, likeså Poulsens ytterligere kunnskap om førkristen samisk religionsutøvelse. Et av de spørsmål jeg i denne artikkelen ønsker å reise, er om Anders Poulsen i sin tilståelse under rettssaken virkelig avslørte sin kunnskap om førkristen samisk religiøs praksis og om trommens symboler? Jeg vil basere analysen på rettslokalets diskurs, et omfattende internasjonalt forskningsfelt som står i gjeld til den språklige vending fra 1990-tallet, et metodologisk veiskille som har hatt fundamental innvirkning på en lang rekke faglige disipliner. En slik metodisk tilnærming vil tjene til å motvirke en stivnet og gammeldags tekstlig innsikt og forståelse, der skriftlige dokumenter kun gjenfortelles og analyseres på et overflatenivå. I det følgende vil denne problematikken bli drøftet ut fra Anders Poulsens bekjennelse, rettsreferatets tilblivelse samt relativt samtidige kilder som omhandler noaidevuohta.

I et historiografisk lys er rettssaken mot Anders Poulsen meget omskrevet.[13] Helt fra slutten av 1600-tallet foreligger tidlige norske omtaler av saken som har bidratt til å gjøre innholdet for forskere. [14] Oppmerksomheten omkring trolldomssaken mot Anders Poulsen har ikke avtatt blant forskere de siste fem tiår. Jeg vil her fremheve nyskapende arbeider av Håkan Rydving 2010, 2007, 1993 og 1988.[15] Dessuten er Anders Poulsen og saken mot ham kortfattet presentert av Einar Niemi. Artikler er skrevet av Rune Blix Hagen, Brita Pollan, Stein Roar Mathisen og meg selv.[16] Hagens og Pollans artikler har et gjenfortellende preg både når det gjelder rettssakens gang og innholdet av Poulsens tilståelse. Mathisens artikkel har et annet fokus, den analyserer museumsutstillinger av samiske trommer.[17]

Fire vesentlige aspekter ved rettsreferatet fra saken mot Anders Poulsen vil bli tatt opp i det følgende. Jeg ønsker å drøfte rettssakens diskurs, Poulsens utlegning av runebommens symboler, rettsreferatet i kontekst samt kildens verdi som informasjon om noaidevuohta. Metodologisk er analysen av rettssakens diskurs basert på Gérard Genettes verker *Narrative Discourse. An Essay in Method* (1972), *Narrative Discourse Revisited* (1983) og *Fiction and Diction* (1991). Genette påpeker at det er mulig å lytte ut ulike diskursive ”stemmer” i alle tekster med narrativ struktur, stemmer da forstått som en abstrahert størrelse. Han nevner ”judicial narratives” som tekster der analyse av diskurs vil være fruktbar. Et rettsreferat betraktes i sin helhet som en fortelling, ført i pennen av en skriver, og narrative strukturer som konstituerende for tekstens oppbygning på ulike nivåer. I min analyse vil hovedvekten ligge på Anders Poulsens stemme og hva den formidler, men også lovens stemme og skriverens

stemme vil bli berørt.[18] En analyse av rettssakens diskurs vil innebære drøfting av hva de ulike stemmer utsier.

Det andre aspektet jeg ønsker å gå inn på, er knyttet til rettsreferatets utlegning av runebommens symboler. I størstedelen av rettsreferatet er det Anders Poulsens stemme vi hører, der han på spørsmål avgir en lang og detaljert bekjennelse. For utlegningen av runebommens symboler er denne stemmen bærende. Det er også dette punktet rettsmyndighetene i særlig grad ønsker belyst.

Det tredje aspektet er knyttet til kontekstuell forståelse av kilden: Hvordan kan Poulsens forklaring på runebommens symboler fortolkes når man ser hele dokumentet i den sammenheng det er blitt til i? Jeg vil argumentere for at i denne saken er en analyse av runebommens symbolikk absolutt beroende på at dokumentet forstås ut fra den rammen det er blitt til i, nemlig en rettssak. Et kjernespørsmål er hvordan Anders Poulsens bekjennelse kan fortolkes innholdsmessig, de gitte rammene tatt i betraktning.

Det fjerde aspektet ved rettsreferatet jeg ønsker å gå inn på, er hva dette dokumentet sier om noaidevuohta. Dette er et diskutabelt tema. Jeg ønsker jeg å belyse Poulsens forklaring i relasjon til noenlunde samtidig litteratur med informasjon om førkristen samisk religion og noaidevuohta. En slik gjennomgang vil sette Poulsens utlegning i relieff og rette søkelyset mot elementer man kunne forventet å finne i en forklaring av en erfaren noaide, men som uteblir.

Rettssakens diskurs

Analyse av rettslokalets diskurs er et omfattende forskningsområde. Ikke minst har skriverens rolle vært viet oppmerksomhet. Et viktig forskningsspørsmål har å gjøre med skriverens mulige innflytelse på det nedskrevne referatet. På dette punktet inntar forskerne ulike posisjoner. Noen påpeker at et historisk dokument forholder seg til en faktisk hendelse, eksempelvis Johan Tønnesson, som bruker betegnelsen ’faktuell prosa’.[19] Dette innebærer at skriveren besatt en høy grad av profesjonalitet og at man dermed kan feste lit til meningsinnholdet i det som står nedskrevet i et rettsreferat. Andre mener teksten kan sees som en tekstlig konstruksjon fra skriverens hånd, slik at det ikke blir mulig å forholde seg til en virkelig hendelse ”bak” teksten.[20] Selv er jeg av den oppfatning at skriveren var en profesjonell person som så det som sin målsetting å skrive ned så korrekt som mulig det som

ble sagt og foregikk under rettssaken. Et slikt standpunkt er støttet av flere forskere.[21] Særlig vil jeg understreke at muntlighetspreget i bekjennelsene støtter en slik forståelse.[22]

Bekjennelser og hele rettsreferater er skrevne tekster og krever fortolkning som skrift. Åpenbare kildekritiske spørsmål – som hvem er det som snakker, og hva er bekjennelsens intensjon og motivasjon innen en legal ramme – er avgjørende for analyse av rettsreferater. Rettsreferater befinner seg altså i en spesiell situasjon, mellom muntlig og skriftlig tekst, noe som er understreket av Elizabeth S. Cohen.[23] Hver stemme framstår som distinkt. Cohens fortolkninger argumenterer for individualisering av et rettsdokuments stemmer, noe som attesteres av skandinaviske forskere, blant dem Jari Eilola, Marie Lennersand, Linda Oja, Per-Anders Östling, Raisa Maria Toivo og meg selv.[24]

Når man skal analysere rettsreferatet fra saken mot Anders Poulsen, er det også spesielle forhold knyttet til skriverens rolle å tas i betraktning. Skriveren, sorenskriver Niels Knag, skrev ned referatet ut fra notater gjort under et forhør tidligere. Anders Poulsen ble fratatt sin runebomme den 7. desember 1691, og han ble forhørt dagen etter. Selve rettsmøtet fant sted 9. og 10. februar 1692. Forhøret fra desember 1691 ble referert til under rettssaken i februar 1692. Språksituasjonen var komplisert. Det var en tolk inne i bildet, som fortolket for rettsmyndighetene hva Anders Poulsen forklarte og for Anders Poulsen hva som ble sagt i rettssalen. Dette gjør at det er mange ledd den språklige utformingen av referatet. Når det gjelder formelle trekk, er språket tilpasset juridisk referats form. Imidlertid er det sannsynlig at meningsgehalten i Anders Poulsens bekjennelse er bevart i rettsreferatet. Skriveren har tilstrebet detaljert og nøyaktig protokollering, ikke minst har han forsøkt å fange muntlig tale og skriftfeste denne.[25]

Anders Poulsens stemme

Gjennom nærlesning av tekst – og da nærlesning forstått som metodisk grep – er det mulig å lytte ut ikke bare hva Anders Poulsen sa under rettssaken, men også hva han ble spurt om. Ved å avdekke såkalte skyggespørsmål kan man retrospektivt påvise hva det ble spurt om med utgangspunkt i hva som ble svart. Poulsen blir spurt om hva symbolene betyr, og svarer utførlig. Det er fem rader på runebommen, og på hver rad er der flere symboler. Et hovedspørsmål når det gjelder rettssakens innhold og dokumentets informasjon om noaidevuohta, blir: Hva er det Anders Poulsens stemme formidler om runebommens symboler?

På den første rad er det tre symboler: figuren til et menneske, ”som hand Kalder *ilmaris*, det er Storm oc Slem Veir”, figuren til et menneske kalt Diermis, ”det er torden”, og ”en Vild Reenβ lignelβe, som hand Kalder *Gvodde*, det er en Vild Reen [Originalens kursivering].[26] Poulsen uttrykker at det er når Gud bedes om det, at virkning av skikkelsene oppnås.

Runebommen kan bli brukt i god og ond hensikt, men Guds navn ble kun nevnt i forbindelse med de gode virkningene. Om den første figuren, mennesket Ilmaris, heter det: ”naar hand tilbeder gud; da skal den same indeholde oc til bage Kalde sit Sleme Veir, oc hand giør Vel slem Veir, men sider det er synd at bede derom”.[27] Om den andre figuren, mennesket Diermis, heter det: ”naar gud bedis, saa hielper diermis at naar det er flo Vejr med megit Regn, da kalder han det Vejr tilbage igien, oc at denne *diermis* hafuer ingen Magt før gud gif(uer) han(nem) forlof”. [28] Anders Poulsen tilstod også ”at *ilmaris* Kand giøre unt oc slem Veir til at beskadige skiber oc baader, men diermis Kand giøre got Veir igien, oc forhindre det unde, naar hand faar lof dertil af gud”.[29] Om den tredje figuren, Gvodde, heter det: ”Naar gud bedis, da gifuiβ Ved dend løche til at faa skyde Vilde Reener, oc naar der spillis paa Runebomen, da der som Ringen iche Vil dandze til denne Reen, da faar hand som spørger effter god løche til Skøtterj, ingen Reen dengang, om hand endskiønt giør sin flid dereffter”.[30] Anders Poulsen gjentok hyppig ordene «Naar gud bedis».[31] I referatet er ”gud” konstant skrevet med liten forbokstav, kan hende fordi skriveren ville antyde at det ikke var den kristne gud som ble omtalt.

Figur 1. Anders Poulsens runebomme, De samiske samlinger, Karasjok.

Symbolene på første rad utlegges altså som to mennesker og et reinsdyr, og symbolene får virkning først når noaiden ber til Gud. Imidlertid understreker Poulsen Guds allmakt og den vanmakt symbolene i seg selv representerer. Gud er i posisjon til å delegere sin makt til sine hjelpere, som er representert på runebommen, men hjelperne kan handle kun på kommando fra Gud. Slik er med med Ilmaris' evne til å lage dårlig vær for å skade skip og båter og Diermis' evne til å gjøre været godt igjen, og forhindre det dårlige været; der er med Guds tillatelse dette skjer. Og selv om Ilmaris kan lage dårlig vær, sa Poulsen at det var synd å be om det.[32] Dette antyder at det finnes en grense mellom bruk av runebommen i god eller dårlig hensikt, selv om begge deler er mulig. Slik er det også med figuren av det ville reinsdyret: den kan gi god eller dårlig lykke. Dersom ringen ikke vil danse for reinsdyret, vil jegeren ikke få noen rein, uansett hvor mye han prøver. Anders Poulsens forklaringer er ikke entydige. På den ene siden understreker han velsignelsene gitt av Gud gjennom figurene på runebommen, de positive virkningene av å praktisere trommingen. På den andre siden røper han at trommen også kan brukes i ond hensikt. Den Gud det er snakk om, er kristendommens Gud, dette gjentas mange ganger i Anders Poulsens forklaring. Symbolene avbildet på runebommen kan

altså bli virkningsfulle gjennom kraft fra den kristne Gud, som Anders Poulsen bekjenner er den Gud han tilber og tror på. Poulsen omtaler Gud i entall, han nevner ikke guder i flertall. Symbolene Ilmaris og Diermis på første rad knyttes betydningen av godt vær, et generelt forhold. Mer spesifikt knyttes lignelsen Gvodde til samisk næringsvirksomhet og betydningen av god reinsdyrfangst, noe som betinger at kulturelle fortolkningsfaktorer aktiveres.

På den annen rad er det fem figurer. Den første er en rund sirkel med en strek gjennom, ”dend Kalder hand *peive*, det er solen” [Originalens kursiv].[33] Når Gud bedes, ”da skal dend gifue got Solskin, læt luft, oc smuch Veir, helst naar Reensdyrene Vil Kalfue, naar Korn oc høe skal Voxe, oc ellerβ gifue got Veir naar derom bediβ”.[34] Den andre figuren er et menneskes lignelse ”som hand Kalder *Jumal barn*, det er guds barn, eller gudz søn Christus, naar hand tilbediβ, saa løβer hand af alle Synder” [Originalens kursiv].[35] Den tredje figuren er et menneskes lignelse, ”som hand kalder *Jumal Etziem*, det er Gud Fader, hand Straffer alle Synder, oc ellers hielper oc forskaffer, ia skicher, oc Straffer, naar hand derom bediβ” [Originalens kursiv].[36] Den fjerde figuren er en kirke, ”som hand kalder Dom Kirch, dend tilbeder hand effterdj hand dend self haf(ue)r giort”. Han sier at ved den får han ”synderniβ forladelβe, Siælenβ Salighed, oc en Christelig død, oc enten man døer eller lefuer saa hielper same Kirche”.[37] Den femte figuren er et menneskes lignelse, ”som hand kalder Engil, det skal Vere gud dend hellig aand, naar hand bediβ, han løβer af alle Synder, saa mand blifuer et nyt ioc Reent Menniske naar hand Vil hielpe”.[38]

På den annen rad utlegges de fem symbolene altså som en sol, Kristus, Gud Fader, en kirke samt Den Hellige Ånd. Den første figuren, Peive, solen, er litt forskjellig fra de andre i denne raden, da den er knyttet til velsignelsen av godt vær. Solen er et natursymbol og kan, på samme vis som figurene på første rad bidra til grødens vekst og gode forhold for reinsdyr som skal kalve. Tre av figurene på denne raden er religiøse symboler med kristen betydning. Den kristne hellige treenighet står sentralt i Poulsens utlegning: Guds sønn, Kristus, løser alle synder når han tilbes. Gud Fader er både straffende og hjelpende. Han straffer synder, men hjelper når han bes om det. Figuren Engil, utlagt som Den Hellige Ånd, tilgir alle synder når han bes om det, så man blir et nytt og rent menneske når han vil hjelpe. Den siste figuren på den annen rad er en domkirke, og Poulsen sier at han tilber den, ettersom han selv har laget den. Kirken skal gi syndenes forlatelse, sjelens salighet og en kristelig død. Totalt sett er symbolene på den annen rad sterkere enn symbolene på den første rad knyttet til en kristen dogmatikk, her er det man finner utlagt kristendommens kjernesymbolikk. Også for figurene

på denne raden understrekes det at de er virksomme kun når Gud bes om det, og Anders Poulsen snakker om Gud i entallsform.

I tillegg knytter Anders Poulsen noen kommentarer til den Gud som er malt: ”Dend gud som tilbediβ, som ofte meldet er, er de lignelβer oc figurer som hand af malet haf(ue)r effter personerne i Guddomen; som hand sige at hans Moder han(nem) lært hafuer”.[39] Første del av dette utsagnet fortolker jeg som opplysninger om de tre symbolene representative for den kristne treenighet, at figurene på runebommens andre rad viser til Faderen, Sønnen og Den Hellige Ånd i kristendommen. Imidlertid inneholder utsagnets siste del en oppsiktsvekkende opplysning, ettersom Poulsen sier at det er hans mor som har lært ham om personene i guddommen, underforstått den kristne lære. Det som ellers kommer fram i rettsreferatet om hans mors religiøse oppfatning, er at hun og en samisk mann i Torne Lappmark som skal ha lært Anders Poulsen sin kunst, ”Var af en Thro”,[40] underforstått trodde moren på den førkristne samiske religion, og nettopp ikke har tatt ved kristendommen. Man ser her en tydelig motsigelse i det Poulsen uttrykker her og det han sier ellers i referatet; den grenseoppgang han ellers foretar, består i at han selv har tatt ved kristendommen, mens hans mor fremdeles er av den gamle tro. Når det gjelder spørsmålet om aktørene nevnt i rettssaken kan avspeile overgangsfaser mellom førkristen religion og kristendom, er min fortolkning ut fra ovenstående at Anders Poulsen mente at hans mor og den samiske mannen i Torne Lappmark begge trodde på den førkristne samiske religion. Den språklige konteksten her tilsier at Poulsen mente de to var av samme tro, og denne troen var ikke kristendommen. Det er her ikke snakk om en blanding av førkristent og kristent. Avslutningsvis i forklaringen av symbolene på den annen rad, føyer Anders Poulsen til opplysninger om noen staver som er malt ved siden av personene på alle radene: ”Ellers staar hos huer person i alle rader en Staf af Malet, som hand Kalder *Juncher Sabbe* eller *Stur Herr Sabbe*, det er Junchers Staf eller Store herrerβ Staf, tj hand siger lige som Jordenβ herrer, hafuer deriβ Staf i haanden saa hafuer disβe personer Stafuer i deriβ hender” [Originalens kursivering].[41] Det å ha en stav i sin hånd utlegges her som et attributt og et tegn på høy sosial status. Juncher – som egentlig har betydningen en ung adelsmann – var en tittel brukt om øverste embetsmann på Vardøhus og en tittel Poulsen trolig forbandt med den høyeste autoritet under kongen. I Anders Poulsens fortolkning var figurene på runebommen å ligne med jordiske adelsmenn eller embetsmenn. Det vi ser er en kobling mellom religiøs og verdslig autoritet ved at betydningen av disse stavene kobles til de ovennevnte symbolene malt på runebommen.

Figur 2. Kopi av Anders Poulsens runebomme. Redskapene er ikke kopi av de originale.

På den tredje raden er det fem skikkelser: For første gang blir noen av figurene på runebommen utlagt som kvinner. Først et menneskes lignelse, en kvinneskikkelse ”som hand kalder *S*^{te}*: Anna*, oc sier hand at denne er *Maries* Søster, oc er i Raad // med Marie naar hun hielper, ellerβ kand denne intet giøre uden Maries Villie”.[42] Ut fra Bibelen er St. Anne mor til Maria, her utlegges hun som Marias søster, så dette er en endring i forhold til den kristne lære. Den andre figuren på tredje rad er også en kvinneskikkelse ”som hand Kalder oc Nefner paa adskillig maade, *Maria, Jumal Enne, Jumal Ache*, det er, *Maria*, Christi Moder, Gudz quinde, naar hun tilbediβ, hielper hun særdeliβ barβel quinder, hun hielper oc til at løβe fra alle Synder, oc hielper oc tilbediβ lige Ved gud”.[43] Fortolkningen av Maria som Kristus’ mor er i henhold til Bibelen, men utlegning av Maria som Guds kvinne er ikke i samsvar med protestantisk lære. Også at Maria kan løse fra alle synder, samt at hun tilbedes ”lige Ved gud”, gir henne en svært betydningsfull plass blant symbolene på runebommen. Det synes klart at funksjonen til de kvinnelige skikkelsene som er avbildet, er å hjelpe, da spesielt kvinner som føder eller som er i nød.

I tillegg til de to kvinneskikkelsene er det på den tredje rad ”3de: Menniskerß lignelse, som hand Kalder *Julle peive, Julle herr*, det er Jule dage, Julle herrer som Raader Julen, *oucht Jule Peiv herr* første Julle dags herre, *Gougt Jule peive herr*, Anden Julle dags herre, *Gvolme Jul peive herr*, tredie Julle dags herre”.[44] Et vesentlig moment er å helligholde disse dagene: ”Naar nogen Vahn helliger disse dage, da skal gud Straffe dend, men naar nogen holder dem ret hellig, oc dend same Vil bede gud om noget, da stilles de dage frem for gud, oc foregifuis at dend eller dend hafuer holt de dage hellige, oc at Gud af dessen aarsage Vil hielpe”.[45] Anders Poulsen ville ikke bekjenne mer om disse dagene, så her er det tydelig at han har fått flere oppfølgende spørsmål, men har ikke villet si mer. Utlegningen er klart knyttet til julen som kristen høytid med dager som ut fra det tredje bud skal holdes hellige. Gud framstilles slik at han velsigner dem som holder hans helligdager og straffer dem som ikke gjør det. Dette samsvarer med bildet av en straffende og hjelpende Gud Fader som ble utlagt på den annen rad.

På fjerde rad er det malt fem skikkelser: en rund sirkel som representerer månen, skikkelsene av to menn som går til kirke, avbildningen av den kirken Anders Poulsen tilhører samt skikkelsen til en mann som kommer til kirke fra den motsatte retningen. Når det gjelder symbolet for månen, Manna, forklarte Poulsen at ”naar gud tilbedis, da giffuer den Klart skin oc got nat Veir, om end det er tycht skyed Veier”.[46] Så er det innført i referatet: ”Videre Ville hand iche bekiende”, noe som betyr at han er blitt spurt om å utdype dette med virkningen av månesymbolet, men ikke ønsket å si noe mer. Andre og tredje symbol på denne rad ”Er 2de Mends Lignelβe, som hand Kalder *Olmoug Mane Kirche* [originalens kursiv], det er folch som gaar til Kirche, huilche hand holder ichun for en bemerchning, lige som andre folch gaar til Kirche”.[47] De to menn som er avbildet gående til kirken, utlegges som helt vanlige kirkegjengere. Så følger et bilde av en kirke

> oc skal betyde dend Kirche huor hand haf(ue)r sit tilhold Ved; til denne Kirche siger hand baade sig self oc andre offrer, baade Voxlyß penge oc andet, dog offrer ingen med mindre de blif(ue)r hiulpen, huilchet offer, de siden lefuerer til Presten til dend Rette Kirche, som denne afmalede haf(ue)r sin bemerchning af, item naar nogen er Syg, eller haf(ue)r Modgang paa Reen eller andet ont er nogen Vederfaret, da bediß oc lofuiß til denne Kirche, oc naar saa nogen blif(ue)r hiulpen da faar Kirchen huiß lofuet er,[48]

Dette symbolet utlegges som den kirke han hører til, og der han ofrer vokslys, penger eller annet. Imidlertid befordrer offeret, som gis til presten, en gjenytelse. Når det er snakk om sykdom eller motgang knyttet til rein, så blir det bedt til kirken, og når bønnen oppfylles, får

kirken det som er blitt lovet. Offeret blir en garanti for at bønnen blir oppfylt. Det siste symbolet på denne raden er ”En Mandz lignelße som Staar paa dend anden side Kirchen, det skal Vere en som Komer paa dend anden side oc Vil gaa til Kirche”.[49] De fire siste symbolene på fjerde rad knytter seg altså til kirkebygningen og kirkegang, og ofring til kirken skjer på betingelse av bønnhørelse.

På den femte og siste raden er det syv figurer – tre av disse er djevler og en er en djevels kvinne. I tillegg er det tre symboler som ikke er i menneskeskikkelse, men som er knyttet til helvete. Den første figuren er et ”quindfolchß lignelße, som skal Vere dend bunden diefuel sin quinde, huis Nafn hand siger sig iche Vide”.[50] Den andre figuren utlegges som ”Et Menniskes lignelße som Staar lidet wdenfor denne første, som hand siger skal Vere en diefuel som dræber folch, oc Mennisker, oc skal Vere Siugdom”.[51] Den tredje figuren utlegges som ”et Menniskeß lignelße lige for denne som melt er, som hand siger skal Vere dend diefuel som nu er løeß oc Regierer i helfuede oc Svefuer om i Verden, huilchen hand siger sig iche hafue nafn paa”.[52] Denne djevelen rømte da Gud bandt den djevelen som er omtalt nedenfor, en djevel i lenke. Det fjerde, femte og sjette symbolet er tegnet i referatet, slik:

> 4: Staar Saaledis  dette Kalder hand *Hilvet Tol*, det skal Vere helvedis Jld, dend Jld brender Menniskenes Siæle i helfuede,
>
> 5: Staar Saaledis  dette Kalder hand *Hilved Tarve Giedme*, som skal Vere helfuedis tiere Kiedel, som Kaager Menniskenβ siæle i helfuede,
>
> 6: Staar Saaledis  , dette Kalder hand *Hilvet Haufd*, det er helvediβ graf, hour udj Kastiβ alle de Mennisker som tror paa diefuelen, oc Kaster Gud dem derudj [originalens kursiv][53]

Den siste figuren på femte rad er en bundet djevel, ”Et Menniskes lignelse som haver en Streg lige fra halßen til en Støtte, denne Kalder hand *Hvenaales Gvolisis*, det er en bunden diefuel i lenche, som skal Vere dend diefuel som blef bunden da gud skabte Verden”.[54] Det hadde seg nemlig slik at ”da gud fant denne, da hafde gud Jern skoe paa oc trøde denne i en Stor Myr”.[55] Utlegningen av de ulike djevlene og av helvete er farget av Bibelen og tanker om straff etter døden. I Poulsens forklaring er det menneskenes sjeler som oppslukes av flammene i helvete, ikke kroppene deres. Sjelene kokes i en tjærekjel, og det finnes en grav der for dem som tror på djevelen. Framstillingen avviker fra vanlige bilder av det kokende vannet i helvete. Det er snakk om flere djevler. En av dem er sykdom, én er en løs djevel og én er bundet. Under utlegningen om djevlene berøres Guds skapelse av verden og straffen som venter i helvete for dem som tror på Den Onde. Det er på femte rad djevlene er symbolisert, et skremmende

område. Farligheten befinner seg nederst på runebommen. Den framstillingen Anders Poulsen gir, er meget jordnær med henblikk på billedbruk og forklaringsfaktorer. Det kom i denne runden ingen kommentarer fra rettens embetsmenn med hensyn til Poulsens fortolkning av symbolene, ingen oppfølgende spørsmål ble stilt.

Etter utlegningen av symbolene fortsatte Anders Poulsen med å forklare hvordan han brukte runebommen for å få svar på det han ville vite. Han hadde to hamre [må forstås som to gjenstander ut fra konteksten], gjort av reinhorn. Den ene kalte han som hand Kalder *Qiaarve vetzier*, ”med dend ene bancher hand Jidelig paa Runnebomen naar hand noget Vil forrette”.[56] Den andre var en innhul messing dechel med en messingring oventil, som hand Kalder *palm*, denne setter hand paa Runnebomen”.[57] Poulsen viste for retten hvordan dette foregikk, ”oc løfte Runnebomen op oc ned med sin haand, Vrier oc holder dend af oc til, oc imedens bancher med hameren, oc siger hand at Ved Mesßing dechelen faar hand at Vide om det eller det er sant eller ei”.[58] Det hadde betydning hvilken vei dechelen danset, om det var med eller mot solen. Motsatt, dersom den danset med solen, ”da hafuer dend en goed løche hand spiller for”.[59] Dersom den danset mot solen, ville personen han spilte for ikke ha lykken med seg. Hvis den kom så langt ned at den stoppet ved en av figurene under den siste streken på femte rad, var Gud sint på den han spilte for. Den personen måtte be mye til Gud før ringen beveget seg tilbake igjen. Slik lot Gud vedkommende se at han var et syndig menneske.[60]

Så tok Anders Poulsen opp runebommen og demonstrerte hvorledes han spilte. Han korset først seg selv, så runebommen, og leste Fadervår på karelsk.[61] Videre leste han bønnen ”ætziem, achie, ja barne, ja Engilen, væche don, med flere ord; oc skulle det vere Gud Fader, din Moder, ia din søn, ia dend hellig aand hielp nu”.[62] Han så på sine figurer,

> oc dechelen dandzede op oc ned, oc hand banchet med hameren, oc foreholt guderne disße ord, ia du gud som har skabt himel oc Jord, Soel oc Maane, ia Stierner, alle Mennisker, ia fugle, ia alle fiske oc hafuet, oc bekiendte sine Synder sigende, ieg er et Syndig Menniske, gamel oc u-Verdig, bettre er det ieg døer, end du iche Vil hielpe den Vj spør eftter, derhoß siger sig at giøre løfte iche at Vil synde mere, med flere hanß tilbedende ord,[63]

I sitatet ovenfor brukes for første gang flertallsformen av ordet gud, samtidig med at entallsformen benyttes. Den praktiske demonstrasjonen av runebommen opp for en utvidet forståelse av hva som ligger i ordet gud. At Poulsen innbefatter en flertallsform, guderne, viser at hans forståelse av gudsbegrepet ikke er så entydig som han har forsøkt å vise tidligere i sin forklaring. Selv om han har vært bevisst på å tilstrebe en framstilling av den ene kristne Gud, vakler hans forklaring her og røper at han henvender seg til flere guder når han spiller på runebommen. Selve demonstrasjonen av spillingen bringer Poulsen nærmere den situasjon

han konkret har vært i flerfoldige ganger under sin noaidevirksomhet, og da slår hans gamle oppfatning gjennom.

Anders Poulsen ble etterpå spurt om han kunne løfte gand. Han svarte at når det er satt gand i noen, ”Kand hand Ved sine guder tage same gand ud oc lade dend Kome i dend same som haver dend først udsat”.[64] Igjen nevner Anders Poulsen guder i flertall, det er mer enn én gud som er virksom når han tar ut gand. Og han viste hvordan han løftet gand og spilte på runebommen til ringen kom ned på en av figurene på femte rad, som var en av djevlene. Da vek ganden fra den som hadde den og gikk over i den som hadde satt den ut. Han sa at han slik hadde hjulpet mange i ”Sverig lapmarch”, men ingen i Norge. På samme måten viste han hvordan ringen danset til en av djevlene dersom en tyv skulle straffes. Da spilte han så lenge “at gud Straffer tiufuen som noget har staalet, saa at hand tørchis oc Matris op at hand blif(uer) lige som tørt træ”.[65] Denne delen av Anders Poulsens bekjennelse har å gjøre med noaidens evne til å bruke runebommen for å finne svar på konkrete spørsmål. Men når det eksempelvis var snakk om å finne en tyv, gjenvisning, understreket han at det var Gud som straffet. Han sa også at ved bønn til Gud når han spilte på runebommen, kunne han skaffe reinsdyrene lykke, slik at ulver ikke skulle drepe dem, og også i andre henseende god lykke. Også når han hjalp barselkvinner, spilte han på runebommen og fikk vite Guds vilje når dechelen danset.[66] Anders Poulsen understreket at han bare gjorde godt når han spilte på runebommen, og han sa at Kristus hadde forbudt både ham og hans sønn å gjøre noe vondt. Han hevdet at han kunne få svar fra runebommen når han holdt den høyt opp i luften, akkurat som når to mennesker taler med hverandre.[67]

Anders Poulsens fryktet for hva som kommer til å skje videre under rettssaken. Den klareste indikasjon på dette viser seg helt på slutten av hans bekjennelse. Han erklærte da at av alle de gjerninger han sa at han kunne forrette, “Ville hand ej tilstaa nogen af den(nem) her i landet at hafue øfuet eller brugt, oc der hoeβ *protesterede* paa sin u-skyldighed oc at intet ont hafue forrettet” [originalens utheving].[68] Han sa også at han ikke hadde forsvoret Gud eller sin kristne tro, og når han tilbad de avmalte guder på trommen, mente han med dem Gud i himmelen. Og “efterdj hand fornehmer at det er øvrigheden imod at hand bruger Runnebomen, Vil hand dend nu forlade, *oc lige som andre folch tro paa gud i himelen*”. [Min kursivering.][69] Den siste setningen torpederer mye av det han har sagt under forhørets utlegning av enkeltsymboler. Kommentaren mer enn antyder at til tross for hyppige forsikringer om tro på den ene kristne Gud, var hans egentlige tro fremdeles den gamle samiske religion.

Den neste dagen, som var 10. februar 1692, ble Anders Poulsen igjen kalt for retten, og på spørsmål svarte han at

> da hand lærde Runnebomens Kunst af sin Moder skeede det af Aarsage, hand Ville Vide huor folch lef(ue)r langt fra, om de hafuer goed løche, hand derom spørger effter, om Reißendiß folch skal hafue goed løche, at Ville hielpe folch naar de Var i nøed, oc Ved same Kunst Ville giøre got, huilchet hanß Moder sagde at Slig Kunst skulle hun lære han(nem), men hand self iche begierede at Ville lære, ydermere blef hand om adskilligt tilspurt huor Ved hand alt tilstod dend forige bekiendelße, oc dend iche udj noget forandrede, ei heller Ville Videre om sit Væßen bekiende end det at Vere en Kunst oc spil huor Ved hand intet unt haf(ue)r forretted [70]

Poulsen stadfestet altså at han hadde lært runebommens kunst fra sin mor og at han ikke hadde gjort noe vondt med sin kunst og bare ønsket å hjelpe mennesker i nød. Kjennelsen innbefattet en gjennomgang av hovedelementene i Poulsens forklaring. Hans virksomhet omtales som ” hanß Store U-gudelighed oc diefle Kunst” [71] og det stadfestes at han hadde lært av sin mor ”om hinde hand siger ei hafde dend rette tro til gud i himelen som andre folch, huilchet hand oc bekiender om sin ene søn Ved Nafn Christopher” [72]og at hans sønn kan tale ”Ved Steene” og få svar akkurat som han selv av runebommen. Det understrekes også ”at hanß Søn Var Vild oc gal da hand lærde, *huilchet alt er af høi forargelße, helst paa disße Vit afliggende Steder, huor en Stor deel Mennisker gandske lidet er opliust om dend rette Guds Kundskab oc dørchelße*” [Min kursivering].[73] At Finnmark er et avsidesliggende sted betinger ut fra denne argumentasjon innbyggernes mangel på opplysning om den rette tro og gudsdyrkelse. Her ligger også en grunn til at folk henvender seg i feil og syndig retning: ”naar den(nem) noget hender oc Veder faris, langt heller spørger Raad hos Saadanne Throldfolch, end indfly til gud med bøn oc paa Kaldelße”.[74] Imidlertid er dette en vanskelig sak å dømme i, og endelig avgjørelse kan ikke tas i Vadsø,

> tj Var det høit fornøden, at der ofuer Slig U-gudelighed blef *Statuerit* et afskyelig Exempel, paa det guds Rette paa Kaldelse Kunde fremmiß; Da som deslige gierninger oc afgudsdørchelßse som Anders Pouelßen fri Villigen beKiender at hafue øfuet, oc er forfaren udj, ei udj lougen findiß benefnde, at de derefter Kunde af straffis, (huor om dog ingen Klager at hand nogen hafuer beskadiget paa lif, hilßen eller godzis Mistelse) haver hans Velbr: ambtmanden *resolverit* oc for Raadsom erachtet, effter at ieg med hans Velbr: derom hafuer *Consulerit*, at denne sag som er en U-sædvanlig *Casus* huorudj behøfuis dend høi øfrigheds betenchende oc skiøn, opsettis indtil høi øfrigheds Svar fra Kiøbenhafn indhentis, huorledis dermed skal forholdiß, oc *acten* imidlertid beskrefuen nedskichis [Originalens kursivering] [75]

Retten skulle avvente svar fra København, og i mellomtiden skulle Anders Poulsen holdes i rettslig forvaring i Vadsø. En oversikt over Anders Poulsens og hans hustrus middel og formue ble bekjentgjort i retten. Til sammen hadde hans bo en verdi på 32 våger og 12 mark.[76]

Så holdes det et rettsmøte igjen i Vadsø den 22. februar. Det dreier seg om et mord. Anders Poulsen var blitt drept med øks dagen etter at hans rettssak var over. Morderen var en mentalt ubalansert person, Villum Gundersen fra Jølster, som arbeidet som dreng hos amtmannen. Han ble ført for retten og ”sagde sig dertil ei at hafue anden aarsage end hand meente same find Var en trold mand oc Vel burde døe, end siger hand sig meente de Vare U-Venner”.[77] Drapet hadde altså sin årsak i at Villum Gundersen mente Anders Poulsen var en trollmann, og ikke i at han mente Anders Poulsen med sin kristeliggjorte fortolkning av runebommen hadde forrådt den samiske tro. Poulsens arvinger krever et liv for et liv, men saken ender med at drapsmannen ikke dømmes til døden, ”at Villum gunderßen som haver Værit betaget sin sunde fornuft da hand dette drab øvede, bør ei derfore paa sit lif at Straffis, men af sin formue som hand haver, eller Kand hereffter bekomme, give fuld Mande boed”.[78]

Innhold og kontekst

Å fortolke Anders Poulsens utlegning av symbolene på runebommen uten å ta i betraktning den kontekst utlegningen skjedde i, er etter min mening umulig. Alt som ble uttrykt av Anders Poulsen ble sagt under en rettssak der han var anklaget for trolldom og kunne forvente en alvorlig dom. Denne saken ble ført på slutten av 1600-tallet, etter et hundreårs alvorlig trolldomsforfølgelse i Finnmark med høy frekvens av dødsdommer. Enhver ny trolldomsanklage bar uvegerlig bud om et alvorlig utfall. Innenfor denne rammen er det Anders Poulsens bekjennelse må forstås.

Det er gjennom Anders Poulsens stemme, slik den er skrevet ned i rettsreferatet, at utlegningen av runebommens symboler presenteres. Fire av symbolene utlegges av Poulsen som natursymboler, nemlig sol, måne, storm og torden. Dessuten er det en figur som utlegges som en villrein. For samtlige av de andre symbolene, som utgjør størstedelen av trommens bilder, er det den kristne Gud og kristendommen som er referert til. Kristendommen gjennomsyrer Anders Poulsens utlegning. Runebommens språk som et religiøst språk synes å ha vært fleksibelt, ettersom nytt innhold og nye tilnærminger muliggjorde nye fortolkninger av runebommens strukturer og figurer.[79]

Anders Poulsens forklaring er ikke entydig. Dette gjelder flere aspekter, blant annet intensjonen for bruk av runebommen. På den ene siden understreker han velsignelsene gitt av Gud gjennom figurene på runebommen, de positive virkningene av å praktisere trommingen. Gjentatte ganger understreker han at han bruker trommen kun i god hensikt. Dette kan jo sees i sammenheng med at ingen hadde klaget på at Anders Poulsen hadde gjort noen som helst skade – et argument for at han snakker sant. På den andre siden røper han at trommen også kan brukes i ond hensikt, særlig hvis dechelen stopper ved en av figurene på femte rad og djevlene aktiveres.

Også når det gjelder hvem som var hans læremester, kommer en inkonsekvens til syne. Han vakler mellom moren og en samisk mann som læremester. Det ble spurt om hva slags gud han tilbad. Han svarte at den guden han tilbad, var de lignelser og figurer han hadde malt etter personene i guddommen ”som han siger at hans Moder han(nem) lært hafuer”.[80] Hans mor hadde altså lært ham runebommens symboler. Samtidig sier han at moren ikke delte den kristne tro. Dermed må man anta at moren hadde lært ham betydningen av runebommens symboler i henhold til samisk religion, mens han i retten utlegger samme symboler knyttet til kristendommen. Uklarheter fortolkningsmessig kommer også til syne når Anders Poulsen utlegger betydningen av noen personer avbildet med staver på trommen. I Poulsens fortolkning kan disse sammenlignes med jordiske adelsmenn eller embetsmenn.

Påliteligheten i Anders Poulsens bekjennelse kan utfordres. Størstedelen av referatet fra hans sak er en fortellende tekst gjengitt i indirekte tale, en fortelling der han gir opplysninger om sitt liv og om runebommen. Opplysningene av biografisk art er antakelig korrekte, men det samme er neppe tilfelle med fortolkningen av symbolene på runebommen som del av en samisk noaides virke. Riktignok er hans demonstrasjon av spilling på runebomme, overbevisende. Dette var en mann med lang erfaring i slik bruk, og en som viste følelser: Med tårer strømmende nedover kinnene løftet han runebommen opp i luften og spilte på den, slik at alle de som var til stede i retten, kunne se det.[81] I tillegg fortalte han trolig korrekt om de anledningene runebommen ble brukt. Imidlertid er bekjennelsen problematisk som kilde til kunnskap omnoaidevuohta.[82] Den kan være korrekt når det gjelder de elementene av bekjennelsen som har å gjøre med natursymboler og næringsveier: solen, månen, storm, torden og ville reinsdyr. Imidlertid er det et spørsmål om hvorvidt Anders Poulsens bekjennelse som helhet står til troende når det gjelder tradisjonell bruk av runebommen. Anders Poulsen prøvde å tilpasse innholdet av sin bekjennelse til den protestantiske kirkes doktrine, en doktrine han ikke i detalj hadde kjennskap til. På den ene

siden forsøkte han ved repetisjon av standard religiøse fraser å overbevise retten om at den ene Gud han tilba, var den kristne Gud. På den andre siden var hans bekjennelse inkonsistent og upålitelig på grunn av plutselige snu-manøvre mellom å proklamere tro på én Gud til å proklamere tro på mange guder. Særlig hans siste bemerkning om at fra nå av ville han kun tro på den rette, kristne Gud, antyder at han hadde tilhørt den førkristne samiske religion hele livet, som hans mor før ham.

Anders Poulsens fortolkning av runebommens symboler varierer med henblikk på troverdighet, og det er nødvendig å se nærmere på hvordan han beskriver de ulike figurene for å evaluere hans fortolkning. Hele tiden understreket han at når man ba til Gud, hjalp ham dem som spurte om hjelp. Han erklærte igjen og igjen at han brukte runebommen i god hensikt. Imidlertid var situasjonen for Anders Poulsen da han ble utspurt i retten, at han måtte overbevise retten om sin kristne tro. Natursymboler var lette å fortolke innenfor en ramme han kjente fra sitt daglige liv. Figurene som betegnet treenigheten var også mulig for ham å forklare ut fra den kristne kirkes lære. Det samme var runebommens evne til å forårsake ondt ved å bruke bildet av Gud som en straffende og velsignende Gud. Situasjonen var tilsvarende for figurene som betegnet kirker og folk som søkte til kirkene. Imidlertid var forhørerne mer interessert i de onde virkningene av runebommen, enn de gode. Problemene startet for alvor da Poulsen kom til den femte rad og bildene av djevlene dukket opp og måtte fortolkes. Han forklarte at dersom dechelen stoppet her, betydde det at personen det ble spilt for, var en syndefull person og derfor ville få sin straff. Myndighetene så dette som djevletilbedelse, selv om symbolene som betegnet helvete ble beskrevet med ord brukt i kristen forkynnelse. Min oppfatning er at de ulike elementene i Anders Poulsens bekjennelse bør differensieres. Noen utlegninger forklarer trommens potensial til å gi svar på spørsmål knyttet til blant annet værforhold og reinsdyrdrift. Disse er helt klart pålitelige ut fra trommens gamle bruk. Andre fortolkninger er knyttet til den protestantiske kristne religion og forklarer symbolene innenfor denne forståelsesrammen. Dette gjelder figurer som betegner treenigheten, kristne merkedager og straff for synd. Disse er problematiske ut fra trommens bruk knyttet til noaidevuohta. Dersom man undersøker Anders Poulsens beskrivelser av symbolene på runebommen ut fra et slikt perspektiv, blir det klart at bekjennelsen er tvetydig, og at den bærer preg av ulike fortolkningsstrategier. Siden det kan stilles spørsmålstegn ved påliteligheten i Anders Poulsens bekjennelse, gir hans beskrivelse neppe et fullstendig bilde av den kunnskap og innsikt en erfaren noaide satt inne med.

Årsaken til dette er den spesielle rammen rundt hans bekjennelse. Anders Poulsen ble forhørt av lovens embetsmenn i en kriminalsak. Utfallet av saken er ukjent, men negativt belagt. Men han kunne ha grunn til frykt. Han gjorde han sitt beste for å overbevise embetsmennene om at han adlød de ti bud, gikk til gudstjeneste i kirken og kun brukte trommen i det godes hensikt. Hans situasjon var vanskelig, ettersom han åpenbart hadde levd et liv i konflikt mellom sin egen samiske bakgrunn og den norske kulturen. Stemmen vi hører i Anders Poulsens bekjennelse er ikke konsistent. Han vakler mellom forskjellige "sannheter", for eksempel hvem som hadde laget runebommen, og hvem som hadde lært ham kunsten. Han er uklar når det gjelder bruken av runebommen, insisterer på de positive effektene av trommingen når man ber Gud om noe, men er unnvikende når det gjelder spørsmålet om hvem som er hjelper når trommen blir anvendt i vond hensikt. Utlegningen av symbolene på runebommen ville sannsynligvis blitt annerledes dersom rammen ikke hadde vært en rettssak.

Lovens stemme

Lovens stemme kommer tydeligst fram i begynnelsen og på slutten av referatet, mens hele midtpartiet er Anders Poulsens beretning, nesten en livshistorie. Runebommen ble lagt fram på tingbordet. Underfogden ønsket at den bekjennelsen Anders Poulsen allerede hadde avlagt i nærvær av ham selv, viselagmann og "Finne lensmanden", skulle bli lest opp og bekreftet. Underfogden formodet at ut fra denne bekjennelsen ville Anders Poulsens trolldomskunst og misbruk av Guds hellige navn fornemmes, noe han mente ikke burde foregå ustraffet.[83] Lovens stemme, slik den høres gjennom underfogd Olle Andersens utsagn, røper at underfogden selv betraktet Anders Poulsens bruk av runebommen som ugudelig og straffbar. Dersom Anders Poulsen holdt fast ved sin tidligere bekjennelse, "formodede" underfogden at dette bekreftet Poulsens utøvelse av trolldom og hans misbruk av Guds navn. Den samme underfogden "formeente" at denne utøvelsen ikke kunne foregå ustraffet. Vi ser at bruken av verb røper Olle Andersens holdning til utøvelse av samisk magi og bruk av runebomme. Tidlig i saken mot Anders Poulsen er ord som "djevelsk" og "ugudelig" brukt i forbindelse med hans mor, som han hadde lært fra, og som ikke hadde den rette tro til Gud i himmelen.[84] Denne måten å ordlegge seg på blir sterkere mot slutten av rettssaken, da kjennelsen skal avsies.

Runebommen ble igjen nevnt av lovens representanter som en introduksjon til Poulsens detaljerte beskrivelse av den. Tidligere hadde han bekjent at trommen som ble presentert i retten, var laget av ham. Nå benektet han dette, "det hand nu benechter", og han sa

at den var slitt av idelig bruk.[85] Poulsen hadde altså under forhøret den 8. desember vedgått at det var han som hadde laget runebommen, men under rettsmøtet 9. februar trakk han dette tilbake. Retten syntes likevel å tro at det var han som hadde laget runebommen og at benektelsen ble gjort for å mildne forbrytelsen han var anklaget for. Imidlertid snudde Poulsen igjen 9. februar og innrømmet at det var han som hadde laget runebommen, som vi kan se ut fra bruken av ordet ”nu” i det følgende sitatet:”Udj dend første Rad staar, effter at hand *nu* bekiente self af haffue giort Runnebomen” [Min utheving].[86]

Lovens stemme kan høres ved enkelte ord eller uttrykk lagt inn i referatet. For eksempel er det i beskrivelsen av figuren Engel, som befinner seg på den andre rad, lagt til en formulering som skaper distanse til det Poulsen har fortalt: “Et menniskes lignelse som hand kaller Engil, det skal Vere gud den hellig Aand”.[87] Når det i referatet står “det skal Vere”, innebærer dette trolig at skriveren stiller seg tvilende til det som Poulsen forklarer. Det samme uttrykket er brukt om utlegningen av en figur på fjerde rad, en rund sirkel, som han kalte Manna: ”Det skal Vere Maanen”.[88] En sirkel kunne åpenbart ha andre fortolkningsmuligheter, så den distanserende formuleringen er på sin plass.

Spor av spørsmålene stilt under forhøret kan registreres gjennom hele bekjennelsen. Disse gir ekko av lovens stemme, om enn indirekte. Da Anders Poulsen hadde gitt sin beskrivelse av de tre figurene på tredje rad, som representerte juledagene, ble han åpenbart spurt om han hadde noe å tilføye, men ”Videre Ville hand iche om de dage bekiende”.[89] Vi finner det samme etter beskrivelsen av månen på fjerde rad: “Videre Ville hand iche bekiende”.[90] Det siste spor av spørsmål ser vi i den delen av bekjennelsen som handler om å løfte gand: ”*Paa til spørgelse* sagde han at naar nogen er sat gand udj Kand han Ved sine guder tage same gand ud” [Min utheving].[91] Spørsmålene som har vært stilt, antyder at rettens embetsmenn gjerne ville vite så mye som mulig om symbolene på runebommen. I rettslokalet spurte de derfor Anders Poulsen om å utdype sin tidligere bekjennelse. Særlig var de interessert i å vite om samisk trolldomskunst, for eksempel hvordan man tok bort gand som var kastet over en person. Men de var også interessert i å vite om de mørkere sider ved runebommens kunst, for eksempel hva som skjedde når runebommen ikke ga svar som innebar lykke og hell, noe Poulsen var motvillig til å gi, “men for ingen deel Ville sige at faa gudernis Svar anderledis end naar dechelen dandzer Ret om med Solen”.[92] Rettens menn var oppriktig interessert i å høre Anders Poulsens stemme, heller det enn å vise fram egen veltalenhet. På den måten demonstrerer de en mer åpen, lyttende og deltakende holdning til

den anklagede personen enn det som kan spores i rettsreferatene fra trolldomssaker tidligere på 1600-tallet.

Mot slutten av saken blir det klart hva forhørerne har vært ute etter hele tiden mens de har lyttet til Anders Poulsen. Enkelte elementer i bekjennelsen ble understreket, særlig at hans kunst var av en djevelsk sort: ”huorledis hans paa raabende Figurers lignelser paa Runnebomen, hannem Ved Fandens indskydelser indbilder de gierninger oc tegn han spørger oc søger efter, som efter hans tale hender oc Vederfares”.[93] Figurene på femte rad er beskrevet slik:”Udj dend 5te: Rad hafuer hand adskillige diefle med dend Elste diefuels quinde, oc helfuedis formeenende *instrumenter* afmalet, oc i Sær en diefuel som skal Vere siugdom, huilchen hand siger Kand dræbe oc døde Mennisker, af huilche figurer oc lignelser” [Originalens kursiv].[94] Retten fant hans verk å være meget straffverdig, særlig fordi han malte den hellige treenighets personer, Gud fader, Sønnen og den Hellige Ånd, som han ved sine besverginger og misbruk ”som Gud for hannem skal forrette oc Kundgiøre, saa megit grovelig Van ærer, for achter, bespotter oc høit fortørner”.[95] Også grunnlag for straff var lesning av Fader Vår i forbindelse med spilling på runebommen, og det at han tegnet hellige korsets tegn over seg og over runebommen før han begynte å spille. Det samme gjaldt at han satte sine bilder i Guds sted, som Guds skapte elementer, og at han sa til dem, ”du Gud som skabte himel oc Jord, Sol oc Maane etc: oc endelig Ved det hand afmaler helfuede oc dieflene, huorom hand intet særdeles vil bekiende huorledes hand med dem omgaais”.[96]

Retten vektla Anders Poulsens motvilje mot å gi detaljer om figurene på runebommen som representerte djevelen. Figurene ble ansett å representere hans gudløse og djevelske kunst, som han hadde lært fra sin mor. Det ble etablert et skille mellom samer som bekjente seg til den kristne tro, og de som ikke gjorde det. Anders Poulsen selv understreket at han bekjente seg til kristendommen. Hans sønn Christopher, som påstod at han hadde samtaler med Kristus gjennom å snakke med steiner, er også nevnt som trolldomskyndig. Retten fant at Anders Poulsens kunst var “af høi forargelse, helst paa disse Vit afliggende Steder, huor en Stor deel Mennisker gandske lidet er opliust om dend rette Guds Kundskab oc dørchelse af huilche en deel naar den(nem) noget hender oc Veder faris, langt heller spørger Raad hos saadanne *Troldfolch*, end indfly til gud med bøn oc paa Kaldelse” [Min utheving].[97] For første gang under rettssaken er ordet “Troldfolch” brukt, og det er stadfestet at det er nødvendig ”at det ofuer slig U-gudelighed blef *Statuerit* et afskyelig Exempel, paa det Guds rette paa Kaldelse Kunde fremmis” [Originalens kursiv].[98] Imidlertid, siden slike gjerninger og avgudsdyrkelse som Anders Poulsen bekjente å ha utøvd, ikke finnes nevnt i loven, slik at de

kunne straffe deretter, så bestemte amtmannen etter at ”*ieg* med hans Velbr: derom haffuer *Consulerit*” [først min kursiv, så originalens kursiv] [99] at dette var et uvanlig kasus som behøvde den høyeste øvrighets betenkning og skjønn, og saken ble utsatt inntil den høyeste øvrighets svar fra København var innhentet.[100]

Skriverens stemme

Stort sett er skriverens stemme nøytral og nedtonet, med ett unntak: Som nevnt i sitatet ovenfor, opptrer skriveren Niels Knag i første person som et ’ieg’ – noe som forekommer svært sjeldent i denne typen dokument – når det gjelder konsultering med ”Hans Velbårenhet” om hvordan denne spesielle saken skal håndteres. Det er ingen indikasjon i referatet på at skriveren er uenig i vurderingen av Poulsens bruk av runebomme som avgudsdyrkelse.

En måte skriveren skaper distanse til den historien Anders Poulsen fortalte, er ved å gi en beskrivelse av ham mens hans spilte på trommen. Poulsen så på sine bilder, og “dechelen dandzede op oc ned, oc hand banchet med hameren, oc foreholdt guderne disse ord (…)”.[101] Synet av en noaide i arbeid har en kort stund distrahert skriveren fra kun å referere hva som ble sagt. Han gir i stedet et glimt av situasjonen i rettslokalet, som må ha vært forbløffende, sett gjennom hans øyne.

Hva sier dokumentet om noaidevuohta?

Hva utsier rettsreferatet fra saken mot Anders Poulsens om noaidevuohta? Tar man utgangspunkt i Anders Poulsen egen stemme og hans utsagn under rettssaken, mangler de vesentligste elementer som kunne fortelle oss hva en noaides virksomhet består i. I Poulsens utleggelse av runebommens symboler er ingen mannlige guddommer nevnt, ingen kvinnelige guddommer nevnt, ingen offerplasser nevnt. Dette til tross for at den samiske religion hadde et stort antall guder av begge kjønn og et stort antall offerplasser. Anders Poulsen sier at hans sønn taler ”med sten”, noe som trolig impliserer offerplasser, men at han selv ikke gjør dette. Når disse tre meget viktige elementer i den førkristne samiske religion er utelatt, er det vesentlige mangler ved kilden som informasjon om noaidevuohta.

Ut fra andre kilder har man en del kunnskap om noaidevuohta. Flere omfattende bibliografier over samisk religionshistorisk litteratur og samisk litteratur er gitt ut, der noaiden og hans virksomhet er viet betydelig plass, likeledes mannlige og kvinnelige guder i den samiske religion, eksempelvis studier av Håkan Rydving, J. Qvigstad og K. B. Wicklund samt Hans Mebius.[102]

Samtidig som saken mot Anders Poulsen fant sted i Vadsø, ble saken mot samiske Lars Nilsson fra Piteå Lappmark holdt i Arjeplog i Sverige.[103] En annen sak fra de finske samiske områder var saken mot Aikie Aikiesson fra Kittka i Kemi Lappmark i 1671, som ble anklaget for å bruke runebomme og å joike.[104] Opplysninger om andre runebommer som er bevart, er gitt blant annet av Rendick Andersen fra Foldalen, som i 1723 beskrev en runebomme for Thomas von Westen.[105] I tillegg finnes det en del beskrivelser av runebommer av senere dato, blant annet i boken *Nåidkonst. Trolltrummans bildvärld* av Ernst Manker.[106]

Det kjennskap man har til ”norske lappers hedenskap” rundt år 1700, stammer hovedsakelig fra flere Relasjoner.[107] I tillegg kan nevnes en del opplysninger i *Major Peter Schnitlers Grenseeksaminajsonsprotokoller 1712-1745*.[108] Samiske guddommer som ikke finnes omtalt i Poulsens utleggelser, er omskrevet i ulike sammenhenger i løpet av de første tiårene etter 1700. En rekke mannlige samiske guddommer er omtalt av Jens Kildal i 1730 i artikkelen ”Afguderiets dempelse og den sande lærdoms fremgang”.[109] Hellige fjell omtales i Thomas von Westens brev til presteskapet i Jämtland, 1723.[110] Samiske offerplasser er ellers utførlig omtalt i Ørnulf Vorren og Hans Kristian Eriksens bok *Samiske offerplasser i Varanger*.[111]

Noen av symbolene på Anders Poulsens runebomme kan knyttes til naturguder. Flere av disse er beskrevet i Rolf Kjellström og Håkan Rydving, *Den samiska trumman* (1988), og i prosten Henric Forbus’ skrivelse, 1727.[112] Også symbolene som utlegges av Poulsen som Juledags herrer, er omtalt i annen litteratur, blant annet er slike herrer vist til i Isaac Olsens relasjon ”Om Lappernis Vildfarelser og Overtro” og Wiklund, *Samerna i 1600-talets Sverige*. Disse symbolene skal være knyttet til gamle merkedager.[113]

Det er avbildning av to kvinneskikkelser på Anders Poulsens runebomme. Her hadde man forventet at navnene på noen av de kjente samiske kvinnelige guder kom opp, gudinner som er svært vanlig å finne på runebommer, nemlig Sarakka, Uksakka og Juksakka.[114] Men i stedet får vi Anna og Maria, i en utlegning ikke overensstemmende med kristen lære.

Når det gjelder hvorvidt trommespill var sentrum i saken mot Anders Poulsen, kan svaret være både ja og nei. Det var snakk om at en gammel samisk noaide ble fengslet for å ha brukt et instrument kalt en runebomme. Om dette instrumentets symboler og utforming ble han forhørt i retten. Når det gjaldt selve trommespillingen, hvordan han utførte det å spille på runebomme, så demonstrerte han dette i retten: løftet runebommen opp og viste hvordan han spilte. Men det gjenstår et viktig spørsmål, nemlig om det Anders Poulsen viste fram i retten,

var en del av samisk religionsutøvelse som noaidevuohta. Min oppfatning er at hva Anders Poulsen viste fram i rettslokalet av trommespill ikke var en genuin demonstrasjon av hvordan en samisk noaide arbeider. Til det er rammene som en rettssal betegner og de naturlige rammene for Poulsens utøvelse av sin kunst innen en religiøs sammenheng alt for forskjellige. Der den naturlige intensjonen for en noaides arbeid er å være til hjelp for mennesker som trenger hjelp, var intensjonen i dette tilfelle en framsyning som skulle være svar på forhørernes spørsmål. Dersom man tar bort den intensjonelle delen av en noaides virke, tar man samtidig bort det alvor og de forpliktelser en noaide vanligvis jobbet i forhold til. At Poulsen i rettssalen kunne løfte opp runebommen og vise hvordan trommen brukes, sier lite om noaidevuohta som en kunst og en ferdighet og en innsikt. De religiøse overtoner er borte.

Konklusjon

Jeg har i artikkelen drøftet språklige, innholdsmessige, kontekstuelle og religiøse aspekter ved rettsreferatet fra saken mot Anders Poulsen. Det er ikke mulig å hevde med belegg i rettsreferatet at dette gir en autentisk beskrivelse av noaidevuohta eller av førkristen samisk naturreligion. Imidlertid synes runebommens språk som et religiøst språk å ha vært fleksibelt; nye fortolkninger av runebommens faste strukturer og figurer var mulig.[115]

Den billedbruk og retorikk Poulsen bruker, viser til den kristne treenighet og avspeiler sentrale tanker i den kristne lære: Gud som en sterk, velsignende og straffende far, Kristus som tilgir alle synder og Den Hellige Ånd, som gjør det mulig å bli et nytt og rent menneske.[116] Utlegningen av Den Hellige Ånd ligner mye på forklaringen av hva Kristus representerer. De kvalitetene Poulsen tillegger domkirken, berører dens evne til å hjelpe de troende både i det jordiske liv og i det hinsidige.

Anders Poulsen svarte tvetydig på flere spørsmål, blant annet hva slags gud han tilbad.[117] Denne inkonsekvensen kan også gi grunn til å trekke i tvil hans fortolkning av andre av runebommens symboler. Som gammel noaide måtte Anders Poulsen ha inngående kunnskap om runebommens symboler og om dens bruk, både til godt og ondt. Imidlertid var det ikke denne kunnskapen han kom fram med i rettssalen. Derimot gjentok han adskillige ganger under rettssaken at han trodde på den kristne Gud og brukte runebommen kun i god hensikt. Dette samsvarer ikke med blant andre Isaac Olsens synspunkter i ”Om Lappernes Vildfarelser og Overtro”, der det tydelig kommer fram at en runebomme alltid ble brukt til det onde så vel som det gode.[118] Poulsens utlegning av runebommens symboler er til dels en hybrid framstillingen av kristendommens dogmer.

Når det gjelder synspunktet at Anders Poulsens religiøse identitet og hans utlegning av runebommens symboler kunne være et resultat av samtidens brytningstid mellom førkristen religion og kristendom, understøtter ikke min analyse et slikt synspunkt. Det som kom fram i retten, var ikke et utslag av en religiøs overgangstid. Snarere var det som ble uttalt av Anders Poulsen et resultat av den konkrete og farlige situasjon han befant seg i, der det var nødvendig for ham nettopp å sette et skille mellom førkristen samisk religion og kristendommen. Hans hovedargument var jo at han hadde tatt ved kristendommen, og dette ville han overbevise rettsmyndighetene om. Derfor er det min oppfatning at den kontekst vi ser i denne saken ikke åpner for nyanser i en religiøs overgangsfase, men nettopp bidrar til at det settes et klart skille mellom den førkristne samiske religion og den kristne tro.

Påstanden om at Anders Poulsens rettssak er den beste informasjon som finnes om Noaidevuohta i Nord-Skandinavia har etter min oppfatning ikke dekning i den kilden som rettsreferatet utgjør. Poulsens forklaring kan ikke ansees som pålitelig. Han gir motstridende opplysninger på en rekke punkter og vakler når han skal gjøre rede for sitt religiøse standpunkt. Dette tyder på at kontekstuelle forhold har spilt en avgjørende rolle for den utlegningen av runebommens symboler som er nedskrevet i rettsreferatet. Ønsket om å framstå som en troende kristen og framstille sin bruk av runebommen kun i god hensikt samt uvissheten med henblikk på saken utvikling og utfall, har bidratt til den utlegning som skjer. Rettsreferatet fra trolldomssaken må settes inn i sin rettslige kontekst, og Poulsens utlegning av symbolene på runebommen må differensieres i en fortolkning. En ukritisk gjenfortelling av rettssaken, som ikke tar hensyn til de mange spenninger som ligger implisitt i teksten, vil på en uheldig måte kunne bidra til romantisering av samene.

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[1] Jeg vil gjerne takke to anonyme reviewers for kyndige og konstruktive kommenater til artikkelnes innhold.
[2] Statsarkivet i Tromsø, Sorenskriveren i Finnmarks arkiv, løpenr. 25, fol. 1a.
[3] James R. Lewis, "New Age Medicine Men vs. New Age Noaidi: Same Neo-Shamanism, Different Socio-Political Situation", i Siv Ellen Kraft, Trude Fonneland og James R. Lewis (red.), *Nordic Neo-Shamanisms* (New York, 2015), 127.
[4] James R. Lewis (2015), 127–128, med referanse til Carlo Castanedas forfatterskap basert på feltarbeid i Mexico, bøker publisert fra 1968 og utover, og Michael J. Harner, Jeffrey Mishlove og Arthur Bloch, *The Way of the Shaman* (San Fransisco, 1990, orig. utgave 1980)
[5] Håkan Rydving, *The End of Drum-Time* (Uppsala, 1993).
[6] Dette er også et argument innenfor forskning på ny-sjamanisme, se James R. Lewis (2015), 127–140.
[7] Einar Niemi, "Hans Hansen Lilienskiold – embetsmann, vitenskapsmann og opprører", i *Portretter fra norsk historie* (Oslo, 1993), s. 61.
[8] Einar Niemi, "Anders Paulsen", i *Norsk biografisk leksikon* (2009). Hentet 5. januar 2016 fra https://nbl.snl.no/Anders_Paulsen.
[9] Rune Blix Hagen, "Harmløs dissenter eller djevelsk trollmann", *Historisk tidsskrift* nr. 02-03 (2002), 326–327.
[10] Rune Blix Hagen, "Witchcraft and ethnicity: a critical perspective on Sami shamanism in seventeenth-century Northern Norway", i Marko Nennonen and Raisa Maria Toivo, *Writing Witch-Hunt Histories. Challenging the Paradigm* (Leiden, 2014), 155-163, på s. 155.

[11] Rune Blix Hagen, ”Samer er trollmenn i norsk historie” (Karasjok, 2005), s. 16. Artikkelen er gitt ut som en egen publikasjon.
[12] Ernst Manker, *Die lappische Zaubertrommel. Eine ethnologische Monographie II* (Uppsala, 1550), s. 430.
[13] Her kan nevnes Einar Niemi, ”Anders Paulsen”, i *Norsk Biografisk Leksikon*, b. 1 (Oslo, 1999), 84; Brita Pollan, *Samiske sjamaner. Religion og utbredelse* (Oslo, 1993), 32, 97; Brita Pollan, *Noaidier. Historier om samiske sjamaner* (Oslo, 2002), 24-31; Rune Blix Hagen, “Harmløs dissenter eller djevelsk trollmann”, *Historisk tidsskrift* nr. 02-03 (2002), 319-346; Rune Blix Hagen, “Sami Shamanism: The Arctic Dimension”, i *Magic, Rituals, and Witches*, vol. 1, nr. 2 (2006), 227-233; Rune Blix Hagen, ”Witchcraft and ethnicity: a critical perspective on Sami shamanism in seventeenth-century Northern Norway”, i Marko Nennonen and Raisa Maria Toivo, *Writing Witch-Hunt Histories. Challenging the Paradigm* (Leiden, 2014), 155-163; Liv Helene Willumsen, *Seventeenth-Century Witchcraft Trials in Scotland and Northern Norway* (PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2008), 227-245; Liv Helene Willumsen, *Dømt til ild og bål* (Stamsund, 2013), 336-353; Liv Helene Willumsen, *Witches of the North* (Leiden, 2013), 298-319
[14] Hans Hammonds misjonshistorie, 27–34; ”Hans Skankes Epitomes Historiæ Missions Lapponicæ Pars Qvarta, 1730”, i *Nordlands og Troms Finner i Eldre Håndskrifter* (Oslo, 1943), 33; Isaac Olsen, ”Om Lappernes Vildfarelser og Overtro”, i Just Qvigstad (red.), *Kildeskrifter til den lappiske mytologi II*, Det Kgl. norske videnskabers selskabs skrifter 1910, no. 4 (Trondhjem, 1910); Anders Løøv, *Samemisjonæren Isaac Olsen og hans ”Underdanigst Undrettning om Norlandenne”* (Snåsa, 1994); Edgar Reuterskiöld, *Källskrifter till Lapparnas mytologi* (Stockholm, 1910), 88–98, på s. 97–98; *Beskrivelse over Finmarkens Lapper, deres Tungemaal, Levemaade og forrige Afgudsdyrkelse, oplyst ved mange Kaabberstykker = Canuti Leemii ... De Lapponibus Finmarchiæ, eorumqve lingva, vita et religione pristina commentatio, multis tabulis aeneis illustrata / med J.E. Gunneri Anmærkninger & E.J. Jessen-S Afhandling om de Norske Finners og Lappers Hedenske Religion København, 1767)*; Jens Andreas Friis, *Lappisk mythologi, eventyr og folkesagn* (Kristiania, 1871); *Major Peter Schnitlers Grenseeksaminajsonsprotokoller 1712-1745*. Utgitt av Kjeldeskriftfondet, b. I, ved Kristian Nissen og Ingolf Kvamen; Just Qvigstad, *Kildeskrifter til den lappiske mythologi*, Det Kongelige Norske Vitenskapers Selskabs Skrifter (Trondheim, 1903) nr. 1 og (Trondheim, 1910) nr. 4; Martha Brock Utne og Ole Martin Solberg, *Finnmark omkring 1700. Aktstykker og oversikter*. Nordnorske samlinger. 1 (1938).
[15] Håkan Rydving, *Tracing Sami traditions : in search of the indigenous religion among the Western Sami during the 17th and 18th centuries* (2010), *Samisk kyrkohistorisk bibliografi* (2007), *The End of Drum-Time* (Uppsala, 1993); Rolf Kjellström og Håkan Rydving, *Den samiska trumman* (1988).
[16] Cf. note 8 ovenfor for referanser til arbeider av Niemi, Pollan, Hagen og Willumsen.
[17] Stein Roar Mathisen, ‘Contextualizing Exhibited Versions of Sami Noaidevuohta’, i Siv Ellen Kraft, Trude Fonneland og James R. Lewis (red.), *Nordic Neo-Shamanism* (New York, 2015), s. 191–213.
[18] I denne saken føres ikke vitner. Også vitnenes stemmer vil være inkludert i en analyse av rettsdokumenter der denne aksent forefinnes. Det foreligger to øyenvitneberetninger i forbindelse med fengslingen av Anders Poulsen i desember 1691, men disse nevnes ikke i rettsreferatet, og jeg går derfor ikke nøyere inn på disse. Det foregår også en rettssak etter at Anders poulsen er blitt drept, men rettsreferatet fra denne faller også utenfor denne artikkelens fokus
[19] Cf. Johan Tønnesson, *Hva er sakprosa* (Oslo, 2008), 24.
[20] Cf. Jürgen Macha, ‘Redewiedergabe in Verhörprotokollen und der Hintergrund gesprochener Sprache’, *Bayerische Dialektologie. Akten der Internationalen Dialektologischen Konferenz 26.–28. Februar 2002*, red. Sabine Krämer-Neubert og Norbert R. Wolf, Schriften zum Bayerischen Sprachatlas, 8 (Heidelberg, 2005), s. 171–178; *Deutsche Kanzleisprache in Hexenverhörprotokollen der Frühen Neuzeit*, red. Jürgen Macha, Eva Topalovic, Iris Hille, Uta Nolting og Anja Wilke, Auswahledition 1 (Berlin, 2005); Eva Topalovic, ’”Ick kike in die Stern vndt versake Gott den Herrn”. Versprachligung des Teufelspaktes in westfälishen Verhörsprotokollen des 16./17. Jahrhunderts’, *Augustin Wibbelt-Gesellschaft. Jahrbuch 20*, s. 69–86. Peter Rushton, ‘Texts of Authority: Witchcraft Accusations and the Demonstration of Truth in Early Modern England’, *Languages of Witchcraft. Narrative, Ideology and Meaning in Early Modern Culture*, red. Stuart Clark (New York, 2001), s. 21–39.
[21] Malcolm Gaskill, ‘Witches and Witnesses in New and Old England’, *Languages of Witchcraft*, red. S. Clark, s. 55–80, på s. 56–58.
[22] Slike muntlighetstrekk er additive setningsstrukturer, aggregerende språkelementer, overflødighet av ord, nærhet til den menneskelige verden samt en fiendtlig tone. Ref. Walter J. Ong, *Orality and Literacy*, pp. 37–45. Barbara Kryk-Kastovsky har i en studie av tidlig moderne engelske rettsdokumenter funnet at rettsreferater beholder mange muntlighetstrekk. Studien er basert på to termer:” turn-taking” og “closeness to the socio-cultural context”. Ref. Barbara Kryk-Kastovsky, ‘Representations of Orality in Early Modern English Trial Records’, *Journal of Historical Pragmatics*, 1(2), (2000): 201–230, på s. 209. Ref. Barbara Kryk-Kastovsky, ‘Historical courtroom discourse’, *Journal of Historical Pragmatics*, 7 (2) (2006): 213–45; Barbara Kryk-Kastovsky, ‘How bad is “bad data”? In search for the features of orality in Early Modern English legal texts’,

Current Issues in Unity and Diversity of Languages. Collection of papers selected from the CIL 18, held at Korea University in Seoul on July 21–26, 2008. Seoul; The linguistic society of Korea; Kathleen L. Doty, 'Telling tales. The Role of Scribes in Constructing the Discourse of the Salem Witchcraft Trials', *Journal of Historical Pragmatics*, 8 (1) (2007): 25–41, på s. 26, 27, 39.

[23] Elizabeth S. Cohen, 'Back Talk: Two Prostitutes' Voices from Rome *c*. 1600', *Early Modern Women: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, 2 (2007); Elizabeth S. Cohen, 'Between Oral and Written Culture: The Social Meaning of an Illustrated Love Letter', *Culture and Identity in Early Modern Europe (1500–1800): Essays in Honour of Natalie Zemon Davis*, red. Barbara B. Diefendorf og Carla Hesse (Michigan, 1993), s. 181–201, på s. 95, 96.

[24] Se Raisa Maria Toivo, *Witchcraft and Gender in Early Modern Society*. Se også Per-Anders Östling, 'Blåkulla Journeys in Swedish Folklore',*Arv: Nordic Yearbook of Folklore*, 62 (2006), 81–122; Marie Lennersand, 'Rättvik', 375–596, i Marie Lennersand og Linda Oja, *Livet går vidare*; Marie Lennersand og Linda Oja, 'Vitnande visionärer. Guds och Djävulens redskap i Dalarnas häxprocesser', 177–184, i Hanne Sanders (red.), *Mellom Gud og Djævelen. Religiøse og magiske verdensbilleder i Norden 1500 –1800* (København, 2001); Jari Eilola, 'Lapsitodistajien kertomukset Ruotsin noitatapaukissa 1668–1676' [Barnevitner i trolldomssaker i Sverige 1668–1676], E-journal *Kasvatus and Aika*, 3 (2009, upaginert); Liv H. Willumsen, 'Children Accused of Witchcraft in 17th-century Finnmark', *Scandinavian Journal of History*, vol. 38, no. 1 (2013), 18-41.

[25] Liv Helene Willumsen, "Oral transference of ideas about witchcraft in seventeenth-century Norway", i Thomas Cohen and Leslie Twomey (eds.), *Spoken Word and Social Practice* (Brill, Leiden, 2015, kommer); Liv Helene Willumsen, *Witches of the North* (Leiden, 2013); Liv Helene Willumsen, *Dømt til ild og bål* (Stamsund, 2013); Liv Helene Willumsen, *Seventeenth-Century Witchcraft Trials in Scotland and Northern Norway* (PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2008).

[26] Statsarkivet i Tromsø, Sorenskriveren i Finnmarks Arkiv (SATØ, SF), løpenr. 25, fol. 2a.

[27] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 2b.

[28] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 2b.

[29] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 2b.

[30] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 2b.

[31] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 2a–2b.

[32] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 2b.

[33] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 2b.

[34] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 2b.

[35] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 3a.

[36] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 3a.

[37] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 3a.

[38] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 3a.

[39] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 3a.

[40] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 2a.

[41] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 3a.

[42] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 3a-3b.

[43] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 3b.

[44] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 3b.

[45] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 3b.

[46] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 3b–4a.

[47] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 4a.

[48] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 4a.

[49] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 4a.

[50] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 4a.

[51] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 4a.

[52] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 4a.

[53] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 4b.

[54] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 4b.

[55] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 4a.

[56] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 4b.

[57] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 4b.

[58] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 4b.

[59] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 5a.

[60] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 5a.

[61] I denne sammenhengen betyr ordet finsk.

[62] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 5a.

[63] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 5a.
[64] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 5a.
[65] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 5b.
[66] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 5b.
[67] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 6a.
[68] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 6a.
[69] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 6a.
[70] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 6a–6b.
[71] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 7b.
[72] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 8a.
[73] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 8a.
[74] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 8a.
[75] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 8a.
[76] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 8b.
[77] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 11b.
[78] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 15a.
[79] Pollan, *Samiske beretninger*, 24.
[80] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 3a.
[81] Fra en samtidig kilde skrevet av Niels Knag datert 15. desember 1693 kommer det fram at Anders Poulsen var beveget og felte tårer i rettssalen. Ref. Appendix til Thott nr. 1735, Kongelige Bibliotek, København.
[82] Niemi, E., "Hans Hansen Lilienskiold – embetsmann, vitenskapsmann og opprører", i *Portretter fra norsk historie* (Oslo 1993), 61; Niemi, "Anders Paulsen (Poulsen, Pouelsen)", 84; Rydving, H., *The End of drum-time: Religious Change among the Lule Saami, 1670s-1740s* (Uppsala, 1995), 35–42; Hagen, "Samisk", 2.
[83] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 1a–1b.
[84] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 7b.
[85] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 2a.
[86] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 2a.
[87] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 3a.
[88] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 3b.
[89] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 3b.
[90] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 3b.
[91] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 5a.
[92] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 5b.
[93] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 6b.
[94] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 6b.
[95] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 7b.
[96] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 7b.
[97] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 8a.
[98] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 8a.
[99] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 8a.
[100] Lov vedtatt i 1686 bestemte at en dødsdom avsagt i en trolldomssak skulle forelegges kongen før henrettelse.
[101] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 5a.
[102] Håkan Rydving, *Samisk Religionshistorisk bibliografi* (Uppsala, 1993); J. Qvigstad og K. B. Wicklund, *Bibliographie der Lappischen Literatur* (Helsingfors, 1899); *Berättelser om samerna i 1600-talets Sverige* (Kungl. Skytteanska Samfundets handlingar (Nr. 27, 1983) gir en del opplysninger om trommer og samisk gudstjeneste; Håkan Rydving, *The End of Drum-Time* (Uppsala, 1993), særlig kapitlene 'Ritual Aspects' og 'Social Aspects' redegjør for vesentlige aspekter ved samisk sjamanisme. Samiske guder og gudinner er også omskrevet i Hans Mebius' bok *Bissie: studier i samisk religionshistorie*.
[103] Lars Nilsson brukte runebomme og trefigurer. Han ble dømt til bålet, og både trommen og trefigurene ble brent før ham selv. Ref. Granquist, K., "Du skal inga andra gudar hava jämte mig", i B-P. Finstad (red.), *Stat, religion, etnisitet* (Tromsø, 1997), 71–88.
[104] Han ble dømt til døden av lokal rett, men på veien til henrettelsesstedet falt han død om, angivelig grunnet trolldom. Ref. Fellman, I., *Handlingar och uppsatsar angåande finska lappmarken och lapparne*, vol. I (Helsingfors, 1910), 383–86.
[105] Jørkov, B., "Den stærke tromme", *Siden Saxo*, nr. 1 (2000), 9–17.
[106] Se arbeider av K. Leem 1767, J.A. Friis 1871, J. Qvigstad 1903, S. Agrell 1934, T. I. Itkonen 1956, E. Manker 1950 og L. Bäckman 1975. Ref. Leem, K., *Beskrivelse over Finmarkens Lapper* (København, 1767); Friis, J. A., *Lappisk mytologi. Eventyr og Folkesagn* (Christiania, 1871); Qvigstad, J., *Kildeskrifter til den lappiske mytologi* (Trondheim, 1903); Agrell, S., *Lapptrummor och runmagi* (Lund, 1934); Itkonen, T. I.,

Heidnischer Religion und Späterer Aberglaube bei den Finnishen Lappen (Helsinki, 1956); Manker, *Die lappische*; Bäckman, L., *Sájva: föreställinger om hjälp- och skyddsväsen i helige fjäll bland samerna* (Stockholm, 1975); Ernst Manker, *Nåjdkonst. Trolltrummans bildvärld* ((Halmstad, 1965).

[107] Blant annet har man Niels Knags beskrivelse, publisert i *Nordnorske Samlinger*. Fra 1711 ”Instruks for helligdagsvægterne” (prestens medhjelpere) utstedt av amtmann Lorch og prost Paus, ref. ”Hans Skankes Epitomes Historiæ Missions Lapponicæ Pars Qvarta, 1730”, i *Nordlands og Troms Finner i Eldre Håndskrifter* (Oslo, 1943), 33. I tillegg inneholder prost Paus’ relasjon av 1715, vesentlig bygget på Isaac Olsens meddelelser, opplysninger om ”Lappernes hedenskap”. Isaac Olsen skrev i 1717, etter at hadde forlatt Finnmark, ”Om Lappernes Vildfarelser og Overtro”, ref. Just Qvigstad (red.), *Kildeskrifter til den lappiske mytologi II*, Det Kgl. norske videnskabers selskabs skrifter 1910, no. 4 (Trondhjem, 1910). Se også Hammonds misjonshistorie, 27–34.

[108] Utgitt av Kjeldeskriftfondet, b. I, ved Kristian Nissen og Ingolf Kvamen.

[109] Edgar Reuterskiöld, *Källskrifter till Lapparnas mytologi* (Stockholm, 1910), 88-98, på s. 97-98.

[110] Edgar Reuterskiöld, *Källskrifter till Lapparnas mytologi* (Stockholm, 1910), 1-7, på s. 2.

[111] Tromsø Museums skrifter XXIV, Nordkalott-forlasget (1993).

[112] Rolf Kjellström og Håkan Rydving, *Den samiska trumman* (Nordiska Museet, 1988); Edgar Reuterskiöld, *Källskrifter till Lapparnas mytologi* (Stockholm, 1910), 28-41, på s. 31-36.

[113] Isaac Olsen, ”Om Lappernes Vildfarelser og Overtro”, i Just Qvigstad (red.), *Kildeskrifter til den lappiske mytologi II*, Det Kgl. norske videnskabers selskabs skrifter 1910, no. 4 (Trondhjem, 1910), 22; K.B. Wicklund (red.), *Berättelser om Samerna i 1600-talets Sverige* (1983), 67.

[114] Edgar Reuterskiöld, *Källskrifter till Lapparnas mytologi* (Stockholm, 1910), 88-98, på s. 94-96;Brita Pollan, *Noaidier. Historier om samisk sjamaner* (Oslo, 2002), XXII.

[115] Pollan, *Samiske beretninger*, 24.

[116] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 3a.

[117] SATØ, SF 25, fol. 3a.

[118] Isaac Olsen, ”Om Lappernes Vildfarelser og Overtro”, i Just Qvigstad (red.), *Kildeskrifter til den lappiske mytologi II*, Det Kgl. norske videnskabers selskabs skrifter 1910, no. 4 (Trondhjem, 1910), 40.

Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom

Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument

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INTRODUCTION
Guide-Quotes[1]

One thing in any case is certain: man is neither the oldest nor the most constant problem that has been posed for human knowledge. Taking a relatively short chronological sample within a restricted geographical area—European culture since the sixteenth century—one can be certain that man is a recent invention within it. . . . In fact, among all the mutations that have affected the knowledge of things and their order, the . . . only one, that which began a century and a half ago and is now perhaps drawing to a close, has made it possible for the figure of man to appear. And that appearance . . . was the effect of a change in the fundamental arrangements of knowledge. . . . If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared . . . one can certainly wager that man would be erased.

—*Michel Foucault,* The Order of Things: An Archaeology of The Human Sciences

The reality in highly indebted countries is grim. Half of Africa's population—about 300 million people—live without access to basic healthcare or a safe water source. In Tanzania, where 40 percent of the population dies before age 35, the government spends nine times more on foreign debt payments than on healthcare. In 1997, before Hurricane Mitch, Nicaragua spent more than half its revenue on debt payments. Until recently, it has taken countries in structural adjustment programs six or more years to get debt relief. For lenders this seems like common sense—making sure the country has its economic house in order before canceling debts—but the human cost is tremendous. Six years is a child's entire elementary school education. If governments are forced to cut subsidies for public education and charge fees that make schooling too expensive for the poor, it cheats a whole generation of children.

—*Robert W. Edgar, "Jubilee 2000: Paying Our Debts"*

Step up to the White House, "Let me in!"
What's my reason for being? I'm your next of kin,
And we built this motherfucker, you wanna kill me 'cause o' my hunger?
. . . I'm just a black man, why y'all made it so hard?
Damn, nigga gotta go create his own job,
Mr. Mayor, imagine this was yo backyard,
Mr. Governor, imagine it's yo kids that starve,
Imagine yo kids gotta slang crack to survive,
Swing a Mac to be alive, . . .
Extinction of Earth? Human cutdown? . . .
Tax-payers pay for more jails for black and latin faces"

—*Nas, "CIA"*

Definitions of the intellectual are many and diverse. They have, however, one trait in common, which makes them also different from all other definitions: they are all self-definitions. Indeed, their authors are the members of the same rare species they attempt to define. . . . The specifically intellectual form of the operation—self-definition—masks its universal content which is

the reproduction and reinforcement of a given social configuration, and—with it—a given (or claimed) status for the group.

—*Zygmunt Bauman,* Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-Modernity and Intellectuals

What is known as the Gregorian reform was actually an effort of modernization initiated and carried out by the Church from about 1050 until 1215 (the year of the Fourth Lateran Council). The reform first of all established the independence of the Church from secular society. And what better barrier could have been erected between clergy and laity than that of sexuality? Marriage became the property of lay men and women; virginity, celibacy, and/or continence became the property of priests, monks, and nuns. A wall separated the pure from the impure. Impure liquids were banished from the realm of the pure: the clergy was not allowed to spill sperm or blood and not permitted to perpetuate original sin through procreation. But in the realm of the impure the flow was not stanched, only regulated. The Church became a society of bachelors, which imprisoned lay society in marriage.

—*Jacques Le Goff,* The Medieval Imagination

The intellectual's schizoid character stems from the duality of his social existence; his history is a record of crises of conscience of various kinds, with a variety of origins. In their ideologies the intellectuals cultivate certain particular interests until they have universalized them, then turn about and expose the partiality of those ideologies. . . . They articulate the rules of the social order and the theories which give them sanction, but at the same time it is intellectuals who criticize the existing scheme of things and demand its supersession.

—*George Konrad, Ivan Szelenyi,* The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power

Now the highest Father, God the master-builder, . . . took up man . . . and placing him at the midpoint of the world . . . spoke to him as follows: "We have given to thee, Adam, no fixed seat, no form of thy very own, no gift peculiarly thine, that thou mayest feel as thine own, have as thine own, pos-

> sess as thine own the seat, the form, the gifts which thou thyself shalt desire. A limited nature in other creatures is confined within the laws written down by Us. In conformity with thy free judgment, in whose hands I have placed thee, thou art confined by no bounds; and thou wilt fix limits of nature for thyself. . . . Neither heavenly nor earthly, neither mortal nor immortal have We made thee. Thou, like a judge appointed for being honorable art the molder and maker of thyself; thou mayest sculpt thyself into whatever shape thou dost prefer. Thou canst grow downward into the lower natures which are brutes. Thou canst again grow upward from thy soul's reason into the higher natures which are divine."
>
> —*Pico della Mirandola,* Oration on the Dignity of Man

THE ARGUMENT PROPOSES THAT THE STRUGGLE OF OUR NEW MILLENNIUM WILL be one between the ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass (i.e., Western bourgeois) conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species itself/ourselves. Because of this overrepresentation, which is defined in the first part of the title as the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom, any attempt to unsettle the coloniality of power will call for the unsettling of this overrepresentation as the second and now purely secular form of what Aníbal Quijano identifies as the "Racism/Ethnicism complex," on whose basis the world of modernity was brought into existence from the fifteenth/sixteenth centuries onwards (Quijano 1999, 2000),[2] and of what Walter Mignolo identifies as the foundational "colonial difference" on which the world of modernity was to institute itself (Mignolo 1999, 2000).[3]

The correlated hypothesis here is that all our present struggles with respect to race, class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, struggles over the environment, global warming, severe climate change, the sharply unequal distribution of the earth resources (20 percent of the world's peoples own 80 percent of its resources, consume two-thirds of its food, and are responsible for 75 percent of its ongoing pollution, with this leading to two billion of

earth's peoples living relatively affluent lives while four billion still live on the edge of hunger and immiseration, to the dynamic of overconsumption on the part of the rich techno-industrial North paralleled by that of overpopulation on the part of the dispossessed poor, still partly agrarian worlds of the South[4])—these are all differing facets of the central ethnoclass Man vs. Human struggle. Central to this struggle also is the usually excluded and invisibilized situation of the category identified by Zygmunt Bauman as the "New Poor" (Bauman 1987). That is, as a category defined at the global level by refugee/economic migrants stranded outside the gates of the rich countries, as the postcolonial variant of Fanon's category of les damnés (Fanon 1963)—with this category in the United States coming to comprise the criminalized majority Black and dark-skinned Latino inner-city males now made to man the rapidly expanding prison-industrial complex, together with their female peers—the kicked-about Welfare Moms—with both being part of the ever-expanding global, transracial category of the homeless/the jobless, the semi-jobless, the criminalized drug-offending prison population. So that if we see this category of the damnés that is internal to (and interned within) the prison system of the United States as the analog form of a global archipelago, constituted by the Third- and Fourth-World peoples of the so-called "underdeveloped" areas of the world—most totally of all by the peoples of the continent of Africa (now stricken with AIDS, drought, and ongoing civil wars, and whose bottommost place as the most impoverished of all the earth's continents is directly paralleled by the situation of its Black Diaspora peoples, with Haiti being produced and reproduced as the most impoverished nation of the Americas)—a systemic pattern emerges. This pattern is linked to the fact that while in the post-sixties United States, as Herbert Gans noted recently, the Black population group, of all the multiple groups comprising the post-sixties social hierarchy, has once again come to be placed at the bottommost place of that hierarchy (Gans, 1999), with all incoming new nonwhite/non-Black groups, as Gans's fellow sociologist Andrew Hacker (1992) earlier pointed out, coming to claim "normal" North American identity by the putting of visible distance between themselves and the Black population group (in effect, claiming "normal" human status by distancing themselves from the group that is still made to occupy the nadir,

"nigger" rung of being human within the terms of our present ethnoclass Man's overrepresentation of its "descriptive statement" [Bateson 1969] as if it were that of the human itself), then the struggle of our times, one that has hitherto had no name, is the struggle against this overrepresentation. As a struggle whose first phase, the Argument proposes, was first put in place (if only for a brief hiatus before being coopted, reterritorialized [Godzich 1986]) by the multiple anticolonial social-protest movements and intellectual challenges of the period to which we give the name, "The Sixties."

The further proposal here is that, although the brief hiatus during which the sixties' large-scale challenge based on multiple issues, multiple local terrains of struggles (local struggles against, to use Mignolo's felicitous phrase, a "global design" [Mignolo 2000]) erupted was soon to be erased, several of the issues raised then would continue to be articulated, some in sanitized forms (those pertaining to the category defined by Bauman as "the seduced"), others in more harshly intensified forms (those pertaining to Bauman's category of the "repressed" [Bauman 1987]). Both forms of "sanitization" would, however, function in the same manner as the lawlike effects of the post-sixties' vigorous discursive and institutional re-elaboration of the central overrepresentation, which enables the interests, reality, and well-being of the empirical human world to continue to be imperatively subordinated to those of the now globally hegemonic ethnoclass world of "Man." This, in the same way as in an earlier epoch and before what Howard Winant identifies as the "immense historical rupture" of the "Big Bang" processes that were to lead to a contemporary modernity defined by the "rise of the West" and the "subjugation of the rest of us" (Winant 1994)—before, therefore, the secularizing intellectual revolution of Renaissance humanism, followed by the decentralizing religious heresy of the Protestant Reformation and the rise of the modern state—the then world of laymen and laywomen, including the institution of the political state, as well as those of commerce and of economic production, had remained subordinated to that of the post-Gregorian Reform Church of Latin-Christian Europe (Le Goff 1983), and therefore to the "rules of the social order" and the theories "which gave them sanction" (See Konrad and Szelenyi guide-quote), as these rules were articulated by its theologians and implemented by its celibate clergy (See Le Goff guide-quote).

The Janus face of the emergence of Mignolo's proposed "modernity/coloniality" complementarity is sited here. As also is the answer to the why of the fact that, as Aníbal Quijano insists in his Qué tal Raza! (2000), the "idea of race" would come to be "the most efficient instrument of social domination invented in the last 500 years." In order for the world of the laity, including that of the then ascendant modern European state, to escape their subordination to the world of the Church, it had been enabled to do so only on the basis of what Michel Foucault identifies as the "invention of Man": that is, by the Renaissance humanists' epochal redescription of the human outside the terms of the then theocentric, "sinful by nature" conception/ "descriptive statement" of the human, on whose basis the hegemony of the Church/clergy over the lay world of Latin-Christian Europe had been supernaturally legitimated (Chorover 1979). While, if this redescription was effected by the lay world's invention of Man as the political subject of the state, in the transumed and reoccupied place of its earlier matrix identity Christian, the performative enactment of this new "descriptive statement" and its master code of symbolic life and death, as the first secular or "degodded" (if, at the time, still only partly so) mode of being human in the history of the species, was to be effected only on the basis of what Quijano identifies as the "coloniality of power," Mignolo as the "colonial difference," and Winant as a huge project demarcating human differences thinkable as a "racial longue durée." One of the major empirical effects of which would be "the rise of Europe" and its construction of the "world civilization" on the one hand, and, on the other, African enslavement, Latin American conquest, and Asian subjugation.

Part I

The Janus Face of the Invention of "Man": Laws of Nature and the Thinkability of Natural, rather than Supernatural Causality versus the Dynamics of the Colonizer/Colonized Answer to the Question of Who/What We Are.

This "enormous act of expression/narration" was paradoxical. It was to be implemented by the West and by its intellectuals as indeed a "Big Bang" process by which it/they were to initiate the first gradual de-supernaturalizing

of our modes of being human, by means of its/their re-invention of the theocentric "descriptive statement" Christian as that of Man in two forms. The first was from the Renaissance to the eighteenth century; the second from then on until today, thereby making possible both the conceptualizability of natural causality, and of nature as an autonomously functioning force in its own right governed by its own laws (i.e., *cursus solitus naturae*) (Hubner 1983; Blumenberg 1983; Hallyn 1990), with this, in turn, making possible the cognitively emancipatory rise and gradual development of the physical sciences (in the wake of the invention of Man1), and then of the biological sciences (in the wake of the nineteenth century invention of Man2). These were to be processes made possible only on the basis of the dynamics of a colonizer/colonized relation that the West was to discursively constitute and empirically institutionalize on the islands of the Caribbean and, later, on the mainlands of the Americas.

This seeing that if, as Quijano rightly insists, race—unlike gender (which has a biogenetically determined anatomical differential correlate onto which each culture's system of gendered oppositions can be anchored)—is a purely invented construct that has no such correlate (Quijano 2000), it was this construct that would enable the now globally expanding West to replace the earlier mortal/immortal, natural/supernatural, human/the ancestors, the gods/God distinction as the one on whose basis all human groups had millennially "grounded" their descriptive statement/prescriptive statements of what it is to be human, and to reground its secularizing own on a newly projected human/subhuman distinction instead. That is, on Quijano's "Racism/Ethnicism" complex, Winant's "race concept," Mignolo's "colonial difference," redefined in the terms of the Spanish state's theoretical construct of a "by-nature difference" between Spaniards and the indigenous peoples of the Americas (Padgen 1982): a difference defined in Ginés de Sepúlveda's sixteenth-century terms as almost a difference between "monkeys and men," homunculi and true humans. "Race" was therefore to be, in effect, the non-supernatural but no less extrahuman ground (in the reoccupied place of the traditional ancestors/gods, God, ground) of the answer that the secularizing West would now give to the Heideggerian question as to the who, and the what we are.

In his 1999 Coloniality Working Group conference presentation, Walter Mignolo perceptively identified one of the consequences of the "Big Bang" initiation of the "colonial difference" as that of the fact that, "in the imaginary of the modern/colonial world system sustainable knowledge . . . disregarded Amerindian ways of knowing and knowledge production that were reduced to curious practices of strange people and, in another domain were demonized." However, the anthropologist Jacob Pandian (1985) enables us to see that this epistemological "disregard" was itself part of an even more central imperative—that of the sustainability of the new mode of being human, of its epochal redescription as, primarily, that of the political subject of the state Man in the transumed and reoccupied place of Latin-Christian Europe's founding matrix description, Christian, which had defined the human as primarily the religious subject of the Church. While, if this new descriptive statement (one that was to gradually privatize as well as harness the matrix Christian identity to the realizing of the modern state's own secular goals of imperial territorial expansion) was also to be effected on the basis of a parallel series of discursive and institutional inventions, there was one that was to be as novel as it was to be central. This, as Pandian documents, was to be that of the West's transformation of the indigenous peoples of the Americas/the Caribbean (culturally classified as Indians, indios/indias), together with the population group of the enslaved peoples of Africa, transported across the Atlantic (classified as Negroes, negros/negras) into the physical referents of its reinvention of medieval Europe's Untrue Christian Other to its normative True Christian Self, as that of the Human Other to its new "descriptive statement" of the ostensibly only normal human, Man.

In his seminal book, *Anthropology and the Western Tradition: Towards an Authentic Anthropology* (1985), Jacob Pandian enables us to see that within the terms of the Judeo-Christian religious creed (within the terms, therefore, of its variant of the "formulation of a general order of existence," correlated "postulate of a significant ill," and therefore proposed behavior-motivating "cure" or "plan of salvation" that is defining of all religions [Girardot 1988]), the physical referents of the conception of the Untrue Other to the True Christian Self had been the categories of peoples defined in reli-

gious terminology as heretics, or as Enemies-of-Christ infidels and pagan-idolaters (with Jews serving as the boundary-transgressive "name of what is evil" figures, stigmatized as Christ-killing deicides). In the wake of the West's reinvention of its True Christian Self in the transumed terms of the Rational Self of Man1, however, it was to be the peoples of the militarily expropriated New World territories (i.e., Indians), as well as the enslaved peoples of Black Africa (i.e., Negroes), that were made to reoccupy the matrix slot of Otherness—to be made into the physical referent of the idea of the irrational/subrational Human Other, to this first degodded (if still hybridly religio-secular) "descriptive statement" of the human in history, as the descriptive statement that would be foundational to modernity.

So that rather than "sustainable knowledge" merely disregarding the "other ways of knowing" of the Amerindian peoples, as Mignolo contends, Pandian proposes instead that it was to be the discourses of this knowledge, including centrally those of anthropology, that would function to construct all the non-Europeans that encountered (including those whose lands its settlers expropriated and those whom they enslaved or enserfed) as the physical referent of, in the first phase, its irrational or subrational Human Other to its new "descriptive statement" of Man as a political subject. While the "Indians" were portrayed as the very acme of the savage, irrational Other, the "Negroes" were assimilated to the former's category, represented as its most extreme form and as the ostensible missing link between rational humans and irrational animals. However, in the wake of the West's second wave of imperial expansion, pari passu with its reinvention of in Man now purely biologized terms, it was to be the peoples of Black African descent who would be constructed as the ultimate referent of the "racially inferior" Human Other, with the range of other colonized dark-skinned peoples, all classified as "natives," now being assimilated to its category—all of these as the ostensible embodiment of the non-evolved backward Others—if to varying degrees and, as such, the negation of the generic "normal humanness," ostensibly expressed by and embodied in the peoples of the West. Nevertheless, if the range of Native Others were now to be classified, as Pandian further explains, in the terms of the multiple mythologies, of the savage Other, the fossil Other, the abnormal Other, the timeless ethnographic

Other, the most salient of all these was to be that of the mythology of the Black Other of sub-Saharan Africans (and their Diaspora descendants). It is this population group who would come to be made, several centuries on, into an indispensable function of the enacting of our present Darwinian "dysselected by Evolution until proven otherwise" descriptive statement of the human on the biocentric model of a natural organism. With this population group's systemic stigmatization, social inferiorization, and dynamically produced material deprivation thereby serving both to "verify" the overrepresentation of Man as if it were the human, and to legitimate the subordination of the world and well-being of the latter to those of the former. All of this was done in a lawlike manner through the systemic stigmatization of the Earth in terms of its being made of a "vile and base matter," a matter ontologically different from that which attested to the perfection of the heavens, and thereby (as such) divinely condemned to be fixed and unmoving at the center of the universe as its dregs because the abode of a post-Adamic "fallen" mankind had been an indispensable function of the "verifying" of medieval Latin-Christian Europe's then theocentric descriptive statement of human as "sinful by nature." In this way, the descriptive statement on which the hegemony of the world of the Church over the lay world was legitimated (Chorover 1979).

Gregory Bateson and Frantz Fanon, thinking and writing during the upheaval of the anticolonial/social-protest movements of the sixties, were both to put forward new conceptions of the human outside the terms of our present ethnoclass conception that define it on the model of a natural organism, as these terms are elaborated by the disciplinary paradigms and overall organization of knowledge of our present episteme (Foucault 1973). In an essay entitled "Conscious Purpose vs. Nature," published in 1969, Bateson proposed that in the same way as the "physiology" and "neurology" of the human individual function in order to conserve the body and all the body's physical characteristics—thereby serving as an overall system that conserves descriptive statements about the human as far as his/her body is concerned—so a correlated process can be seen to be at work at the level of the psyche or the soul. To put it another way, not only is the descriptive statement of the psyche/soul determinant of the kind of higher-level learning

that must take place, seeing that the indispensable function of each such system of learning must be, imperatively, to conserve that descriptive statement, but it is also determinant of the overall range of acquired know-how that is produced by the interactions of the wider society in which each individual finds itself—and as a society whose overall descriptive statement will necessarily be of the same general order as that of the individual, at the level of the psyche/soul. All such learning, whether at the microlevel of the individual or at the macrolevel of the society, must therefore function within the terms of what Foucault has identified as a specific "regime" and/or "politics of truth" (Foucault 1980, 1981).

Fanon had then gone on to analyze the systemically negative representation of the Negro and of his African past that defined the curriculum of the French colonial school system of the Caribbean island of Martinique in which he had grown up (one in which, as he also notes, no Black counter-voice had been allowed to exist), in order to reveal why, as a result of the structures of Bateson's system of learning designed to preserve the status quo, the Antillean Negro had indeed been socialized to be normally anti-Negro. Nor, the Argument proposes, was there anything arbitrary about this deliberate blocking out or disregard of a "Black" voice, of a positive Black self-conception. Rather this "blocking out" of a Black counter-voice was, and is itself defining of the way in which being human, in the terms of our present ethnoclass mode of sociogeny, dictates that Self, Other, and World should be represented and known; a lay counter-voice could no more have normally existed within the terms of the mode of sociogeny of medieval Latin-Christian Europe. In consequence, because it is this premise that underlies the interlinked nature of what I have defined (on the basis of Quijano's founding concept of the coloniality of power) as the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom, with the logical inference that one cannot "unsettle" the "coloniality of power" without a redescription of the human outside the terms of our present descriptive statement of the human, Man, and its over-representation (outside the terms of the "natural organism" answer that we give to the question of the who and the what we are), the Argument will first link this premise to a fundamental thesis developed by Nicholas Humphrey in his book *A History of the Mind: Evolution and the Birth of Consciousness*,

published in 1992. It will then link both to the sixteenth-century dispute between Bartolomé de Las Casas, the missionary priest, on the one hand, and the humanist royal historian and apologist for the Spanish settlers of then Santo Domingo, Ginés de Sepúlveda, on the other—as a dispute that it will define as one between two descriptive statements of the human: one for which the expansion of the Spanish state was envisaged as a function of the Christian evangelizing mission, the Other for which the latter mission was seen as a function of the imperial expansion of the state; a dispute, then, between the theocentric conception of the human, Christian, and the new humanist and ratiocentric conception of the human, Man_2 (i.e., as homo politicus, or the political subject of the state).

Here, the Argument, basing itself on Fanon's and Bateson's redefinition of the human, proposes that the adaptive truth-for terms in which each purely organic species must know the world is no less true in our human case. That therefore, our varying ontogeny/sociogeny modes of being human, as inscribed in the terms of each culture's descriptive statement, will necessarily give rise to their varying respective modalities of adaptive truths-for, or epistemes, up to and including our contemporary own. Further, that given the biocentric descriptive statement that is instituting of our present mode of sociogeny, the way we at present normatively know Self, Other, and social World is no less adaptively true as the condition of the continued production and reproduction of such a genre of being human and of its order as, before the revolution initiated by the Renaissance humanists, and given the then theocentric descriptive statement that had been instituting of the mode of sociogeny of medieval Latin-Christian Europe, its subjects had normatively known Self, Other, as well as their social, physical, and organic worlds, in the adaptively true terms needed for the production and reproduction not only of their then supernaturally legitimated genre of being human, but as well for that of the hierarchical social structures in whose intersubjective field that genre of the human could have alone realized itself.

And it is with the production and reproduction of the latter (i.e., the social world) that a crucial difference needs to be identified in our human case. This was the difference identified by C. P. Snow when he described our present order of knowledge as one defined by a Two Culture divide between

the natural sciences, on the one hand (whose domains comprise the physical cosmos, as well as that of all biological life), and the disciplines of the social sciences and the humanities on the other (Snow 1993). And although there has been some attempt recently to rebut the hypothesis of this divide, centrally among these the Gulbenkian Report on the social sciences prepared by a team of scholars headed by Immanuel Wallerstein and Valentin Mudimbe (1994), the fact remains that while the natural sciences can explain and predict, to a large extent, the behaviors of these nonhuman worlds, the disciplines of the social sciences and humanities still remain unable to explain and predict the parameters of the ensemble of collective behaviors that are instituting of our contemporary world—to explain, therefore, the why not only of the large-scale inequalities, but also of the overall Janus-faced effects of large-scale human emancipation yoked to the no less large-scale human degradation and immiseration to which these behaviors collectively lead. These behaviors, whether oriented by the residual metaphysics of fertility/reproduction of the agrarian age in the poorer parts of the world, or by the metaphysics of productivity and profitability of our techno-industrial one in the rich enclaves—with the one impelling the dynamics of overpopulation, and the other that of overconsumption—now collectively threaten the planetary environment of our human-species habitat.

The Argument proposes, in this context, that the still unbreachable divide between the "Two Cultures"—a divide that had been briefly challenged by the range of anticolonial as well as the social cum intellectual movements of the sixties, before these movements were re-coopted—lies in the fact that our own disciplines (as literary scholars and social scientists whose domain is our sociohuman world) must still continue to function, as all human orders of knowledge have done from our origin on the continent of Africa until today, as a language-capacitated form of life, to ensure that we continue to know our present order of social reality, and rigorously so, in the adaptive "truth-for" terms needed to conserve our present descriptive statement. That is, as one that defines us biocentrically on the model of a natural organism, with this a priori definition serving to orient and motivate the individual and collective behaviors by means of which our contemporary Western world-system or civilization, together with its nation-state sub-

units, are stably produced and reproduced. This at the same time as it ensures that we, as Western and westernized intellectuals, continue to articulate, in however radically oppositional a manner, the rules of the social order and its sanctioned theories (Konrad and Szelenyi 1979).

Recent and still ongoing scholarship on archaeo-astronomy has shown that all human orders—from the smallest society of nomadic hunter-gatherers, such as the San people of the Kalahari, to the large-scale societies of Egypt, China, the Greeks, and the Romans—have mapped their "descriptive statements" or governing master codes on the heavens, on their stable periodicities and regular recurring movements (Krupp 1997). Because, in doing so, they had thereby mapped their specific criterion of being human, of what it was "to be a good man and woman of one's kind" (Davis 1992), onto the physical cosmos, thereby absolutizing each such criterion; and with this enabling them to be experienced by each order's subjects as if they had been supernaturally (and, as such, extrahumanly) determined criteria, their respective truths had necessarily come to function as an "objective set of facts" for the people of that society—seeing that such truths were now the indispensable condition of their existence as such a society, as such people, as such a mode of being human. These truths had therefore both commanded obedience and necessitated the individual and collective behaviors by means of which each such order and its mode of being human were brought into existence, produced, and stably reproduced. This, therefore, meant that all such knowledges of the physical cosmos, all such astronomies, all such geographies, whatever the vast range of human needs that they had successfully met, the range of behaviors they had made possible—indeed, however sophisticated and complex the calculations that they had enabled to be made of the movements of the heavens (as in the case of Egypt and China)—had still remained adaptive truths-for and, as such, ethno-astronomies, ethno-geographies.

This was no less the case with respect to the long tradition of Greek/Hellenistic astronomy, which a medieval Judeo-Christian Europe would have inherited. Since, in spite of the great advances in mathematical astronomy to which its fundamental Platonic postulate (that of an eternal, "divinized" cosmos as contrasted with the Earth, which was not only subject to change

and corruption, but was fixed and unmoving at the center) has led a long line of astronomers to struggle to "save the phenomena" (i.e., to reconcile their measurements of the movements of the heavens with this premise), Greek astronomy was to remain an ethno-astronomy. One, that is, in which the moral/political laws of the Greek polis had been projected upon the physical cosmos, enabling them to serve as "objective truth" in Feyerabend's (1987) sense of the term, and therefore as, in my own terms, adaptive truth-for the Greeks. With the consequence that their projected premise of a value distinction and principle of ontological distinction between heaven and earth had functioned to analogically replicate and absolutize the central order-organizing principle and genre-of-the-human distinction at the level of the sociopolitical order, between the non-dependent masters who were Greek-born citizens and their totally dependent slaves classified as barbarian Others. With this value distinction (sociogenic principle or master code of symbolic life/death) then being replicated at the level of the intra-Greek society, in gendered terms (correlatedly), as between males, who were citizens, and women, who were their dependents.

In a 1987 interview, the theoretical physicist David Bohm explained why the rise of the physical sciences would have been impossible in ancient Greece, given the role that the physical cosmos had been made to play in stabilizing and legitimating the structures/hierarchies and role allocations of its social order. If each society, Bohm pointed out, bases itself on a general notion of the world that always contains within it "a specific idea of order," for the ancient Greeks, this idea of order had been projected as that of an "increasing perfection from the earth to the heavens." In consequence, in order for modern physics (which is based on the "idea of successive positions of bodies of matter and the constraints of forces that act on these bodies") to be developed, the "order of perfection investigated by the ancient Greeks" had to become irrelevant. In other words, for such an astronomy and physics to be developed, the society that made it possible would have to be one that no longer had the need to map its ordering principle onto the physical cosmos, as the Greeks and all other human societies had done. The same goes for the need to retain the Greek premise of an ontological difference of substance between the celestial realm of perfection (the realm of

true knowledge) and the imperfect realm of the terrestrial (the realm of doxa, of mere opinion).

This was not a mutation that could be easily effected. In his recent book *The Enigma of the Gift* (1999), Maurice Godelier reveals an added and even more powerful dimension as to why the mutation by which humans would cease to map the "idea of order" onto the lawlike regularities of physical nature would not be easily come by. This would come to be effected only in the wake of the Renaissance humanists' initiation of the processes that would lead to the degodding/de-supernaturalizing of our modes of being human on the basis of their invention of Man in the reoccupied place of their earlier matrix theocentric identity, Christian.

Although, Godelier writes, as human beings who live in society, and who must also produce society in order to live, we have hitherto always done so by producing, at the same time, the mechanisms by means of which we have been able to invert cause and effect, allowing us to repress the recognition of our collective production of our modes of social reality (and with it, the Argument proposes, the recognition also of the self-inscripted, auto-instituted nature of our genres/modes of being human). Central to these mechanisms was the one by which we projected our own authorship of our societies onto the ostensible extrahuman agency of supernatural Imaginary Beings (Godelier 1999). This imperative has been total in the case of all human orders (even where in the case of our now purely secular order, the extrahuman agency on which our authorship is now projected is no longer supernatural, but rather that of Evolution/Natural Selection together with its imagined entity of "Race"). As if, in our contemporary case, Evolution, which pre-adapted us by means of the co-evolution of language and the brain to self-inscript and auto-institute our modes of being human, and to thereby artificially program our own behaviors—doing so, as the biologist James Danielli pointed out in a 1980 essay, by means of the discourses of religion, as well as of the secular ones that have now taken their place—still continued to program our hybrid ontogeny/sociogeny behaviors by means of unmediated genetic programs. Rather than, as Danielli further argued, all such behaviors being lawlikely induced by discursively instituted programs whose good/evil formulations function to activate the biochemical

reward/punishment mechanism of the brain—as a mechanism that, while common to all species, functions in the case of humans in terms specific to each such narratively inscribed and discursively elaborated descriptive statement and, thereby, to its mode of the "I" and correlated symbolically/altruistically bonded mode of the eusocial "we" (Danielli 1980).

If, as David Bohm pointed out, the Greeks' "idea of order" had been mapped upon degrees of perfection, projected upon the physical cosmos as degrees of rational perfection extending from the apex of the heavens' degrees to the nonhomogenous nadir of the earth's—with the rise, in the wake of the collapse of the Roman Empire, of a now Judeo-Christian Europe, while the classical Greco-Roman (i.e., Ptolemaic) astronomy that had given expression to the Greek idea of order was to be carried over—it was to be Christianized within the terms of Judeo-Christianity's new "descriptive statement" of the human, based on its master code of the "Redeemed Spirit" (as actualized in the celibate clergy) and the "Fallen Flesh" enslaved to the negative legacy of Adamic Original Sin, as actualized by laymen and women. Hence the logic by which medieval Latin-Christian Europe's "notion of the world" and "idea of order" would become one of degrees of spiritual perfection, at the same time as it would remain mapped onto the same "space of Otherness" principle of nonhomogeneity (Godzich 1986). With the result that on the basis of this projection, the medieval Latin-Christian subject's sensory perception of a motionless earth would have "verified" for them not only the postulate of mankind's justly condemned enslavement to the negative Adamic legacy, but, even more centrally, the "sinful by nature" descriptive statement of the human in whose terms they both experienced themselves as Christians, being thereby behaviorally impelled to seek redemption from their enslavement through the sacraments of the Church, as well as by adhering to its prohibitions, and to thereby strive to attain to its otherworldly goal—that of Divine Election for eternal salvation in the Augustinian civitas dei (the city of God).

Central to Winant's "immense historical rupture," therefore, was the conceptual break made with the Greco-Roman cum Judeo-Christian premise of a nonhomogeneity of substance, and thereby of an ontological distinction between the supralunar and the sublunar, heaven and earth, as the break

that was to make possible the rise of a nonadaptive, and therefore natural-scientific, mode of cognition with respect to the "objective set of facts" of the physical level of reality: with respect to what was happening "out there." The fifteenth-century voyages of the Portuguese (to and around Africa, then to the East), as well as Columbus's voyages across an until-then held to be (by Western Europeans) non-navigable Atlantic Ocean (since both of these areas, Black Africa and the Americas, had been held to be uninhabitable, the one because too hot, the other because under water, with both being outside God's providential Grace) were themselves expressions of the same overall process of self-transformation. This as the process that, internal to late-medieval Latin-Christian Europe, was to underpin the rise of the modern political city and monarchical states of Europe, and that (together with an ongoing commercial revolution) were to effectively displace the theologically absolute hegemony of the Church, together with that of its celibate clergy, over the lay or secular world, replacing it with that of their (i.e. the monarchical states') politically absolute own. The new conceptual ground of this reversal had, however, been made possible only on the basis of the intellectual revolution of Renaissance humanists—a revolution that, while allied to the Reform movement of Christian humanism, was mounted in large part from the counter-perspective of the lay intelligentsia. From the viewpoint, therefore, of the category whose members had until then been compelled to think and work within the very theocentric paradigms that legitimated the dominance of the post-Gregorian Reform Church and its celibate clergy (the name clergy means, in Greek, the chosen) over the lay world—as these paradigms had been elaborated in the context of the then hegemonic Scholastic order of knowledge of medieval Europe.

This theological condemnation of the "natural man" of the laity had become even more intensified by medieval Scholasticism's reconception of the human in Aristotelian Unmoved/Mover terms. Its Omnipotent God had created the world for the sake of His Own Glory, thereby creating mankind only contingently and without any consideration for its own sake (propter nos homines/for our human sake), had left it, in the wake of the Adamic Fall and its subsequent enslavement to the Fallen Flesh, without any hope of being able to have any valid knowledge of reality except through the media-

tion of the very paradigms that excluded any such hope. Given that it was precisely these theologically absolute paradigms that, by circularly verifying the "sinful by nature" cognitive incapacity of fallen mankind, served at the same time to validate both the hegemony of the Church and of the celibate clergy over the lay world, including the state, as well as the hegemony of the supratemporal perspective of the Church (based on its represented access to Divine Eternal Truth) over any knowledge generated from the local, temporal, and this-worldly perspective of a lay world ostensibly entrapped in the fallen time of the secular realm, this thereby subjected mankind to the instability and chaos of the capricious whims of Fortune (Pocock 1989).

The lay intelligentsia of medieval Europe had, therefore, found themselves in a situation in whose context, in order to be learned and accomplished scholars, they had had to be accomplices in the production of a "politics of truth" that subordinated their own lay world and its perspective on reality to that of the Church and of the clergy. Accomplices also in the continued theoretical elaboration of a theocentric descriptive statement of the human, in whose terms they were always already the embodied bearers of its postulate of "significant ill"—that of enslavement to Original Sin—an "ill" curable or redeemable only through the mediation of the Church and the clergy, and circularly, through that of the theologically absolute paradigms that verified the hegemony of the latter.

The manifesto (put forward from the perspective of the laity) that was to make possible the rupture in whose terms the Copernican Revolution and the new epoch that would become that of the modern world were to be made possible was that of the fifteenth-century treatise by the Italian humanist Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494) entitled *Oration on the Dignity of Man*. In this treatise, Pico rewrote the Judeo-Christian origin narrative of Genesis. Adam, rather than having been placed in the Garden of Eden, then having fallen, then having been expelled with Eve from the garden by God, is shown by Pico to have not fallen at all. Instead, he had come into existence when God, having completed his Creation and wanting someone to admire His works, had created Man on a model unique to him, then placed him at the center/midpoint of the hierarchy of this creation, commanding him to "make of himself" what he willed to be—to decide for himself whether to fall

to the level of the beasts by giving into his passions, or, through the use of his reason, to rise to the level of the angels (See Pico's guide-quote). It was therefore to be on the basis of this new conception, and of its related civic-humanist reformulation, that Man was to be invented in its first form as the rational political subject of the state, as one who displayed his reason by primarily adhering to the laws of the state—rather than, as before, in seeking to redeem himself from enslavement to Original Sin by primarily adhering to the prohibitions of the Church.

Two strategies were made use of in order to effect this epochal degodding (if, at first, only in hybridly religio-secular terms) of the "descriptive statement" in whose terms humans inscript and institute themselves/ourselves as this or that genre of being human. The strategy was that of a return: the return by the humanists to Greco-Roman thought, to (in the case of Pico) the Jewish mystical tradition of the Kabbalah, as well as to the even earlier Egyptian thought as transmitted through these latter, in order to find both a space outside the terms of the medieval order's "descriptive statement" and an alternative model on which to reinvent the matrix optimally Redeemed-in-the-Spirit Self of the Christian, the "subject of the church," as that of the Rational Self of Man as political subject of the state. While it was the revalorization of natural man that was implicit in this overall return to the Greco-Roman and other pre-Christian thought, and models by Renaissance humanists such as Ficino and Pico, as Fernand Hallyn (1990) has proposed, that was to make possible Copernicus's intellectual challenge to the ontological distinction between the supralunar and sublunar realms of the cosmos: to its foundational premise of a nonhomogeneity of substance between them.

Why was this the case? Within the terms of the medieval order's theocentric conception of the relation between a totally Omnipotent God and contingently created humans, the latter could not attempt to gain valid knowledge of physical reality by basing him/herself on the regularity of its laws of functioning. Seeing that God, as an absolute and unbound God, could arbitrarily intervene in the accustomed course of nature (cursus solitus naturae) in order to alter its processes of functioning, by means of miracles, at any time He wished to do so. It was therefore to be, as Hallyn

proposes, the humanists' revalorized conception of a more egalitarian relation between natural man and a Christian God, reconceived as a Caring Father who had created the universe specifically for man's sake (propter nos homines, for our human sake), that provided the counter-ground for the Copernican rupture with the orthodox Christianized astronomy that had been inherited from the Greeks. It was the new premise that God had created the world/universe for mankind's sake, as a premise that ensured that He would have had to make it according to rational, nonarbitrary rules that could be knowable by the beings that He had made it for, that would lead to Copernicus's declaration (against the epistemological resignation of Ptolemaic astronomy, which said that such knowledge was not available for mere mortals) that since the universe had been made for our sake by the best and wisest of master craftsmen, it had to be knowable (see Copernicus guide-quote).

In his book *The Medieval Imagination*, Jacques Le Goff analyzes the way in which the medieval order of Latin-Christian Europe had organized itself about a value principle or master code that had been actualized in the empirical relation between the celibate category of the clergy (as the embodiment of the Spirit, and the noncelibate category of the 1aity (as the embodiment of the Fallen Flesh). This Spirit/Flesh code had then been projected onto the physical cosmos, precisely onto the represented nonhomogeneity of substance between the spiritual perfection of the heavens (whose supralunar bodies were imagined to move in harmonious and perfectly circular motions) as opposed to the sublunar realm of Earth, which, as the abode of a post-Adamic fallen mankind, had to be at the center of the universe as its dregs—and, in addition, to be not only nonmoving as it is sensed by us to be, but to be so because divinely condemned to be nonmoving in the wake of the Fall. However, it was not only the Earth that had to be known in these adaptive truth-for terms, within the conceptual framework of the Christian-Ptolemaic astronomy of the time. The geography of the earth had also had to be known in parallel Spirit/Flesh terms as being divided up between, on the one hand, its temperate regions centered on Jerusalem—regions that, because held up above the element of water by God's Providential Grace, were habitable—and, on the other, those realms that, because outside this

Grace, had to be uninhabitable. Before the fifteenth-century voyages of the Portuguese and Columbus, which disproved this premise of the nonhomogeneity of the earth's geography, the Torrid Zone beyond the bulge of Cape Bojador on the upper coast of Africa had therefore had to be known as too hot for habitation, while the Western hemisphere had had to be known as being devoid of land, seeing that all land there had to remain, in the framework of Christian Aristotelian physics, submerged in its "natural place" under water, since ostensibly not held "unnaturally" above the water by Divine Grace.

This series of symbolically coded Spirit/Flesh representations mapped upon the "space of Otherness" of the physical cosmos had not only functioned to absolutize the theocentric descriptive statement of the human, its master code of symbolic life (the Spirit) and death (the Flesh), together with that statement's overall explanatory thesis of supernatural causation. It had also served to absolutize "a general order of existence," together with its "postulate of significant ill," whose mode of affliction then logically calls for the particular "plan of salvation" or redemptive cure able to cure the specific "ill" that threatened all the subjects of the order, in order to redeem them from its threat of nihilation/negation that is common to all religions (Girardot 1988). Now in specific Judeo-Christian formulation, the postulate of "significant ill" had, of course, been that of mankind's enslavement to Original Sin, with his/her fallen state placing him/her outside God's Grace, except when redeemed from this "ill" by the sacrament of baptism as administered by the clergy. While this behavior-motivating schema had itself also been anchored on the Spirit/Flesh, inside/outside God's Grace, ill/cure system of symbolic representations attached to the represented supra/sublunar nonhomogeneity of substance of the physical cosmos, as well as to the habitable/uninhabitable geography of the earth.

Here the Argument identifies Girardot's schemas as ones that also function beyond the limits of original religious modalities, seeing them instead in the terms of Danielli's hypothesis as forms of the central, behavior-motivating/-demotivating, discursive, good/evil postulates, able to activate the biochemical reward and punishment mechanism—and, therefore, as the central "machinery of programming" that is common to all human orders,

whether religious or secular. In consequence, whether religious or secular, all such schemas/programs and their formulations of "a general order of existence" also function to inscribe the specific "descriptive statement" of the human that is enacting of the ontogeny/sociogeny, nature-culture mode of being human, for whom the specific ensemble of motivated behaviors will be adaptively advantageous. In this conceptual framework it can therefore be recognized that it was in the context of the humanists' redescribing of the Christian definition of the human—in new, revalorizing, and (so to speak) propter nos homines and/or Man-centric terms—that the series of fifteenth-century voyages on whose basis the West began its global expansion voyages (one of which proved that the earth was homogeneously habitable by humans, seeing that the Torrid Zone was indeed inhabited, as was that of the land of the Western hemisphere that turned out to be above water), together with Copernicus's new astronomy (which proposed that the earth also moved about the Sun, projected as the center, and was therefore of the same substance as, homogeneous with, the heavenly bodies), were to initiate the rupture that would lead to the rise of the physical sciences. Thereby, to a new order of cognition in which "the objective set of facts" of the physical level of reality was now to be gradually freed from having to be known in the adaptive terms of a truth-for specific to each order, as they had been millennially—to be known as they were and are "out there."

What needs to be emphasized here is, firstly, that the two orthodox presuppositions that were now to be swept away—that of the nonhomogeneity of the geography of the earth and that of the nonhomogeneity of the earth and the heavens—had been ones indispensable to the conservation of the medieval order's theocentric descriptive statement of the human. Secondly, it had been the reinvention by the lay humanists of the Renaissance of the matrix identity Christian in terms of the new descriptive statement of Man as political subject, allied to the historical rise and expansion of the modern state (for whom, eventually, these earlier orthodox presuppositions, their truth-fors, were expendable, because no longer of any adaptive advantage to its own instituting as such a mode of being human), that had made the sweeping away of the earlier unquestioned principles of nonhomogeneity possible.

This sweeping away led a later Isaac Newton to exult that, because it had now been shown that all parts of the universe were made of the same forces, of the same matter, one could now be able to extrapolate from the bodies nearest to us, and on the analogy of nature always consonant with itself, what the bodies furthest from us had necessarily to be (Funkenstein 1986).

To sum up: this means that the epochal rupture that was set in motion by Western intellectuals, by means of which human knowledge of the physical cosmos would be freed from having to be known in the adaptive truth-for terms that had been hitherto indispensable to the instituting of all human orders and their respective modes/genres of being human—the rupture that was to lead to the gradual development of the physical sciences—had been made possible only by the no less epochal reinvention of Western Europe's matrix Judeo-Christian genre of the human, in its first secularizing if still hybridly religio-secular terms as Man as the Rational Self and political subject of the state, in the reoccupied place of the True Christian Self, or mode of sociogeny, of Latin-Christian Europe; by the reinvention also of the secular entity of the West in the reoccupied place of the latter, with this reinvention being based on the model of Virgil's Roman imperial epic.

This takes us back to the negative aspect of the dialectical process of culture-historical transformation by which the West was to initiate the first phase of the degodding of its descriptive statement of the human, thereby also initiating the processes that were to lead to the development of the new order of nonadaptive cognition that is the natural sciences. Since it was to be in the specific terms of this reinvention—one in which while, as Christians, the peoples of the West would see themselves as one religious genre of the human, even where they were to be convinced that theirs was the only true religion, and indeed, as Lyotard points out, were unable to conceive of an Other to what they called God—as Man, they would now not only come to overrepresent their conception of the human (by means of a sustained rhetorical strategy based on the topos of iconicity [Valesio 1980]) as the human, thereby coming to invent, label, and institutionalize the indigenous peoples of the Americas as well as the transported enslaved Black Africans as the physical referent of the projected irrational/subrational

Human Other to its civic-humanist, rational self-conception. The West would therefore remain unable, from then on, to conceive of an Other to what it calls human—an Other, therefore, to its correlated postulates of power, truth, freedom. All other modes of being human would instead have to be seen not as the alternative modes of being human that they are "out there," but adaptively, as the lack of the West's ontologically absolute self-description. This at the same time as its genuine difference from all others (i.e., its secularizing reinvention of its matrix religious identity from the Renaissance onwards as that of Man in two forms—one ratiocentric and still hybridly religio-secular, the other purely secular and biocentric) would remain overseen, even non-theorizable within the acultural premise on whose basis it had effected the reinvention of its matrix Christian genre or theological "descriptive statement" of the human.

This central oversight would then enable both Western and westernized intellectuals to systemically repress what Geertz has identified as the "fugitive truth" of its own "local culturality" (Geertz 1983)—of, in Bruno Latour's terms, its specific "constitution with a capital C," or cultural constitution that underlies and charters our present order, as the parallel constitutions of all other human orders that Western anthropologists have brilliantly elucidated underlie and charter all other human orders (Latour 1991)—doing so according to the same hybrid nature-culture, ontogeny/sociogeny laws or rules. With this systemic repression ensuring that we oversee (thereby failing to recognize) the culture and class-specific relativity of our present mode of being human: Man in the second, transumed, and now purely biocentric and homo oeconomicus form of that first invention that was to lead to Winant's "immense historical rupture," to Quijano's "Racism/Ethnicism" complex, and to Mignolo's modernity/coloniality complementarity.

What were the specific terms of that first reinvention? Of its overrepresentation? Why were these terms to lie at the basis of the Las Casas/Sepúlveda dispute, whose empirical outcome—in favor of the latter's humanist arguments as opposed to Las Casas's still theologically grounded ones—was to provide the legitimated "ground" for what was to become the colonizer (both the metropolitan imperialists and their settler enforcers) vs. colonized relation (both Indians and Negroes, on the one hand, and the set-

tlers as criollos subjugated to the metropolitan peninsulares—whether those of Spain, England, or France—on the other).

Part II

The Las Casas/Sepúlveda Dispute and the Paradox of the Humanists' Invention/Overrepresentation of "Man": On the Coloniality of Secular Being, the Instituting of Human Others.

> The suggestion that the Indians might be slaves by nature—a suggestion which claimed to answer questions concerning both their political and their legal status—was first advanced as a solution to a political dilemma: by what right had the crown of Castile occupied and enslaved the inhabitants of territories to which it could make no prior claims based on history? . . . [John Mair's text adopted from Aristotle's Politics] was immediately recognized by some Spaniards as offering a final solution to their problem. Mair had, in effect, established that the Christians' claims to sovereignty over certain pagans could be said to rest on the nature of the people being conquered, instead of on the supposed juridical rights of the conquerors. He thus avoided the inevitable and alarming deduction to be drawn from an application of these arguments: namely that the Spaniards had no right whatsoever to be in America.
>
> —*Anthony Pagden,* The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indians and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology

> Leopoldo is asked to compare the Spaniards with the Indians, "who in prudence, wisdom (ingenium), every virtue and humanity are as inferior to the Spaniards as children are to adults, women are to men, the savage and ferocious [man] to the gentle, the grossly intemperate to the continent and temperate and finally, I shall say, almost as monkeys are to men." . . . "Compare the gifts of magnanimity, temperance, humanity and religion of these men," continues Democrates, "with those homunculi [i.e., the Indians] in whom hardly a vestige of humanity remains."
>
> —*Ginés de Sepúlveda (cited by Pagden)*

The major reason for writing (this book) was that of seeing all and such an infinite number of the nations of this vast part of the world slandered (defamed) by those who did not fear God . . . [and who published] it abroad that the peoples of these parts, were peoples who lacked sufficient reason to govern themselves properly, were deficient in public policy (and) in well-ordered states (republics) . . . as if Divine Providence, in its creation of such an innumerable number of rational souls, had carelessly allowed human nature to so err . . . in the case of such a vast part of the human lineage (*de linaje humano*) as is comprised by these people allowing them to be born lacking in sociality, and therefore, as monstrous peoples, against the natural tendency of all the peoples of the earth . . .

—*Fr. Bartolomé de Las Casas,* Apologetic History of the Indies

I am talking of millions of men who have been skillfully injected with fear, inferiority complexes, trepidation, servility, despair, abasement.

—*Aimé Césaire,* Discourse on Colonialism[5]

Leopoldo: If a breach of natural law is a just cause for making war, either I am wrong, or there will be no nation on earth that cannot be militarily attacked because of their sins against, or breaches of, the natural law. Tell me then, how many and which nations do you expect to find who fully observe the law of nature?

Democrates: Many do, I am sure: [but] there are no nations which call themselves civilized and are civilized who do not observe natural law.

—*Ginés de Sepúlveda,* The Second Democrates, or
On the Just Causes of War Against the Indians

Clearly one cannot prove in a short time or with a few words to infidels that to sacrifice men to God is contrary to nature. Consequently neither anthropophagy nor human sacrifice constitutes just cause for making war on certain kingdoms. . . . For the rest, to sacrifice innocents for the salvation of the Commonwealth is not opposed to natural reason, is not something abominable and contrary to nature, but is an error that has its origin in natural reason itself.

—*Las Casas's reply to Ginés de Sepúlveda*[6]

And there is no difference with respect to the duties imposed upon these who do not know him, (the True God as we Christians do) as long as they hold some God to be the true God, and honor him as such. . . . This is because the mistaken conscience/consciousness (*la conciencia erronea*) obliges and compels exactly the same way as does the true/a correct one (*la conciencia recta*).

—*Las Casas,* Tratados de Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas (Third Treatise)

The priest Casas having at the time no knowledge of the unjust methods which the Portuguese used to obtain slaves, advised that permission should be given for the import of slaves into the islands, an advice which, once he became informed about these methods, he would not have given for the world. . . . The remedy which he proposed to import Black slaves in order to liberate the Indians was not a good one, even though he thought the Black slaves, at the time to have been enslaved with a just title; and it is not at all certain that his ignorance at the time or even the purity of his motive will sufficiently absolve him when he finds himself before the Divine Judge.

—*Las Casas,* History of the Indies (vol. 3)

. . . Doctor Sepúlveda, before dealing with an issue of which he had no direct knowledge should have sought information from those servants of God, who have toiled day and night to preach to convert the peoples of the Indies, rather than have rushed to pay heed to and give credit to those profane and tyrannical men who, in order to justify the expropriations (*latrocinio*) robberies and murders that they have committed, as well as the usurped social rank to which they have climbed doing so at the cost of the vast torrents of spilled blood, of the suffering and damnation of an infinite number of innocent souls, have persuaded him to write his thesis [i.e., in defence of their position/interests].

—*Las Casas,* Tratados

Culture, in my view, is what a human being creates and what creates a human being at the same time. In culture, the human being is simultaneously creator and creation. This is what makes culture different from both the natural and the supernatural; because in the supernatural we have the world of

> the Creator, and in nature we have the world of creations. The coincidence of these two roles in a human being is what makes him a cultural being. . . . Transculture means a space in, or among, cultures, which is open to all of them. Culture frees us from nature; transculture frees us from culture, from any one culture.
>
> —*Mikhail Epstein, "Postcommunist Postmodernism: An Interview"*

> About the Pope being the Lord of all the universe in the place of God, and that he had given the lands of the Indies to the King of Castille, the Pope must have been drunk when he did it, for he gave what was not his. . . . The king who asked for and received this gift must have been some madman for he asked to have given to him that which belonged to others.
>
> —*Cenú Indians' reply to the Spaniards*[7]

Two different anthropologies and their respective origin models/narratives had inscribed two different descriptive statements of the human, one which underpinned the evangelizing mission of the Church, the other the imperializing mission of the state based on its territorial expansion and conquest. Nevertheless, rather than merely a Christian/classics opposition, the second descriptive statement, that of "Man" as political subject of the state, was to be instead a syncretized synthesis of the anthropology of the classics drawn into a secularizing Judeo-Christian framework, and therefore into the field of what Latour would call the West's "constitution with a capital C."

This syncretism had already been at work in the formulations of Ficino and Pico della Mirandola. For the latter, classical thought had enabled him, as part of his revalorizing strategy of natural man, to fuse the original Judeo-Christian conception of the human as being made in the image of God, with the view of Platonic philosophy in which man is defined by the fact of the choice that he can give himself to adopt "the sensual life of an animal or the philosophical life of the gods." Ficino had also defined man in terms derived from both Christian and Platonic, as well as other pre-Christian sources as a creature standing between "the physical world of nature" and "the spiritual

world of the angels of God": as balanced between "natural" and "supernatural" order. It was in the context of this syncretized reinscription that the new criterion of Reason would come to take the place of the medieval criterion of the Redeemed Spirit as its transumed form—that the master code of symbolic life ("the name of what is good") and death ("the name of what is evil") would now become that of reason/sensuality, rationality/irrationality in the reoccupied place of the matrix code of Redeemed Spirit/Fallen Flesh. The descriptive statement instituting of the humanists' Man would therefore use the Judeo-Christian answer to the what and who we are (i.e., the "human created in the image of God," but later become the embodiment of Original Sin) to revalorize the medieval order's fallen natural man by proposing that, because "God is included in man in that an image embodies and includes its exemplar," human reason had remained "lord over the senses similar to the way in which God is lord over his creatures."

The relation here is one of analogy. While reason is not a god, "it partakes of some of God's functions" in that it is intended to rule over a "lower order of reality." The fundamental separation for Pico was one between two orders of creation, with man placed by God at the midpoint between them. These were, on the one hand, the "super-celestial" regions with minds (i.e., angels, pure intelligences), and on the other, a region "filled with a diverse throng of animals, the cast off and residual parts of the lower world." Placed between these two realms, man was the only creature "confined by no bounds," free to "fix limits of nature" for himself, free to be "molder and maker of himself" (see Pico's guide-quote). Rather than the medieval Christian's choice of remaining enslaved to the Fallen Flesh and to Original Sin, or seeking to be Redeemed-in-the-Spirit through the sacraments of the Church, this newly invented Man's choice is that of either growing downwards into the lower natures of brutes, or responding to the Creator's call to grow "upward" to "higher" and "divine" natures (Miller 1965).

With this redescription, the medieval world's idea of order as based upon degrees of spiritual perfection/imperfection, an idea of order centered on the Church, was now to be replaced by a new one based upon degrees of rational perfection/imperfection. And this was to be the new "idea of order" on whose basis the coloniality of being, enacted by the dynamics of the rela-

tion between Man—overrepresented as the generic, ostensibly supracultural human—and its subjugated Human Others (i.e., Indians and Negroes), together with, as Quijano notes, the continuum of new categories of humans (i.e., mestizos and mulattos to which their human/subhuman value difference gave rise), was to be brought into existence as the foundational basis of modernity. With this revealing that, from the very origin, the issue of race, as the issue of the Colonial Question, the Nonwhite/Native Question, the Negro Question, yet as one that has hitherto had no name, was and is fundamentally the issue of the genre of the human, Man, in its two variants—the issue of its still ongoing production/reproduction in the form of the second variant.

The clash between Las Casas and Sepúlveda was a clash over this issue—the clash as to whether the primary generic identity should continue to be that of Las Casas's theocentric Christian, or that of the newly invented Man of the humanists, as the rational (or ratiocentric) political subject of the state (the latter as the "descriptive statement" in whose terms Sepúlveda spoke). And this clash was to be all the more deep-seated in that the humanists, while going back to the classics and to other pre-Christian sources in order to find a model of being human alternative to the one in whose terms the lay world was necessarily subordinated, had effected their now new conception and its related "formulation of a general order of existence" only by transuming that of the Church's matrix Judeo-Christian conception, thereby carrying over the latter's schematic structure, as well as many of its residual meanings.

In this transumed reformulation, while the "significant ill" of mankind's enslavement was no longer projected as being to the negative legacy of Adamic Original Sin, the concept of enslavement was carried over and redescribed as being, now, to the irrational aspects of mankind's human nature. This redescription had, in turn, enabled the new behavior-motivating "plan of salvation" to be secularized in the political terms of the this-worldly goals of the state. Seeing that because the "ill" or "threat" was now that of finding oneself enslaved to one's passions, to the particularistic desires of one's human nature, salvation/redemption could only be found by the subject able to subdue his private interests in order to adhere to the laws of the

politically absolute state, and thereby to the "common good." This meant that the primary behavior-motivating goal, rather than that of seeking salvation in the civitas dei, was now that of adhering to the goal of the civitas saecularis (Pocock 1975): the goal, that is, of seeking to ensure the stability, order, and territorial expansion of the state in a competitive rivalry with other European states. This at the same time as the primacy of the earlier religious ethic, as defended by Las Casas from a universalistic Christian perspective, was replaced by the new ethic of "reasons of state," as the ethic carried by a Sepúlveda whose civic humanist values were still, at the time, only incipiently emergent. However, it is the latter ethic that, given the existential sociopolitical and commercial, on-the-ground processes that were to lead to the rapid rise of the centralizing state,[8] to its replacement of the medieval system-ensemble with its monarchical own (Hubner 1983), and to the expanding mercantilism with its extra-European territorial conquests, exponentially accelerated was soon to triumph and become the accepted doctrine of the times.

Nowhere is this mutation of ethics seen more clearly than in two plays written in the first decades of the seventeenth century: one the well-known play by Shakespeare, *The Tempest*; the other the less well-known play by Spain's Lope de Vega, written at roughly the same time and entitled *The New World Discovered by Christopher Columbus*. In the plot of *The Tempest*, the central opposition is represented as being between Prospero and Caliban; that is, between Higher Reason as expressed in the former, and irrational, sensual nature as embodied in the latter. The drunken sailors, Stephano and Trinculo, had also, like Caliban, been shown as embodying that enslavement to the irrational aspects of human nature (if to a lesser degree than the latter) which Prospero must repress in himself if he is to act as a rational ruler; that is, one for whom the securing of the stability and order of the state (in effect, reasons-of-state) had now to be the overriding imperative, the major this-worldly goal. And while Miranda as woman, and as a young girl, is shown as poised at midpoint between rational and irrational nature, she is pre-assured of attaining to the former status because of her father's tutoring. This master code of rational nature/irrational nature, together with the new "idea of order" as that of degrees of rational perfection in place of the

earlier degrees of spiritual perfection, is also seen to be at work in Lope's play, even where syncretized with the earlier religious ethic within the context of Spain's Counter Reformation order of discourse. There, the rational/irrational master code contrasts the rational Christian king and queen of Spain, Ferdinand and Isabel, as opposed, on the one hand, to the "irrational" Moorish prince of Granada—who is shown dallying with the sensual pleasures of love while Ferdinand and Isabel capture Granada, displacing him ("Orientalism" has an even longer history than Said has traced!)—and on the other, and most totally so,[9] to the "irrational" because tyrannical Arawak cacique who, because of his forcible abduction of the bride-to-be of one of his subjects, is shown to be as justly expropriated of his sovereignty, his lands, and his religion as Caliban is "justly" expropriated of his in The Tempest. In both plays, therefore, the Human Other figures to the generic human embodied in Prospero and in the Catholic king and queen are made to embody the postulate of "significant ill" of enslavement to the lower, sensory aspects of "human nature." At the same time, the generic human bearer-figures of the politically rational are made to actualize the new, transumed formulation and its conception of freedom as having no longer mastery over Original Sin (as well as over those Enemies-of-Christ who as such remain enslaved to it), but rather of mastery over their own sensory, irrational nature—and, as well, of all those Human Other categories who, like Shakespeare's Caliban and Lope de Vega's Dulcanquellín, are stigmatized as remaining totally enslaved to theirs.

But perhaps what Shakespeare's Reformation play reveals, more clearly than does Lope de Vega's Counter Reformation one, is the profound shift in the grounds of legitimacy of which Sepúlveda had been the proponent in the 1550s dispute with Las Casas, and that were now being instituted in early seventeenth-century Western Europe. That is, the shift in the terms by which the latter's ongoing expropriation of New World lands and the subsequent reduction of the indigenous peoples to being a landless, rightless,[10] neo-serf work force—together with the accelerated mass slave trade out of Africa to the Americas and the Caribbean and the instituting of the large-scale slave plantation system that that trade made possible—will be made to seem just and legitimate to its peoples. In addition, the way in which this shift will be

linked to another shift (one by which Western Europe's categorization of the "Indians" and "Negroes" in now secular rather than in the earlier religious terms of Otherness: the new terms, therefore, of Quijano's "Racism/Ethnicism" complex) will be effected.

As Valentin Mudimbe documents in his *The Invention of Africa* (1988), beginning in 1444 with the Portuguese landfall on the shores of Senegal West Africa, all the actions that were to be taken by European-Christians—their enslavement of non-Christians whom they first classified in theological terms as Enemies-of-Christ, whether those of Africa or those of the New World, together with their expropriation of the lands of the peoples on both continents (limitedly so, at that time, in the case of Africa; almost totally so in the case of the Americas)—were initially seen as just and legitimate in Christian theological terms. In these terms, all the concessions of non-European lands by the pope to the Portuguese and Spanish sovereigns were effected by means of several papal bulls that defined these lands as ones that, because not belonging to a Christian prince, were terra nullius ("the lands of no one"), and so legitimately expropriated by Christian kings (Mudimbe 1988). In other words, they were so seen within the terms of the adaptive truth-for of their "local culture's" still hegemonic descriptive statement of the human, and of the order of knowledge to which that statement gave rise. And, therefore, as the truth of the "single culture" in whose theocentric terms they thought and acted (Epstein 1993), whose truth they believed to be as supernaturally ordained as we now believe ours to be "objective" because, ostensibly, supraculturally true.

This means that the large-scale accumulation of unpaid land, unpaid labor, and overall wealth expropriated by Western Europe from non-European peoples, which was to lay the basis of its global expansion from the fifteenth century onwards, was carried out within the order of truth and the self-evident order of consciousness, of a creed-specific conception of what it was to be human—which, because a monotheistic conception, could not conceive of an Other to what it experienced as being human, and therefore an Other to its truth, its notion of freedom. Its subjects could therefore see the new peoples whom it encountered in Africa and the New World only as the "pagan-idolators," as "Enemies-of-Christ" as the Lack of its own nar-

rative ideal. This was consequential. It set in motion the secularizing reinvention of its own matrix Christian identity as Man. The non-Europeans that the West encountered as it expanded would classify the West as "abnormal" relative to their own experienced Norm of being human, in the Otherness slot of the gods or the ancestors. This was the case with the Congolese who, seeing the white skin of the Europeans as a sign of monstrous deviance to their Bantu genre/norm of being human, classified them together with their deceased ancestors (Axelson 1970). For the Europeans, however, the only available slot of Otherness to their Norm, into which they could classify these non-European populations, was one that defined the latter in terms of their ostensible subhuman status (Sahlins 1995).

The creation of this secular slot of Otherness as a replacement for the theocentric slot of Otherness in which non-European peoples had been classified in religious terms as Enemies-of-Christ, pagan-idolators, thereby incorporating them into the theological system of legitimacy—which, as set out in the papal bulls from the 1455 Romanus Pontifex onwards, had provided the framework in whose terms their ostensibly "lands of no one/terra nullius" had been seeable as justly expropriable, and they themselves justly enslavable as such pre-classified populations—was taking place, however, in the wider context of the overall sociopolitical and cultural transformation that had been set in motion in Western Europe from the Renaissance onwards, one correlated with the challenge of the then ascendant modern European monarchical state to the centralizing post-Gregorian hegemony of the Church.

In this context, Anthony Pagden has excellently documented the shift that would eventually take place in the grounds of legitimacy in whose terms Europeans were to see themselves as justly expropriating the lands and living space of the indigenous peoples of the New World. This shift, as he shows, would occur as a direct result of the fact that while, at first, the Spanish state had depended on the pope's having divided up the New World between Spain and Portugal, doing this in exchange for the promise that their respective states would help to further the evangelizing mission of Christianity, the Spanish sovereigns had soon become impatient with the papacy's claim to temporal as well as to spiritual sovereignty. In conse-

quence, King Ferdinand of Spain, wanting to claim temporal sovereignty for himself as he set out to institute the first Western European world empire, had summoned several councils comprised of jurists and theologians. He had then given them the mandate that they should come up with new grounds for Spain's sovereignty, which moved outside the limits of the sovereignty over the temporal world claimed by the papacy.

The fact that the theological grounds of the legitimacy both of Spain's sovereignty over the New World and of its settlers' rights to the indigenous people's lands (as well as of the latter's right, in the early period, to carry out slave-trading raids on the American mainland) had come upon a central obstacle made this matter all the more urgent. The obstacle was this: all the basic concepts of the theological system of legitimation—i.e., that the lands of non-Christian princes were terra nullius and as such justly expropriable by Christian princes; that the indigenous peoples could be enserfed or even enslaved where necessary—had come to founder upon a stubborn fact. This was that the indigenous peoples of the New World could not be classified as Enemies-of-Christ, since Christ's apostles had never reached the New World, never preached the Word of the Gospel to them. Which meant that because they could not have ever refused to hear the Word, they could not (within the terms of the orthodox theology of the Church) be classified as Christ-Refusers, their lands justly taken, and they themselves enslaved and/or enserfed with a "just title."

The life-long struggle of Bartolomé de Las Casas, the Spanish missionary priest, in the wake of his 1514 conversion experience, to save the Caribbean Arawaks from the ongoing demographic catastrophe that followed both their infection by new diseases to which they had no immunity and their subjection to the harsh, forced-labor regime of the Spaniards was a struggle waged precisely on the basis of the fact that such subjection could not be carried out with a "just title." This was, therefore, to lead him to make a fateful proposal, one that was to provide the charter of what was to become the Black-diasporic presence in the Americas. This proposal was that African slaves, whom he then believed to have been acquired with a just title, should be brought in limited numbers as a labor force to replace the Indians. This proposal, which kick-started what was to be the almost four-centuries-

long slave trade out of Africa, had therefore been the result of his struggle not to replace "Indians with Africans," as Liberal historians who think in biocentric, classificatory terms would have it—but rather, within the theological terms in which Las Casas thought and fought, to replace those whom he knew from first hand to have been enslaved and enserfed outside the "just title" terms of orthodox Christian theology with others whom, as he thought at the time, had been acquired within the terms of those "just titles." The cited passage (see Las Casas guide-quote) reveals that Las Casas, when he later found out that the African slaves had been no less ruthlessly acquired outside the terms of the same just titles than had been the Indians, was to bitterly repent of his proposal. But by then, the mass slave trade from Africa across the Atlantic that would give rise to today's transnational Black Diaspora had taken on a life and unstoppable dynamic of its own.

Las Casas had thought and acted in the terms of his Christian evangelizing imperative. The Spanish state's primary imperative, however, was that of its territorial expansion, of realizing its imperial goals of sovereignty over the new lands. Its jurists had, in this context, at first attempted to get around the Enemies-of-Christ obstacle by means of a judicial document called "The Requisition" ("Requerimento"). A hybridly theologico-juridical document, written in Latin, the Requisition was supposed to be read out to groups of assembled indigenes by a notary who was to accompany any slave-raiding, land-expropriating expedition that sailed from the first settled Caribbean islands to the mainland. This document was intended to ensure that the indigenes in question literally heard the Word of the Christian Gospel, so that they could then be later classified as having refused it, and therefore as Enemies-of-Christ. The document proclaimed to the indigenes that Christ, who was king over the world, had granted this sovereignty to the pope, who had in turn granted the lands of their "barbarous nations" to the king of Spain, who had sent the expedition members as his emissaries. The expeditionaries had been sent to give the indigenes the choice of accepting the king of Spain's sovereignty over their lands, together with their acceptance of Christ's Word and, with it, of conversion to Christianity. If they accepted the king's sovereignty together with conversion, they would be unharmed. Should they refuse (thereby making themselves Christ-Refusers and

Enemies-of-Christ), they would be attacked, captured, justly enslaved—their lands justly expropriated. If Las Casas was to write that on reading this document he did not know whether to laugh or cry, the reported reply by the Cenú peoples on the mainland to one such expedition opens a transcultural cognitive frontier onto the way in which, to use Marshall Sahlins' phrase (if somewhat inverting its meaning) "natives think" (Sahlins 1990), and law-likely so within the terms of their/our order-specific modes of adaptive cognition-for, truth-for.

Seen from hindsight, what the Cenú are saying (see Cenú/Greenblatt guide-quote) is that, outside the "local cultural" field of what was then Western Europe, and therefore outside the adaptive truth-for terms of its monarchical-Christian genre of being human, the speech of the Requisition was "mad and drunken": speech that was meaningless. Since it was only in the terms of what could seem just and legitimate to a specific genre of being human that the lands of non-Christian and non-European peoples could have been seen as the pope's to give, or the king of Castile's to take. What is of specific interest here is not only that it was this initial, large-scale, one-sided accumulation of lands, wealth, power, and unpaid labor by the West that was to provide the basis for today's 20/80 wealth and power ratio between the world's peoples, but also that this primary accumulation had been effected on the basis of a truth-for, or system of ethno-knowledge, that was no less non-veridical outside the viewpoint of its subjects than the premise the Portuguese and Columbus's voyages had only recently disproved—i.e., the premise that the Earth was nonhomogeneously divided into habitable within God's Grace and uninhabitable outside it. Seeing that what we also come upon is the nature of our human cognitive dilemma, one that is the very condition of their/our existence as hybridly nature-culture beings, the dilemma is how, in Epstein's terms, we can be enabled to free ourselves from our subordination to the one culture, the one descriptive statement that is the condition of us being in the mode of being that we are (Epstein 1993).

That vast dilemma, which is that of our still-unresolved issue of consciousness (McGinn 1999) was one that Las Casas brilliantly touched upon when, referring to the Aztecs' practice of human sacrifice, he stated that a

mistaken (i.e., adaptive) consciousness/conscience impels and obliges no less than does a true one. However, not only the Cenú Indians, but the Spaniards themselves had also come to realize the invalid nature of their attempt to get around the theological concept of Enemies-of-Christ. In consequence, as Pagden tells us, the Spanish Crown had, from early on, initiated the adoption of new grounds of legitimacy that were to eventually make the Requisition document unnecessary. The councils of jurists/theologians that King Ferdinand set up for this purpose had come up with a formula that, adopted from *The Politics* of Aristotle, would not only enable the master trope of Nature (seen as God's agent on Earth) to take the latter's authoritative place, but would also effect a shift from the Enemies-of-Christ/Christ-Refusers system of classification to a new and even more powerfully legitimating one. It was here that the modern phenomenon of race, as a new, extrahumanly determined classificatory principle and mechanism of domination (Quijano 2000), was first invented, if still in its first religio-secular form. For the indigenous peoples of the New World, together with the mass-enslaved peoples of Africa, were now to be reclassified as "irrational" because "savage" Indians, and as "subrational" Negroes, in the terms of a formula based on an a-Christian premise of a by-nature difference between Spaniards and Indians, and, by extrapolation, between Christian Europeans and Negroes. This neo-Aristotelian formula had been proposed by the Scottish theologian John Mair.

A new notion of the world and "idea of order" was being mapped now, no longer upon the physical cosmos—which beginning with the fifteenth-century voyages of the Portuguese and Columbus, as well as with the new astronomy of Copernicus, was eventually to be freed from having to serve as a projected "space of Otherness," and as such having to be known in the adaptive terms needed by human orders to represent their social structures as extrahumanly determined ones. Instead, the projected "space of Otherness" was now to be mapped on phenotypical and religio-cultural differences between human variations and/or population groups, while the new idea of order was now to be defined in terms of degrees of rational perfection/imperfection, as degrees ostensibly ordained by the Greco-Christian cultural construct deployed by Sepúlveda as that of the "law of nature," "nat-

ural law": as a "law" that allegedly functioned to order human societies in the same way as the newly discovered laws of nature served to regulate the processes of functioning of physical and organic levels of reality.

It is, therefore, the very humanist strategy of returning to the pagan thought of Greece and Rome for arguments to legitimate the state's rise to hegemony, outside the limits of the temporal sovereignty claimed by the papacy, that now provides a model for the invention of a by-nature difference between "natural masters" and "natural slaves," one able to replace the Christian/Enemies-of-Christ legitimating difference. For while Mair does not specifically use the term rational, the thesis of a by-nature difference in rationality (one transumed today into a by-Evolution "difference" in a substance called I.Q.) was to be central to the new legitimation of Spain's right to sovereignty, as well as of its settlers' rights both to the land and to the labor of the Indians. With, in consequence, the institution of the encomienda system, which attached groups of Indians to settlers as a neo-serf form of labor, together with the institution of the slave plantation system manned by "Negroes" coming to centrally function so as to produce and reproduce the socioeconomic and ontological hierarchies of the order as if indeed they had been mandated by the ostensibly extrahuman agency of "natural law."

For the settlers—as well as for their humanist royal historian and chaplain, Ginés de Sepúlveda, who defended their claims (against the opposition of the Dominican missionaries and, centrally so, of Las Casas, who sought to put an end to the encomienda labor system)—the vast difference that existed in religion and culture between the Europeans and the indigenous peoples was clear evidence of the latter's lack of an ostensibly supracultural natural reason. The quite Other form of life and mode of being human of the indigenous peoples were therefore simply seen by the Spaniards as the irrational Lack of their own. So that even when confronted, as in the case of the Aztecs, with the latter's complex and well-organized imperial civilization—one, however, based on the central institution of large-scale human sacrifice—Sepúlveda was able to argue that this practice by itself was clear evidence of the Aztecs' lack of "natural reason": of their having therefore been determined by "natural law" to be the "natural slaves" of the Spaniards.

In opposition to this thesis, and from the perspective of his own universalist Christianity and evangelizing imperative, Las Casas was to put forward, in his formal dispute with Sepúlveda in 1556, one of the earliest attempts at a transcultural mode of thinking—one that was almost heretical to his own Christian religious beliefs. He had counter-argued that the Aztec practice of human sacrifice was a religious practice that, rather than giving proof of the Aztecs' lack of rational reason, proved itself to be an error of reason itself. This, given that to the Aztecs human sacrifice, "the sacrifice of innocents for the good of the commonwealth," was a practice that was not only seen by them to be a legitimate, just, and rational act, but was also one that had seemed to them to be a pious and virtuous one. In effect, an act that had been seen as being as righteous and virtuous by the Aztecs in their adaptive truth-for terms (based on their having mistaken, from Las Casas's Christian perspective, their false gods for the true One) as the Spanish settlers' expropriation of the indigenous peoples' lands and the enserfment of their lives/labor would come to seem just and legitimate to them within the adaptive truth-for and incipiently secular terms of the new "reasons-of-state" legitimation now being put forward by Sepúlveda.

The universally applicable Christianity in the terms of whose schema of Divine Election and Damnation Las Casas waged his struggle (terms that, once he had been informed by his fellow Portuguese missionaries of the unjust and rapacious methods used by the Portuguese to acquire African slaves, would lead him to confess that his proposal put his own soul in mortal danger), and the identity that he had experienced as primary—that of being a Christian (an identity that had impelled him to do "all that one ought to as a Christian," which for him had centrally included making use of the state as a means of evangelizing the Indians) were increasingly being made secondary. This at the same time as the new identity of the "political subject" (one defined by a "reasons-of-state ethic," which instead used the Church for its own this-worldly purpose) came to take center stage—the new identity of which intellectuals like Sepúlveda were now the bearers.

In consequence, the humanist counter-discourse of the latter, which functioned in the terms of this new descriptive statement and of its "reasons-of-state ethic," now became the new "common sense" (as we see it

enacted in Shakespeare's *The Tempest*) of the pre-Enlightenment, pre-Darwinian era. It was therefore within the terms of this new "common sense"—and in the context of his defense of the settlers' rights to the lands and enserfed labor of the indigenous peoples, as well as of the Crown's right to wage just war against the latter if they resisted its sovereignty—that Sepúlveda further elaborated Mair's proposed legitimating of neo-Aristotelian by-nature difference, defining it as one based not only on differential degrees of rationality, but also as being human, of humanity.

Here we see the fatal error attendant on the West's degodding of its religious Judeo-Christian descriptive statement of the human at its clearest. While, as Christians, Westerners could see other peoples as also having gods (even if, for them, necessarily "false" ones as contrasted with their "true" and single One), as subjects defined by the identity Man, this could no longer be the case. Seeing that once its "descriptive statement" had been instituted as the only, universally applicable mode of being human, they would remain unable, from then on until today, of (to paraphrase Lyotard) conceiving an Other to what they call human (Lyotard 1990). And where the matrix Christian conception of the human, which not only knew itself to be creed-specific, but which had also been one carried by a Church that had been engaged for hundreds of years in Europe itself in the Christianizing conversion of pagan peoples, had compelled its missionaries to engage in transcreedal, transcultural modes of cognition, even where transforming the pagan gods into the satanic figure of their Christian Devil—for the humanists' "Man," overrepresented as the supracultural, super-creedal human itself, this was not possible. Hence the logic by which, for the humanist Sepúlveda, the religious practices of the Aztecs were, so to speak, "crimes against humanity," breaches of the ostensible universally applicable "natural law,"—a law that imposed a by-nature divide between "civilized" peoples (as true generic humans who adhered to its Greco-European cultural construct) and those, like the indigenous peoples of the Americas and the Caribbean, who did not. As such, the New World peoples had to be seen and constructed, increasingly by all Europeans, in neo-Sepúlvedan terms as forms of Human Otherness, if to varying degrees, to a now secularizing West's own. And while a Las Casas, in the context of his struggle against both Mair's and Sepúlveda's

theses, would see, from his own universalist-Christian perspective, that their systemic classifying of the indigenous peoples as "by nature" different from, and inferior to, the Spaniards, and as almost subhuman—that further, their (in his terms) deliberate "slandering" of an entire population, of a "large part of God's Creation" had the directly instrumental purpose of subordinating the peoples whom they slandered in order to expropriate their lands and to reduce them as a population to enserfed encomienda labor (to render them, in Peter Carlo's term, landless and rightless)—this "slandering" was nevertheless not arbitrary.

Instead, it was a constitutive part of the new order of adaptive truth-for that had begun to be put in place with the rise to hegemony of the modern state, based on the new descriptive statement of the human, Man, as primarily a political subject—of, therefore, the West's own self-conception. As a result, seen from a transcultural perspective in the context of the "local cultural field" of a Judeo-Christian/Latin-Christian Europe that was in the process of reinstituting itself as the secular imperial entity, the West, this "slandering" both of Indians and of Negroes can be seen in its precise role and function. That is, as a lawlike part of the systemic representational shift being made out of the order of discourse that had been elaborated on the basis of the Judeo-Christian Spirit/Flesh organizing principle (one in whose logic the premise of nonhomogeneity, articulating its master code of symbolic life and death, had been mapped onto the physical cosmos) to the new rational/irrational organizing principle and master code. And as one whose foundational premise of nonhomogeneity, which was now to be mapped onto a projected, ostensibly divinely created difference of substance between rational humans and irrational animals, would also come to be mapped at another "space of Otherness" level. This level was that of a projected Chain of Being comprised of differential/hierarchical degrees of rationality (and thereby, as shown in the quote from Sepúlveda, of humanity) between different populations, their religions, cultures, forms of life; in other words, their modes of being human. And while the West placed itself at the apex, incorporating the rest (the majority of whom it would come to dominate in terms of their differential degrees of distance from, or nearness to, its now hegemonic, secularizing, and single own), and was to legitimate its relation

of dominance over them all in the terms of its single culture's adaptive truth-for, it was to be the figure of the Negro (i.e., the category comprised by all peoples of Black African hereditary descent) that it was to place at the nadir of its Chain of Being; that is, on a rung of the ladder lower than that of all humans, lower even than that of Sepúlveda's New World homunculi.

While "indios" and "negros," Indians and Negroes, were to be both made into the Caliban-type referents of Human Otherness to the new rational self-conception of the West, there was also, therefore (as Poliakov notes), a marked differential in the degrees of subrationality, and of not-quite-humanness, to which each group was to be relegated within the classificatory logic of the West's ethnocultural field. From the beginning, it would be the "Negroes" who would be consigned to the pre-Darwinian last link in the Chain of Being—to the "missing link" position, therefore, between rational humans and irrational animals. And while the fact that the "Indians" were, by the late 1530s, declared to be de jure, if not altogether de facto, free (and as such vassals of the Crown like the Spaniards, if still secondary "native" ones) at the same time as the "Negroes" would continue to constitute the only outrightly enslaved labor force, and this fact was a partial cause of this differential, there was an additional major and powerful factor. This factor was that of the role that the black skin and somatotype of peoples of African hereditary descent had been made to play, for centuries, in the elaboration of monotheistic Christianity, as well as in all three monotheisms, all of which had been religions instituted by population groups who were white-skinned, or at least, not black-skinned. With the result that the intellectuals of these groups, in developing the symbolic systems of their monotheistic creeds, had come to define these symbols in the terms of their own somatotype norm, in the same way as the Bantu-Congolese had done in developing their polytheistic own. An account of the early seventeenth-century kingdom of the Congo, written by a Spanish Capuchin missionary priest (Father Antonio de Teruel), reveals the above parallel, thereby providing us with a transgenre-of-the-human, transcultural perspective.

The indigenous peoples of the Congo," Teruel wrote, "are all black in color, some more so, some less so. Many are to be seen who are the color of chestnut and some tend to be more olive-colored. But the one who is of the

deepest black in color is held by them to be the most beautiful. Some are born somewhat light-skinned, but as they grow older they become darker and darker. This occurs because their mothers make use of the artifice of an ointment . . . with which they anoint their infants, exposing them once they have been anointed, to the rays of the sun, then leaving them there for long periods, and repeating this action over and over . . ." (Teruel 1663-64; emphasis added)

> Given the fact that a black skin is so highly regarded among them, we Europeans appear ugly in their eyes. As a result, children in those areas, where a white has never been seen before, would become terrified, fleeing in horror from us, no less than our children here are terrified by the sight of a black also fleeing in horror from them. But they do not want us to call them negroes (negros) but Blacks (Prietos); amongst them only slaves are called negroes and thus amongst them it is the same things to say negro as to say slave" (Teruel (1663-1664) Ms. 3533:3574).

Unlike the Bantu-Congolese ethno-specific conception, however, the monotheists had projected their respective creeds as universally applicable ones, defining their God(s) and symbol systems as the only "true" ones. This was to be even more the case with respect to Christianity from the time of the Crusades onwards. With the result that, as the historian Fernández-Armesto noted in his description of the "mental horizons" of Christian Europeans at the time of their fourteenth-century expansion into the Mediterranean, followed by their expansions into the Atlantic, in the terms of those "horizons," Black Africans had been already classified (and for centuries before the Portuguese landing on the shores of Senegal in 1444) in a category "not far removed from the apes, as man made degenerate by sin." And while the roots of this projection had come from a biblical tradition common to all three monotheisms—that is, "that the sons of Ham were cursed with blackness, as well as being condemned to slavery"—in Europe, it had come to be elaborated in terms that were specific to Christianity. In this elaboration, the "diabolical color," black, had become the preferred color for the depiction of "demons" and the signification of "sin"—the signifying

actualization, therefore, of Judeo-Christianity's behavior-programming postulate of "significant ill" to its limit degree. So that as a result, in addition to their being co-classified with apes, who "iconographically . . . signified sin," Black Africans were generally thought in "medieval ape lore," a precursor to the theory of Evolution, to be "degenerate" descendants of "true man" (Fernández-Armesto 1987). Because all of these traditions reinforced each other, the "descendants of Ham" classificatory category that was to be deployed by the Europeans at the popular level, once the Enemies-of-Christ justificatory category had been discarded as legitimation of the mass enslavements of Africans (at the official level of Church doctrine, one of the justifications was also that the latter's physical enslavement was a means of saving their souls), would be inextricably linked to Judeo-Christianity's "formulations of a general order of existence," to its descriptive statement of what it was to be a Christian—to be, therefore, in their own conception, the only possible and universally applicable mode of being human, yet as a mode which nonconsciously carried over, as the referent of "normalcy," their own somatotype norm in the same way as their now purely secular and biocentric transformation of Christian, Man, overrepresented as if its referent were the human, now continues to do, even more totally so.

PART III

From the Iconography of Sin and the Christian Construction of Being to the Iconography of Irrationality and the Colonial Construction of Being: On the Paradox of the Mutation from Supernatural to Natural Causation.

Sepúlveda's classification of the peoples of the Americas as homunculi, who—when contrasted to the Spaniards in terms of prudence and reason (ingenium)—are almost "like monkeys to men," can be seen as transuming, or carrying over, the residual iconography of sin into the formulation of the new postulate of "significant ill" as that of being enslaved to the irrational aspects of one's nature. So that, while the iconic figure of the "ape" is maintained because the earlier matrix ontological distinction between the con-

demned category of peoples enslaved to Original Sin, and the Elect category of those redeemed from this sin has now been recast in the terms of the "by-nature difference" of rationality, the "ape" figure will be deployed in the new terms of a secularizing iconography as the marker of a naturally determined zero degree of irrationality. So that, as the earlier ontological distinction between the Elect-Redeemed and the Condemned (a distinction that had been actualized by the relation between the category of the celibate clergy and that of the non-celibate laity) came to be replaced by the new distinction made between those determined by nature to be the possessors of reason, and those predestined by it to remain enslaved to a lack of such reason, this distinction will be actualized in a new relation. This was the relation, in the Americas and the Caribbean, between the European settlers classified as by nature a people of reason (*gente de razón*) and the non-European population groups "Indians" and "Negroes," classified as "brute peoples without "reason" who were no less naturally determined to be so. It is here, therefore, that the figure of the Negro was now to be transferred, like that of the ape, from the earlier iconography of sin and its postulate of "significant ill" to the new iconography of irrationality, to its new postulate of "significant ill." As a result, where before the "Negro" had been projected, within the terms of the Judeo-Christian imaginary, as the "figure" of the human made degenerate by sin, and therefore supernaturally determined (through the mediation of Noah's curse laid upon the descendants of Ham) to be the nearest of all peoples to the ape, now he/she will be projected as the by-nature determined (i.e., caused) missing link between true (because rational) humans and the irrational figure of the ape. This at the same time as inside Europe, the increasingly interned figure of the Mad would itself come to function, within the terms of the same iconography, as the signifier of the "significant ill" of a threatened enslavement to irrationality in the reoccupied place of the medieval Leper, whose figure, in a parallel way to that of the "Negro," had served as the intra–Christian-European signifier of the then "significant ill" of enslavement to Original Sin.

This alerts us to the dialectic at work in the epochal shift effected by the West from the explanatory model of supernatural causation to that of natural causation. That is, to the fact that it was the same explanatory model that

legitimated the large-scale expropriation and mass enslavement of two peoples on the grounds of a naturally determined difference of rational substance between them and their expropriators and slave masters that had, at the same time, made possible the rise and development of the physical sciences as a new order of human cognition. This meant that the same model that was to initiate the centuries-long degradation of two human groups for the benefit of another such group was to also set in motion the process that would emancipate the "objective set of facts" of the physical level of reality from having to be known in the adaptive truth-for terms in which it had been hitherto known by all human population groups. This had been so known, in exactly the same way as "Indians" and "Negroes" were now going to be "known" by Europeans, as an indispensable function of the mechanisms by means of which, as Godelier points out, all human groups have been enabled to make the fact that it is they/we who are the authors and agents of our own orders opaque to themselves/ourselves. Since they are mechanisms that function to project their/our authorship onto Imaginary supernatural Beings, as well as to represent the latter as being as much the creators of the physical cosmos onto which each order mapped its structuring principles, descriptive statement of the human, and correlated moral laws as they are of the subjects, who ostensibly merely mirror these laws in the organization of their/our own social hierarchies, divisions of labor, and role allocations.

Hence the logic by which, if the Copernican Revolution was to be only made possible by the West's invention of Man outside the terms of the orthodox, "sinful by nature" descriptive statement and theocentric conception of the human, Christian, this was to be only fully effected by the parallel invention/instituting of the new categories that were to serve as the physical referents of Man's Human Other. With the result that the same explanatory model that legitimated the expropriation and internment of the Indians, the mass enslavement of the Negroes, and the internment of the Mad—all ostensibly as living proof of their naturally determined enslavement to irrationality—will also underlie the cognitively emancipatory shift from the explanatory model of supernatural causation to that of natural causation, which made the natural sciences possible. The shift, therefore, from the explanatory principle of Divine Providence and/or retribution, as well as

from that of witchcraft and sorcery, to that of the new principle of laws of nature, of events happening cursus solitus naturae (in the accustomed or ordinary course of nature) as the explanatory model that underlay the scientific revolution, both with respect to the physical sciences and, if more slowly so, to the rise of modern medicine.

However, at the same time as the West initiated the process by means of which the projection of extrahuman causation could no longer be mapped, in good faith, on the physical levels of reality, it would also begin, in the wake of its reinventing of its descriptive statement as that of Man in its first form, to identify as its Imaginary extrahuman Being the figure of "Nature," now represented as the authoritative agent on earth of a God who, having created it, has now begun to recede into the distance. So that as the earlier Spirit/Flesh master code was being relegated to a secondary and increasingly privatized space, the new rational/irrational master code, which was to be the structuring of the rearranged hierarchies of the now centralized political order of the modern state, was being projected upon another "space of Otherness." This was that of the projected hierarchy of a graduated table, or Chain of all forms of sentient life, from those classified as the lowest to those as the highest. It is, therefore, as the new rational/irrational line (drawn between the fundamental ontological distinction of a represented nonhomogeneity between divinely created-to-be-rational humans, on the one hand, and divinely created-to-be irrational animals, on the other) comes to be actualized in the institutionalized differences between European settlers and Indians/Negroes, that the figure of the Negro as the projected missing link between the two sides of the rational/irrational divide will inevitably come to be represented in the first "scientific" taxonomy of human populations, that of Linnaeus, as the population that, in contrast to the European (which is governed by laws), is governed by caprice (Linnaeus 1735). So irrational that it will have to be governed by others.

In consequence, and as Poliakov argues in *The Aryan Myth* (1974), it is the population group classified as "Negro" by the West who would be made to pay the most total psycho-existential price for the West's epochal degodding of both its matrix Judeo-Christian identity and the latter's projection of Otherness. Since, if that process called for the carrying over or transuming

(Bloom 1983) of the monotheistic macro-stereotype of all Black peoples as descendants of Noah's son Ham (whom he had cursed, condemning his descendants to be the servants to the descendants of those of his two other sons, Japhet and Shem), and its reattachment to the new concept of the sub-rational Negro, condemned this time by the malediction of Nature rather than by Noah, this was because, in both cases, that stereotype had become indispensable to the mechanisms by which the Judeo-Christian West enacted its descriptive statement of the human—firstly as Christian, then as its first hybridly religio-secular variant, Man.

This in the same way in which it would remain indispensable to the enacting of the descriptive statement of the now purely secular because bio-centric Darwinian variant of Man: one in which the Human Other malediction or curse, one shared with all the now colonized nonwhite peoples classified as "natives" (but as their extreme nigger form) would be no longer that of Noah or Nature, but of Evolution and Natural Selection. So that whatever the terms of derogatory clichés of which both the native and the "Negro" are the butt, what is clear is that its obsessive "name of what is evil" stereotyping functions as an indispensable part of the Godelier-type mechanism by which the subjects of the West (including those subjects like ourselves whom it has "westernized" and "modernized") are enabled to make opaque to themselves/ourselves (according to the same nature-culture laws by which the subjects of all other human orders have done and do the same) the empirical fact of our ongoing production and reproduction of our order, of its genre of being human, its mode of consciousness or mind, and therefore of the latter's adaptive truth-for. We are, as intellectuals, the agents of its formal elaboration.

The first form of the secularizing, "name of what is evil," stereotyped role of the "Negro" was, however, different from the form it now takes. Poliakov links that first form, and the conceptual imaginative terms it would take, to a shift in the role played by that other major Other figure to the Judeo-Christian identity, the Jew. This shift began with the rise of the modern state in Spain, together with the centralizing of its order, from 1492 onwards. In that year, all Jews who adhered to their religion of Judaism were expelled, while shortly after, the conquered Islamic Moors of southern Spain began to

be forcibly converted to Christianity—both as effects of the goal of "religious unification" that was to be the basis of the monarchical order of Spain. In consequence, Poliakov points out—because a great number of Jews had accepted conversion to Christianity, rather than being expelled—the imposition of a single orthodox faith, that of Christianity, under the aegis of the Inquisition as an agent of the new state had given rise to the problem of the conversos or converts, either Moriscos (Muslim converts) or Marranos (Jewish converts). It was, therefore, in the context of the shift from being a primarily religious subject, for whom the "name of what is evil" was/is that of a common enslavement by all mankind to Original Sin, to that of being a political subject of a state (yet unified on the basis of its Christian creed) that the Other to the norm of this subject was to be the category of the conversos, both Marranos and Moriscos. A specific reprobation was therefore now placed on these two categories: that of their impurity or uncleanness of blood, and also of their faith, because descended from ancestors who had practiced the Jewish and the Islamic creeds.

If, as Harold Bloom notes, cultural fields are kept in being by transumptive chains (Bloom 1982), it was to be the trope of "purity of blood," together with that of its threatening "stain" (itself a "re-troped" form of the matrix negative construct of the "taint" of Original Sin) that, once re-troped as "racial purity," would come to be attached to peoples of Black African hereditary descent. With the result that if the latter would (together with a range of other nonwhite "natives") come to reoccupy the now purely secular place that had been earlier occupied by the Marrano and Morisco, the deep-seated belief in the pollution carried by their "negro blood" would lead to the theme of miscegenation coming to reoccupy the earlier foundational place that the incest had taken in all other human orders (Fox 1983). This at the same time as all members of this population were now to be constructed, discursively and institutionally, as the bottom marker—not now merely on a local scale, such as that of the "clean" Spanish-Christian scale of being, but instead of what was to become, from Sepúlveda onwards, that of a projected universally human scale of being. With this being so, whether in the terms of the Enlightenment's "Nature," or even more totally so in terms of the Darwinian paradigm of Evolution.

What Poliakov reveals here, therefore, is the nonarbitrary and systemic nature of the way in which the range of negatively marked tropes attached to the "figure" of the "Negro" were/are only the contemporary culmination of a process by means of which, beginning early on in the sixteenth century, a projected taxonomy of human population groups had begun to be put in place—one in which the "Negro" had to be, imperatively, at the bottom. Beginning with Peter Martyr's 1516 definition of Indians as "white," as contrasted with "black" Ethiopians, this placing was carried over in the first attempt at "racial classification" by François Bernier in 1684, which also assimilated the Indians to the white race now projected as the normal race. While the parallel systemic construction of the Black as the "abnormal" race can be seen in the generalization of the positive/negative value meanings (common to all European languages) as between mestizo (white/Indian) and mulatto (white/Black). What Poliakov further demonstrates is that, in the same way as the systemic construction of Moriscos and Marranos was an indispensable function of the inscripting and instituting of the norm subject of the Spanish religio-political monarchical state as a "clean" and therefore rational subject (rather than, as before, a subject seeking to be spiritually redeemed), so it is to be with respect to the role of the Black Other in the construction of Europeans as racially "pure," secular subjects. In that, beginning with the West's expansion in the fifteenth century, it would be the Black population group whose discursive and institutional degradation as the new ne plus ultra marker of barely human status (whether in the terms of Man_1 or of Man_2) was to be an indispensable function of the enacting of the descriptive statements by means of which the West was to effect its epochal de-supernaturalization of its matrix mode of being human. As redescriptions, that is, by means of which it would open the frontier onto natural-scientific knowledge, both of the physical and (after Darwin) of the biological levels of reality, at the same time as these redescriptions were to lead directly to the present "Two Cultures" divide of our contemporary order of knowledge.

So that if Darwin's redescription of the human in now purely secular terms, and his deconstruction of the rational/irrational master code mapped on to a projected Chain of Being of all forms of sentient life, was to make possible the rise and development of the biological sciences, on the

one hand—it was, on the other, to provide the "new" ground for this "Two Cultures" organization/order of knowledge. That is, as one whose disciplinary fields were to be all based on the new description of the human as a purely biocentric being, and in whose terms not only the peoples of the Black Diaspora, but this time the peoples of Black Africa itself (as well as their continent, Africa), together with all the colonized dark-skinned "natives" of the world and the darker-skinned and poorer European peoples themselves,[11] were now to find themselves/ourselves as discursively and institutionally imprisoned as the Indians, the Negroes-as-slaves and the Mad had been discursively and institutionally imprisoned in the terms of the descriptive statement of the earlier form of Man_1.

This principle, that of bio-evolutionary Natural Selection, was now to function at the level of the new bourgeois social order as a de facto new Argument-from-Design—one in which while one's selected or dysselected status could not be known in advance, it would come to be verified by one's (or one's group's) success or failure in life. While it was to be in the terms of this new Argument, with its postulate of the no less extrahuman (because bio-evolutionarily determined) ordering of our contemporary social and economic order, that the extreme situation both of the darker-skinned "natives" and of the Black in the West's new conception of the human was, as it still continues to be, both discursively and institutionally constructed. With this construction serving as an indispensable function of the continued production and reproduction of our still hegemonic biocentric and ethnoclass descriptive statement of the human, Man, as the first represented to be a universally applicable "descriptive statement" of the human, because overrepresented as being isomorphic with the being of being human itself—and dependent, for its enactment, on a new "space of Otherness" principle of nonhomogeneity in the reoccupied place of the earlier rational/irrational line. This principle would be embodied in the new line that W. E. B. Dubois was to identify as the Color Line: that is, as a line drawn between the lighter and the darker peoples of the earth, and enforced at the level of social reality by the lawlikely instituted relation of socioeconomic dominance/subordination between them. With this line being as centrally a function of the enacting of our present biocentric, descriptive statement of the human as

(in the medieval order of Latin-Christian Europe) the institutionally and discursively enforced line drawn between the categories of the clergy and the laity had been a central function of the enacting of the then theocentric genre or descriptive statement of the human.

Part IV

From the Degodding of the Descriptive Statement to its De-biologizing, from Natural to Nature-Culture Causation: The Sixties, the Multiple Challenges to "Man," and the Colonial/Native/Negro/Third-World Questions, as the Genre or the Assuming-of-"Man"-to-Be-the-Human Issue.

> What is by common consent called the human sciences have their own drama . . . [A]ll these discoveries, all these inquiries lead only in one direction: to make man admit that he is nothing, absolutely nothing—and that he must put an end to the narcissism on which he relies in order to imagine that he is different from the other "animals." . . . This amounts to nothing more nor less than man's surrender. . . . Having reflected on that, I grasp my narcissism with both hands and I turn my back on the degradation of those who would make man a mere mechanism. . . . And truly what is to be done is to set man free.
>
> —*Frantz Fanon,* Black Skins, White Masks

Here the Argument returns to Margaret Boden's point about the principal metaphysical significance of artificial intelligence (Boden 1977), linking it to Nicholas Humphrey's distinction between the "objective" set of facts "out there" and the way each organism—or (as the Argument's extension of his thesis puts it, each genre-of-the-human)—must lawlikely know its reality primarily with reference to its own adaptively advantageous production/reproduction as such a mode of being. Thus, what the range of anticolonial movements at the level of the global (as well the multiple) social movements internal to the United States and other First-World countries that took place during the fifties and sixties fundamentally revealed was the gap that exists

between our present "mental construction of reality" as one projected from the perspective (and to the adaptive advantage) of our present ethnoclass genre of the human, Man, and its biocentric descriptive statement, and the way our global social reality veridically is out there; that is, outside the viewpoint of ethnoclass Man—of its genre of being, of truth, of freedom—as all three are articulated in the disciplines of our present epistemological order and its biocentric disciplinary discourses. The literary scholar Wlad Godzich first made this point, if in somewhat different terms, when he wrote in 1986 on the great impact of the sociopolitical upheavals of the late fifties and sixties, particularly decolonization and liberation movements. And although most of the new theoretical departures, he would add, were to be quickly reterritorialized and re-coopted back into the mainstream orthodoxies of our present disciplines, the fact is that (as noted earlier) some aspects of this initial impact have remained (Godzich 1980).

That one of the central remaining manifestations of this impact was to be that of feminist studies was due to a fundamental fact. This was that of the way in which while before the sixties, the issues with which women were concerned had been addressed only in the context of the Woman's Question of the Marxist paradigm (as, at that time, the only paradigm concerned with the relation between knowledge and human emancipation), in the wake of the sixties, women activists had ceased their earlier "echoing" of Marxist thought and had redefined the Woman's Question into an issue that was specific to their own concerns, rather than as merely being, as before, a subset of what might be called the Labor Issue. Renaming themselves feminists, they had redescribed their issue as that of gender and sexism, thereby targeting the deconstruction of the social phenomenon of patriarchy as their goal, rather than the mode-of-economic-production target of the Marxian Labor issue. This has not been the case, however, with the issues that before the sixties had been known as the Colonial Question, the "Native" (i.e. nonwhite) and the Negro Question—all of which had been, like the Woman's Question, subsets of the Marxian Labor issue. This in spite of the fact that at the empirical level, it was the multiple movements related to these questions that had most forcibly erupted in concrete political and social struggles all over the globe, as well as internally in the United States.

The Argument proposes, on the basis of the first part of its title, that all of these Questions, ones that in the wake of the attaining of political independence by the former colonies or of the ending of segregation in the United States would come to be labeled instead as the Third-World and "Minority" Questions, now need to be redescribed in the terms of an issue that is specific to them—yet one that has hitherto had no name, seeing that it cannot exist as an "object of knowledge" within the terms of our present order of knowledge any more than, as Foucault points out, biological life could have existed as an object of knowledge in the classical (and in my terms, the pre-bourgeois) episteme. This issue is that of the genre of the human, the issue whose target of abolition is the ongoing collective production of our present ethnoclass mode of being human, Man: above all, its overrepresentation of its well-being as that of the human species as a whole, rather than as it is veridically: that of the Western and westernized (or conversely) global middle classes.

The paradox with which we are confronted here is the following: that in the wake of the intellectual revolution of the Renaissance, as carried out in large part by the lay humanists of the Renaissance on the basis of their revalorized redescription of the human as the rational, political subject, Man—on the basis, as Jacob Pandian points out, of their parallel invention of Man's Human Others—Western intellectuals were to gradually emancipate knowledge of the physical cosmos from having to be known in the adaptive, order-maintaining terms in which it had hitherto been known by means of the rise and development of the physical sciences. This meant that increasingly, and for all human groups, the physical cosmos could no longer come to be validly used for such projections. Instead, the West's new master code of rational/irrational nature was now to be mapped onto a projected Chain of Being of organic forms of life, organized about a line drawn between, on the one hand, divinely created-to-be-rational humans, and on the other, no less divinely created-to-be-irrational animals; that is, on what was still adaptively known through the classical discipline of "natural history" as a still supernaturally determined and created "objective set of facts." This "space of Otherness" line of nonhomogeneity had then functioned to validate the socio-ontological line now drawn between rational, political Man (Prospero,

the settler of European descent) and its irrational Human Others (the categories of Caliban [i.e., the subordinated Indians and the enslaved Negroes]), in exactly the same way as, before Copernicus, the "space of Otherness" projection of a nonhomogeneity of substance between the perfection of the celestial realm and the degradation of the terrestrial had reciprocally bolstered and validated the Spirit/Flesh code as enacted in the ontological value difference between clergy and laity within the terms of Judeo-Christianity's matrix formulation of a "general order of existence." In the same way, therefore, as in the order of knowledge of pre-Newtonian Europe, all knowledge of the astronomy of the universe had had, however technically sophisticated and whatever its predictive power, to remain couched in ethno-astronomical terms, so all pre-Darwinian knowledge of organic life had had to be conceptualized in the terms of a (so to speak) proto- or ethno-biology.

The biological sciences were therefore to come into existence only in the wake of the second act of redescription effected during the nineteenth century by Liberal humanist intellectuals—as a redescription by means of which the still hybridly religio-secular political subject conception of the human, Man (as embodied in Prospero) was redefined as optimally economic Man, at the same time as this Man was redefined by Darwin as a purely biological being whose origin, like that of all other species, was sited in Evolution, with the human therefore existing in a line of pure continuity with all other organic forms of life. A mutation had thereby occurred, in that Darwin, by means of his deconstruction of the Chain of Being that had been earlier mapped onto the rational human/irrational animals line, had begun the emancipation of the human knowledge of the purely biological level of reality from having to be known in genre-specific adaptive terms, thereby giving rise to the biological sciences and to its contemporary, dazzling triumphs—as, for example, the cracking of the DNA code, the Human Genome Project, together with the utopian cum dystopian promises and possibilities of biotechnology.

It can be seen in hindsight that the "space of Otherness" which had been projected both upon the heavens as well as upon organic life, had been a central function of the Godelier-type mechanisms by means of which, as

humans, we keep our own authorship and agency opaque to ourselves, in that the respective codes that had been mapped upon them (i.e., that of Redeemed Spirit/Fallen Flesh, then that of rational nature [redeemed from irrationality] and irrational nature [enslaved to irrationality]) had both played a central analogical status-ordering and thereby system-maintaining role for their respective social systems: firstly, that of Latin-Christian Europe, followed by that of the monarchical (whether absolute or constitutionally limited) order of the landed-gentry West. Analogical in the sense that it was their "space of Otherness" projection that had induced the subjects of both of these orders to both know and experience their societies' respective role allocation, social hierarchies, divisions of labor, and ratio-proportional distribution of their goods and their bads as being supernaturally preordained—as, in their respective ethno-knowledges, both the projected difference of ontological substance between heaven and earth (Spirit/Flesh) in the first case, and in the second, that between rational humans and irrational animals, had been divinely created to be. With the status-ordering principles generated from their respective codes—one based on ostensibly differential degrees of enslavement to sin/redemption from sin, the other on ostensibly differential degrees of rational nature/enslavement to irrational nature—thereby inducing the subjects of these orders to experience their own placement in the structuring hierarchies of the order as having been extrahumanly (in these two cases supernaturally) designed and/or determined, rather than as veridically or systemically produced by our collective human agency.

The Argument proposes that the new master code of the bourgeoisie and of its ethnoclass conception of the human—that is, the code of selected by Evolution/dysselected by Evolution—was now to be mapped and anchored on the only available "objective set of facts" that remained. This was the set of environmentally, climatically determined phenotypical differences between human hereditary variations as these had developed in the wake of the human diaspora both across and out of the continent of Africa; that is, as a set of (so to speak) totemic differences, which were now harnessed to the task of projecting the Color Line drawn institutionally and discursively between whites/nonwhites—and at its most extreme between

the Caucasoid physiognomy (as symbolic life, the name of what is good, the idea that some humans can be selected by Evolution) and the Negroid physiognomy (as symbolic death, the "name of what is evil," the idea that some humans can be dysselected by Evolution)—as the new extrahuman line, or projection of genetic nonhomogeneity that would now be made to function, analogically, as the status-ordering principle based upon ostensibly differential degrees of evolutionary selectedness/eugenicity and/or dysselectedness/dysgenicity. Differential degrees, as between the classes (middle and lower and, by extrapolation, between capital and labor) as well as between men and women, and between the heterosexual and homosexual erotic preference—and, even more centrally, as between Breadwinner (job-holding middle and working classes) and the jobless and criminalized Poor, with this rearticulated at the global level as between Sartre's "Men" and Natives (see his guide-quote), before the end of politico-military colonialism, then postcolonially as between the "developed" First World, on the one hand, and the "underdeveloped" Third and Fourth Worlds on the other. The Color Line was now projected as the new "space of Otherness" principle of nonhomogeneity, made to reoccupy the earlier places of the motion-filled heavens/non-moving Earth, rational humans/irrational animal lines, and to recode in new terms their ostensible extrahumanly determined differences of ontological substance. While, if the earlier two had been indispensable to the production and reproduction of their respective genres of being human, of their descriptive statements (i.e., as Christian and as Man_1), and of the overall order in whose field of interrelationships, social hierarchies, system of role allocations, and divisions of labors each such genre of the human could alone realize itself—and with each such descriptive statement therefore being rigorously conserved by the "learning system" and order of knowledge as articulated in the institutional structure of each order—this was to be no less the case with respect to the projected "space of Otherness" of the Color Line. With respect, that is, to its indispensability to the production and reproduction of our present genre of the human Man_2, together with the overall global/national bourgeois order of things and its specific mode of economic production, alone able to provide the material conditions of existence for the production and reproduction of the

ethnoclass or Western-bourgeois answer that we now give to the question of the who and what we are.

It is in this context that the Negro, the Native, the Colonial Questions, and postcolonially the "Underdeveloped" or Third/Fourth-Worlds Question can be clearly seen to be the issue, not of our present mode of economic production, but rather of the ongoing production and reproduction of this answer—that is, our present biocentric ethnoclass genre of the human, of which our present techno-industrial, capitalist mode of production is an indispensable and irreplaceable, but only a proximate function. With this genre of the human being one in the terms of whose dually biogenetic and economic notions of freedom both the peoples of African hereditary descent and the peoples who comprise the damned archipelagoes of the Poor, the jobless the homeless, the "underdeveloped" must lawlikely be sacrificed as a function of our continuing to project our collective authorship of our contemporary order onto the imagined agency of Evolution and Natural Selection and, by extrapolation, onto the "Invisible Hand" of the "Free Market" (both being cultural and class-specific constructs).

The challenge to be confronted at this conjuncture is this: While from the Renaissance onwards, Western intellectuals have, by means of the development of the natural sciences, enabled us to obtain nonadaptive knowledge of our nonhuman levels of reality, we have hitherto had no such parallel knowledge with respect to ourselves and the nature-culture laws that govern our modes of being, of behaving, of mind, or of minding. The buck for such knowledge (one able to open up a new frontier of nonadaptive human self-cognition, and therefore the possibility of our nonheteronomously and now consciously ordered/motivated behaviors, beyond the ethnoclass limits of our contemporary ones) stops with us. While the prescriptive guidelines of how we are to set about this challenge lie in the paradox of the new Darwinian descriptive statement of the human: Man in its second, purely secular, biocentric, and overrepresented modality of being human. What then had been the contradiction at the heart of the Darwinian Revolution, at the core of its paradigm of Evolution that was to give rise to, on the one hand, the continuing dazzling successes of the biological sciences and, on the other, not only to the obsessive ethno-biological beliefs in the genetic

inferiority of nonwhite natives, in the barely evolved near-primate status of black-skinned peoples (as matrix beliefs that would logically make possible the "life unworthy of life" extermination credo of the Nazis), but also at the same time to C. P. Snow's "Two Cultures" division of knowledge? That is, to the natural-scientific disciplines on the one hand, and to the rigorous yet adaptive, and therefore ethno-disciplines of the humanities and social sciences on the other?

Although Foucault, in his analysis of the processes by means of which the classical episteme was replaced by our own, had proposed that these epistemes be seen as being discontinuous with each other, what he oversaw was that such a discontinuity, like the earlier discontinuity that had been effected by the classical episteme itself, was taking place in the terms of a continuous cultural field, one instituted by the matrix Judeo-Christian formulation of a general order of existence. That, therefore, these shifts in epistemes were not only shifts with respect to each episteme's specific order of knowledge/truth, but were also shifts in what can now be identified as the "politics of being"; that is, as a politics that is everywhere fought over what is to be the descriptive statement, the governing sociogenic principle, instituting of each genre of the human. With the result that as Christian becomes Man_1 (as political subject), then as Man_1 becomes Man_2 (as a bio-economic subject), from the end of the eighteenth century onwards, each of these new descriptive statements will nevertheless remain inscribed within the framework of a specific secularizing reformulation of that matrix Judeo-Christian Grand Narrative. With this coming to mean that, in both cases, their epistemes will be, like their respective genres of being human, both discontinuous and continuous.

This was the fact that Jacob Pandian brought to our attention when he noted that the Untrue Christian Self as the Other to the True Christian Self of the Judeo-Christian conception was to be re-inscripted, from the sixteenth century onwards, as the new Untrue Human Others to the "true" human that is Man, in its two forms. Firstly as subrational Indian, Negro Others to Man_1, then, secondly, as native and nigger Others to Man_2. It is with this proposal that he also provides the answer to the why of the imperative signifying role that will continue to be placed by the secular West upon

what seems to its subjects, from the perspective of their somatic norm, to be the alien features of the Negroid physiognomy. The answer also as to the why the negative connotations that will continue to be placed on it should, while now effected in purely biologized terms, still carry over, if in new post-sixties terms, the "undeserving" "name of what is evil" ordering principle that still reenacts the matrix stigma that had been placed by medieval Christianity on the Negroid physiognomy (Gans 1999). With the consequence that because now made to embody and actualize the example of the human, not now as fallen to the status of the ape, but rather as barely evolved from it (and, as such, an undeserving race because dysselected-by-Evolution within the logic of the Darwinian paradigm), it was now not only the peoples of the Black ex-slave Diaspora, but all the peoples of Black Africa who would be also compelled to confront the inescapable fact (one attested to by the infamous 41-bullet shooting death of Amadou Diallo) that, as put succinctly by Frantz Fanon, "wherever he[/she] goes in the world, the Negro remains a Negro" (Fanon 1967)—and, as such, made to reoccupy the signifying place of medieval/Latin-Christian Europe's fallen, degraded, and thereby nonmoving Earth.

The Argument here redefines Marx's class struggle in the terms of a "politics of being": that is, one waged over what is to be the descriptive statement of the human, about whose master code of symbolic life and death each human order organizes itself. It then proposes that it was precisely because of the above political dynamic—which underpinned the Darwinian Revolution, making it possible—that it was also compelled to function as a half-scientific, half-mythic theory of origins, at least as it had to do with the human. Since it was to be in the context of the political struggle for hegemony that was being waged by a then increasingly wealthy but non-landed bourgeoisie against the established ruling elite of the landed gentry elite that Darwin would be impelled to put forward a new theory with respect to the origin of all species, including the human species (one able to move outside the terms of the "Argument from Divine Design"), that had functioned to legitimate both the ruling status of the landed gentry and the order of knowledge of the classical episteme, and that had provided the mode of adaptive truth-for indispensable to the legitimation of the ruling gentry's hegemony.

It was in order to deconstruct the "Argument from Divine Design" that Darwin was to put forward his brilliantly innovative new paradigm that would lead to the rise and development of the biological sciences, at the same time as it would also elaborate a new origin narrative in place of Genesis (Isaacs 1983).

Blumenberg reveals the central role that will be played in this reformulation by the clergyman-economist Thomas Malthus (Blumenberg 1983). This is the new form of the "absence of order" that Malthus will elaborate in his 1798 *Essay on the Principle of Population*. For Malthus, it is the "autonomous lawfulness of population growth," projected as a "universal law of life," which predetermines a new modality of the "absence of order": this time, the ostensibly fundamental contradiction posed by the fact that men's increase in numbers is a geometric progression, whereas the increase in the quantity of food can only be an arithmetical progression. With the result that given the widening gap between the two progressions, the law of self-regulation that follows logically calls for the state's noninterference with the ostensibly extrahuman regulatory effect of the supposed "law of nature"—a law that also calls for the category of the Poor to be left by themselves, unaided by any measures taken by the state, in order that its members can be weeded out by the "iron laws" of nature. What Malthus puts in place, therefore, is the second transumed reformulation of the matrix Judeo-Christian formulation. Enslavement here is no longer to Original Sin, or to one's irrational nature—with, in the case of the latter, the threat or "significant ill" of the political state falling into the chaos and nonpredictability of a state-of-nature. Rather, enslavement is now to the threat of Malthusian overpopulation, to its concomitant "ill" of Natural Scarcity whose imperative "plan of salvation" would now be postulated in economic terms as that of keeping this at bay—of material, in the place of the matrix spiritual, Redemption.

The above reformulations were all part of the then intellectuals' struggle to redescribe both the human, and its human activity, outside the terms of the description of the human on whose basis the owners of landed wealth had based their hegemony. What is usually overlooked, however, is that their redescription will be one that carried in its turn a new descriptive statement

able to legitimate the rise to hegemony of the non-landed, capital-owning bourgeoisie as the new ruling elite. While it will be in the lineaments of the new criteria defining of Man_2, in the terms of this new descriptive statement, that the lineaments of its negative Human Others are also already outlined. Seeing that if at one level Man_2 is now defined as a jobholding Breadwinner, and even more optimally, as a successful "masterer of Natural Scarcity" (Investor, or capital accumulator), what might be called the archipelago of its modes of Human Otherness can no longer be defined in the terms of the interned Mad, the interned "Indian," the enslaved "Negro" in which it had been earlier defined. Instead, the new descriptive statement of the human will call for its archipelago of Human Otherness to be peopled by a new category, one now comprised of the jobless, the homeless, the Poor, the systemically made jobless and criminalized—of the "underdeveloped"—all as the category of the economically damnés (Fanon 1963), rather than, as before, of the politically condemned. With the result that if inside Europe, it will be the Poor who will be made to reoccupy the earlier proscribed interned places of the Leper and the Mad, in the Euro-Americas, it is the freed Negro, together with the Indians interned in reservations, or as peons on haciendas, who will now be interned in the new institution of Poverty/Joblessness.

That is, in an institution now made to actualize the idea of the human overcome by Natural Scarcity, and therefore in the process of being swept away by Malthus's "iron laws of nature," because unable, as the regular jobholding Breadwinners and Investors are so clearly able to do, to master the "ill" of this scarcity. This at the same time, as Fanon shows in *The Wretched of the Earth*, as the "native" rural agro-proletariat interned in colonial institutions would be made to actualize the category most totally condemned to poverty and joblessness, ostensibly because of the represented bio-evolutionarily determined incapacity of its members to do otherwise. Since, like the medieval Leper, whose proscribed role had called for him/her to actualize the realization of the effects of mankind's enslavement to Original Sin, so this new archipelago of Otherness will be made to signify the realization of the new reformulation's posited "absence of order," or postulate of "significant ill," defined now in economic terms. And "curable," therefore, only in economic terms.

What can be seen as at work here is the positive aspect of the political project that, however nonconsciously so, drove Darwin's intellectual enterprise. In that it is going to be in the wider context of the intellectual revolution of Liberal or economic (rather than civic) political humanism that is being brought in from the end of the eighteenth century onwards by the intellectuals of the bourgeoisie, together with their redefinition of Man_1 in the purely secular and now biocentric terms of Man_2 that these new sciences are going to be made possible. Since the new genre of being human, in its now purely degodded conception, is one that no longer needs to know the world of organic life in the ostensibly supernaturally ordered, adaptive truth-for terms in which it had to be known by the subject-bearers of Man_1—as it had been known, therefore, in the terms of Foucault's classical episteme, with these terms serving to validate the hegemony of the owners of landed rather than of moveable wealth, or capital. Yet it is also in the terms of this specific political project that the fundamental paradox of the Darwinian Revolution emerges, one that links the imperatively secured bottom role of the Black Diaspora peoples—as well as the systemic expendability of the global Poor, of the jobless, the homeless, the underdeveloped—to the issue raised earlier with respect to the imperative "Two Culture" organization of our present order of knowledge.

To sum up: it is in this context that a new principle of nonhomogeneity, that of Dubois's Color Line in its white/nonwhite, Men/Natives form (i.e., as drawn between the lighter and the darker races), will now be discursively and institutionally deployed as a "space of Otherness" on which to project an imagined and extrahumanly (because ostensibly bio-evolutionarily) determined nonhomogeneity of genetic substance between the category of those selected-by-Evolution and the category of those dysselected-by-Evolution. The Color (cum Colonial) Line would, therefore, be made to reoccupy the places earlier occupied by the Heaven/Earth, supralunar/sublunar, and by the rational humans/irrational animals premises of nonhomogeneity in order to enable the selected/dysselected, and thus deserving/undeserving status organizing principle that it encoded to function for the nation-state as well as the imperial orders of the Western bourgeoisie, in the same way as Jacques Le Goff documents the enslaved to the flesh/Redeemed-in-the-

Spirit, deserving/undeserving status-organizing principle had functioned for the ecclesiastical-cum-medieval aristocratic order of Latin-Christian Europe (Le Goff 1988). So that where the ranking rule of superiority/inferiority accepted and internalized by all the subjects of the medieval order of Europe had been that of differential degrees of redemption from enslavement to the Fallen Flesh, degrees therefore of religious merit (with the "learned" scholars of the order, as Le Goff points out, obsessively priding themselves on their ability to keep themselves chaste and sexually continent on feast days, at the same time as they stigmatized the peasants as people who, unlike them, gave in to their lustful and carnal desires, thereby falling to the level of beasts [Le Goff 1988]), in the case of the bourgeoisie, the ranking rule would be a transumed form of the first. As such, therefore, it would come to be based on degrees of selected genetic merit (or eugenics) versus differential degrees of the dysselected lack of this merit: differential degrees of, to use the term made famous by *The Bell Curve*, "dysgenicity."

It is this new master code, one that would now come to function at all levels of the social order—including that of class, gender, sexual orientation, superior/inferior ethnicities, and that of the Investor/Breadwinners versus the criminalized jobless Poor (Nas's "black and latino faces") and Welfare Moms antithesis, and most totally between the represented-to-be superior and inferior races and cultures—that would come to function as the dually status-organizing and integrating principle of U.S. society. So that if, before the sixties, the enforced segregation of the Black population in the South as the liminally deviant category of Otherness through whose systemic negation the former Civil War enemies of North and South, together with the vast wave of incoming immigrants from Europe, would be enabled to experience themselves as a We (that is, by means of the shared similarity of their now-canonized "whiteness"), in addition, their segregated status had served another central function. This had been that of enabling a U.S. bourgeoisie, rapidly growing more affluent, to dampen class conflict by inducing their own working class to see themselves, even where not selected by Evolution in class terms, as being compensatorily, altruistically bonded with their dominant middle classes by the fact of their having all been selected by Evolution in terms of race.

For this vicarious compensation had been (and still is) urgently necessary, given the degree of psychic devastation wrought on the non-middle-class groups by the terms of the new degodded redescription of the human in the context of the Darwinian/Malthusian reformulation of the original Judeo-Christian formulation. This was so in that in the terms of their new behavior programming schema, in whose "dysselected by Evolution until proven otherwise" criterion (i.e., guilty until proven innocent) the individual could not know if s/he had indeed been so selected except by attaining to the optimal status of being a middle class Breadwinner and/or successful Entrepreneur/Investor, to not be middle class was/is to have to accept one's ostensible dysselection. This premise had induced in the white, blue-collar (non-middle) working classes' status a deeply destructive form of self-hatred, whose corrosive force could only be assuaged by institutionalized mechanisms, whether those of the school curricula as noted by Carter G. Woodson in 1933, or that of outright segregation of (as well as of multiple other forms of discrimination against) the Black U. S. population group. Seeing that it was and is only such mechanisms that can enable the white, blue-collar working classes, as well as the white poor, to experience themselves as having been selected, although not in class terms, at least as members, together with their bourgeoisie, of the highly selected and thus highly "deserving" white race. With this being so proved, ostensibly, by the fact of the empirical dominance and supremacy of whites as a group over all other nonwhite races and, most totally, over their "racial" anti-type Other, the Black American—as the group whose Negroid physiognomy and origin continent/Africa prove them, within the terms of the Darwinian Imaginary, to belong to the category of humans most totally of all peoples dysselected-by-Evolution. The bottommost role of Black Americans in the United States is systemically produced, since it is the ostensible proof of their alleged dysselected "undeservingness" that then functions as the central psychic compensatory mechanism for the white working class, at the same time as this mechanism induces them to continue to see/experience themselves as also being, in terms of class, "dysselected by Evolution"—a perception that induces them to accept their own class-subordinated status, as well as the hegemony of their middle classes.

The Negroid physiognomy and its continent of origin, Black Africa, together with the dark-skinned poorer peoples assimilated to its category have been made to function within the terms of our present biocentric conception of the human, as well as of its related "formulation of a general order of existence" (whose postulate of "significant ill" is that of a dual mode of Natural Scarcity—that is, a scarcity of fully genetically selected human beings, on the one hand, and of material resources on the other), as the actualized embodiment, no longer of the human made degenerate by sin and therefore fallen to the status of the apes, but of the human totally dysselected, barely evolved, and as such intermediate between "true" humans and the primates. As such, the marker of that most totally dysselected-by-Evolution mode of non-being that each individual and group must strive to avoid, struggle to prove that they themselves are not, if they are to be.

A parallel and interlinked role is also played by the category of the Poor, the jobless, the homeless, the "underdeveloped," all of whom, interned in their systemically produced poverty and expendability, are now made to function in the reoccupied place of the Leper of the medieval order and of the Mad of the monarchical, so as to actualize at the economic level the same dysgenic or dysselected-by-Evolution conception. With the post-Sixties' reordering of society, "Negroid" physiognomy and skin color will be made to coalesce with the inner city status of poverty and joblessness, crime, and drugs. They will do so together with those brown Latino faces assimilated to its status as this status, a new Liminal category, enables the incorporation of the socially mobile Black middle class into the normative order of things, if still at a secondary level. The metaphysical dread of this "Negroid" presence by the "normal" subjects of the order will lead logically to Nas Escobar's "taxpayers" being eager to pay for more jails for Black and Latin faces; eager to see poor women taken off welfare and kept "out of plain sight." Since here, again, it is not as men, women, and children that they are being condemned. It is as "the name of what is evil."

Here, the dimensions of the fundamental paradox that lies at the core of the Darwinian answer to the question of who we are (when seen from the perspective of the goal of unsettling our present coloniality of power, of being) emerges. The paradox is this: that for the "descriptive statement" that

defines the human as purely biological being on the model of a natural organism (thereby projecting it as preexisting the narratively inscribed "descriptive statement" in whose terms it inscripts itself and is reciprocally inscripted, as if it were a purely biological being, ontogeny that preexists culture, sociogeny), it must ensure the functioning of strategic mechanisms that can repress all knowledge of the fact that its biocentric descriptive statement is a descriptive statement. Yet that such strategic, Godelier-type mechanisms of occultation, repressing recognition that our present descriptive statement of the human is a descriptive statement, are able to function at all (if outside our conscious awareness) is itself directly due to the fact that, as Terrence W. Deacon points out in his 1997 book *The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and the Brain*, humans have been pre-adapted, primarily through the co-evolution of language and the brain, to be a symbolic and, therefore, a self-representing species.

In consequence, if it was the functioning of these symbolic, representational, behavior-motivating/demotivating processes as it has to do with the stigmatizing portrayal of women as intellectually inferior, made by "angry male professors," that Virginia Woolf had brilliantly zeroed in on (in her essay *A Room of One's Own*), it was also this same "representational process," as expressed in the curriculum and order of knowledge of the United States, that the Black American educator Carter G. Woodson was to identify in his 1933 *Miseducation of the Negro* as functioning in a parallel manner as a behavior-motivating/demotivating mechanism. This, seeing that, as he pointed out, the curriculum's systemic canonization/positive marking of all things European and Euro-American, and no less systemic stigmatization/negative marking of all things African/Afro-American clearly had an extracognitive function. This function was one that, by motivating whites (by representing their ancestors as having done everything worthwhile doing), and as lawlikely demotivating Blacks (by representing theirs as having done nothing), ensured the stable reproduction of the U.S. order that called for the white population group as a whole to be at the apex of the social order, and for the Black population group to be at the bottom (Woodson 1933). With this thereby "verifying," by its systemic production of the constant of the 15 percent school achievement gap between white and

Black students, the selected-by-Evolution status of the one, the dysselected-by-Evolution nature of the other, and thereby the principle of nonhomogeneity that is mapped upon the "space of Otherness" of the Color Line in its most total white/Black forms. As the line from which the status-ordering principle, based upon differential degrees of selectedness/dysselectedness and functioning at all levels of the order, is transformatively generated, thereby enabling the subjects of our orders to continue to experience it as the realization of a true, because ostensibly extrahumanly determined, order.

If we see both Woolf's and Woodson's insights as insights into the workings of the symbolic representation processes instituting of our present genre of the human, Man, and therefore as insights into the necessarily adaptive truth-for nature of the overall system of knowledge that is enacting of these processes, then the following linkages can be made. Linkages not only to Aimé Césaire's recognition of the same "demotivating" processes at work in ensuring the subordination of the decolonized in his *Discourse on Colonialism* (1960), but also to the multiple challenges mounted during the sixties—both at the global level by anticolonial activists and by activists in Europe, and then in the United States by Blacks and a range of other nonwhite groups, together with feminists and Gay Liberationists—with all calling in question the systemic nature of their negative markings as nongeneric or abnormal Others to a series of positively marked generic norms. If this same overall representation process was to be followed up post-sixties by Edward Said's more in-depth elaboration of Césaire's thesis with respect to Orientalism, the same linkage can also be made several centuries backward to Las Casas's profound challenges to what he called the "slandering" of the indigenous peoples as a function of the legitimating not only of the expropriation of their lands, but also of their expulsion, as "such a large part of God's creation," from human status. Since what joins all of these challenges, from that of Las Casas to all those of our contemporary order, is, the Argument proposes, their profound challenge to the overrepresentation of Man, in both of its variants: to, thereby, the coloniality of being, power, truth, freedom to which such an overrepresentation leads.

If Fanon, from the standpoint of a "native colonized" and Black Human Other (i.e., as the standpoint of groups, prohibited—most totally so the lat-

ter—from realizing themselves as fully human within the terms of our present ethnoclass genre of the human), was to put forward the conception of modes of sociogeny (of each genre-specific governing sociogenic principle, descriptive statement, or code of symbolic life/death) as a new object of knowledge, which itself functions in a "space of transculture," as a space from which to define the human outside the terms of any one member of the class of such principles, statements and codes, he had thereby laid the basis for a fundamental recognition on our part. A recognition in which we can come to see ourselves as a contemporary, increasingly westernized (in the terms of Man) population, who, as in the case of all other genre-specific human populations, inscript and auto-institute ourselves as human through symbolic, representational processes that have, hitherto, included those mechanisms of occultation by means of which we have been able to make opaque to ourselves the fact that we so do. While it was a parallel recognition that some half a century ago led Aimé Césaire (because coming from the same standpoint of liminal deviance to our present ethnoclass norm of being human as did Fanon) to put forward his cognitively emancipatory proposal for a new science able to complete the natural sciences.

The natural sciences (Césaire had argued in a talk given in Haiti, entitled "Poetry and Knowledge") are, in spite of all their dazzling triumphs with respect to knowledge of the natural world, half-starved. They are half-starved because they remain incapable of giving us any knowledge of our uniquely human domain, and have had nothing to say to the urgent problems that beleaguer humankind. Only the elaboration of a new science, beyond the limits of the natural sciences (he had then proposed), will offer us our last chance to avoid the large-scale dilemmas that we must now confront as a species. This would be a science in which the "study of the Word"—of our narratively inscribed, governing sociogenic principles, descriptive statement, or code of symbolic life/death, together with the overall symbolic, representational processes to which they give rise—will condition the "study of nature" (Césaire 1946, 1990). The latter as study, therefore (the Argument proposes), of the neurophysiological circuits/mechanisms of the brain that, when activated by the semantic system of each such principle/statement, lead to the specific orders of consciousness or modes of mind in whose

terms we then come to experience ourselves as this or that genre/mode of being human. Yet, with this process taking place hitherto outside our conscious awareness, and thereby leading us to be governed by the "imagined ends" or postulates of being, truth, freedom that we lawlikely put and keep in place, without realizing that it is we ourselves, and not extrahuman entities, who prescribe them.

In his introduction to Fanon's *Les damnés de la terre* (The Wretched of the Earth), J. P. Sartre zeroed in on the parallel dilemma of "colonized" native intellectuals who find themselves/ourselves in a situation in which the Man/Native dichotomy can be seen as an exact parallel of the clergy/laity dichotomy as it existed towards the end of the Middle Ages. Like the clergy intellectuals then, now it is the intellectuals of Man who "own the Word," while, like the pre-Renaissance lay intellectuals, it is the "native" intellectuals (and postcolonially speaking, the intellectuals of the subordinated and economically impoverished world) who now have only the use of Man's Word, who therefore can only "echo." That is, who must think, write, and prescribe policies, however oppositionally so, in the terms of the very biocentric paradigms that prescribe the subordination and impoverishment of the vast majority of the worlds to which they/we belong; since paradigms elaborated in the very terms of the descriptive statement of the human, in whose logic the non-Western, nonwhite peoples can only, at best, be assimilated as honorary humans (as in the case of the "developed" Japanese and other lighter-skinned Asians) and, at the worst, must (as in the case of Nas's "black and 1atino faces") forcibly be proscribed from human status by means of the rapidly expanding U.S. prison-industrial system; as itself, a central mechanism of the overall archipelagoes of the poverty-producing institutions of the Third and Fourth Worlds, archipelagoes that are the major costs paid for the ongoing production, realization, and reproduction of our present ethnoclass genre of the human, of its overrepresentation as if it were isomorphic with the human, its well being, and notion of freedom, with those that would have to be brought into existence, were the well-being of the human to be made into the referent imperative.

If, as Sartre saw so clearly in the case of Fanon, "native" intellectuals had ceased echoing and had begun opening their mouths for themselves in

response to a parallel "phase of objectification," a hardening insulation from what is human that is increasingly made evident by the ossification of our present order of knowledge and its biocentric paradigms, so Fanon's "self-assertion," his concentration on finding the lost motives, related no longer to Man's but to our human self-interest, was to be effected by means of a redescription parallel to that by means of which the lay humanists had invented Man and its Human Others in the reoccupied place of the Christian genre of the human and its pagan/idolator/Enemies-of-Christ/Christ-killer/infidel Others. Nevertheless, while these lay humanist intellectuals had indeed effected a redescriptive statement by means of which they secularized human existence, detaching it from the supernatural agency of the divine realm, they had done so only by opening the pathway that would eventually lead, with Darwin, to a new descriptive statement, itself re-anchored in the no less extrahuman agency of Evolution, thereby reducing the human within the terms of a biocentric "human sciences" paradigm to being a "mere mechanism" driven in its behavior by its genetic programs—and, as such, subject to the processes of natural causation, rather than to the ontogeny/sociogeny or nature-culture modality of causation, which alone could enable (as Fanon brilliantly glimpsed) the reflexively self-aversive behavior of many westernized Black peoples, made into the Other to our present ethnoclass norm of being human, to repress the genetic instinctual narcissism defining of all modes of purely organic life. And what Fanon's new answer to the question of who/what we are (its revalorizing "descriptive statement" detached now from any form of extrahuman agency or authorship, theocentric or biocentric) enables us to come to grips with is precisely such a new mode of causation, thereby, with the still-to-be-explained puzzle of (human) consciousness(es), doing so outside the terms of our present "Two Culture" order of knowledge and its adaptive "regime of truth" based on the biocentric disciplinary paradigms in whose terms we at present know our social reality; this, as the indispensable condition of our continuing to assume that the mode of being in which we now are (have socialized/inscripted ourselves to be) is isomorphic with the being of being human itself, in its multiple self-inscripting, auto-instituting modalities.

If Césaire called in 1946 for a new science of the Word, a science therefore of our dual descriptive statements and thereby of our modes/genres of being human, doing so from the perspective of a poet—in 1988, the physicist Hans Pagel would make a parallel call in his 1988 book *The Dream of Reason: The Computer and the Rise of the Sciences of Complexity*. His call, too, was for a new frontier to be opened onto a nonadaptive mode of human self-cognition: onto the possibility, therefore, of our fully realized autonomy of feelings, thoughts, behaviors.

The true leap, Fanon wrote at the end of his *Black Skins, White Masks*, consists in introducing invention into existence. The buck stops with us.

NOTES

1. The epigraphs placed at the beginning of select sections are intended to serve as guide-quotes, or as Heideggerian guideposts (Heidegger 1998), to orient the reader as the Argument struggles to think/articulate itself outside the terms of the disciplinary discourses of our present epistemological order; seeing that it is these discourses, this order, that are necessarily—as the condition of our being in the genre/mode of being human that we now hegemonically are—instituting/inscripting both of the Man of the Argument's title, and of its overrepresentation as if it were the human.
2. The series of papers presented/made available by Aníbal Quijano at the 1999 and 2000 conferences held by the Coloniality Working Group at SUNY-Binghamton are central to the formulations of this Argument (see References).
3. The same holds for the two papers presented by Walter Mignolo at both of these conferences (see References), as well as for his book *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges and Border Thinking* (2000).
4. The divide is not only economic, but also behavioral. Where the subjects of the techno-industrial North are hegemonically oriented in their behaviors by the contemporary secular metaphysics of productivity and profitability, the subjects of the South, while drawn into the margins as satellite spheres of the techno-industrial North, are still partly oriented in their behaviors by the largely religious, traditional metaphysics of reproductivity/fertility that had been instituting of the agrarian revolution. The problem of the environment, of global warming, etc., is directly due to the convergence of these two metaphysics and the way in which both continue to impel our collective behaviors outside of our conscious awareness.

5. Cited by Frantz Fanon as epigraph to his *Peau Noire, Masques Blancs* (Black Skins, White Masks) 1967.
6. Las Casas's reply to Ginés de Sepúlveda on the occasion of the 1660–61 debate at Valladolid, Spain, as to whether or not the New World Indians were equally "men" (Las Casas) or "slaves-by-nature" (Sepúlveda).
7. The Cenú Indians' reply to the Spaniards' "local culture" conception of the legitimacy of the Papal Bull of 1492 as one that "gave" the New World to Spain, as cited by Greenblatt (1974).
8. In his presentation to the 2000 Conference of the Coloniality Working Group, now included in this volume, Kelvin Santiago-Valles documented these socio-existential, political, and commercial-economic processes, even where he represents the latter as the determinant forces driving the transformation (see References), as distinct from Kurt Hubner's concept of an interacting overall system-ensemble transformation (Hubner 1983), the key to which, the Argument proposes, is the redescription of the descriptive statement of the public operational identity of Christian as that of Man overrepresented as the generic human; the redescription also, therefore, of the Christian Others—i.e., pagan-idolators, infidels, Enemies-of-Christ, as Human Others (i.e., Indians, Negroes).
9. As Quijano perceptively sees, the contemporary focus on Orientalism that deals with the stigmatization of Islam, as an alternative imperial monotheistic order to that of the West, has completely and strategically displaced the far more totally exclusionary system of stigmatization placed upon Indians and Negroes (see his Qué tal Raza!).
10. Peter Carlo raises this issue—that of the role of discursive formations in the ongoing processes of accumulation by which the "proletariats" are produced as rightless and landless—in his presentation at the 1999 Conference of the Coloniality Working Group (see References).
11. Ibid.

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